Ash'arism meets Avicennism : Sayf al-Din al-Amidi's doctrine of creation by Hassan, Laura
Hassan, Laura (2017) Ash'arism meets Avicennism : Sayf al‐Din al‐Amidi's doctrine of creation. PhD thesis. SOAS 
University of London. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26654 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 
thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination.
	 1	
 
 
 
 
Ash‘arism meets Avicennism:  
Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī’s  
Doctrine of Creation 
 
Laura Hassan 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD  
2017 
 
 
 
 
Department of the Near and Middle East 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
University of London 
	 2	
 
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis 
 
I have read and understood Regulation 21 of the General and Admissions Regulations for students 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London concerning plagiarism. I 
undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been 
written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or 
paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly 
acknowledged in the work which I present for examination. 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________  Date: _________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 3	
Abstract 
It is now broadly recognised that, far from extinguishing the tradition of falsafa in the Islamic 
world, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), in his thoroughgoing critique of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, actually 
inaugurated an era of greater interaction between falsafa and kalām. Indeed, post-Avicennan 
Ash‘arism was profoundly influenced by the legacy of Avicennism. Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī             
(d. 631/1233) is one post-Avicennan Ash‘arī versed in both traditions whose works represent 
their convergence. Primarily known for his jurisprudence, al-Āmidī’s theological and 
philosophical works have not received due attention. This thesis takes the issue of the world’s 
creation – traditionally a site of contention between Muslim philosophers and theologians – 
and considers how al-Āmidī’s thought reflects the confluence of his influences. 
It is argued that the philosophers’ and theologians’ respective doctrines of creations are 
embedded in contrasting frameworks rooted in distinctive worldviews. On the one hand, Ibn 
Sīnā’s metaphysical distinction between the possible and necessary of existence is the basis of 
his conception of the world’s pre-eternal emanation. On the other, for the mutakallimūn, the 
physical theoretical framework of atomism bolsters their view that God created the world from 
nothing, since by that framework, the temporal finitude of existents aside from God is proven. 
The thesis therefore provides (in Chapter 1) a biography and overview of al-Āmidi’s works, then 
(in Chapter 2) explains the aforementioned frameworks for the discussion of creation, before 
devoting a chapter each (Chapters 3 and 4) to al-Āmidī’s reception of each framework, and 
finally studying (in Chapter 5) his own doctrine of creation. It emerges that al-Āmidī begins a 
committed Avicennist, before developing, by stages, a strong reaction to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s 
(d. 606/1210) integration of falsafa with kalām. The intellectual challenges he faces in 
incorporating Avicennism’s most compelling theories without compromising core Ash‘arī 
beliefs indicate some of the key issues facing theologians of his era. 
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Transliteration 
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Additionally:  
- Grammatical case endings are not represented in transliteration, except where 
possessive pronouns are added (so, jawābuhu). 
- The lām of the definite article is always written, even before shamsī letters.  
- In names, the hamzat al-waṣl is represented by dropping the initial ‘a’. So Abū l-Ḥusayn 
(and not Abū al-Ḥusayn). This is also the case where conjunctions occur in an iḍāfa 
construction. 
- The tā’ marbūṭa is rendered as a final a (and not ah). So sunna and not sunnah.  In iḍāfa 
constructions, the tā’ marbūṭa is represented as at. 
 
Translations are my own unless otherwise stated; Marmura’s and McGinnis’ translations of 
(respectively) the Ilāhiyyāt and the Ṭabī‘iyyāt of Ibn Sīnā’s Kitāb al-Shifā’ were frequently 
consulted. 
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Introduction 
Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), known primarily for his talent as a jurisprudent, is also 
commonly recognised, and still revered among some modern Muslims, as an Ash‘arī theologian 
of great significance. Lesser known is his skill as an exponent of falsafa. Scholars of the 
continuing tradition of Avicennan philosophy in the post-Avicennan Islamic world have noted 
his contribution in this field in the form of his response to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) 
commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s (d. 428/1037) al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt. Indeed, on the basis of his 
authorship of Kashf al-tamwīhāt fī sharḥ al-ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, Gutas classes al-Āmidī as a 
‘mainstream Avicennist’.1 Yet al-Āmidī’s earliest work of falsafa, al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-
zawāhir, is still barely known. The impetus for this thesis is the puzzle represented by al-Āmidī’s 
authorship of works of both Ash‘arī kalām and Avicennan falsafa. This is a puzzle precisely 
because of how little we yet understand of the complex interactions between these traditions in 
the post-Ghazālian Muslim world, traditions whose relationship has historically been presumed 
to be essentially inimical. 
What is understood – this much has been broadly acknowledged for the past few decades –  is 
that, far from somehow extinguishing the tradition of falsafa in the Islamic world, al-Ghazālī (d. 
505/1111), in his thoroughgoing critique of the methods and doctrines of that tradition (and 
especially of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics), actually inaugurated an era of greater interaction 
between the traditions. And thanks to the flurry of scholarly activity provoked partly by Gutas’ 
two 2002 seminal papers on the Arabic-language philosophical output of the 13th century, and 
its maturation into a distinct field of Islamic studies, it is increasingly clear that post-Avicennan 
Ash‘arism was profoundly influenced by the legacy of Avicennism.2 The philosophical and 
																																																						
1 Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy’, 7. I will argue that this is based on a misreading of the objective of that 
work. 
2 Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy’ and ‘The Heritage of Avicenna’. Early contributions include Shihadeh’s 2005 
paper, in which he argues that al-Rāzī was the first theologian to effect a genuine integration of philosophical 
methods into theological discourse (Shihadeh, ‘From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī’). Endress further demonstrated al-Rāzī’s 
pivotal role in bringing Ibn Sīna’s teachings into the madrasa (Endress, ‘Reading Avicenna’). Brentjes, focussing on 
patronage of the philosophical sciences, proves that Avicennan philosophy became an accepted part of intellectual 
life across the Middle East (Brentjes, ‘Courtly Patronage’ and ‘Orthodoxy’); Eichner draws attention to the similarity 
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theological works of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī have been recognised for their significance in this 
general context by a number of scholars, but are yet to receive any extended analysis in this 
regard. 3 Whilst one book length study of al-Āmidī’s thought exists (and has been a useful source 
for the present study), it treats al-Āmidī’s works of kalām to the exclusion of his philosophical 
works.4 In a general sense, the figure of al-Āmidī merits further study simply because his works 
belong to the intellectual history of this still under-researched but highly significant period. 
The diversity of his intellectual legacy, spanning, as it does, both of the major intellectual 
traditions of the Islamic world, furthermore makes him an ideal candidate for enhancing our 
understanding of how these traditions came to interact in this period. Al-Āmidī’s thought also 
demands more focused attention on the basis of its impact on the course of Islamic theology, 
such as its well-established influence on the Mawāqif of ‘Adūd al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), itself a 
work of lasting importance for Islamic theological discourse through several centuries. 5 And 
yet, I have already alluded to the fact that al-Āmidī’s works of philosophy, most of which 
remain unedited, have barely been studied. Nor has the influence of his philosophical 
background on his works of theology received sustained attention. 
																																																						
between Ash‘arī and philosophical summae in the post-Avicennan period (Eichner, ‘Dissolving the Unity’). Each of 
these scholars also point to further research needed into the developing falsafa-kalām dynamic. Specific aspects of the 
Avicennan heritage have also been subject to serious research. Both Shihadeh and Wisnovsky treat the long tradition 
of commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt (Shihadeh, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Commentary’; Wisnovsky, ‘Avicennism and 
Exegetical Practices’). Others focus on paradigmatic philosophical questions (e.g. Eichner, ‘Essence and Existence’). 
Still others, on individuals important in the reception of Avicennan philosophy; Janssens, for instance, on two 
twelfth-century Avicennists (in Janssens, ‘al-Lawkarī’s Reception’ and ‘Bahmanyār Ibn Marzabān’); Shihadeh has 
highlighted individuals including Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī and al-Mas‘ūdī (Shihadeh, ‘A Post-Ghazālian Critic’ and 
Doubts). 
3 See for instance, Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy’, 7; Endress, ‘Reading Avicenna’, 408-410, where he 
characterises al-Āmidī as metacritic of al-Rāzī; Eichner, ‘The Post-Avicennan Philosophical Tradition’, 94-95, where 
she briefly considers the structures of two of al-Āmidī’s works of philosophy; Arif, ‘Al-Āmidī’s Reception of Ibn Sīnā’, 
on al-Nūr al-Bāhir. The relative lack of attention to al-Āmidī is partly due to the fact that his philosophical works have 
only recently become available. 
4 Al-Shāfī‘ī, al-Āmidī. Weiss treats aspects of al-Āmidī’s theology pertinent to his jurisprudence in his study of al-
Āmidī’s legal method (Weiss, The Search, Chapter 1). Shorter studies are Endress, ‘Die Dreifache Ancilla’, which treats 
al-Āmidī’s use of logic in his Abkār al-afkār; Janssens, ‘al-Āmidī and his Integration’, which concentrates on his 
doctrines of the soul and of the resurrection. The editors of al-Āmidī’s two works of kalām also provide useful studies 
of his life, works, and theological method. 
5 See van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, 478-9 where he collates references from the Mawāqif which demonstrate the 
influence of al-Āmidī’s Abkār; Weiss, ‘al-Ījī’, 398. 
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The overarching objective of this thesis is to conduct a contextualising investigation of the 
encounter of philosophy and theology in the works of al-Āmidī, with the goal of contributing to 
our knowledge of this significant period of Islamic intellectual history. This objective subsumes 
several more specific aims. One is to ascertain the progression of al-Āmidī’s intellectual 
commitments by considering the broad intellectual project which informs each of his works of 
theology and philosophy. Secondly, the thesis aims to establish the nature and extent of the 
Avicennan influence on al-Āmidī’s thought, through a study of his adoption (or rejection) of Ibn 
Sīnā’s philosophical theories, arguments and methods. The reason for the focus on Avicennan 
philosophy is that the Nūr indicates that it is Ibn Sīnā’s thought which is the primary 
philosophical influence on al-Āmidī.6 A third major focus is the extent to which al-Āmidī 
endorses the methods and doctrines of classical Ash‘arism, and the extent and character of 
departures he makes in this regard. This is significant because of the evolutions we know to 
have been occurring within the Ash‘arī tradition in this period, the character of which needs 
more focused scholarly attention. Thus, at the background of each of these aims is the 
important comparative task of relating al-Āmidī’s integrations of philosophy and theology to 
those of other post-Avicennan Ash‘arīs of the 12th and 13th centuries. The purpose of this is to 
better understand the spectrum of post-Avicennan philosophical theology, and al-Āmidī’s 
situation along that spectrum. 
The method I have chosen for conducting the investigation summarised by these objectives is 
to study a particular topic in al-Āmidī’s thought, since it is only through focused analysis of a 
specific issue that these broader questions can be thoroughly investigated. The thesis therefore 
finds its focus in the study of the major theological issue of the creation of the world. The topic 
has been selected because of its traditionally highly contentious status as a topic of debate 
between the philosophers and theologians of the Islamic world. In the creation debate, two 
																																																						
6 It is also more generally the case that Ibn Sīnā’s works, though they built on the thought of previous Muslim 
philosophers including al-Farābī (d. 339/950), came to dominate the tradition of falsafa and were the primary focus of 
subsequent responses to the tradition. Michot, reflecting on Ibn Sīnā’s towering significance, writes that ‘a whole 
spectrum of positions... developed in relation to [Ibn Sīna] - totally or partly positive, mixed and hybrid, partly or 
totally negative’ (Michot, ‘al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id’, 110). 
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antithetical visions of the God-world relationship clash: on the one hand, the philosophical 
theory of an emanated, pre-eternal world, on the other, the classical theological belief in the 
creation of the world from nothing by a voluntary creator. Analysis of al-Āmidī’s discussions of 
the topic therefore promises to provide insight into his position in relation to each tradition, 
and with regard to his own conception of the relationship between the two traditions. 
The particular doctrines of creation espoused by the philosophers and theologians respectively 
are, in fact, pinnacles of two worldviews fundamentally alien to one another. In Ibn Sīnā’s 
conception, God’s creation of the world is understood as the sheer necessity of his existence 
emanating existence onto all else. God thus understood may be seen as remote from the 
intricate, particular, processes of creation despite his unique efficacy in their occurrence. By 
contrast, the basic worldview of the Ash‘arī theologians has God as a personal deity intimately 
involved, despite his absolute superiority, in the workings of the created order which He 
brought into being at a particular moment in time according to his will. These contrasting 
worldviews are developed within equally contrasting philosophical systems. The two traditions 
have their own approaches to defining the objectives of their investigations; to the ordering of 
topics within their respective investigations; to the methods of investigation pursued; and so 
on. This means that the question of how the world came to exist is pursued in different problem 
contexts, and using different investigatory methods, within each tradition. Therefore, analysis 
of al-Āmidī’s thought on creation in relation to his dual heritage is more complex than a 
straightforward assessment of the opinion he holds on how the world came to be. This fact is 
reflected in the structure of this thesis. 
In Chapter 1, I provide a biographical account of al-Āmidī, along with a chronology of his works 
of theology and philosophy. In Chapter 2, I present the two main conceptions of causation 
which meet in al-Āmidī’s discussions of creation. I show how these derive from the distinct 
worldviews just mentioned, and that they are developed within very different philosophical 
frames of reference. On the one hand, Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of God’s production of the 
world by his existence alone is established within the metaphysical context of the analysis of 
the two categories of existent, necessary and possible. On the other, for classical Ash‘arī 
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theologians, the world’s creation was primarily proven within the physical theoretical context 
of discussion of the world’s constituents. This is because of the way in which the theologians 
exhaustively dichotomised existents into the immaterial and eternal (God) and the material and 
impermanent (the world). Since all existents aside from God were believed to be utterly 
material, the establishment of the world’s reliance on a cause was effected through 
demonstration of the finitude of the material world.7  
The delineation of these two intellectual frames of reference in Chapter 2 informs the analysis 
of the subsequent two chapters. In Chapter 3, I treat al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s 
metaphysics, specifically, his notion of the dichotomy between necessary and possible 
existents. A variety of Ibn Sīnā’s works are considered, although it will become clear that his 
Shifā’ and Ishārāt represent his most significant and influential contributions in this regard. This 
chapter provides an opportunity to investigate the aforementioned question of the nature and 
extent of the Avicennan influence on al-Āmidī’s thought, a major component of the 
overarching objective of the thesis. Specifically, the analysis will concern the extent of al-
Āmidī’s adoption of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and necessary of existence. This 
includes investigation of al-Āmidī’s perspectives on the nature of possibility, the meaning of 
God’s being ‘necessary of existence’, and on the relationship between the possible and 
necessary of existence, specifically with regard to how possible existents are caused. The 
relevant classical kalām parallels for the discussion of such issues will be the essential context 
for the investigations here. 
In Chapter 4, the thesis turns to focus on al-Āmidī’s physical theory and its background in the 
tradition of his theological school. This allows for an investigation of the second major question 
posed by the thesis, namely, concerning the legacy of classical Ash‘arism in al-Āmidī’s thought. 
The investigation will focus on the extent to which al-Āmidī endorses classical Ash‘arī physical 
theory, both in terms of his adherence to the theories themselves, and with regard to the 
function of physical theory within the broader theological project. Any departures from Ash‘arī 
																																																						
7 My claim that the primary paradigm for classical Ash‘arī discussions of creation is their physical theory is qualified 
in Chapter 2. 
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atomism will be qualified and their significance analysed. The thought of other post-classical 
Ash‘arīs on the same theories will be an ever-present context to the analysis. 
The findings of Chapters 3 and 4 inform the final chapter, where I consider al-Āmidī’s doctrine 
of creation. Here, the central question of the thesis concerning the relationship between 
Avicennism and Ash‘arism in al-Āmidī’s thought is investigated. I will consider the respective 
relevance of the Avicennan metaphysical ideas discussed in Chapter 3, and of the physical 
theories treated in Chapter 4 for al-Āmidī’s understanding of the relationship between God and 
the world. The chapter will interrogate al-Āmidī’s position on the question of the world’s 
origins in each of his works of falsafa and kalām, how he establishes his positions in relation to 
the metaphysical and physical paradigms of his context, and what this tells us about the 
meeting of the diverse influences on his thought. Again, the study will contextualise al-Āmidī’s 
views, especially in relation to al-Rāzī’s discussions of creation, with the objective of placing al-
Āmidī within his immediate intellectual context. This will be followed by broader conclusions. 
The thesis is thus structured around a fundamental contrast between the two intellectual 
paradigms of Avicennism and Ash‘arism concerning their understandings of the nature of 
creation, rooted in distinct worldviews. However, it is true to say that it is what the two 
traditions have in common which makes their encounter most important. In the course of my 
investigations it will become clear that Ibn Sīnā, like the al-Ash‘arīs, is intent on demonstrating 
the absolute transcendence and superiority of God as he understands it – albeit that his 
conception of God’s superiority is alien to that of the Ash‘arīs. The thesis will show that it is 
because of Ibn Sīnā’s emphasis on God’s transcendence that aspects of his thought are so utterly 
compelling for kalām theologians like al-Āmidī. I will argue that the differences between the 
two doctrines of creation treated in the thesis reflect in part two very different manners of 
handling the tension between affirming God’s transcendence and maintaining that he is, as the 
Qur’ān maintains, a voluntary agent. Al-Āmidī’s thought on creation thus represents one post-
Avicennan thinker’s response to two different resolutions of the same theological question. 
More broadly, his thought offers a window over the encounter between the two traditions in 
this highly significant era of Islamic Intellectual history, as we shall see. 
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Chapter 1 
Al-Āmidī’s Life and Works 
They envied the young man for they had not achieved like him 
To him they were opponents, and his enemies 8 
 
The background of al-Āmidī’s life circumstances is highly pertinent to the development of his 
thought and to the various influences thereon, and therefore an important foundation of the 
investigations of the thesis. Providing a biography for al-Āmidī is not straightforward; there are 
considerable variations between the relevant accounts. Several scholars have focused attention 
on the accounts of al-Āmidī’s biographers because of the fact that some of them suggest that he 
suffered persecution because of his pursuit of philosophy. Later in the chapter I review existing 
scholarship which interprets al-Āmidī’s biography in relation to important questions 
surrounding the status of philosophy in the thirteenth-century Islamic world. I begin by 
reconstructing al-Āmidī’s basic biography, extricating the core consensus of the available 
sources from additional, contradictory materials which are subject to analysis later in the 
chapter.9 
1. Biographical Sketch 
Alī b. Abī ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. al-Sālim al-Taghlibī was born in 551/1156 in Āmid, the largest 
town in the region of Diyarbakir, eastern Anatolia (the town itself is now called Diyarbakir), 
																																																						
8 Ibn al-‘Imād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7, 253. The verse, used of al-Āmidī, originates with Abū l-Aswad al-Du’alī (d.c. 
69/689). 
9 The key sources are those biographical accounts written by his near contemporaries, namely Al-Qifṭī’s (d. 646/1248) 
Tārīkh al-ḥukamā’; Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī’s (d. 654/1256) Mir’āt al-zamān; Abū Shāma’s (d. 665/1267) al-Dhayl ‘alā l-rawḍatayn; 
Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a’s (d. 668/1270) ‘Uyūn al-anbā’; Ibn Khallikān’s (d. 681/1282) Wafayāt  al-a‘yān; and Ibn Wāṣil’s (d. 
697/1298) Mufarrij al-kurūb. However, the following later sources are also of interest in terms of which details of the 
narrative are crystallised: al-Fidā’’s (d. 731/1331) al-Mukhtaṣar fī akhbār al-bashar; al-Dhahabī’s (d. 748/1347) Tārīkh al-
islām and Siyar a‘lām al-nubalā’; al-‘Umarī’s (d. 750/1349) Masālik al-abṣār; al-Ṣafadī’s (d. 764/1363) al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt; 
al-Yāfi‘ī’s (d. 769/1367) Mir’āt al-janan; Ibn Kathīr’s (d. 774/1373) al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya; the Ṭabaqāt al-shāfi‘iyya of al-
Isnawī (d. 772/1370), al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), and Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba (d. 851/1448); al-‘Asqalānī’s (d. 852/1449) Lisān al-
mizān; Ibn Taghribirdī’s (d. 874/1470) al-Nujūm al-zāhira; al-Suyūṭī’s (d. 911/1505) Ḥusn al-muḥāḍara; Ṭashköprüzāde’s 
(d. 968/1561) Miftāḥ al-sa‘āda; al-Nu‘aymī’s (d. 978/1571) al-Dāris fī tārīkh al-madāris; and finally, Ibn al-‘Imād’s (d. 
1089/1679) Shadharāt al-dhahab. 
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whence his appellation. Other epithets include Abū l-Ḥasan, Abū l-Qāsim, and, in recognition of 
the importance of his major work of kalām, Ṣāḥib al-Abkār. The sources tell us nothing about his 
family or social background, and after departing his hometown aged either 14 or 15 (c. 
565/1170), al-Āmidī never returned.10 Before he left, al-Āmidī received a basic education; 
Qur’ānic memorisation and recitation, theology (uṣūl al-dīn) and Ḥanbalī law. On journeying to 
Baghdād as a teen, al-Āmidī first continued his studies under the Ḥanbalī Abū l-Fatḥ Naṣr b. 
Fatyān b. al-Munī al-Ḥanbalī (d.?), whom he is said to have surpassed in skill at disputation. He 
then transferred to the Shāfi‘ī school, making acquaintance with and studying under Abū l-
Qāsim Yaḥyā b. ‘Alī b. Faḍlān (d. 595/1199). Ibn Faḍlān was head of the Shāfi‘īs of Baghdād and 
known for his skill at disputation (khilāf) and logic (manṭiq).11 Two sources (Al-Qifṭī’s Tārīkh al-
ḥukamā’ and the later, derivative source, Ṭashköprüzāde’s Miftaḥ al-sa‘āda) also tell us that al-
Āmidī learnt philosophy with a group of Christians and Jews in the Karkh region of Baghdād.12 
																																																						
10 The editor of the Abkār, al-Mahdī, attributes al-Āmidī’s failure to return to Āmid to the humble standing of his 
family, on the basis that they do not feature in the biographical accounts, and that he is named after his place of 
origin rather than his family line (Abkār, 1, 16). 
11 Ibn Faḍlān was also the teacher of ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (d. 633/1231), himself a philosopher whose 
autobiography Gutas has shown to shed important light on the presence of Avicennan philosophy in the mainstream 
madrasa institution of Baghdād in the thirteenth century (as well as more generally among intellectuals outside the 
madrasa). The pursuit of philosophy is common to both disciples of Ibn Faḍlān, and it may be the case that al-Āmidī’s 
interest in Avicennan philosophy was stimulated in part by Ibn Faḍlān’s interest in the logic of the philosophers. In 
his autobiography, al-Baghdādī also describes a trend of using the logic of the philosophers in jurisprudence, which 
adds weight to the notion that al-Āmidī encountered philosophy in part through Ibn Faḍlān, an outstanding jurist 
(see Gutas, ‘Philosophy in the Twelfth Century’, 19). As‘ad al-Mayhanī (d. 523/1130), whose Ta‘līqa al-Ṣafadī’s claims 
al-Āmidī studied, is also a possible influence in al-Āmidī’s encounter with falsafa. Al-Mayhanī, whom Griffel argues 
was a follower of al-Ghazālī, was a jurist skilled in the art of disputation, and also active in the philosophical tradition 
(Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, 71-74). His works are not known to be extant. 
I cannot determine the basis of Endress’ claim (‘Reading Avicenna’, 408; ‘Die Dreifache’, 122) that al-Āmidī 
transferred to the Ash‘arī tradition of theology at the time of his change of law schools. It is true, of course, that the 
Shāfi‘ī school was strongly associated with Ash‘arism, but this does not necessarily indicate that al-Āmidī maintained 
a commitment to Ash‘arī theology at this time. Indeed, as I will shortly discuss, the evidence of the chronology of the 
extant works is that al-Āmidī was not committed to Ash‘arī doctrines during his time in Baghdād. Furthermore, the 
Shāfi‘ī school of the time seems to have been characterised by its openness to the rational sciences more generally, 
so that a change of allegiance to Shāfi‘ism was just as likely prompted by an interest in philosophy as by a theological 
interest. What does seem very likely is that Ibn Faḍlān mentored al-Āmidī in the skill of disputation, since both men 
are praised by the biographers for this skill, relevant to the study of philosophy and theology, as well as 
jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the one known extant MS of al-Āmidī’s work on disputation, Ghāyat al-amal fī ‘ilm al-
jadal, is undated. 
12 ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī’s autobiography parallels al-Āmidī’s here; he too claims to have studied Avicennan 
philosophy with a group of interested individuals, confirming its presence within private scholarly circles in 
Baghdād at the time.  
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At some point during his 30s or early 40s, al-Āmidī left Baghdād. Al-Qifṭī claims that al-Āmidī 
fled Baghdād, attributing this to his having been shunned, his doctrine defamed, by a group of 
jurists due to his interest in philosophy. As will become clear, the notion that al-Āmidī’s 
engagement with the philosophical sciences provoked negative reactions and led to his 
frequent moves is a significant motif among his biographers.  
Al-Āmidī arrived in Cairo in 592/1196 at the age of 42. Some of the sources mention a period 
before his journey to Cairo (of up to a decade) spent in Syria - possible at Aleppo or Ḥamā; Ibn 
Khallikān writes that during this period in Syria, al-Āmidī pursued his interest in the sciences of 
the ancients (‘ulūm al-awā’il, normally a reference to the Hellenic philosophical tradition). An 
encounter with the illuminationist philosopher al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) around this time 
also appears in a small number of sources, and is said to have made a significant impression on 
al-Āmidī.13 If this encounter is historical, it would mean that al-Āmidī left Baghdād quite some 
time before arriving in Cairo in 592, since al-Suhrawardī died five years before that, but this is 
uncertain. Upon arrival in Cairo, al-Āmidī took up a position at the Shāfi‘ī Madrasa in al-Qarāfa 
al-Ṣughrā, where he frequently debated and lectured. He stayed in Cairo for a considerable 
period, lecturing and writing. Al-Qifṭī writes that his works on the ‘science of the ancients’ 
became well known and were frequently copied during his time in Cairo. None of al-Āmidī’s 
extant works of theology, philosophy or jurisprudence date from this period, although al-Shāfi‘ī 
suggests that unknown legal works, referred to vaguely in al-Āmidī’s works of theology, may 
have been authored during this time.14 
Several years after his arrival in Cairo, al-Āmidī fled for Syria. The year of this move is not 
known, but must have been before 605/1208 (when al-Āmidī was aged 53), by which time we 
know that al-Āmidī was receiving patronage from the rulers of Ayyūbid Syria. Here, the motif of 
the controversy of al-Āmidī’s involvement in philosophy arises once more. Ibn Khallikān puts 
al-Āmidī’s departure from Cairo down to his being hounded as a result of his interest in 
philosophy. According to him, a group of scholars accused him of following ‘the way of the 
																																																						
13 Al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt, 21, 225; Ṭashköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-Sa‘āda, 1, 301.  
14 Shāfi‘ī, al-Āmidī, 61-62. 
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philosophers’ (madhhab al-falāsifa), and resultantly, having ‘bad doctrine’. This anti-philosophy 
motif is crystallised in the later sources; al-Fidā’, Ibn Kathīr, al-Dhahabī, al-Suyūṭī, Ibn al-‘Imād 
and Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba all relate the same account of al-Āmidī’s departure from Cairo. There is 
also the hint of more personal reasons for al-Āmidī’s troubles in that most of the biographical 
accounts which claim that al-Āmidī fled Cairo due to accusations relating to his philosophical 
interests also describe those who rallied against al-Āmidī as having been envious of him.  
On arrival in Syria, al-Āmidī settled first in Ḥamā, where he enjoyed a period of stability under 
the patronage of al-Malik al-Manṣūr (r. 587-617/1191-1220), to whom his Kashf al-tamwīhāt fī 
sharḥ al-ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt is dedicated. It seems to have been in Ḥamā that al-Āmidī first 
encountered the works of al-Rāzī. His time there also appears to have been extremely 
important in al-Āmidī’s development as both philosopher and theologian; almost all his extant 
works in these sciences date from this period.  
Later, in around 617/1220, aged 66, al-Āmidī travelled to Damascus, where he was given 
headship of al-Madrasa al-‘Azīziyya, where he continued lecturing, writing many of his legal 
works during this time. Under al-Malik al-Mu‘aẓẓam (r. 615-624/1218-1227), al-Āmidī was well 
supported. However, during the reigns of al-Mu‘aẓẓam’s successors, al-Malik al-Nāṣir (r. 624-
626/1227-1229), and al-Malik al-Ashraf (r. 626-635/1229-1238), al-Āmidī seems to have become 
increasingly unpopular. Eventually, in 631/1233, al-Ashraf dismissed al-Āmidī from his position 
as head at the madrasa, and placed him under house arrest. He died just a few months later, on 
4 Ṣafar 631/1233.  
 The biographical sources provide contradictory explanations of al-Āmidī’s fall from grace. Al-
Jawzī claims that the reason for al-Āmidī’s dismissal from his position in Damascus was the 
Ayyūbid rulers’ (specifically, al-Mu‘aẓẓam and al-Ashraf’s) disdain for his use of ‘logic and the 
sciences of the ancients’. According to al-Jawzī, al-Ashraf issued a fatwā against the teaching of 
any science other than tafsīr and fiqh. Ibn Kathīr later repeats this narrative, as does al-Nu‘aymī, 
who comments that ‘ancient philosophy was on the rise’ prior to the issuing of this 
denunciation. The main alternative to the notion that al-Āmidī fell from grace because of his 
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philosophising activities is the idea that he lacked political tact and diplomacy. In particular, 
both al-Qifṭī and Ibn Wāṣil (and, following them, al-Ṣafadī and Ṭashköprüzāde), relate an 
incident whereby when in 631/1233 the Ayyūbid ruler al-Malik al-Kāmil gained control of Āmid, 
al-Āmidī’s hometown, he discovered that its previous ruler had requested that al-Āmidī take on 
Judgeship of the city. The sources vary as to whether al-Āmidī refused, or ostensibly accepted, 
but never actually went. In either case, it is agreed that al-Ashraf was not consulted, and that 
when he learnt of this, al-Āmidī was dismissed from his role as head of al-Madrasa al-‘Azīziyya. 
The related motif of difficulties associated with al-Āmidī’s personality also arises here; al-Jawzī 
and Ibn Kathīr relate that al-Mu‘aẓẓam disliked al-Āmidī; he is said to have announced ‘my 
heart does not receive him’. Additionally, political factors outside of al-Āmidī’s own influence 
are suggested in some of the sources. Both al-Jawzī and Ibn Wāṣil indicate a dispute between al-
Ashraf and the previous rulers of Ayyūbid Damascus which may have had some bearing on al-
Āmidī’s standing in the Ayyūbid court upon al-Ashraf’s rise to power.  
A final important thread relates to al-Āmidī’s personal encounters with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and 
his students, in particular, Shams al-Dīn al-Khasrawshāhī. Ibn Wāṣil, who was a student of al-
Āmidī in Ḥamā, is particularly interested in this matter. He stresses that al-Āmidī opposed al-
Rāzī (and also al-Ghazālī) as an intellectual and ‘proved the falsity’ of many of his ideas in his 
works. He claims that al-Āmidī was envious of al-Rāzī and resultantly ‘exaggerated in his 
defamations and slander of him’. He also claims that al-Rāzī was much more famous and 
wealthy than al-Āmidī, and that in scholarly gatherings in Damascus, the former came to be 
favoured by al-Mu‘aẓẓam to the detriment of al-Āmidī. There is a provincial overtone in this 
account in that Ibn Wāṣil stresses that the a‘jām (‘foreigners’ or possibly ‘Persians’) rallied 
together against al-Āmidī, ‘grieving him… because of their alliance and agreement with one 
another’. 
2. Works 
The present study uses all al-Āmidī’s known extant works of falsafa and kalām, though he has 
hitherto been known primarily as a highly skilled jurist. Al-Āmidī’s jurisprudential works post-
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date his works of theology. The following is a chronological list of al-Āmidī’s works of falsafa 
and kalām known to be extant, along with description of their contents. Further justification of 
my assessment of the works will be provided in the course of the thesis.  
Al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Brilliant Light on Splendid Wisdom) 
Four of the Nūr’s five volumes are extant. The extant MS was printed in facsimile form by Fuat 
Sezgin in 2001. The copy dates from the year 592/1196. This dating concurs with al-Qifṭī’s 
reference to the circulation of al-Āmidī’s philosophical works during his time in Cairo, where he 
moved in the same year. It suggests that the work was written either in Baghdād, or during al-
Āmidī’s first spell in Syria (if it is true that he spent time in Syria prior to his journey to Cairo). 
However, Arif concludes that the work was written shortly before al-Āmidī’s death on the basis 
of a passage in the introduction in which al-Āmidī refers to ‘the vigour of youth’ having ‘faded 
away’.15 The passage is, however, rhetorical in intent, and cannot be taken as evidence of the 
work’s dating. The reference to the passing vigour of youth arises in the context of al-Āmidī’s 
emphasis on his persistent endeavours in unravelling the ‘secrets’ of philosophy. He also refers 
to the lack of assistance he received in the project of composing the Nūr. The theme of 
intellectual toil against adversity is not uncommon to the introductions of medieval works of 
theology and philosophy, and against this background, al-Āmidī’s complaint of weariness and 
lack of youthful vigour should not be taken as an indication of his age at the time of the Nūr’s 
composition.  
The Nūr is a work of Avicennism modelled on the Shifā’ in which al-Āmidī summarises, endorses 
and defends Ibn Sīnā’s major doctrines. It is an early work reflective of a time in al-Āmidī’s life, 
possibly during his encounter with philosophers at Baghdād, when he was a committed 
Avicennist. This may have coincided with his transfer from the Ḥanbalī to the more rationally 
oriented Shāfi‘ī school. 
																																																						
15 Arif, ‘Al-Āmidī’s Reception’, 213, although this contradicts his acknowledgement earlier in the article that the 
extant MS is dated 592/1196. Endress also claims that the Nūr was composed in al-Āmidī’s old age (‘Die Dreifache’, 
136-7). 
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In the work, he responds to both the philosopher Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. c. 560/1165) and 
to Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (to whom he refers as Ṣāḥib al-tahāfut) in their respective criticisms of 
Ibn Sīnā. I have not found any demonstration of awareness of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s reception of 
Ibn Sīnā in this work. Despite his overwhelming support for Avicennan doctrine in this work, al-
Āmidī does object to some ideas, including, for instance, the notion that possibility (imkān) has 
extra-mental reality (as I will discuss in Chapter 3). Probably due to his commitment in this 
work to falsafī doctrines such as the eternity of the world, al-Āmidī nowhere mentions his 
authorship of the Nūr in his later works of kalām. 
Kashf al-tamwīhāt fī sharḥ al-ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (An Exposition of Errors in the Commentary on 
the Pointers and Reminders) 
The Kashf was published in 2013 (and again in 2015), and exists in manuscripts in Istanbul and 
Berlin, the latter an autograph.16 It was written in 605/1208, and is dedicated to the ruler of 
Ḥamā, al-Malik al-Manṣūr (r. 587-617/1191-1220) where al-Āmidī was probably living by that 
time. Since the Kashf is a direct response to al-Rāzī, its dedication to al-Manṣūr suggests that al-
Āmidī was in competition with al-Rāzī’s followers (whom we know from Ibn Wāṣil he 
encountered in the Syrian courts) for Ayyūbid patronage. 17  The work must be read against this 
political background. It also represents the first extant evidence of al-Āmidī’s intellectual 
encounter with al-Rāzī. I will pay greater attention to the question of the intellectual agenda of 
this work, since it is initially obscure, and because the various assessments of the nature of the 
work in recent decades have been significant in conclusions drawn about al-Āmidī. 18 
Al-Āmidī is explicit in his introduction that this is a response to al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ on Ibn Sīnā’s 
Ishārāt, aimed at redressing its ‘errors and falsities’ (maghālīṭ wa-tamwīhāt), and also the 
mingling into philosophy of that which is not a part of it (adkhala fīhā mā laysa minhā).19 The 
																																																						
16 MS Or. 8253 at the British Library is wrongly titled Kashf al-tamwīhāt and is in fact a copy of al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ. 
17 Ibn Wāṣil, Mufarrij al-kurūb, 5, 35-41. 
18 The work has been variously assessed: al-Shāfi‘ī denies that it has any connection to al-Rāzī, understanding it to be 
a direct commentary on the Ishārāt (Shāfi‘ī, al-Āmidī, 81-83); Gutas acknowledges that it is directed at al-Rāzī but sees 
it as evidence of al-Āmidī’s mainstream Avicennism (Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy’, 84 and 87). 
19 Kashf, 2, 419. 
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work’s contents validate this stated purpose. Despite the fact that a significant proportion of al-
Rāzī’s comments on the Ishārāt either elucidate Ibn Sīnā’s meaning, or provide alternative 
proofs for his doctrines, al-Āmidī consistently comments only on parts of the Sharḥ in which al-
Rāzī critiques inconsistencies or weaknesses in Ibn Sīnā’s proofs. Since al-Rāzī does not point 
out objections in his discussion of every section, this makes the text of the Kashf extremely 
selective, and means that it does not at all represent the overall content of either the Ishārāt, or 
of the Sharḥ. For instance, al-Āmidī moves from a critique on the commentary on Ishārāt V, in 
which Ibn Sīnā discusses creation, directly to a critique of al-Rāzī’s commentary on an aspect of 
the next book, on emanation, without indicating the transition. Furthermore, al-Āmidī pays no 
heed to al-Rāzī’s imposition of structure on the text of the Ishārāt; al-Rāzī divides each Namaṭ 
into a number of masā’il, a practice which was to become highly influential on later readings of 
the work, but which does not appear to be of interest to al-Āmidī.  
The nature of al-Āmidī’s criticisms tells us more about the work’s agenda. Frequently, al-
Āmidī’s criticisms of al-Rāzī have little or no bearing on the question of the validity of Ibn Sīnā’s 
original arguments, meaning that they cannot be read as a defence of the Ishārāt (nor as 
evidence of al-Āmidī’s ‘Avicennism’). I will provide a number of examples. In the first, al-Āmidī 
criticises al-Rāzī on a point of logic which has no direct bearing on the argument of the latter, 
and is therefore of little relevance to the evaluation of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine. In fact, al-Āmidī’s 
correction also suggests that he has misread al-Rāzī. In his opening comments on Ibn Sīnā’s 
discussion of creation, al-Rāzī explains what is intended by Ibn Sīnā in his use of two distinct 
terms for creation: ṣun‘ and ibdā‘. He writes that the former is said specifically of (mukhtaṣṣ bi) 
the possible existent whose existence is preceded by matter and time, while the latter is said of 
the possible existent whose existence is not preceded by matter and time.20 This distinction 
accurately reflects Ibn Sīnā’s own, expressed later in the chapter: in section 9, he argues by way 
of this distinction for the superiority of God’s creative act (ibdā‘) in the case of the pre-eternity 
of the world.21 
																																																						
20 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 1, 214. 
21 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, 2, 524-5. 
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Al-Āmidī takes al-Rāzī to be defining the terms, and points out what he perceives to be a logical 
problem in al-Rāzī’s statement. He writes that the expression ‘x is specific to (mukhtaṣṣ bi) y’ 
means that x refers to y and nothing else. This means that al-Rāzī’s statements ‘ṣun‘ is specific to 
x’  and ‘ibdā‘ is specific to y’, logically signify that ṣun‘ is x and ibdā‘ is y, i.e. that ṣun‘ is the 
possible existent whose existence is preceded by matter and time! He corrects al-Rāzī, writing 
that ṣun‘ means ‘the bringing into existence of the possible which is preceded by matter and 
time’, and ibdā‘ is ‘the bringing into existence of that which is not preceded by matter and 
time’.22 This correction of what al-Āmidī understands to be a logical error on al-Rāzī’s part is 
characteristic of a heavy focus on such concerns. There is no real conceptual concern 
underlying the correction, and Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation is not bolstered by al-Āmidī’s 
critique. 
 Secondly, al-Rāzī’s commentary sometimes provides charitable resolutions for apparent 
inconsistencies in the text of the Ishārāt. Al-Āmidī occasionally critiques al-Rāzī at the expense 
of Ibn Sīnā. For instance, in discussion of the title of Ishārāt IV, ‘Existence and its Causes’, al-Rāzī 
points out that God’s existence, which is uncaused, is discussed within this book. Al-Rāzī 
suggests that ‘Existence’ here should be taken to mean the restricted sense of uncaused 
existence, and thus, the problem is solved (fa-indafa‘a al-su’āl). Rather than accept this 
resolution, al-Āmidī objects without presenting an alternative. He agrees that the title must 
either apply to existents in a universal sense, or only to some. Al-Rāzī has made Ibn Sīnā’s title 
apply only to caused existents, but this is against what Ibn Sīnā obviously intends (khilāf al-ẓāhir 
min kalām al-shayk). This is because Ibn Sīnā’s third discussion within this Namaṭ deals with the 
Necessary of Existence.23 Al-Āmidī is explicit in conceding that, due to al-Rāzī’s failure to 
resolve the inconsistency, the problem identified remains (al-ishkāl mutajjihan lā maḥāla).24 
A final example illustrates al-Āmidī’s tendency to focus on undermining al-Rāzī’s arguments 
without regard to the doctrinal implication of his criticism. In IV.10, as part of his proof for 
																																																						
22 Kashf, 2, 788. 
23 Al-Āmidī here appropriates al-Razī’s division of the Ishārāt into masā’il without comment. 
24 Kashf, 2, 743-4. 
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God’s existence, Ibn Sīnā asserts that the possible acquires existence from something outside 
itself.25 Al-Rāzī complains that this is superfluous: since Ibn Sīnā has previously defined the 
possible existent as that which has neither existence nor non-existence by virtue of its own 
essence, this assertion has no benefit in the context of this proof for the existence of God.26 This 
is a relatively minor point. Al-Rāzī is suggesting that Ibn Sīnā’s argument is tautologous. If al-
Āmidī’s Kashf were primarily written with a view to defending Avicennan doctrine, we might 
expect him either a) to concede the point, since it has no bearing on the course of the argument 
or b) to further develop or explore the notion of possible existence. 
He does neither. Rather, he defends the letter of Ibn Sīnā’s argument, claiming that the 
statement does have value as an explanatory statement, for ‘someone hearing this statement 
might be conceding the existence of possibility and asking for an explanation of its meaning’.27 
This is typical of his focus on the letter of the Ishārāt over its spirit. By contrast, at the same 
point in his commentary, al-Ṭūṣī develops Ibn Sīnā’s notion that possible things acquire 
existence from outside their own essences, using the concept of preponderance (tarajjuḥ).28 It 
seems once more that al-Āmidī is motivated by a desire to undermine al-Rāzī’s criticism, rather 
than to develop or even defend the Avicennan doctrines under investigation. 
There is little evidence that al-Āmidī has a commitment to Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy in the Kashf. 
Though his criticisms of al-Rāzī normally entail a defence of the Avicennan statement under 
examination, we have seen that this is somewhat accidental to al-Āmidī’s task. Al-Āmidī’s goal 
is not the defence of Ibn Sīnā as such. Furthermore, there are philosophical inconsistencies 
between the Nūr and the Kashf. For instance, despite objecting to the notion that possibility has 
extra-mental reality in the Nūr, in his Kashf, al-Āmidī refutes al-Rāzī’s arguments for the very 
same position. This reinforces the impression that the Kashf is not intended to represent al-
Āmidī’s own opinion, but is a dialectical exercise. This is no more than al-Āmidī says of his 
objective in the work. Furthermore, it accords well with the context of competition for 
																																																						
25 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, 2, 448. 
26 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 1, 195. 
27 Kashf, 2, 750. 
28 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, 2, 448. 
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patronage. Al-Āmidī seems primarily concerned to prove his own mastery as reader of Ibn Sīnā 
and as a logician by undermining those of al-Rāzī, whom he tellingly describes in his 
introduction as the one who ‘has become famed among those heedful of [philosophy], and 
distinguished over his peers as one well versed in it’ (man ishtahara min al-muntabihīn fīhā wa-
yumayyaz ‘alā aqrānihi min al-mutarassimīn bihā).29 An ability to demonstrate al-Rāzī’s fallibility as 
reader of Ibn Sīnā would have served al-Āmidī in demonstrating his worth as a subject of 
courtly support. His intellectual commitments at this time cannot be ascertained through the 
Kashf. 
Al-Mubīn fī sharḥ alfāẓ al-ḥukamā’ wa-l-mutakallimīn (The Expositor in Explanation of the Terms of 
the Philosophers and Theologians) 
This is a dictionary of philosophical and theological terms which is doctrinally neutral. It was 
first published in 1987. It is dedicated to a certain ruler who, though eulogised, is unnamed. It 
may be, given his patronage of the Kashf, that al-Malik al-Manṣūr is the individual in question. 
This, along with the dating of the work is, however, uncertain. The existence of the work 
demonstrates what is increasingly clear, namely, that interests in philosophy and theology 
were not considered incompatible. 
Daqā’iq al-ḥaqā’iq fī l-ḥikma (Subtle Truths on Philosophy) 
A comparison of the introduction of the Daqā’iq with that of the Rumūz (below) strongly 
suggests that the latter is an abridgement of the former. The intellectual project outlined by al-
Āmidī in both is almost identical. This is supported by the fact that in his later works of 
theology, al-Āmidī frequently makes mention of the two works together. The works represent a 
middle phase in which al-Āmidī is committed to classical kalām doctrines such as the temporal 
origination of the world, but accommodates as much of the philosophical sciences as is not 
contradictory to core kalām belief. However, only the first volume of the Daqā’iq, on logic, is 
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extant, in a MS at Princeton available digitally (MS 42b, Digital Library of Islamic Manuscripts, 
Princeton University).  
Rumūz al-kunūz (Representing Treasures) 
The Rumūz was completed in 610/1213, and the extant MS dates from 612/1215 (MS 
Neurosmaniye 2688, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul). 
In the introduction, al-Āmidī explains that many parts of falsafa do not contradict sound 
doctrine, and that his aim in the work is to show which parts may be accepted, and which 
should be rejected by the ‘Orthodox’ (ahl al-ḥaqq). He comments that most of the logic of the 
falāsifa, as well as their natural philosophy, can be accepted, and also some parts of their 
metaphysics.30 The topics of the Rumūz are ordered according to Ibn Sīnā’s schema, beginning 
with logic and moving through natural philosophy and metaphysics. Al-Āmidī treats the 
premises which Ibn Sīnā provides in support of each doctrine and accepts those which present 
no contradiction with core kalām doctrine, but rejects those which do. I discuss this in Chapter 4 
in relation to al-Āmidī’s view on the indivisibility of matter in the Rumūz. This is not a work of 
great originality, and many discussions are tantalisingly brief. Several inconsistencies are 
unresolved, and kalām doctrines insufficiently supported. Al-Āmidī makes frequent reference to 
both the Daqā’iq and the Rumūz in his theological works. 
What is clear from the contents of the work is that a shift in doctrinal commitments occurred at 
some point between al-Āmidī’s writing of the Nūr and of the Rumūz. Al-Āmidī contradicts the 
commitment expressed in the Nūr to philosophical doctrines like the eternity of the world and 
the absolute simplicity of God as necessary of existence. As I have noted, the Kashf is not a 
reliable source for al-Āmidī’s doctrinal commitments, and it is therefore difficult to ascertain 
whether al-Āmidī arrived in Syria a committed Ash‘arī, or became convinced of the doctrine of 
the school during his time at the Ayyūbid court. It is clear, however, that al-Āmidī remained 
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highly engaged with and impressed by many aspects of Avicennan philosophy at the time of 
writing the Rumūz. 
Abkār al-afkār fī ‘ilm al-kalām (Unprecedented Thoughts on the Science of Theology) 
Two of the manuscripts of the Abkār date its completion to the year 612/1215. The work was 
edited and published in 2002 by Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Mahdī. 
This is a work of Ash‘arī theology in five volumes. Al-Āmidī clearly identifies himself with the 
classical Ash‘arī tradition; within the opening four folios of his epistemological discussions, al-
Ash‘arī, al-Bāqillānī, Ibn Fūrak and al-Isfarā’īnī are all mentioned by name. Here, al-Āmidī is 
committed to both the doctrine and, in general, the methods of classical Ash‘arism, using, for 
instance, the classical method for defending the doctrines of God’s unicity and of creation ex 
nihilo. The work is marked by the comprehensiveness of al-Āmidī’s treatment of arguments for 
the positions he outlines. The degree of the work’s comprehensiveness is matched only by its 
dialecticism: the great majority of each discussion is devoted to refutation of erroneous 
opinions, and equally to the refutation of methods of proving al-Āmidī’s preferred opinion 
which fall short of his standards for demonstration.  
As I will demonstrate, arguments devised or developed by al-Rāzī (though he is never named) 
feature particularly prominently as targets for al-Āmidī’s refutations. The work is also marked by 
its heavy criticism of Avicennan doctrines. In discussion of each topic, Ibn Sīnā’s view is 
frequently treated first in a manner which simplifies falsafī doctrines for presentation then 
refutation. This is not to say, however, that the positive influence of falsafa is not felt. In certain 
key respects which I will demonstrate, al-Āmidī’s theological thought is marked by an Avicennan 
influence. 
What is clear is that a further shift in al-Āmidī’s intellectual commitments has occurred over a 
very short period during his time in Syria, between his completion of the Rumūz (in 610/1213) 
and of this, his magnum opus, two years later. Avicennan philosophy is no longer viewed with 
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sympathy, but the defence of Ash‘arī theology against the perceived threat of falsafa has become 
the priority. 
Ghāyat al-marām fī ‘ilm al-kalām (Endpoint of Aspirations in the Science of Theology)  
There is some confusion over the dating of the Ghāya, but it is clear from the contents as well as 
from al-Āmidī’s references to the Abkār that the Ghāya is the later work.31 The work was edited 
and published in 2010 by Ḥasan Maḥmūd ʻAbd al-Lati ̣f̄ al-Shāfiʻī. 
This is a shorter work of theology, ostensibly an abridgement of the Abkār. This is suggested by 
al-Āmidī himself, as well as by references in the biographical literature to a single volume 
summary of the Abkār identifiable as Ghāyat al-marām. In fact, although the overall doctrinal 
positions of the works are the same, they are dissimilar on some important points, to be 
explored in subsequent chapters.  
3. Interpreting Contradictions between al-Āmidī’s Biographers  
We have seen that the most significant variations between the extant biographical sources 
pertain to the reason for al-Āmidī’s unpopularity and eventual dismissal from his position in 
Ayyūbid Damascus. At each juncture in al-Āmidī’s career, his biographers vary on the subject of 
what precipitated his moves from one city to another to another. Because of the suggestion by 
some biographers that al-Āmidī’s philosophising activities led to his persecution, his biography 
has attracted a relatively large amount of scholarly interest. For traditional scholars who took 
the view that philosophy was perceived as antithetical to Islam, and that it eventually died out 
at the pen of al-Ghazālī, al-Āmidī’s biography perfectly illustrated the issue. Goldziher saw al-
Āmidī’s fall from favour in Damascus as ‘clear testimony’ of the anti-philosophical attitude of 
the era. This idea had longevity: Sourdel, in the Encyclopedia of Islam (1986) and even Weiss, in 
																																																						
31 For al-Shāfi‘ī’s assessment of this confusion, see Shāfi‘ī, Al-Āmidī, 95-97.  
Some sources suggest that al-Āmidī wrote a commentary on al-Rāzī’s al-Maṭālib al-‘āliyya, entitled al-Mākhadh ‘alā l-
Maṭālib al-‘āliyya. However, the MS present in the Institute of Manuscripts in Cairo (MS 3, Tawhīd), which bears the 
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in Istanbul, Feyzullah Library (MS 1101). Al-Qifṭī refers to al-Āmidī’s commentary on al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ al-Ishārāt as Kitāb 
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his extended study of al-Āmidī’s jurisprudence, both perpetuated the notion that philosophy 
was ‘in disrepute’ and that al-Āmidī was ‘ostracised and maligned’ as a result.32 Though he 
contests the anti-philosophy trope of earlier scholarship, even Arif, as recently as 2003, accepts 
that al-Āmidī’s fall from favour at Damascus was linked to the issuance of a fatwā against the 
study of philosophy.33 
Both Brentjes and Endress, as part of their respective re-examinations of the place of the 
philosophical sciences in the learning institutions of the Islamic world, contest a simplistic 
interpretation of al-Āmidī’s biography. Brentjes rightly observes that the contemporary sources 
for al-Āmidī’s life cannot be harmonised to provide a single history. She argues that the 
biographical accounts offer not history per se, but historical constructions, and that they must 
be read as such. She believes, furthermore, that accounts such as those concerning al-Āmidī 
have been used by scholars like Goldziher to create ‘new myths for new purposes’.34 Brentjes 
presents a multitude of counter-evidence against the notion that an anti-philosophical attitude 
prevailed in the post-Ghazālian Muslim world. Against this background, her own reading of the 
reason for al-Āmidī’s dismissal from his position in Damascus is that it was primarily ‘a story of 
conflicts in patronage relationships between a brilliant and self-confident scholar, his peers and 
his patrons’.35 I fully concur with Brentjes that the available biographical accounts for the life of 
al-Āmidī resist a simple, unified reading. Despite the prevalence of the anti-philosophical motif, 
the political and personal aspects of the accounts are persistent and significant, though not 
always in agreement. 
Endress argues for the importance of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in causing ‘Ibn Sīnā [to] enter the 
madrasa’.36 He demonstrates that Avicennan philosophy was increasingly read, commented on, 
refuted and defended by jurists and theologians such that the distinct traditions came to 
																																																						
32 Weiss, The Search, 29.  
33 Arif, ‘Al-Āmidī’s Reception’, 209. 
34 Brentjes, ‘Orthodoxy’, 38. 
35 Brentjes, ‘Courtly Patronage’, 422. 
36 Endress, ‘Reading Avicenna’, 398. 
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converge into an ‘epistemic community of ‘ulūm ‘aqliyya’.37 In this context, he too challenges the 
traditional reading of al-Āmidī’s biography. He does not specifically address the issue of 
contradictory sources. Rather, his focus is on al-Āmidī as metacritic of al-Rāzī in his criticism of 
Ibn Sīnā, and more generally, as intellectual ‘competitor’ to al-Rāzī.38 He also stresses the 
probable ‘struggle for influence’ at the Ayyūbid courts. 
My own reading of the biographical sources, in conjunction with the evidence of the analysis of 
al-Āmidī’s works conducted in this thesis, follows the trajectory of the insights offered by both 
Brentjes and Endress.  Firstly, the notion that al-Āmidī was persecuted on the basis of his 
philosophical interests alone is unlikely given what we know of the presence of philosophy in 
the mainstream learning institutions of his day across Middle East. This subject has been 
treated by several scholars including Endress and Brentjes, as well as Michot and Gutas. Gutas 
uses the autobiography of the philosopher ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī to demonstrate the 
presence of philosophy in the scholarly environment of Baghdād at the time. He demonstrates 
that manuals of ḥikma were very much part of the curriculum at the al-Madrasa al-Niẓāmiyya in 
the post-Ghazālian era. He shows that al-Ghazālī’s own philosophically oriented works, namely 
his Maqāsid and Tahāfut, were considered works of philosophy, and were studied alongside 
classical and Ghazālian works of kalām. Niẓāmiyya professors were openly interested in 
Aristotelian, Avicennan philosophy. Furthermore, we know from al-Baghdādī that Ibn Sīnā’s 
works (namely, the Shifā’ and the Najāt) were in circulation in Baghdād.39 It appears that 
opportunities to pursue philosophy were very much available in twelfth-century Baghdād, 
where al-Āmidī began his engagement with philosophy. 
As both Endress and Brentjes have demonstrated, this is no less true of twelfth-century Ayyūbid 
Syria, where al-Āmidī composed the majority of his philosophical and theological works. 
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Indeed, Brentjes shows that the Ayyūbid dynasty gave comparatively greater patronage to 
scholars of the ancient sciences than other contemporary dynasties. On the basis of Ibn Abī 
Uṣaybī‘a’s biographical accounts of various scholars involved in the ancient sciences, she draws 
attention to Ḥamā and Damascus as sites of great interest in philosophical learning, and 
describes the importance of the availability of al-Rāzī’s works at the Damascene court for 
debate on the heritage of Ibn Sīnā. In this context, it is unsurprising that some of al-Āmidī’s 
biographers describe his time at Ḥamā as some of his most peaceful and productive years in 
pursuit of philosophy. His dedication of his Kashf, with its overtly philosophical orientation, to 
an Ayyūbid ruler suggests that his philosophical activities were conducted with the backing of 
the court. Furthermore, Brentjes shows that al-Ashraf, the very ruler at whose hands al-Āmidī 
was dismissed from his scholarly position, in fact continued to surround himself with scholars 
of the philosophical sciences.40 In addition, we know that al-Rāzī’s works continued to be freely 
circulated, and his students to enjoy courtly patronage, after al-Āmidī’s demise. All this 
compounds the impression that al-Āmidī’s fall from favour is not attributable to his 
engagement with the philosophical sciences.  
My analysis of al-Āmidī’s works confirms that the anti-philosophy trope of the biographical 
sources is unlikely to reflect reality. The trend of traditional scholarship to seize upon al-Āmidī 
as an exemplar of the persecuted philosopher does not make sense against the evidence of his 
extant works. Specifically, the notion that al-Āmidī was dismissed from his position in the 
madrasa at Damascus because of his interest in philosophy does not align with the attitude 
towards philosophy expressed in the works for which he is best known, and which would 
certainly have been known during his latter years in Damascus, namely his Abkār al-afkār and 
Ghāyat al-marām. I will show that despite the deep influence of Ibn Sīnā’s most original 
metaphysical ideas on al-Āmidī’s thought, these later works of theology represent a 
conservative reaction to the more comprehensive integration of falsafī doctrine and methods 
into kalām discourse represented by al-Rāzī. For instance, unlike his peer, al-Āmidī resists the 
restructuring of theology to allow for the separate treatment of matters pertaining to existence 
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per se. Al-Āmidī names al-Rāzī mutafalsafat al-islām, and this is not mere rhetoric, but a 
fundamental criticism of al-Rāzī’s integration of the traditions. I will show that al-Rāzī’s works 
are far more accommodating of Avicennan doctrine and method than al-Āmidī’s most mature 
works. Given al-Āmidī’s relative conservatism, it therefore seems unlikely that al-Āmidī’s 
engagement with philosophy alone would have precipitated his ill-treatment at the hands of 
the Ayyūbid rulers. 
To confirm this finding, I have also considered the evidence of the biographical accounts 
pertaining to ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī offered by those scholars who also provide accounts of 
the life of al-Āmidī. As Gutas has shown, al-Baghdādī was freely engaged in philosophy. The two 
scholars were contemporaries who both studied and worked in Baghdad and Damascus. Both 
studied Shāfi‘ī law under Ibn Faḍlān, and both were well known to Ibn Abī Uṣaybī‘a, who writes 
of the friendship between his grandfather, uncle and father and al-Baghdādī, and between his 
father and al-Āmidī. Both travelled extensively and both are well known for their pursuit of 
philosophy. If al-Āmidī truly faced accusations of heresy and bad doctrine on the basis of his 
interest in philosophy alone, we might expect his biographers to record similar accusations 
against his peer. Unlike al-Āmidī, however, al-Baghdādī’s interest in philosophy is never 
critiqued in the available biographical sources. His activities as a ḥadīth scholar are lauded, and 
the religious role thus assumed by him not described as compromised by his pursuit of 
philosophy. This makes it even less likely that al-Āmidī’s difficulties are attributable to his 
philosophical interests alone.  
Endress stresses the importance of al-Āmidī’s opposition to al-Rāzī as a source of conflict in his 
life. The analysis of al-Āmidī’s works of falsafa and kalām which constitutes the remainder of 
this thesis has revealed the fundamental importance of al-Āmidī’s response to al-Rāzī for the 
course of his own intellectual career, thus extending Endress’ insights. A key finding of this 
thesis is that al-Āmidī’s intellectual opposition to al-Rāzī is the most pervasive, persistent 
feature of his thought. This observation applies as much to his Kashf, where his driving agenda 
is not the defence of Ibn Sīnā but the simple quest to undermine al-Rāzī as a reader of Ibn Sīnā, 
as to his Abkār al-afkār, where al-Āmidī repeatedly refutes arguments for doctrines which he 
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himself upholds, apparently simply because they have been devised by al-Rāzī. Of all his 
biographers, Ibn Wāṣil shows the greatest awareness of this fact, and I find his comments 
regarding the exaggerated nature of al-Āmidī’s opposition to and defamation of al-Rāzī to 
concur with the evidence of the works themselves. Specific examples of the way in which al-
Āmidī receives al-Rāzī will be provided in the chapters to come. For now, suffice it to note that 
al-Āmidī consistently refers to his peer in a manner intended to undermine. We have seen that 
in his Abkār, al-Āmidī refers to al-Rāzī as ‘mutafalsafat al-islām’, and that despite the total 
dissimilarity of the Kashf to the Abkār in other respects, al-Āmidī’s goal there is to expose logical 
errors of ‘he who has become famous for drawing attention to [the philosophical sciences]’.41 
This makes it likely that Ibn Wāṣil’s version of events surrounding al-Āmidī’s unpopularity at 
the Damascene court contains a core of truth. Al-Āmidī is certainly motivated by opposition to 
al-Rāzī, and this may well have been a factor in his difficulties in Ayyūbid Syria. 
More speculatively, it seems possible that al-Āmidī’s character was a factor in his unpopularity 
(as implied by Brentjes). A persistent idea underlying many of the sources that al-Āmidī made 
enemies easily. Frequent references to ‘envy’ – either al-Āmidī’s own, or that of his opponents 
for his achievements – pepper the sources. The verse most commonly cited in connection with 
Āmidī reads: 
Ḥassadū al-fatā idh lam yanālū sa‘yahu 
Fa-l-qawmu a‘dā’un lahu wa-khuṣūmu42 
(They envied the young man for they had not achieved like him 
To him they were opponents, and his enemies) 
Al-Āmidī’s propensity to controversy may be owed partly to his having been a rather difficult 
individual. In combination with his intellectual opposition to an individual who turns out to 
have been more influential, this could have caused al-Āmidī quite significant problems. 
However, this suggestion must remain speculative. What can be argued more definitively is that 
the course of al-Āmidī’s career, especially in Ayyūbid Syria, was determined by issues 
surrounding patronage and support. The Kashf is perhaps the clearest testament to the fact that 
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al-Āmidī’s intellectual opposition to al-Rāzī was motivated in part by competition over 
patronage and the struggle for influence at court. The fact of the work’s dedication to an 
Ayyūbid ruler, in conjunction with its project of undermining al-Rāzī as an intellectual, 
together demonstrate this fact. Precisely how the competition for patronage featured in al-
Āmidī’s fall from favour in the court at Damascus cannot, however, be reconstructed. 
Despite the conclusions drawn so far, which concur with those of Brentjes and Endress, the 
persistent anti-philosophy motif in the biographical accounts cannot be ignored. At this 
juncture, observations made by Brockopp, in his study of the multiple biographical accounts for 
the early Malikī scholar Sahnūn b. Sa‘īd (d. 240/854), are relevant. Brockopp argues that 
biographical accounts of exemplary figures often contain contradictory information which 
reflect the concerns of the biographers, and that the mistake of modern readers is to treat such 
contradictions ‘simply as problems to be resolved’ in establishing the facts about an individual’s 
life. He argues that the contradictory aspects of such accounts often represent the biographers’ 
imaginary, indicating the ways in which their subjects have been perceived as exemplary.43 
Brockopp focuses on individuals who are positively idealised in contradictory ways, but his 
analysis is also important in the case of al-Āmidī. Though the anti-philosophical motif is not 
used to elevate al-Āmidī’s status, we may well read its presence as part of a trend to make an 
example of al-Āmidī’s life story in relation to ongoing tensions between the traditions of falsafa 
and kalām. 
As I will demonstrate in the course of the thesis, al-Āmidī’s thought is marked by his grappling 
for the appropriate balance between the integration of the most compelling aspects of the 
philosophical sciences, and the maintenance of the parameters of classical kalām. Although it is 
true that philosophy was entering the mainstream across the twelfth-century Middle East, this 
is not to say that its status as natural companion to kalām theology was settled. And although I 
have agreed with Brentjes et al that the accusations apparently levelled against al-Āmidī should 
not be taken at face value, their very presence in even the earliest sources suggests that the 
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perceived tension between the traditions did not immediately cease to exist upon the entrance 
of falsafa into the madrasa. Though al-Ghazālī did not bring an end to philosophy in the Islamic 
world, al-Āmidī’s biography testifies to the fact that the tension between the traditions 
persisted, albeit with greater complexity. The presence of an ongoing Tahāfut style trend of 
polemics against the philosophers, among scholars such as al-Balkhī, demonstrates this well.44 
It seems that it was still the order of the day to critique an intellectual with the language of the 
tension between falsafa and kalām. So whilst the traditional reading which sees al-Āmidī’s 
experiences as testimony to the persecution of philosophically engaged intellectuals does not 
hold true, it may well be true that when al-Āmidī found himself in dispute with other scholars 
(whatever the cause), his contemporaries attributed those disputes to his engagement in 
philosophy. On this reading, the presence of the anti-philosophy motif, though not reflective of 
a general hostility towards philosophy, may indicate the ongoing ambiguity of the status of 
falsafa among contemporary (and later) intellectuals. The relationship between developments 
in philosophical theology in the Islamic world, and attitudes towards philosophy on the part of 
biographical historians of the Islamic world, is a subject worthy of research beyond this project. 
The ongoing presence of complexity in the relationship between the traditions of falsafa and 
kalām is, however, hardly surprising. Intellectuals like al-Āmidī, working at the boundaries of 
the traditions, dealt with major theological questions arising at the encounter of two alien 
worldviews. A specific instance of one such theological challenge, namely, the question of 
creation, occupies the remainder of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Concepts of Creation in al-Āmidī’s Intellectual Context 
‘If God’s work is not voluntary, 
 God’s personality is destroyed’ 45  
A cardinal principle of Islamic theology, past and present, and in all its forms, is the deep 
conviction that behind the reality in which we find ourselves is a cause – a power singularly 
responsible for the existence of all else. This, of course, is the cornerstone of the Qur’anic 
worldview, the axiom of its chapter and verse. As is plain in present-day debates between 
literalist and progressive Creationists and theistic Evolutionists, however, what it means for the 
cosmos to be caused, and precisely what that cause is like, are ever subject to interpretation. 
The broadest landscape in which this thesis finds its home is the history of the quest for the 
identity of the world’s cause, or in other words, the quest to account for what ‘Creation’ and the 
‘Creator’ really are. Of course, the project is much more local than this expansive question. Yet 
it is helpful to keep this bigger picture in view. 
The contribution of this thesis is a detailed analysis of a single theologian’s integration of two 
distinct paradigms for the relationship between the world and its cause. My starting point is an 
introductory exposition of these paradigms. In this chapter I account for two antithetical 
visions of the God-World relationship. These are, on the one hand, the classical Ash‘arī notion 
of creation, and on the other, Ibn Sīnā’s. I argue that divergent notions of what determines an 
existent’s need for a cause underly the disparity between these two visions.46 I explain how 
these competing conceptions of creation are expressed within, respectively, a metaphysical 
framework - Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and necessary of existence (Section 1), 
and a physical theoretical framework - Ash‘arī atomism (Section 2). I also provide reflections on 
how these distinct doctrines of creation embrace, in their own ways, the Qur’anic worldview (in 
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Section 3). This analysis provides the appropriate framework within which to consider the 
situation of al-Āmidī’s thought with regard to the theologies of creation in his milieu. 
1. Ibn Sīnā’s Conception of Creation  
I begin by explaining how Ibn Sīnā’s belief in the world’s eternity is grounded in his 
metaphysics, focusing on his Shifā’. Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation can be understood as the 
outcome of his theory on the different modes in which the world and its cause exist, and of his 
understanding of the relationship between the two kinds of existent. It is therefore his 
distinction between the possible and necessary of existence which is the primary context for 
his doctrine of creation.  
Ibn Sīnā is rightly famed for his distinction between the existent whose essence determines 
neither its existence nor its non-existence, and which is therefore ‘possible of existence by 
virtue of itself’ (mumkin al-wujūd li-dhātihi), and the existent the essence of which determines 
that it must exist, and which is therefore ‘necessary of existence by virtue of itself’ (wājib al-
wujūd li-dhātihi). The distinction is central to Ibn Sīnā’s entire metaphysical system. It brings 
coherence to the various discussions subsumed within his study of the existent qua existent, 
uniting investigation of the Godhead with study of all other aspects of the existent, among 
which, for instance, unity and multiplicity and causality.47 So fundamental is the distinction 
that in the Ilāhiyyāt of his Shifā’, it appears second only to the discussion of the existent itself.48 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this concept for the coherent Islamic philosophical 
theology set forth by Ibn Sīnā. Indeed, Ibn Sīnā’s applications of his theory include his proof for 
the existence of a being which is Necessary of Existence,49 his identification of this being with 
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the Qur‘ānic God,50 his defence of the uniqueness of God among the numerous pre-eternal 
beings of his Neoplatonic cosmology,51 and his doctrine of the pre-eternity of the world.52  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is Ibn Sīnā’s applications of his ontology within his doctrine of 
creation which concern us, and of which I now provide a preliminary account to be expanded 
upon in the next chapter. For Ibn Sīnā, the possible of existence is that whose essence does not 
determine its existence. This means that according to Ibn Sīnā, the world’s property of 
requiring a cause is a function of the possibility of the essences of which it is constituted. This 
position is contrastable with the classical kalām understanding that the world requires a cause 
for its existence because at one time, it did not exist. On Ibn Sīnā’s understanding, despite its 
posited eternity, the world is unlike God in that it is caused, since by virtue of itself, existence 
does not belong to it. God, by contrast, is uncaused not simply because he has always existed, 
but because non-existence is incompatible with his very essence.53  
According to Ibn Sīnā, the only valid relationship between the Necessary of Existence and the 
possible essences upon which he bestows existence is the relationship between a necessitating 
efficient cause and its effect. Ibn Sīnā holds that the effect relies on its efficient cause for its 
existence alone, and throughout the duration of its existence.54 This is contrasted with the 
notion that the effect relies on its efficient cause only for the bestowal of existence after non-
existence, which has led ‘some to think that a thing is in need of the cause for its origination 
alone, but that once it is originated… it no longer needs a cause’.55  
Having established that effects do not rely on their efficient causes for their origination and 
thus, that ‘true causes’ (al-‘ilal al-ḥaqīqiyya) coexist with their effects, Ibn Sīnā posits a hierarchy 
of efficient metaphysical causes. He distinguishes between a form of causality in which the 
																																																						
50 Ibn Sīnā, Najāt, 2, 89-94; Ilāhiyyāt, I.6-7, 29-38 and VIII.4-7, 273-298; Ishārāt, IV.16-29, 456-483. Wisnovsky aptly 
describes Ibn Sīnā’s notion of necessity as ‘the grab-bag of intransitive divine qualities’ (Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna and 
the Avicennian Tradition’, 120).  
51  Ibn Sīnā, Ta‘līqāt, 28, 54. 
52 Ibn Sīnā, Najāt, 2, 69-70, 75-76; Ilāhiyyāt. IX.1, 299-309; Ishārāt, V.1-9, 485-525. 
53 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, I.6, 29-34. 
54 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, VI.1 and VI.2, especially 196-198 and 201-2. 
55 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, VI.1, 198; c.f. Ṭabī‘iyyāt, I.12, 1, 80.  
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cause produces its effect from pre-eternity, and one in which the effect of the agent comes to 
exist after not having existed. The former he describes as the ‘pre-eminent [kind of] cause (awlā 
bi-l-‘illiyya) because it prevents the nonexistence of the thing absolutely’.56 The next (and more 
controversial) step taken by Ibn Sīnā  is to define this kind of causality as ‘Creation’ (ibdā‘), with 
reference to the fact that it is the ‘giving of existence to a thing after absolute non-existence’ 
(ta’yīs al-shay’ ba‘d lays muṭlaq), preventing non-existence entirely.57  Despite the terminological 
difference (the theologians normally refer to ījād al-shay’ ba‘d al-‘adam), the echo of language 
used by the theologians to express the primacy of God as Maker of a world created ex nihilo is 
clear and probably deliberate.  
Later in the Metaphysics, Ibn Sīnā proves that the permanent, eternal efficient causation which 
he defines as ‘Creation’ is the only sound explanation for the manner of God’s existentiation of 
the world. He first comments that the principles already established in relation to the nature of 
the Necessary of Existence, and of the efficient-cause effect relationship, ought to suffice the 
reader in understanding that the effect of the Necessary of Existence must co-exist with it pre-
eternally. However, he proceeds to an extensive disjunction ad absurdum, by which he 
establishes that the world is pre-eternal. This is particularly to the exclusion of the scenario 
imagined by the theologians, in which, prior to God’s bestowal of existence upon the world, the 
world is actually non-existent. Ibn Sīnā contrasts the theologians’ view with his own, in which 
the Necessary of Existence, which permanently exists because its essence is to exist, 
permanently bestows, via that essence and without intermediary or delay, existence which is 
likewise permanent, that is to say, pre-eternal and perpetual.58 
Finally, and crucially for subsequent philosophical-theological discussions on creation, in his 
analysis of the nature of necessary existence, Ibn Sīnā islamicises Neo-Platonic conceptions of 
the world’s cause in a manner not found in the thought of any predecessor. Since, for Ibn Sīnā, 
the Necessary of Existence is absolutely simple, God is entirely immaterial and therefore pure 
																																																						
56 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, VI.2, 203. 
57 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, VI.2, 203-204. 
58 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, IX.1, 300-307.  
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intellect. In line with his absolute simplicity, God’s intellect is identical with his existence.59 And 
since God is unlike humans in that his knowledge is absolutely perfect, there is no distinction 
between his knowledge and his action (indeed, they are identical). Accordingly, Ibn Sīnā defines 
God’s volition as the unhindered effect of his knowledge, identical with emanation itself.60 Thus 
Ibn Sīnā is able to define the eternal necessitating cause of the universe as voluntary – a 
crucially innovative step for an Islamic philosopher, and one which would shape the course of 
subsequent debates. I will later show that in subsequent discussions, the question of whether or 
not the notion of permanent, essential, efficient causation envisioned by Ibn Sīnā is correctly 
described as ‘creation’ and as ‘agency’ causes a shift in the axis of Ash‘arī discussions of 
creation. 
Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine that the world is eternal is, then, a function of his understanding of God as 
the metaphysical efficient cause of the world’s existence.61 This means that the foundations of 
his doctrine of creation, and the primary philosophical framework within which it is set forth, 
are metaphysical. This can be contrasted in some respects with the primary framework within 
which the classical Ash‘arī understanding of the world’s creation is set forth. 
2. The Classical Ash‘arī Conception of Creation 
The second of the two paradigms for the explanation of creation within al-Āmidī’s primary 
intellectual context is that of classical Ash‘arism. For classical Ash‘arīs, the physical theoretical 
model of atoms and accidents provided the main framework within which the world’s 
dependence on its cause was established. 
																																																						
59 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, VIII.6, 284-5. 
60 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, VIII.7, 291-6, especially 295; and see Rahman, ‘Ibn Sīnā’s Theory’, 49; and Adamson’s study of Ibn 
Sīnā’s characterisation of the Necessary of Existence with the qualities of the Islamic God, among which, his volition 
(Adamson, ‘From the Necessary Existent’). 
61 On the Aristotelian background to Ibn Sīnā’s notion of efficient causation, and on Ibn Sīnā’s innovation in making 
God both final and efficient cause of the world, see Wisnovsky, ‘Final and Efficient Causality’. 
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The following figure is derived from a passage in al-Anṣārī’s (d. 512/1118) al-Ghunya fī uṣūl al-dīn, 
and neatly illustrates the overall ontology accepted by all classical Ash‘arī scholars.62  
Objects of Knowledge 
(ma‘lūmāt) 
                                      
                                 Existents                                                                  Non-Existents 
                              (mawjūdāt)                                                                     (ma‘dūmāt) 
 
 
The Eternal Existent                                Temporally Originated Existents 
       (qadīm)                                                          (muḥdathāt)  
 
  
                                                               
                                                              Substance                    Accident 
                                                               (jawhar)                        (‘araḍ) 
Figure 1.    
 
Al-Ash‘arī and his followers uphold two kinds of existent. The primary duality of existents is 
not, however, necessarily and possibly existent but the dichotomy between eternality and 
temporality. The extent to which Ash‘arī mutakallimūn insisted on the distinction cannot be 
overstated. Ibn Fūrak cites al-Ash‘arī as having claimed that ‘a necessary property of the 
existent (al-wājib fī ḥukm al-mawjūd) is that it either has a beginning, or is beginningless.’63 The 
eternal existent is described as ‘the absolute existent’ (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq), with reference to 
the fact that it is not subject to non-existence, and contrasted in this regard with temporally 
originated existents.64 Al-Isfarā’īnī describes the eternal as that whose ‘non-existence is 
impossible’.65 This expression demonstrates the total identification of past eternality with 
necessity among classical Ash‘arīs. By contrast, temporally originated existents are not 
absolute, being subject to actual non-existence. They are therefore not necessary, and so 
																																																						
62 Al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 279-280. 
63 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 32. He also writes of originatedness (ḥudūth) as ‘one of the two predications of existence (min 
waṣfay al-wujūd) (27). On predications in Ash‘arī kalām, see Frank, ‘The Ash‘arite Ontology’, 178-181. 
64 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 28. 
65 Isfarā’īnī, ‘Aqīda, 138. 
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inferior to the eternal existent. Within al-Ash‘arī’s system, temporal existents are those which 
require a cause. For al-Ash‘arī, the term muḥdath is synonymous with the term makhlūq 
(created). That which undergoes non-existence must be created if it is to exist at all.66 On this 
understanding, the need for cause is associated with an actual state of non-existence (and not, 
as in Ibn Sīnā’s system, with mere susceptibility to non-existence). Within the Ash‘arī ontology, 
an existent’s need for a cause is entailed by its temporal impermanence. 
The Ash‘arī notion of causedness thus far explained is metaphysical, which is to say that it is 
premised on the metaphysical postulate that that which comes to exist after not existing requires 
a cause. Nevertheless, among classical Ash‘arīs, the world’s need for a cause was almost 
exclusively established within a natural philosophical framework. For classical Ash‘arīs, the 
division of temporally originated existents into substance and accident was exhaustive.67 Al-
Ash‘arī defines the world as ‘all created things, both substances and accidents’ (jumlat al-
makhlūqāt jawāhiruhā wa-a‘rāḍuhā). 68  Given that the jawhar is defined as the space-occupying 
existent (al-mutaḥayyiz), and the accident as that which inheres in a substrate (namely, 
substance), the presence of temporally originated beings which do not exist in space (i.e. 
immaterial beings) is precluded.69 That is to say that Ash‘arī atomism presents an entirely 
materialistic view of the realm of existence outside God. An obvious implication is that in order 
to prove the temporal origination (and therefore causedness) of the world, one need only prove 
the temporal origination of substances and accidents. This explains the high importance of the 
atomist doctrine in Ash‘arī expressions of the world’s contingency. Though the world’s 
causedness is an inherently metaphysical matter, the nature of atoms and accidents is absolutely 
fundamental to its establishment.  
																																																						
66 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 28.  
67 Early Ash‘arīs tended to discuss substance, accident, and body (jism) as categories of temporal existents. The body 
is an aggregate of substances, and therefore not a primary division. Al-Juwaynī seems, however, to have been the 
first Ash‘arī mutakallim to uphold the primacy of the substance/accident dichotomy. 
68 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 37; c.f. al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 17. 
69 The existence of eternal immaterial beings other than God is precluded separately, in discussions of the 
impossibility of the existence of more than one creator, e.g. al-Ash‘arī, Luma‘, 20-21; al-Mutawallī, Mughnī, 9. 
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Ash‘arī atomism therefore provided the essential framework with which to prove the world’s 
creation ex nihilo, and thence its need for a cause. This was chiefly accomplished via the proof 
from accidents, the ‘kalām proof par excellence’ for the temporal creation of the world, or in al-
Āmidī’s words, ‘the famous method of our school’ (al-madhhāb al-mashhūr li-aṣḥābinā).70 This 
proof, discussed in detail in Chapter 5, relies on several key tenets of Ash‘arī atomism, including 
the non-endurance of accidents, the impossibility of substance existing devoid of accidents, and 
the temporal origination of atoms. In the case of many works of classical kalām, the use of the 
proof from accidents is formalised to the extent that the atomist doctrine is defended exclusively 
in the context of this proof.  
Ibn Fūrak, in his Mujarrad, claims that al-Ash‘arī said the following concerning the doctrine that 
matter is ultimately composed of indivisible parts: 
Whoever claims monotheism (al-tawḥīd) [but] denies this is equivalent, in his denial of 
matter’s indivisibility, to the non-believer.71 
This association of anti-atomism with unbelief reflects the deep-rooted significance of Ash‘arī 
physical theory for the core theology of the tradition. Here, it is the finitude of matter in terms 
of its divisibility which is seen to entail its dependence on a cause. Yet the more important 
dimension of matter’s finitude for the Ash‘arīs is its temporal finitude, that is, its being 
originated from absolute non-existence. Within the atomistic vision of the universe, creation is 
not the realisation of some inherent potential, but the production of stuff from absolute 
nothingness.  Accordingly, establishing the temporal finitude of the constituents of the world is 
fundamental to proving its need for a cause. It is only on the basis that matter comes to be from 
nothing that creation as understood in the tradition can be said to occur. Physical theory is thus 
paramount to the Ash‘arī theological project. 72 
																																																						
70 Abkār, 3, 335. See Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 134-146 for a summary of uses of the proof. 
71 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 211.  
72 The introduction to the Ishāra, the earliest kalām work of al-Rāzī, who I will show ultimately departs from the 
classical Ash‘arī understanding of causedness, confirms the theological function of physical theory: ‘the questions of 
this science are either creedal doctrines such as establishing the eternity and unicity of the Creator, or matters upon 
which these doctrines depend, such as matter’s composition of indivisible parts’ (Ishāra, 28). 
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A qualifying observation is in order. I have emphasised that atomism provides the primary basis 
for establishing the world’s creation ex nihilo, and thence its causedness, among classical 
Ash‘arīs. Yet the Ash‘arī understanding of possibility is also a significant thread within the 
schools’s conception of causedness. The concept of possibility as the presence of multiple 
synchronic alternatives allows the classical Ash‘arīs to posit the need for a particularising agent 
(a voluntary Creator) to specify each of the attributes of the world, most prominently its 
creation at a specific moment in time. Thus, my stress on the dominance of physical theory as 
the framework within which Ash‘arīs establish creation ex nihilo should not obscure the role of 
the classical Ash‘arīs’ own metaphysics of possibility. The importance of this observation will 
become clear in the next chapter, where al-Āmidī is shown to draw on the teaching of classical 
Ash‘arism in his reception of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics of possibility. My claim is not, then, that 
classical Ash‘arīs have exclusively physical theoretical foundations for their understanding of 
creation -  I have stressed that the notion that the temporal origination of an existent 
determines its need for a cause is a metaphysical belief. My point is that Ash‘arī physical theory 
provides the framework within which the world’s causedness (via its temporal origination) is 
established. It can therefore be viewed as equivalent to Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics as a context for 
the development of a doctrine of creation.  
In order to demonstrate the great consistency between generations of classical Ash‘arīs with 
regard to the procedure for proving creation ex nihilo, I now provide a survey of arguments for 
creation employed within a selection of Ash‘arī summae. The purpose is to illustrate the 
dominance of physical theory within the defence of creation. Secondarily, it will become clear 
that since classical Ash‘arīs understood an existent’s being caused as determined by its 
temporal originatedness, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo served as the crucial premise in 
proofs for a cause of the world. Furthermore, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo served, often 
simultaneously, to establish that the world’s cause is possessed of volition (irāda).73 In this 
regard, the importance of the principle of particularisation is also exemplified. 
																																																						
73 The doctrine of creation ex nihilo also serves the Mu‘tazila in proving God’s existence, and is also predominantly 
established among them via the proof from accidents; the first appearance of the proof among the mutakallimūn 
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Abū l-Ḥassan al-Ash‘arī (d. 324/936) 
Despite being the eponymous founder of the tradition, there is greater discontinuity between 
al-Ash‘arī and subsequent classical Ash‘arīs in methodology than occurs at later stages of the 
tradition. Nonetheless, his extant works contain the seeds of the more technical systematic 
theology of his disciples, as I demonstrate with regard to the doctrine of creation on the basis of 
the discussion in Kitāb al-Luma‘. 
No separate section is devoted, in the Luma‘, to proving creation ex nihilo. This is not because 
the doctrine is not present, but because it is established within al-Ash‘arī’s proof for God. The 
proof relies on the scripturally-inspired example of the origination of man from a drop of 
sperm.74 It is argued that man is no more capable of conveying (naqala) himself from the state of 
a sperm droplet to that of a fully developed human than of conveying himself from old-age to 
youthfulness. Thus, there must be something which conveys (nāqil) man from one state to the 
next, identified as God himself.75 This argument entails a denial of natural potency of any kind, 
demanding God’s constant intervention in physical processes, in line with al-Ash‘arī’s 
occasionalist commitments.76 It also relies on the principle that the changing characteristics of 
existents require a particularising cause, being unable to self-differentiate from other possible 
characteristics. It is therefore to this point an argument proceeding from the changeability of 
the world’s constituents to the existence of an agent of change, and creation ex nihilo is not 
entailed. The need for an agent of change in the atoms of human bodies does not alone entail 
the temporal origination of the world, nor of the human race; one could postulate an infinite 
regress of the life-cycle sperm-human-sperm, maintained by God’s continual intervention.  
However, al-Ash‘arī does hold that creation as a whole is temporally originated. He does not 
directly address the possibility of an infinite regress of temporally originated occurrences, but 
																																																						
appears to have been with Abū l-Hudhayl (cited by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in Sharḥ al-uṣūl, 95; c.f. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 
134-5). For ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s version, see Sharḥ al-uṣūl, 95-115. 
74 Q23:12-14; 22:5; 32:7-9. 
75 Al-Ash‘arī, Luma‘, 6. 
76 See Davidson, ‘Arguments from the Concept’, 309, on the relationship between Ash‘arī proofs for God and 
occasionalism. 
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in response to an imagined opponent who suggests that mankind could have originated from a 
first, eternal drop of sperm, he argues that sperm must be temporally originated, since nothing 
which is subject to change is eternal. Furthermore, existents which cannot precede that which 
is temporally originated (in this case the atoms of the body, which cannot procede the sperm 
from which they are produced) are themselves temporally originated. Al-Ash‘arī adds that the 
proof from change against the eternity of sperm applies to all bodies.77 Al-Ash‘arī’s view is that 
a world comprised entirely of temporally originated bodies must itself be temporally 
originated, the product of a particularising Creator. The principle that the existent which is not 
devoid of temporally originated existents must itself be temporally originated is central to the 
proof from accidents, as we shall see.78   
Al-Ash‘arī’s proof for God is premised upon the world’s inherent temporality, proven by its 
changeability. The argumentative strategy of the Luma‘, where defence of the existence of the 
Creator and of the temporal origination of the world appear as one, testifies to the close 
relation between the doctrines. The changeability of the human and of all bodies proves 
simultaneously the world’s originatedness, the existence of its cause, and the nature of its 
cause. The significance of reflection on the physical world in defence of its need for a cause is 
clear, and related to the more methodological treatments of this subject among later Ash‘arīs. 
Early Classical Ash‘arism 
Proofs for creation and the existence of God become formalised among Ash‘arīs of the next 
generation. The following discussion of the relevant parts of Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-
Bāqillānī’s (d. 403/1013) Kitāb al-Tamhīd, and ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī’s (d. 429/1037) Uṣūl al-
																																																						
77 Al-Ash‘arī, Luma‘, 7. I disagree with Davidson that this is a version of the proof from accidents (Davidson, Proofs for 
Eternity, 136). 
78 A similar argument appears in al-Ash‘arī’s Risāla ilā ahl al-thagr, where, on the basis that ‘no changeable thing is 
eternal’ he ultimately concludes that ‘the change [which occurs to] bodies must terminate at temporally originated 
entities before which no bodies existed’, adding that this ‘proves a wise, powerful originator’ (Risāla, 144-6). Al-
Ash‘arī does not provide an argument for his claim that a temporally originated world requires a cause (unlike 
subsequent generations of Ash‘arīs). This suggests that he holds that this is an item of immediate knowledge. 
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dīn illustrates the role of physical theory within their thought, and the intrinsic connection 
between the doctrines of creation ex nihilo and of the existence of a volitional Creator.  
Despite differences in method, in each of the works, creation ex nihilo appears as an explicit 
premise of the proof for the Creator (and therefore, structurally, proof for creation precedes 
proof for the creator). Al-Bāqillānī uses the proof from accidents, which relies upon several 
tenets of kalām physical theory, to establish the world’s temporal origination.79 His proof for the 
Creator begins ‘this temporally originated, well-designed world requires an originator and 
designer (lā budd li-hādhihi l-‘ālam al-muḥdath al-muṣawwar muḥdith muṣawwir)’.80 For al-Bāqillānī, 
the world’s origination at a particular point in time is one of a host of characteristics possessed 
by the world which in themselves are only possible, which is to say that they could be 
otherwise. The specification of the time of the world’s creation in particular (for which the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo is essential), as well as its characteristics of dimension, shape, and 
so on, all point to the existence of a volitional particulariser. This is because al-Bāqillānī holds it 
to be impossible for an occurrence for which there are multiple synchronic alternatives to 
cause itself. Since the world could have been originated five minutes before it was or five 
hundred years after, it cannot have caused its own origination, since there would have been no 
factor particularising the time of that origination.81  
 Thus, just as for al-Ash‘arī the changing characteristics of humankind and the world, and their 
initial creation ex nihilo establish both the existence of a cause and its nature, so for al-Bāqillānī, 
the specific characteristics of the world, pre-eminently its originatedness at a given time, 
establish both the existence of the world’s cause and its attribute of volition. The world is seen 
																																																						
79 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 22-23. 
80Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 23. 
81 Craig describes this as the ‘principle of determination’, and sees it as key to the ‘unique genius’ of the kalam 
formulation of the cosmological argument in establishing that the world’s cause is a freely acting personal deity 
(Craig, ‘Design and the Cosmological Argument’, 34-339). 
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to depend both for its initial creation and for its ongoing particularised existence, upon a 
voluntary Creator.82  
For al-Baghdādī, too, creation ex nihilo is proven via the proof from accidents, and the existence 
of a voluntary creator on the basis of the world’s creation in time.83 He too argues that 
‘temporally originated things must have an originator’, and in the subsequent discussion that 
such an originator must be possessed of volition, given the particularisation of the world’s 
existence at one time over another, and the remainder of the world’s particularised 
characteristics.84  
Late Classical Ash‘arism 
Al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) is the most influential theologian of this period and the works of a 
number of other late classical Ash‘arīs closely depend on his. Variations between al-Bāqillānī’s 
version of the proof from accidents and al-Juwaynī’s have been well documented by Davidson 
and others.85 For our purposes, it is sufficient to observe the predominance of the proof from 
accidents, with its reliance on atomist physical theory.86 Like his predecessor, al-Juwaynī 
																																																						
82 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 23-4. Al-Bāqillānī uses three proofs for the Creator with this same premise. In a subsequent 
section, he writes: ‘temporal occurrences only depend on an originator with respect to their temporal 
originatedness’ (al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 25). Elsewhere, proving God’s entitative attribute of volition, he states: ‘The 
existence of temporal occurences, whose nature is [that they can not exist at one time and exist at another], has no 
greater priority than their non-existence except whether there is the intention of an intendor (qaṣd al-qāṣid) and the 
will of a willer by whose will they exist in connection with his plan’ (Tamhīd, 29). The dependence of his affirmation 
of a volitional Creator upon his notion of the world’s temporal originatedness and ongoing changeability is clear.  
Davidson rightly observes that the reasoning of al-Bāqillānī’s proof from particularisation ‘is not really dependent on 
the proof of creation to which [he] joins it’, since according to the principle of particularisation, the specific 
characteristics of even an eternal world would require a cause (Davidson, ‘Arguments from the Concept of 
Particularisation’, 301). However, it appears to me that the world’s origination at a particular time is seen by al-
Bāqillānī as its prime characteristic pointing to its need for a particulariser. This is seen in his analogy of a piece of 
writing requiring an author to particularise its origination over its non-existence. 
83 Al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl, 33-60 (proof from accidents); 68-69 (proof for the creator). 
84 Al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl, 68.  
85 Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 143-6. One new feature is the way in which al-Juwaynī establishes the existence of 
accidents. Al-Juwaynī argues that the characteristics of things, being inherently possible, require a cause. 
Specifically, he argues that the behaviours and characteristics of substances in the world around us are only possible 
(min al-mumkināt). Thence, he argues that possibles (al-ḥukm al-jā’iz), if their existence is to be realised, require a 
necessitator, which he demonstrates to be the necessitating accidents inhering within substance (Irshād, 17-18). The 
Ash‘arī conception of possibility, key to proofs for God, is embedded within al-Juwaynī’s proof from accidents for 
creation ex nihilo.  
86 Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 17-27. 
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premises his proof for the creator on creation ex nihilo. Although there is a sophistication in his 
thought not found among his predecessors, al-Juwaynī makes no break with the conception of 
causedness and creation he has inherited. 
He argues that ‘existence and non-existence are both possible (jā’iz) for that which is 
temporally originated’.87  He then argues that an existent so characterised, if it does come to 
exist, requires a cause to particularise its existence over its continued non-existence. This 
articulates the classical Ash‘arī doctrine that temporal originatedness (ḥudūth), that is, the 
actual presence of non-existence prior to existence, is what determines an existent’s need for a 
cause. Next, he explicitly considers what the nature of the cause of a temporally originated 
world must be. He rules out the notion that a necessitating cause or a nature could be 
responsible for a temporally originated world on the basis that the effects of such causes must 
concur temporally with their causes (al-‘illa tūjib ma‘lūlaha ‘alā l-iqtirān).88 Thus the action of such 
a cause would necessitate, in the case of the eternity of the cause, an eternal world (already 
disproven) or, on the assumption of the temporal origination of the cause, an infinite regress of 
temporally originated causes, which is impossible.89 It must, then, be the case that a temporally 
originated world is the effect of a volitional agent (fā‘il mukhtār). In al-Juwaynī’s argument, the 
function of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in establishing both the world’s need for its cause, 
and the voluntary nature of that cause, is especially clear. This represents a peak in 
articulations of this conception of causedness and creation, shortly to be subjected to 
modification in light of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation.90 
Although expressed with increasing sophistication from one generation of Ash‘arī scholars to 
the next, the conception of causedness and creation remains unchanged. This section has 
																																																						
87 Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 28. 
88 Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 28. 
89 Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 29. 
90 Alongside the major twelfth-century development of the Ash‘arī treatment of creation at the pen of al-Ghazālī 
which is key context to this thesis, a strand of Ash‘arism continues which broadly imitates the methods of al-Juwaynī 
and other classical Ash‘arīs. Al-Anṣārī’s (d. 511/1118) discussions of creation in his Ghunya are a prime example. His 
discussion of the physical theory of atoms and accidents occurs almost exclusively in the context of the proof from 
accidents (Ghunya, 1, 279-341). 
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illustrated the importance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo among classical Ash‘arīs as a 
premise of proofs for God, and that the doctrine is consistently defended within the framework 
of Ash‘arī physical theory. Later in the thesis, I demonstrate that both the utilisation of physical 
theory, and the theological function of creation ex nihilo, are impacted heavily by the influence 
of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics among post-classical Ash‘arīs. 
3. Theological Significance  
Having discussed the major competing notions of creation and causedness within al-Āmidī’s 
intellectual context, but before commencing a study of his reception of each, it is worth briefly 
relecting on what is at stake theologically. The two doctrines of creation outlined possess wide 
theological significance, and, I will argue, correlate to two contrasting approaches to the 
resolution of a theological paradox implicit to the Qur’ān. These theological ramifications merit 
reflection because al-Āmidī’s perspectives on creation represent his reception of the 
contrasting theologies implied. 
All theological speculation can be said to be the quest for an understanding of the character of 
God, and of the God-world relationship. For the Islamic theologian, the Qur’ān is a key source of 
information about God’s character and his relation to the world. and apparent contradictions 
within the Qur’ān are a major stimulus for theological debate. Abrahamov discusses two prime 
examples of the way in which apparent contradictions feature in theological discussion, 
namely, the problem of Qur’ānic anthropomorphisms, and of divine pre-determinism. In 
relation to the question of anthropomorphisms, the theologian must reconcile the Qur’ānic 
insistence on God’s ‘otherness’ from his creation (‘there is nothing like unto him’ [Q 42:11]) with 
statements which describe him in human, and even corporeal terms (‘Everything will perish 
save his face’ [Q28:88]).91  
																																																						
91 Abrahamov, ‘Theology’, 420-421; and his ‘The Bi-lā kayf doctrine’ on various theological resolutions of 
anthropomorphisms within the Qur’ān. 
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Underlying the tension between anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an and its simultaneous 
insistence on God’s transcendence is a deeper paradox which, though it calls on the reader’s 
attention less immediately, remains a major theological issue. It is the tension between the 
transcendence of God on the one hand, and his revealing himself in a way that is knowable and 
understandable to mankind, on the other. As well as being the underlying theological paradox 
behind the issue of anthropomorphisms, this tension is also the source of debate over the sense 
in which the Qur’ān is the word (kalām) of God, and the concomitant major theological issue of 
the createdness of the Qur’ān. Here, classical theologians and traditionalists were grappling to 
understand how the eternal, unchanging, transcendent God could reveal himself in the 
tangible, temporal words of the Qur’ān.92 In a very real sense, the paradox between God’s 
transcendence and his knowability is, then, one which was at the background, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, of much Islamic theological speculation. 
Kalām-falsafa polemics can be viewed from one angle to represent the battle for the most 
appropriate resolution of the paradox, even if the practitioners themselves did not articulate 
their debates in this way. Indeed, the two conceptions of causedness which are the subject of 
this thesis directly correlate to the way in which the Ash‘arī theologians on the one hand, and 
Ibn Sīnā on the other, resolve the transcendent-knowable paradox. The encounter over the 
nature of creation is not an end unto itself, but one battle-ground for the identity of the Islamic 
God. Specifically, what is at stake in discussion of creation is what it means for God to be 
‘volitional’ and ‘powerful’. These terms, intelligible for us in relation to human agents possessed 
of volition and power, are nevertheless descriptors of the transcendent God who is supposed to 
be totally unlike anything in the created order.  
The classical Ash‘arī understanding of creation reflects the school’s distinctive conception of 
what it means for the transcendent God to be ‘voluntary’ and ‘powerful’. It could be argued that 
there is nothing which more definitively characterises Ash‘arī doctrine as Ash‘arī than its vision 
																																																						
92 As Martin puts it, this was ‘essentially an argument about the ontology of divine speech in the human, creaturely 
context’ (Martin, ‘Createdness’). Watt interprets the Ash‘arī doctrine of the Qur’ān’s uncreatedness as a function of 
the school’s emphasis on God’s transcendence: ‘for al-Ash‘arī, this Eternal-in-history cannot be a creature merely, 
because of the otherness of creature from the Creator’ (Watt, ‘Early Discussions’, 104). 
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of the nature of God’s volition and power. This vision touches on the whole spectrum of Ash‘arī 
beliefs, including its most historically peculiar. Essentially, the Ash‘arī understanding of 
volition (irāda) is derived from human experience. Al-Ghazālī articulates the classical position 
when he defines volition as ‘an attribute… the essence of which is to differentiate a thing from 
its like (takhṣīṣ al-shay’ ‘an mithlihi)’ and provides the example of a man choosing between two 
identical dates.93 On this understanding, God’s relation to the effects of his power entails the 
presence of multiple synchronic alternatives for each given occurrence, and his selection of one 
over all others. This accords with the vision of creation as God’s selection of a moment, chosen 
over all others, in which he brought the world into existence. 
Yet characterising God’s volition in apparently human terms would seem to run the risk of the 
anthropomorphism which many Islamic theologians were so keen to avoid. The distinctively 
Ash‘arī solution used by classical theologians to preserve the transcendence of God whilst thus 
characterising him is to re-interpret volition and power in the case of humans. The Ash‘arīs 
curtail human volition and power, through their famous doctrine of kasb (man’s ‘performance’ 
of acts created by God).94 Temporally originated volition and power (al-irāda al-ḥāditha and al-
qudra al-ḥaditha), and the acts with which they are associated, may give man the illusion of total 
freedom over his own action, but are, in fact, created accidents. They are acts of God, created 
instant by instant as the result of his unrestricted freedom to will and act. Thus, volition can be 
defined in the case of both God and humans as an entity ‘the function of which is to 
particularise one possibility over another’.95 Yet the property (ḥukm) of God’s volition is that it 
																																																						
93 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 22-24. In his early work of kalām, the Ishāra, al-Rāzī also explicitly analogises from human to 
divine volition, arguing that the volition for something to occur cannot apply to something which already exists as 
follows: ‘do you not see that we do not find in ourselves the exercise of the volition to do that which already exists?’ 
(Ishāra, 63). 
94 Frank’s study of kalām conceptions of moral obligation provides a clear analysis of the Ash‘arī doctrine of human 
action (Frank, ‘Moral Obligation’, 207-215); also Abrahamov, ‘A Re-examination’. On Ash‘arī occasionalism as an 
expression of the school’s emphasis on God’s absolute superiority to his creation, see for instance, Fakhry, Ash’arī 
Occasionalism, 9. 
95 Abkār, 1, 301, a definition which he holds to be also applicable in the case of the created accident of human will 
(Abkār, 2, 459). 
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is eternal, and therefore uncreated, whereas all human volition is temporally originated, 
created directly by God and only acquired by the human agent.  
The desire to preserve the singularity of God’s volition and power can be seen as the impetus 
for a number of Ash‘arī doctrines, including the application of the occasionalist doctrine to 
processes observed in nature, which entails the denial of secondary causality;96 the Ash‘arī 
response to Mu‘tazilī theodicy, which prioritises defence of God’s power and freedom of action 
over belief in the objectivity of justice;97 and, most pertinently in the present context (but not 
exclusive to Ash‘arism) the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The classical Ash‘arī understanding of 
causation is thus not isolated in its theological significance. Rather, the specific conception of 
God’s relation to the acts of his power, a relation in which God chooses, through volition, and 
originates, by power, one alternative out of the multiple synchronic possible courses of action, 
is integral to the Ash‘arī understanding of the identity of the Islamic deity. This is a personal 
deity characterised by terms understood in relation to humankind, but utterly transcendent 
especially in the sense that no other existent possesses his unrestricted freedom of action. This 
dearly held vision of God informs classical Ash‘arī conceptions of causation and creation. 
Although the Qur’ān does not have the same status within Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical project as for 
the Ash‘arīs, it is true to say that Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation accords with one interpretation 
of the Qur’ān’s depiction of God. Indeed, there is a profound and deliberate theological potency 
in Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the being whose existence is necessary by virtue of its own 
essence, and beings whose existence is only possible by virtue of their essences. The description 
of the Necessary of Existence as ‘the affirmation of existence’ (ta’akkud al-wujūd) aligns 
powerfully with the Qur’ānic portrayal of God as ultimate and unique existentiator and 
sustainer of all that is. 98 By identifying the Qur’ānic God as Necessary of Existence, Ibn Sīnā gave 
philosophical expression to a major impulse of kalām rational theology – the desire to ascribe to 
God maximal glory and unique responsibility for the existence of everything else. Ibn Sīnā’s 
																																																						
96 See Frank, ‘The Structure of Created Causality’. 
97 See e.g. Legenhausen ‘Notes towards’; Ormsby, Theodicy, 17-25. 
98 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, I.7, 36. 
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distinction between the necessary and possible of existence, though its historical origins are 
not Islamic, and though it had philosophical motivations, deliberately embraces an Islamic 
worldview in that it clearly complies with the aforementioned Qur’anic formulation ‘laysa ka-
mithlihi shay’’ (there is nothing like unto Him) (Q 42:11). Ibn Sīnā’s Necessary of Existence is 
unique and essentially superior to all other existents.  
In turn, Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of God’s agency can be seen to reflect one resolution of the 
transcendent-knowable paradox - one which is distinctly unlike al-Ash‘arī’s.99  His conception of 
God’s transcendence means that for Ibn Sīnā, the words ‘voluntary’, ‘powerful’, and ‘knowing’ 
are only equivocally applied to both God and mankind. Whilst the Ash‘arīs define volition and 
power in the same way in the case of human and divine agents, qualifying this in relation to  
the createdness of human volition and power, Ibn Sīnā defines volition and power in relation to 
a divinity whose determining characteristic is his transcendent existence. Rather than taking 
his definition of ‘volition’ from human experience, Ibn Sīnā begins from his premise of God’s 
transcendent existence, and defines his volition accordingly, as we have seen, as the 
unhindered action of his existence in bestowing existence, that is, as emanation itself. The 
sense in which mankind is described as volitional is quite separate from this definition.100  
Against this background, it is unsurprising that when the creationist doctrine comes face-to-
face with Ibn Sīnā’s eternalism, it is the very issues of the nature of God’s volition, power and 
agency which come to the fore, as I will demonstrate especially in Chapter 5. Since the Ash‘arīs 
and Ibn Sīnā are in total agreement that the world indeed has a cause, the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo is transformed into a defence of the nature of the relationship between the world and 
its cause, and resultantly, of the character of God. 
																																																						
99 The Ash‘arī approach is normally contrasted with the Mu‘tazilī preservation of mankind’s free will. Yet in the post-
classical context, an appropriate contrast is with Ibn Sīnā.  
100 See al-Rāzī’s explanation of Ibn Sīnā’s view that divine volition cannot be defined on the basis of human volition in 
Maṭālib, 3, 175.  
My comments on the relation of Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of God’s volition to the Qur’ānic worldview are not 
intended to obscure the Neoplatonised Aristotelian background to his core conception of God’s perfection as pure, 
unbounded, and simple existence. Rather, the aim is to emphasis the inevitability of its influence on the theological 
tradition, given its appeal to the Qur’ānic worldview.  
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Rahman writes of Ibn Sīnā: 
‘Since he could not accept philosophically the idea of creation in time, advocated by 
orthodoxy, but also took the demands of traditional Islam seriously… the concept of 
contingency seemed to him to respond exactly to the demand of religion that God and 
the world cannot co-exist at the same level of being, that between God and the world 
there is a radical ontological dislocation.’101 
It is certainly true that Ibn Sīnā’s version of eternalism, uniquely among those of his 
philosophical predecessors, responds to traditional theological and scripturalist demands. 
Rahman, typically of his generation of scholars, also believed that Ibn Sīnā ‘proved to be the 
bête noire of the orthodox, and al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī, and other orthodox representatives chose 
him as their unique target’.102 However, as I aim to demonstrate in relation to al-Āmidī, the 
Islamic appeal of aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation meant that he provoked a re-working 
of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo among generations of post-Avicennan Ash‘arī scholars. In 
particular, far from being a ‘target’ for al-Rāzī, Ibn Sīnā is a formative influence on his 
discussions of creation. These reflections on the theological significance of the two doctrines of 
creation which are the context to the study serve as a reminder of the issues at stake for al-
Āmidī and others like him who inherited the debate. 
4. Conclusion 
Al-Āmidī, as a philosophical theologian working at the boundary of the traditions of falsafa and 
kalām, inherits two contradictory doctrines of creation. This much is a commonplace – the 
debate between philosophers and theologians across the religious traditions over the question 
of the world’s eternity is a well-known site of contention. I have demonstrated in this chapter, 
however, that much more is at stake in the discussion of creation than the question of how long 
the world has existed. In fact, al-Āmidī is faced with two highly differentiated interpretations of 
																																																						
101 Rahman, ‘Ibn Sīnā’s Theory’, 38. 
102 Rahman, ‘Ibn Sīnā’s Theory’, 45. 
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the Qur’ānic doctrine of God’s transcendence. Each originates in a distinct worldview, and each 
is developed within a distinct ontological framework. The one is a metaphysical framework, 
within which the doctrine of the world’s eternity is justified on the basis of analysis of the two 
kinds of existent, possibly and necessarily existing. The other is a physical theoretical 
framework, by which the temporal finitude of all existents outside the realm of God is 
established. 
Because Ibn Sīnā’s and the classical Ash‘arīs’ doctrines of creations are formulated within such 
distinct frameworks, in order to understand how al-Āmidī’s doctrine of creation represents the 
encounter of the two traditions, the thesis proceeds by considering his treatment of these two 
frameworks. For this reason, al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical distinction 
between the possible and necessary of existence is the subject of the next chapter, Ash‘arī 
physical theory the subject of Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, I demonstrate how the influence 
of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of causedness causes a rupture in the content and function of the creation 
debate among post-classical Ash‘arīs, and the situation of al-Āmidī’s thought with regard to this 
development. 
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Chapter 3 
Al-Āmidī’s Conception of Possibility and Necessity 
 ‘There is nothing more true than the Necessary of Existence”103 
‘In everything other than [that which is]  
Necessary of Existence by its own essence, there is deficiency’104  
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the primary conceptual paradigm within which Ibn Sīnā 
develops his vision of creation is his metaphysical distinction between the possible and 
necessary of existence. The theological appeal of this distinction proved undeniable for 
practitioners of a school of theology - Ash‘arism - the driving force of which was the desire to 
exalt God to the greatest degree by demonstrating his uniqueness and superiority to his 
creation. And yet, as I have indicated, Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of necessity and possibility was 
intrinsically enmeshed in a metaphysical system which was totally alien to Ash‘arī ontology. I 
will demonstrate, furthermore, that Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophy undergirds his major 
metaphysical distinction in a manner which normally goes unappreciated. The distinction 
between the possible and necessary of existence and the concomitant metaphysics of causation 
and creation thus find their home within a comprehensive philosophical system including its 
particular conception of the material world – one which is alien to that of the Ash‘arīs. More 
obviously, it is evident that for all its theological appeal, Ibn Sīnā’s cosmological applications of 
his distinction were gravely problematic for those operating within the kalām tradition, in 
which denial of God’s creation of the world ex nihilo (ba‘d al-‘adam) was traditionally tantamount 
to heresy.105  
																																																						
103 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, VIII.6, 284.  
104 Ibn Sīnā, Ta‘līqāt, 62. 
105Al-Juwaynī describes those who reject the first premise of the traditional proof for the temporality of the world as 
al-mulḥida (infidels, atheists) (Irshād, 18). Al-Ghazālī is famous for including the doctrine among three counts upon 
which the falāsifa should be counted heretics (Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 7, 226; see Griffel, Apostasie, for a contextualising 
study). 
In 2004, Wisnovsky commented on the ‘daunting amount of scholarship’ necessary for an understanding of the 
reception of Ibn Sīnā’s key metaphysical doctrines by Sunni mutakallimūn (Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna and the Avicennian 
Turn’, 132-3). In the decade since, much work has been done, but much remains, and this chapter situates itself 
within that field of research. 
	 57	
This chapter is therefore a case study at one juncture of the meeting of two complete 
philosophical systems in the thought of al-Āmidī. Because of its ubiquitousness across Ibn Sīnā’s 
philosophical system, his distinction between the possible and necessary of existence can be 
discussed from numerous angles. This chapter cannot comprehensively represent al-Āmidī’s 
reception of all aspects of the distinction.  Rather, I am concerned with his views on features of 
Ibn Sīnā’s ontological distinction which arise at the meeting of the traditions as significant 
philosophical problems, and which relate to the discussion of creation. I have delineated and 
will treat a cluster of interrelated issues, namely: the distinction between the possible and 
necessary of existence as the most basic ontological dichotomy; the question of what it is that 
the attributions ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ qualify (in relation to discussions of essence and 
existence); and the question of what possibility is, then two questions concerning the relation 
between a possible existent and its cause, namely; the question of what determines a possible 
existent’s reliance on its cause; and the question of how the cause of the possible existent is 
related to its non-existence. Together, these issues take us to the heart of al-Āmidī’s reception 
of Ibn Sīnā. 
Firstly, I provide an exposition of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction, focusing on the issues just identified, 
then treat the comparable issues within the classical Ash‘arī metaphysics of possibility and 
necessity. I then take each issue in turn, accounting in each instance firstly for relevant post-
Avicennan developments in Ash‘arī thought, then analysing al-Āmidī’s views in his works of 
falsafa and kalām. I demonstrate that classical Ash‘arī kalām is rich with resources for the 
discussion of the metaphysics of possibility and necessity, and that al-Āmidī is not a passive 
recipient of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology,  but engages his thought using tools from the Ash‘arī tradition. 
Al-Āmidī appropriates aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s major metaphysical distinction, but in his most 
mature works, extricates it from its natural philosophical and theological contexts. He thus 
adopts its most theologically weighty applications, without ceding to undesired aspects of the 
worldview to which it belongs. 
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1. Ibn Sīnā on Possibility and Necessity 
1.i On What is Attributed by the Terms ‘Possible’ and ‘Necessary’  
In the previous chapter, I presented Ibn Sīnā’s dichotomy between the possible and necessary 
of existence as the major alternative to the classical kalām dichotomy between eternal and 
temporally originated existents. Although accurate, this way of comparing the traditions 
initially disguises their different conceptions of existence and essence. In fact, Ibn Sīnā’s 
understanding of essence and existence is fundamentally unlike that of classical Ash‘arism, and 
arises as an important philosophical problem when the two traditions meet over the discussion 
of possibility and necessity.  
However, there is no consensus among contemporary scholars in the interpretation of the 
distinction between essence and existence in Ibn Sīnā’s thought, despite the very many 
important studies that have been devoted to his theory. 106 Indeed, early on in its reception, Ibn 
Sīnā’s essence-existence distinction was subject to a variety of readings. This is partly 
attributable to the presence of ambiguity and complexity in the way in which Ibn Sīnā himself 
expresses aspects of the distinction. The relevance of these observations for the present study 
is that already by the time of al-Āmidī, Ibn Sīnā’s theory was being mediated by its early 
interpreters. As I will demonstrate, al-Āmidī himself receives and critiques not Ibn Sīnā’s own 
theory of the relationship between essence and existence, but al-Rāzī’s. It is therefore 
important that I first present the diverse readings of the theory, explaining which I find closest 
to what Ibn Sīnā intended, in order, later, to differentiate between the original theory and its 
subsequent interpretation, especially by al-Rāzī. In this section, I concentrate mainly on 
																																																						
106 Bertolacci’s contribution is the most recent. He points to the abundant, ‘long history’ of scholarship on Ibn Sīnā’s 
essence/existence distinction (Bertolacci, ‘The Distinction’, 258). Early studies include Goichon, ‘La distinction’; 
Jolivet, ‘Aux Origines’; Morewedge, ‘Philosophical Analysis’; Rahman, ‘Essence and Existence’. More recently, 
Wisnvosky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, Chapter 7-11; and ‘Notes on Avicenna’s Concept’; Lizzini, ‘Wujūd/Mawjūd’, 117-138; 
Druart, ‘‘Shay’ or ‘Res’’ (and on the reception of Ibn Sīnā’s theory, Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence’; Eichner, 
‘Essence and Existence’). 
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contemporary interpretations of Ibn Sīna; al-Rāzī’s reading is better accounted for later in the 
chapter. 
Perhaps the most significant area of conceptual confusion and disagreement which arises in 
discussions of the essence-existence distinction relates to the question of whether or not Ibn 
Sīnā held to the division of existence itself into the modes ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’. Broadly 
speaking, interpretations of Ibn Sīnā’s theory on this point fall into two main groups. Firstly, 
many readers of Ibn Sīnā, both medieval and modern, attribute to Ibn Sīnā the view that the 
terms ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ predicate existence itself, which is to say that there are two 
kinds of existence. This view concurs with the notion that Ibn Sīnā holds that God’s essence is 
identical with his existence, his essence being no more and no less than ‘necessary existence’. 
By contrast, the possible of existence is held according this reading to be a composite of 
essence, which determines the characteristics of the existent (what it is), and existence, which 
is ‘super-added’ to essence (to determine that it is). The existence which is added to the possible 
essence is, on this reading, qualitatively different to the existence of God.107  
The understanding that existence is ‘super-added’ to essence in the case of the possible of 
existence represents a particular interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the possible of 
existence. The theory that essence and existence are distinct in the possible of existence is very 
prominent in Ibn Sīnā’s thought - on the basis of this view, he holds all beings aside from God to 
be composite (and therefore, caused). As he explains in the Ishārāt, using the example of a 
																																																						
107 For instance, al-Suhrawardī claims that ‘the Peripatetics’ held the view that existence is super-added to essence in 
possibles; this has been taken to refer to al-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā (cited by Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence’, 27). 
Aquinas writes that Ibn Sīnā held that ‘existence is other than essence or quiddity’ and that ‘there exists a thing 
whose quiddity is its existence’, and Germann adopts this reading, taking it to mean that ‘[God] is the only existent 
(mawjūd) whose essence is its existence’ (Germann ‘Avicenna and Afterwards’, 92). McGinnis argues that Ibn Sīnā 
‘analyse[s] existence into its most basic modal structure, namely the conceptual categories of necessary existence 
and possible existence’, thenceforth referring to Ibn Sīnā’s ‘modal metaphysics’ (McGinnis, Avicenna, 165; ‘Old 
Complexes, New Possibilities’, 28); he also reads Ibn Sīnā as maintaining that God’s existence is identical with his 
essence (Avicenna, 169-170). Alper reconstructs Ibn Sīnā’s proof for God as being based on the distinction between 
necessary and possible existence. He cites Ibn Sīnā in the Ilāhiyyāt I.6: inna al-umūr allatī tadkhul fī l-wujūd taḥtamil fì-l-
'aql al-inqisām ilā qismayn’, and reads this as entailing two types of existence: ‘[Ibn Sīnā] explains why necessary 
existence has no cause, but possible existence does’ (Alper ‘Avicenna’s Argument’, 134). The implications of the claim 
that Ibn Sīnā maintains the modality of existence for his understanding of essence are not always explored by 
commentators. 
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triangle: ‘Know that you could conceive of the meaning of a ‘triangle’ and yet question whether 
it was attributed with existence in particulars, or was not an existent’.108 For Ibn Sīnā, essences 
can be characterised aside from particular instances of their existence. It is essences which 
determine the characteristics of a given existent, including whether it is necessary or possible 
that it exist. According to the reading under discussion, the distinction between essence and 
existence in the possible of existence equates to the view that existence is modally 
categorisable and determinate, super-added in the case of the possible of existence.  
A second broad category of interpretations covers those which stress the inseparability of 
essence and existence in Ibn Sīnā’s thought. Wisnovsky stresses that the notion that existence 
is super-added to essence in the case of the possible is not inherent to Ibn Sīnā’s own ontology, 
but represents an interpretation of what he intends by describing essence and existence as 
distinct in the case of the possible of existence.109 He challenges the assumption that the 
Peripatetics to whom al-Suhrawardī attributes the view that existence is additional to essence 
in the case of possibles include Ibn Sīnā: ‘to my knowledge, Avicenna never committed himself 
to the thesis that existence is something super-added to (zā’id ‘alā) a thing’s quiddity’.110 Lizzini 
describes Ibn Sīnā’s essence/existence distinction as a ‘paradox’, for ‘although essence and 
existence are to be conceived of as “distinct” and therefore responsible for compositeness in 
existent things, they prove to be inseparable from each other and hence resistant to any 
attempt to consider them separately’. This means that existence cannot be conceived of apart 
from the existent, and that it is therefore not existence per se, but the existent, which is either 
possible or necessary: it is in fact ‘the modal nature of essence’ which is responsible for the 
designation of existents as either possible or necessary. 111 Bertolacci emphasises even more 
																																																						
108 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV.6, 443. 
109 Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence’, 28. 
110 Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence’, 28. It is Wisnovsky’s thesis that the view that existence is super-added to 
essence in the case of the possible stems from al-Rāzī’s development of Ibn Sīnā’s view into what he believed to be an 
‘Avicennian’ ontology. This is revisited later in the chapter. 
111 Lizzini, ‘Mawjūd/wujūd’, 120.  
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that it is the mutual connection between essence and existence, and not their separation, which 
Ibn Sīnā promotes in his ontology.112 
I find the latter reading of Ibn Sīnā to concur most closely with Ibn Sīnā’s own treatments of the 
distinction in the metaphysical parts of his works, and will account for this view as a basis for 
my claim that al-Āmidī is (in his works of kalām) a commentator not on Ibn Sīnā’s theory but on 
al-Rāzī’s interpretation thereof. 113 The manner in which Ibn Sīnā commences his discussions of 
necessity and possibility suggests that the term ‘Necessary’ in his construction ‘Necessary of 
Existence’ (wājib al-wujūd) does not predicate existence adjectivally, but refers to the way in 
which a being exists, which is to say that ‘necessary’ qualifies an existent, and not existence 
itself. 114 There is nothing in Ibn Sīnā’s definition of the subject of Metaphysics to suggest that 
																																																						
112 Bertolacci, ‘Essence and Existence’, 270-275, and especially 275 for his evidence that Ibn Sīnā holds existence to be 
as extensionally broad as ‘thing’, particularly argued against those who read Ibn Sīnā to believe that ‘thing’ is 
logically prior to existent (such as Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna’s Concept’, especially 199, 218-219). 
A further interpretation is maintained by Treiger. Treiger shows that Ibn Sīnā held the term ‘existent’ to be a 
modulated term on the basis of a passage in the Maqūlāt (1.2) in which Ibn Sīnā states that ‘the meaning of existence… 
is one in many things but is different in them in another respect’ (‘Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendent Modulation of 
Existence’, 353-363).  
Mayer also references Ibn Sīnā’s notion of ‘ambiguity of existence’ (tashkīk al-wujūd), following Naṣīr al-dīn al-Ṭūsī’s 
(d. 1274) interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt 4.9-15 (Mayer, On Existence, 123). According to Mayer’s reading of the 
notion of tashkīk al-wujūd, Ibn Sīnā holds that that that which is accidental to existence determines its division into 
distinct categories, but that existence itself is absolute (Mayer, On Existence, 66-70; c.f 90-91). This reading also implies 
(along with the first reading under discussion) that Ibn Sīnā holds that existence is predicable apart from specific 
existents, a view that Mayer expresses in discussion of Ibn Sīnā’s proof for God (Mayer, On Existence, 125-126; ‘Burhān’ 
22-23).  
113 I have concentrated on Ilāhiyyāt I.2-4, where Ibn Sīnā explains his view of the subject matter of Metaphysics; I.6-7, 
where he argues for his distinction and gives his first argument for the unicity of the Necessary of Existence; and 
VIII.4-5, where he discusses the relationship between essence and existence in the Necessary of Existence. The most 
relevant passages from the Ishārāt are IV.6-7, where he accounts for his distinctions between essence and existence 
and between possibly and necessarily existing essences; and IV.16-18, where he argues for the unicity of the 
Necessary of Existence. 
114 Ibn Sīnā’s novel use of the iḍāfa construction ‘Necessary of Existence’ (wājib al-wujūd) to identify God’s essence is 
reflective of the subtlety with which he expresses his view of the relation between essence and existence. Translators 
have frequently translated the construction ‘Necessary Existent’ (For instance, Adamson, ‘From the Necessary 
Existent’, 170 and throughout; Marmura’s translation of Ilāhiyyāt, I.6, 29, VIII.5, 279, and throughout; McGinnis, 
Avicenna, 164, paraphrasing Ilāhiyyāt I.7; Alper ‘Avicenna’s Argument’, 137; Morewedge, The Metaphysica, throughout). 
A more accurate translation, which retains the obscurity of the expression in the Arabic, is ‘Necessary of Existence’; 
Hourani early on employed this translation, arguing that despite its awkwardness in English, it best expresses Ibn 
Sīnā’s meaning (Hourani, ‘Ibn Sīnā on Necessary and Possible Existence’, 75). Wisnovsky agrees that ‘the more literal 
renderings better flush out Avicenna’s philosophical choices and dilemmas’ (Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna and the 
Avicennian Turn’, 115). In any case, it is clear how Ibn Sīnā’s use of language at points leaves his theory susceptible to 
a variety of interpretations. 
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he views existence as determinate, or predicable apart from existents. Rather, the philosophy of 
metaphysics is the study of the existent (al-mawjūd) and ‘things.. that accompany it inasmuch as 
it is an existent’. ‘The necessary’ and ‘the possible’ appear within a list of ‘proper accidents’ (al-
‘awāriḍ al-khāṣṣa) of the existent which also includes ‘the one and the many, the potential and 
the actual, the universal and the particular’. These are described as accidents which the 
existent ‘receives’.115 It seems from this account of the subject of metaphysics that if Ibn Sīnā 
should be understood to uphold the modal dichotomy of existence per se into ‘necessary and 
possible’, his ontology would also be subject to a matrix of other dichotomies applicable to 
existence per se: simple vs complex; potential vs actual; universal vs particular. 
 Aside from the fact that this is unlikely, we can observe more straightforwardly that existence 
per se is not mentioned here, but rather, the existent, studied according to the various states 
which occur to it on account of accidents inhering within it.116 A little later, delineating the 
subjects to be discussed within this study of the existent, Ibn Sīnā refers to ‘the state of 
necessity’ (ḥāl al-wujūb) and ‘the state of possibility’ (ḥāl al-imkān).117 This confirms the view that 
Ibn Sīnā understands necessity and possibility to be ways in which beings exist, rather than two 
kinds of existence belonging to concomitant categories of essences.  
I also disagree that Ibn Sīnā holds that God’s essence is identical with his existence; though true 
in a particular sense, the assertion simplifies Ibn Sīnā’s position. In fact, what Ibn Sīnā 
repeatedly states is that God is uniquely distinguished by his ‘necessity of existence’, and 
elsewhere, ‘the affirmation of existence’ (ta’akkud al-wujūd) belonging to him alone.118 He argues 
																																																						
115Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, I.2, 10. 
116 Kukkonen shows that potentiality and actuality are ‘concomitant accidents’ of being in Ibn Sīnā’s thought, defined 
by Ibn Sīnā’s own logical definition as ‘terms that are inextricably bound up in the characterisation and analysis of all 
manner of beings, even though they do not disclose directly the essence of any one being’ (‘Potentiality’, Section 2). 
117 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, I.4, 19. 
118 E.g. Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt I.6, 32, where he argues for the singularity of the Necessary of Existence on the basis that 
there can be no two existents which are alike in the ‘necessity of existence’ (luzūm al-wujūd or wujūb al-wujūd), I.7, 35, 
where necessity of existence is the ‘meaning’ (ma‘nā) characterising such a being; VIII.4. 273-4, VIII.5, 279, and I.7, 36, 
where he defines necessity of existence as ‘nothing other than the affirmation of existence (ta’akkud al-wujūd)’; c.f. 
Ishārāt IV.18, 3 464, where he again argues that the specifying quality of the Divine is that he exists by necessity. The 
point is that Ibn Sīnā repeatedly characterises God by his unique quality of necessity of existence, which is not the 
same as identifying his essence with a type of existence which is necessary. 
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in the Shifā’ that God’s essence is uncaused on the basis that if one were to postulate the 
‘addition (ifāda) of existence to the necessity of existence’, this would constitute ‘the addition 
(ifāda) of [that which is] a condition of his essence’, which is to say that the fact that God exists 
is a condition of his being ‘necessary of existence’, by virtue of his essence.119 This suggests that 
it is the necessity of existence, and not existence itself, which is identical with God’s essence. It 
is the fact that God exists which is his essence (since he could not not exist), and not his 
existence per se. This stands against the view that Ibn Sīnā holds that existence is determinate 
and predicable aside from individual existents. It also, therefore, counters the view that God’s 
existence is unlike the existence of the possible. 
It is useful to acknowledge at this juncture that Ibn Sīnā’s statement of his position is not 
without ambiguity, which explains its various interpretations. For instance, in accounting for 
God’s attributes, Ibn Sīnā argues that God can only be characterised according to negations or 
relations because he ‘has no quiddity… He is pure existence, with the condition that privation 
and all other descriptions must be negated [in relation] to him’ (lā māhiyya lahu…fa-huwa 
mujarrad al-wujūd bi-sharṭ salb al-‘adam wa-sā’ir al-awṣāf ‘anhu).120 Ibn Sīnā may not be referring to 
a mode of existence, but to the fact that God’s essence is that he exists, as a basis for his 
argument that his essence is simple and without additional attributes. However, it is clear that 
this is open to interpretation, and that those who hold to the determinate status of existence in 
Ibn Sīnā’s thought are not without support for their position. This is important because it 
explains the variety of interpretations to which Ibn Sīnā’s distinction was subjected from its 
earliest reception. 
Nevertheless, given my agreement with those who hold that Ibn Sīnā views existence as 
something intrinsic to the thing, and not determinate and additional to it, it remains to 
consider the sense in which essence and existence are truly distinct in his thought. For if 
existence and essence are inseparable; and if existence per se is not determinate; if all possible 
essences are existents, then in what sense is essence truly distinct from existence? This aspect 
																																																						
119 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, I.7, 36. 
120 Ilāhiyyāt, VIII.4, 276. 
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of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction has concerned commentators throughout the long history of 
scholarship on the question. It is also of direct relevance to the present study, since post-
Avicennan Ash‘arī theologians were particularly interested in this question in relation to the 
classical Ash‘arī belief that essence and existence are identical. Contemporary interpretations 
range from Goichon’s ‘realist’ position, according to which Ibn Sīnā held essence to be real to 
the extent that existence is understood as accidental to essence, to those such as Morewedge 
who tend to interpret essence in Ibn Sīnā’s thought as a logical, conceptual entity.121  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address this question comprehensively. Rather, I wish 
to highlight the importance of the broadly neglected natural philosophical context for Ibn 
Sīnā’s conception of essence, and for its later reception.122 Ibn Sīnā’s conception of potentiality, 
and the natural philosophy in which it finds its context, helps explain how essence is distinct 
from existence in his thought. It is also with respect to his understanding of potentiality that 
Ibn Sīnā’s ontology and his related theory of causation and cosmology is most clearly 
distinguished from that of the classical Ash‘arīs. Having come to understand that the natural 
philosophical underpinnings of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of essence are crucial to the course of its later 
reception, I next discuss those natural philosophical foundations, focusing especially on his 
concept of potentiality. 123  
1.ii On what Possibility Constitutes 
Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the principles of body is the natural philosophical underpinning of his 
metaphysical ontology. The theory of hylomorphism posits that body is the composition of 
																																																						
121 Goichon, La Distinction; Morewedge, ‘Philosophical Analysis’, esp 431-2. For recent summaries of the spectrum of 
positions on this question, see Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna’s Concept’, 200; Lizzini, ‘Mawjūd/wujūd’, 122.  
122 Ibn Sīnā’s distinction is normally discussed in a metaphysical context, e.g. Hourani ‘Ibn Sīnā on Necessary and 
Possible Existence’; Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Chapter 9; Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics. Recent exceptions 
(upon which I have depended here) are McGinnis, ‘What Underlies the Change’; and ‘Making Something’; Shihadeh, 
Doubts, Chapter 4. 
123 Ibn Sīnā is explicit about the natural philosophical underpinnings of his ontology. Indeed, his philosophical 
system, modelled on Aristotle’s, places Metaphysics after Physics on account of the fact that the study of existence 
relies on premises established within natural philosophy. For his discussion on the relation of Metaphysics to the 
other sciences, see Ilāhiyyāt, I.2, 7-13, and on the division of the sciences in general, Madkhal, I.2, 12-16. For 
discussions of the former, see Fakhry, ‘The Subject Matter’; Genequand, ‘Metaphysics’, 785-7, and of the latter, 
Marmura, ‘Avicenna on the Division’.  
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matter (hayūla, mādda) with form (ṣūra).124 Despite the distinction, matter has no existence in 
actuality without the presence of form.  In this sense, matter considered in itself is pure 
potentiality. This is a point made in the Physics and revisited at greater length in the 
Metaphysics.125 The presence of form actualises matter, giving it existence as a constituent of 
body.126 Privation (al-‘adam) is a further principle of the body in that it is subject to change. Ibn 
Sīnā gives the example of a robe whose colour changes from white to black. In this example, the 
privation of blackness is a principle for the change in colour, for the robe could not become 
black if it was already black.127 
A few short steps take us from this physical theory to Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical distinction 
between the possible and necessary of existence, and his concomitant conception of the 
possible essence. Ibn Sīnā identifies the potency of matter, both implicitly and explicitly, with 
the possibility of existence. Actualised matter, within body, is associated with necessary 
existence.128 The process by which form actualises matter can be understood as a process of 
necessitation. Furthermore, privation, far from being pure non-existence, is understood as the 
lack of a determinate form (for instance, the non-blackness of the robe in the example above). 
This understanding of privation informs Ibn Sīnā’s view of possible essence. The privation of a 
																																																						
124 Ibn Sīnā, Ṭabī‘iyyāt, I.2, 1, 14-15. 
125 Ibn Sīnā, Ṭabī‘iyyāt, I.1, 1, 14, and Ilāhiyyāt, II.3, 57-63. 
126 On Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of prime matter, see Lizzini, ‘The Relation’; Shihadeh, ‘Avicenna’s Corporeal Form’, 
also dealing with its reception. 
127 Note however that Ibn Sīnā qualifies this understanding of privation, arguing that it cannot strictly speaking be a 
principle, being a non-existent. See Ṭabī‘iyyāt, I.2, 1, 19; and McGinnis, ‘Making Something’, 558-9. See also McGinnis, 
‘What Underlies the Change’, 261-2, for the grounding of this theory of the principles of body in Aristotle. 
128 Ibn Sīnā writes that Metaphysics includes discussion of ‘the state of possibility and its true nature (this being the 
same as the investigation of potentiality and actuality)’ (Ilāhiyyāt, I.4, 19).  
As Davidson points out, potentiality and possibility both translate the Greek δυναμις (Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 16), 
indicating the association of the concepts in Aristotle. See Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 9.8, on matter as potency; and 
Knuuttila, Modalities, 1-14 and 19-44 on Aristotle’s understanding of potency. On the relation between Aristotle’s 
theory of form and matter and his notions of potentiality and actuality, see Kukkonen, ‘Potentiality’, Section 1. Ibn 
Sīnā developed his own notion of possibility from materials already existing in the Arabic Aristotle, and it is clear 
that the Aristotelian conception of matter is a crucial aspect of that background (see Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s 
Metaphysics, Chapter 11).  
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specific form is associated with a specific possibility (for instance, the possibility of blackness). 
So the possibility of each occurrence is determinately related to that occurrence. 129   
Against this natural philosophical conception of possibility, we are better able to understand 
Ibn Sīnā’s conception of essence. Individual possibilities, being related to determinate 
privations, describe characterisable entities (for instance, ‘blackness’, or ‘triangularity’). It is 
this that constitutes ‘essence’ (māhiyya, dhāt) in Ibn Sīnā’s thought. And it is this that is 
described as either impossible, possible, or necessary. So far, then, it has become clear that Ibn 
Sīnā relates possibility and the possible essence to the specific, particularised, deprivations 
inherent in matter. This goes some way to explaining the sense in which the essence of a 
possible existent is genuinely distinct from its existence in Ibn Sīnā’s ontology. In the course of 
one of his proofs for the world’s eternity, the realism of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of the possible essence 
becomes plain. The proof in question becomes an important site of debate over the nature of 
possibility in the post-Avicennan tradition and is therefore worth pausing over. 
Early in his Physics (I.2), in discussion of the principles of body, Ibn Sīnā poses the question of 
whether the initial privation of a form (non-horseness, for instance), requires an associated 
substrate in order for the generation of the body to occur.130 The metaphysical significance of 
this question is that if the generation of every generated existent requires the prior existence of 
a substrate, matter must be pre-eternal. The pre-eternity of matter entails the pre-eternity of 
the world as a whole (because matter cannot exist without form). 
 At I.2, Ibn Sīnā does not immediately answer his own question, stating that this is a question 
for metaphysics (al-falsafa al-ūlā). However, two books later (still within the Physics), Ibn Sīnā 
does enter expansively into the discussion, and eventually asserts that every generated existent 
																																																						
129 Shihadeh shows that Ibn Sīnā distinguishes between the possibilities associated with matter (‘dispositional 
possibility’, or the possibility of coming-to-be) and those associated with form (‘particular per se possibilities’) on the 
basis of Ilāhiyyāt, IV.ii (Doubts, 111-2). These types of possibility closely correspond to each other in that the 
dispositional possibility inherent to the material substrate, which permits that it may come to be, to use Shihadeh’s 
example, yellowish brown, corresponds to the privation of the specific form ‘yellowish brown’, which is possible in 
itself. 
130 Ibn Sīnā, Ṭabī‘īyyāt, I.2, 1, 20. 
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is indeed preceded by a substrate of matter. Whilst in Physics I.2, Ibn Sīnā referred to the need 
for a substrate to which the privation of the determinate form of the body would be associated, 
by III.11, he refers to ‘the possibility of existence (jawāz al-wujūd)’ and its need for a substrate. 
This makes the metaphysical implications of the discussion plain. 
In order to establish the need for a substrate in which possibility inheres, Ibn Sīnā must 
eliminate other ways of conceiving of possibility. He does so here in the Physics (III.11) by way of 
an argument that is later basically repeated in the Metaphysics (IV.2), where its applications for 
his doctrine of the pre-eternity of the world are clearer.131 The basic argument is as follows: 
1. Prior to every non-existent, there is its possibility. This possibility is a realised thing 
(amr muḥaṣṣal), not non-existence in general.132 
2. Possibility cannot subsist in itself, since it is a relation (muḍāf, or ma‘nā iḍāfī), intelligible 
in connection to something else. That which subsists in itself cannot be a relation. 
3. Possibility is not the power of the efficient principle (in the Metaphysics, the ‘power of 
the agent’) to bring the thing into existence. Otherwise, the statement ‘that whose 
existence is not possible cannot be brought into existence’ would really mean ‘that 
which cannot be brought into existence cannot be brought into existence’, which is 
meaningless.133  
4. Being neither a substance in its own right, nor the power of the efficient cause, possible 
existence requires a substance in which to inhere. This substance is matter.134  
																																																						
131 In the context of the Physics, Ibn Sīnā specifically poses the question of whether motions are preceded by a 
substrate of matter. The equivalent section in the Metaphysics (IV.2, 139-140) concerns the more general question of 
whether generated existents are preceded by a substrate of matter. The forms of the arguments and their 
metaphysical significance are, however, the same. 
132 In Ilāhīyyāt, I.5, 24, Ibn Sīnā writes that ‘the existent (al-mawjūd), the established (al-muthbat) and the realised (al-
muḥaṣṣal) are synonymous (asmā’ mutarādifa ‘alā ma‘nā wāḥid)’. Thus, when Ibn Sīnā refers to possibility as a ‘realised 
thing’ in this quotation, he has its existence in mind. 
133 In other words, defining possibility as ‘that which God can do’ trivialises God’s power, since it means that he is able 
to do only what he is able to do. 
134 Ibn Sīnā, Tabī‘īyāt, III.11, 359-60; Ilāhiyyāt, IV.2, 139-140; c.f. Ishārāt, V.6, 507-513. For discussion of the argument, 
see e.g. McGinnis, ‘Making Something’; and ‘The Eternity of the World’; Acar, Talking about God, 186-88; Davidson, 
Proofs for Eternity, 16-17 (who connects it to Aristotle’s argument from possibility for the eternity of matter). 
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In this proof, the materiality and objectivism of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of essence is made plain. Our 
conceptualisation of what can exist corresponds to determinate possibilities so real that they 
require a substrate of matter. This understanding of possibility is deliberately differentiated 
from alternatives in the course of this proof for the world’s eternity. Since for Ibn Sīnā, 
possibility requires a material substrate, the possible essence is not a mere concept in the mind. 
Just as matter cannot exist without form, so the possible essence is only actualised when it 
comes to exist. Yet just as body is a composite of matter and form, and as form does not exist 
aside from its material substrate, so the possible of existence is, inextricably, a composite of its 
existence and its essence. Essence, though it is the unactualised principle of the possible of 
existence, is nevertheless distinct and requisite to the possible of existence. 
1.iii On the Causation of the Possible of Existence 
Let us finally consider how Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of possibility and necessity features in his theory 
of causality. Ibn Sīnā holds that the possible of existence relies on a cause a) on account of its 
essential possibility; and b) for its existence alone, and throughout the duration of its existence. 
According to him, the non-existence of a possible essence is in no way associated with its cause. 
This theory is established contra the notion that causes are responsible for the origination 
(ḥudūth) of their effect from non-existence. If that were the case, the effect would act on the 
possible being during its non-existence to endow it with existence.135 According to Ibn Sīnā, this 
is impossible, since existence cannot be causally related to non-existence. As he puts it, ‘the 
originating cause has no influence nor usefulness in [regard to its effect] having been non-
existent’ (laysa li-l-‘illa al-muḥditha ta’thīr wa-ghanā’ fī annahu lam yakun)136  
Furthermore, the effect of an efficient cause must, according to Ibn Sīnā, concur with it 
temporally. There can be no delay. This position is opposed to the understanding that causes 
																																																						
135 Ilāhiyyāt, VI.1, 197-202; Ishārāt, V.2-3, 487-499. The identity of Ibn Sīnā’s opponents (‘the common people’) is 
debated (see Marmura, ‘The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality’; Shihadeh, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Commentary’, 319-
320; Richardson, The Metaphysics of Agency, 23-32). Suffice to note for our purposes the anti-kalām metaphysical 
implications of Ibn Sīnā’s theory as he develops them (namely, that a pre-eternal effect can be correctly described as 
originated).  
136 Ilāhiyyāt, VI.1, 199. 
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must be temporally prior to their effect – an understanding which Ibn Sīnā attributes to 
peoples’ confusing efficient causes with accidental causes. The example Ibn Sīnā gives is of the 
existence of a building. Many would consider the building’s builder to be its efficient cause, 
existing temporally prior to it, bringing it into existence, and having no subsequent relation to 
its continued existence. According to Ibn Sīnā, the existence of the building is actually the 
effect of its constitution of a combination of materials. This combination is temporally 
concurrent with the building, is responsible for its existence and not its origination, and exists 
as efficient cause to the existence of the building throughout its existence.137  
Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of the relation between the possible of existence and its cause entails 
the belief that a pre-eternally existing possible existent can be correctly described as caused, 
and thus, that a pre-eternal world can be described as ‘created’. A related opinion is that the 
cause whose effect is never non-existent is superior to the cause which does not prevent the 
absolute non-existence of its effect. The former kind of causation is described as ibdā‘, or 
‘absolute creation’.138  On this understanding, a God who creates a pre-eternally existing world 
is more powerful and more noble than the one who gives the world existence after non-
existence. Indeed, Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of the possible essence and of the nature of efficient 
causation allows him absolutely to disassociate possibility from God. In Ibn Sīnā’s thought, the 
Necessary of Existence is only associated with beings in their state of necessary existence which 
he bestows, not in the state of possibility which they possess of their own essences. He 
intellectually apprehends and enacts the possible of existence only in its actualised, 
necessitated state. Ibn Sīnā’s God is ‘necessitation itself’ (nafs al-wājibiyya), pure act, and can in 
no way be associated with privation. 139 His creation proceeds causally from him, and he cannot 
withhold any part of his action of necessitation. The nature of God’s power is that he exists, and 
by existing, bestows existence on every possible essence. 
																																																						
137 Ilāhiyyāt, VI.2, 201-202.  See Richardson, The Metaphysics of Agency, Chapters 1 and 2 on Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of 
the relation between the efficient cause and its effect. 
138 Ishārāt, V.9, 524-5.  
139 Ta‘līqāt, 50. 
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In the preceding account, several aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of possibility and necessity 
have been signalled as key issues for its later reception. The significance of each of these will 
become clearer in what follows. I turn to demonstrate, more briefly, how Ibn Sīnā’s conception 
of possibility, possible essences, and their causation, is alien from Ash‘arī metaphysics. Only 
against this background can the post-Avicennan Ash‘arī reception of the ontology be properly 
appreciated. 
2. The Classical Ash‘arī Metaphysics of Possibility and Necessity 
There is an undeniable innovation in Ibn Sīnā’s coherent ontology of possible and necessary 
existence. I have explained that it was the dichotomy between eternal and temporally 
originated existents that formed the backbone of classical Ash‘arī theology, and the temporal 
origination of an existent which was understood to determine its need for a cause. In this major 
respect, classical Ash‘arī discussions of possibility do not bear the same theological weight as 
Ibn Sīnā’s. Nevertheless, pre-Avicennan kalām resources for the discussion of possibility are 
rich, and it is instructive to consider them, because the traditions’ distinct notions of what 
potentiality and possibility constitute underly their respective doctrines of creation. Ash‘arī 
discussions of possibility are embedded in a variety of kalām topics. In the following, I highlight 
a number of these in a bid to demonstrate that Ash‘arī theologians shared some common 
intuitions with Ibn Sīnā about the nature of possibility and necessity, but also held a deeply 
incompatible conception of God’s relation to possible existents.140 
I argued above that it is fruitful to analyse Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible essence 
and its existence from the perspective of his understanding of potency and its inherence in 
matter. This way of approaching Ibn Sīnā’s ontology makes it readily contrastable with that of 
classical Ash‘arism. We have seen that classical Ash‘arism is distinguishable from both the falsafī 
tradition and from classical Mu‘tazilism in part by its insistence on stripping the world of all 
																																																						
140 Mu‘tazilī discussions of possibility and necessity are also highly developed, but will only be touched on here in 
relation to Ash‘arī responses thereto. Frank’s excellent study of the Baṣran Mu‘tazilī conception of existents and non-
existents deals with the Mu‘tazilī identification of the non-existent (al-ma‘dūm) with the thing for which existence is 
possible (jawāz al-wujūd) (Frank, ‘Al-ma‘dūm wa-l-mawjūd’). 
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potency. The school’s understanding of the relationship between essence and existence is 
informed, like Ibn Sīnā’s, by its understanding of potency. For classical Ash‘arīs, the existent is 
no more and no less than its essence. This is normally expressed in terms of the relationship 
between the existent (al-mawjūd) and the thing (al-shay’). As al-Bāqillānī puts it, ‘the existent is 
the real, generated thing, since the meaning of the thing[’s being a thing] according to us is that 
it exists’ (al-mawjūd huwa al-shay’ al-thābit al-kā’in li-anna ma‘nā al-shay’ ‘andanā annahu mawjūd).141 
Outside of the realm of existents, there is pure and absolute nothingness: ‘the non-existent is 
nothing, [and] not a thing’ (al-ma‘dūm muntaf laysa bi-shay’).142 
The view that essence and existence are identical corresponds to the Ash‘arī understanding of 
possibility. Since there is no potency outside of God, designating an event or existent ‘possible’ 
does not constitute a reference to a determinate, entitative possibility. There is some confusion 
in the secondary literature, however, about what exactly possibility does constitute according 
to classical Ash‘arism. To clarify the issue, I turn to a consider a number of contexts in which 
the discussion of possibility arises. 
Discussions of possibility within Ash‘arī kalām broadly occur in contexts in which a defence of 
God’s power (qudra) is at stake. The most obvious Ash‘arī defence of God’s power is the 
occasionalist doctrine. God’s constant intervention in creation entails his continual recreation 
of the endurance of the matter of the world, and of all other accidents inhering within 
matter.143 This extends to all forms of action, both human and non-human. All capacity to act 
(istiṭā‘) is produced by God at the moment of the action with which it was associated.144 So in the 
example of the burning of cotton by fire, God produces the power of the fire to burn at the 
moment at in which the fire comes into contact with the cotton.  The Ash‘arī doctrine strips the 
world of potency. Existents in the world do not have causal natures predisposing them to a 
																																																						
141 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 15; c.f. al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 124. On the classical Ash‘arī notion of existence see Frank, ‘The 
Ash‘arite Ontology’, 65 and 172-177. Although existence is not independent of essence, the term ‘existence’ is used by 
the Ash‘arīs as a univocal referent. 
142 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 15 
143 The classical Ash‘arī conception of matter, accidents, and their endurance is treated in Chapter 4. 
144 E.g. Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 107-8; al-Bāqillāni, Kitāb al-tamhīd, 325. 
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particular behaviour. Rather, the potential for a given occurrence is associated with God’s 
power of action.  
It is incorrect, however, to equate the Ash‘arī association of potency with God’s power to an 
absolute identification of possibility with God’s power. McGinnis and Griffel both imply that 
pre-Avicennan Ash‘arīs held that an occurrence is possible only in the sense that God is able to 
enact it.145 One implication of this reading would be that instances of non-existence cannot be 
described as possible (since possibility is God’s capacity to act, which is not applicable to non-
existence). Another implication is that nothing is impossible for God. This is because, since 
there is no sense in which a given occurrence is possible apart from with reference to God, 
describing an occurrence as ‘impossible’ in relation to God is technically meaningless.  
The extant Ash‘arī sources in fact point to an alternative view. Al-Ash‘arī himself held that God 
is powerful over anything that can be enacted (qādir ‘alā kull mā yaṣiḥḥ an yakūn maqdūran).146 
This implies a limitation of God’s power to that which is possible in itself, for there are also 
things which cannot be enacted, which are impossible in themselves.  God’s power is not 
limited by his inability to do what cannot be done - for instance, to create and destroy a given 
atom instantaneously.147 The notion that occurrences are either possible or impossible in 
themselves implies a transcendent framework for determining what is and is not possible. We 
saw that Ibn Sīnā holds the same intuition, and that for him, possibility and impossibility are 
determined in relation to essences. The Ash‘arīs, however, held no such notion, since they 
																																																						
145 McGinnis (‘What Underlies the Change’, 275; ‘The Eternity of the World’, 9); Griffel (Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical 
Theology, 162-3) McGinnis discusses Ibn Sīnā’s argument against the definition of possibility as the power of the agent 
(mentioned above). He identifies the position which Ibn Sīnā opposes as the Ash‘arī kalām position (McGinnis, ‘The 
Eternity of the World’, 9). I believe this to be a misleading association. Griffel is less explicit, but suggests that al-
Ghazālī ‘shifts the whole debate away from what God can do to what can be affirmed or denied, that is, to the level of 
human judgements’ (Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, 163). This implies that al-Ghazālī’s view was innovative, 
obscuring its kalām background. Kukkonen (‘Possible Worlds’, 494) also asserts that al-Ghazālī’s notion that God 
cannot do the impossible (see e.g. Tahāfut, 175) is innovative. Shihadeh accounts for the Ash‘arī background of al-
Ghazālī’s response to Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of possibility in Doubts, 120-124. 
146 Mujarrad, 101; see Gimaret, La Doctrine, 284. 
147 See Gimaret, La Doctrine, 154 and 285.  
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denied the concept of non-existent essences. The possibility of a given existent was thus a 
purely rational designation, with no non-existent ‘thing’ or ‘essence’ as its object.148   
A further crucial difference between Ibn Sīnā’s theory and the Ash‘arī conception of possibility 
arises in discussion of God’s attribute of knowledge. For the Ash‘arīs, what is known (al-ma‘lūm) 
is divided into the existent and the non-existent. We find in al-Ash‘arī a defence of God’s 
knowledge of the non-existent. He writes that God both knows and is ‘powerful over what does 
not come to be’ (‘alā mā lā yakūn).149 This implies that there are infinite unactualised rational 
possibilities. Indeed, the notion that the things that God knows (his ma‘lūmāt), and the objects 
of his power (his maqdūrāt) are infinite is also an established Ash‘arī doctrine.150  This is a key 
divergence from Ibn Sīnā’s theory, in which possibilities are always actualised. It highlights a 
central component of the Ash‘arī conception of God’s power and will. Though God does not 
enact every possibility, un-enacted possibilities are still within his power (that is to say that al-
maqdūr covers both divisions of al-ma‘lūm). This means that God is able to withhold power.151  
Al-Ash‘arī expresses this point as follows: ‘the absence of that which can be enacted by power, 
despite [the presence of] the power of the enactor to enact it, does not entail deficiency in the 
enactor, given that it is impossible that anything other than [the enactor] could prevent its 
existence’ (intifā’ al-maqdūr ma‘ kawn al-qādir qādiran ‘alayhi lā yūjib naqṣan li-l-qādir ma‘ istiḥāla an 
																																																						
148 By contrast, the Mu‘tazilī al-Khayyāṭ, citing Abū l-Hudayhl, defends the doctrine of the non-existent thing with 
reference to possibility. He writes ‘a person does not do any action except that a similar action is also possible for 
him… for not all of the things within his power today are brought into existence… for if no non-existent thing 
remained connected with his power to enact it, it would be impossible to say that the agent was powerful to enact 
something like [the thing that he did enact]’ (Kitāb al-intiṣār, 15). 
149 Mujarrad, 70, and for a Mu‘tazilī statement of God’s power over that which he enacts and that which he chooses 
not to, see Kitāb al-intiṣār, 11. 
150 Gimaret, La Doctrine, 284.  
151 The modern dominance of the notion of possibility as the presence of multiple synchronic alternatives is broadly 
attributed to Jon Duns Scotus’ Lectura I 39, ‘On Contingency and Freedom’ (see e.g. Knuuttila, ‘Time and Modality’). 
However, the statistical model of possibility in the realm of logic (in which a proposition is deemed a) necessary if it 
is always true, b) possible if it is sometimes true, and c) impossible if it is never true) predominated the Aristotelian 
tradition and is therefore the background to Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of possibility in the metaphysical realm. See 
Hintikka, Time and Necessity; and Knuuttila, Modalities, on medieval notions of possibility, specifically, Chapter 1 on 
Aristotle’s modal conception of possibility and necessity. Bäck (‘Avicenna’s Conception’ especially 226-229), however, 
argues that Ibn Sīnā departs from a purely statistical model of possibility.  
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yakūn mamnū‘an bi-ghayrihi).152  That is to say that God’s power is not restricted by the fact that 
he does not enact everything that he could, since it is he who prevents the existence of those 
things that do not come to be. The turn of phrase throws up the contrast between al-Ash‘arī 
and Ibn Sīnā’s notions of possibility. Whilst Ibn Sīnā describes the possible of existence as 
necessary through another (wājib bi-ghayrihi), for al-Ash‘arī, certain existents are prevented by 
an agent, namely God. For Ibn Sīnā, there can be no such entities, since by God’s act of 
necessitation, all possibilities are actualised. Ibn Sīnā’s God cannot withhold power, whilst al-
Ash‘arī’s most certainly can. The idea that God is responsible for both the non-existence and 
existence of the effects of his power informs the Ash‘arī belief that he is responsible for the 
origination in time (ḥudūth) of the world. The contrast between this and Ibn Sīnā’s notion that 
the efficient cause is responsible for the existence of its effects and must thus co-exist with its 
effects temporally should be evident by now. 
In this account of Ash‘arī discussions concerning possibility, I have deliberately focused on the 
tradition’s founder, to demonstrate that such discussions are indigenous to Ash‘arism. In the 
works of later Ash‘arīs, discussions of possibility are developed. The famous proof from 
particularisation is firmly embedded in al-Ash‘arī’s conception of God’s power and its extension 
to possibilities which never come to be. Specifically (as discussed in Chapter 2) the proof relies 
on the premise that things could be other than they are, and proceeds to prove that a voluntary 
particulariser must have selected the characteristics of this world (prominently, the time of its 
origination) over other possible characteristics.153 In al-Juwaynī’s Kitāb al-shāmil, we find a clear 
discussion of necessity and possibility in context of this proof.  At points, the discussion is 
strikingly similar to Ibn Sīnā’s analysis of necessity and possibility. For instance, al-Juwaynī 
states that God needs no particulariser in order to exist because his existence is of necessity 
(min haythu wajaba lahu al-wujūd).154 Yet despite such superficial similarities, al-Juwaynī’s 
understanding is fundamentally Ash‘arī. Al-Juwaynī states that the ‘single axis’ around which 
proofs for the world’s reliance on a particularising cause revolve is whether ‘[the existence of] 
																																																						
152 Mujarrad, 70. 
153 See Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 174-203 for an account of various versions of this proof.  
154 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 268.  
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that which comes to be after not having been… is necessary, or only possible.’155 He proceeds to 
establish that both the ‘continued non-existence’ and the existence of such beings are possible, 
and thence that their existence requires a cause.156 Al-Juwaynī categorises the non-existent into 
that which is impossible, also described as ‘necessarily non-existent’, and that which is possible, 
but which does not exist. The non-existence of the former, being necessary, does not require a 
cause, since ‘the necessary is independent, in its necessity, of a particulariser (al-wājib istaqbala 
fī wujūbihi ‘an al-mukhaṣaṣ)’. The non-existence of the latter, being possible, however, does 
require a particularising cause. This is because the property of that which is possible is that it 
requires a cause. Thus, both the non-existence and the existence of that which is possible can 
be attributed to a cause.157  
So for al-Juwaynī, as for al-Ash‘arī, possibilities are synchronic conceptual alternatives, and 
there are an infinity of possibilities which are never actualised. Furthermore, existents are only 
designated possible in respect to the fact that there was a point in time at which they did not 
exist, and not by mere susceptibility to non-existence. In concluding the section, al-Juwaynī 
writes that he has considered everything that has been said in ‘establishing that the temporally 
originated [existent] requires an originator.’158  For classical Ash‘arīs, the determinant of 
causedness is temporal originatedness, and not possibility of existence. This clearly contrasts 
with Ibn Sīnā’s view. Post-Avicennan mutakallimūn had al-Juwaynī’s analysis, and other earlier 
sources at hand when encountering Ibn Sīnā’s theory of possibility and necessity.159 Perhaps 
there are also more resources for Ibn Sīnā’s own theory therein than have been discovered or 
appreciated to date.160 
																																																						
155 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 264. 
156 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 266. 
157 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 268.  
158 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 172. 
159 These may include non-extant sources. For instance, only one of al-Isfarā’īnī’s works is known to be extant. 
160 The debate over the potential kalām influences on Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics of possibility and necessity is outside the 
scope of this study, but represents an important area of research. Wisnovsky has argued, for instance, for the 
importance of kalām debates over the divine attributes as background (e.g., Avicenna’s Metaphysics, Chapter 13; and 
“One Aspect of the Avicennian Turn”); Alper has considered the influence of the proof from particularisation for the 
existence of God on Ibn Sīnā’s proof (Alper, “Avicenna’s Argument for the Existence of God”). 
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Having accounted for the two theories of possibility inherited by al-Āmidī, and signaled the 
most significant points of difference between the systems, I turn to consider the reception of 
Ibn Sīnā’s distinction in al-Āmidī’s thought, focusing on the cluster of issues identified in the 
introduction. In each section, I discuss post-Avicennan precedents for al-Āmidī’s reception of 
Ibn Sīnā, specifically the thought of al-Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī, selected for the 
influence they assert on al-Āmidī. In particular, I argue that al-Āmidī’s theological works show a 
strong reaction to al-Rāzī’s in questions pertaining to possibility and necessity.  
In each section, I then consider al-Āmidī’s discussions of the issue at hand in his works of falsafa, 
primarily as background to his works of kalām. I treat three philosophical works, whose distinct 
intellectual projects inform their treatment of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of possibility and necessity. Al-
Nūr al-bāhir receives most attention. As al-Āmidī’s longest extant work of falsafa, it gives the 
most insight into the nature of his reception of Ibn Sīnā. Kashf al-tamwīhāt and Rumūz al-kunūz, 
by contrast, serve primarily (respectively) dialectical and pragmatic purposes, and will be 
treated accordingly. Finally, and most significantly, I focus on al-Āmidī’s works of kalām. 
3. Possibility as Determinant of Causedness 
3.i The Post-Avicennan Context 
The immediate context for al-Āmidī’s reception of this aspect of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology is an 
intellectual development already occurring among post-classical Ash‘arīs including al-Ghazālī, 
al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī. I firstly account for these thinkers’ receptions of the distinction at 
the most basic level of its importance as a dichotomy of existents, and with regard to the notion 
that it is possibility which determines causedness.  
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3.i.a. Al-Ghazālī 
It is now commonplace to acknowledge that al-Ghazālī’s thought is influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s.161 
Al-Ghazālī’s acceptance of Ibn Sīnā’s basic distinction between the possible and necessary of 
existence is attested across several works. He supports the distinction between possible and 
necessary logical propositions, as attested in his Mī‘ār al-‘ilm, and also the possibility/necessity 
dichotomy as a metaphysical distinction.162 In al-Maqṣad al-asnā, for instance, he writes that the 
specifying quality of divinity (al-khāṣiyya al-ilāhiyya) is that it is ‘necessary of existence in its 
essence, [that] by which everything which is in possibility comes to exist’.163 Elsewhere in the 
same work he describes all other existents as not having claim to existence of themselves (ghayr 
mustaḥaqq al-wujūd bi-dhātihi), but becoming necessary through God.164  
A closer examination of al-Ghazālī’s reception of the distinction shows that he rejects key 
aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine. In the Iqtiṣād, al-Ghazālī identifies the possible existent as the 
originated existent (the ḥādith), defined as ‘that which was non-existent, then came to exist’.165 
So for al-Ghazālī (as for his Ash‘arī predecessors), an existent is deemed to require a cause only 
if it was first actually non-existent.166 Though al-Ghazālī describes this kind of existent as 
‘possible’, this is not with the signification of Ibn Sīnā’s expression ‘possible of existence by 
																																																						
161 See Frank, Creation, on al-Ghazālī’s cosmological views, where his basic thesis is that ‘while rejecting several 
elements of Avicenna’s cosmology, al-Ghazālī adopts several basic principles and theses that set his theology in 
fundamental opposition to that of the classical Ash‘arite tradition’ (Creation, 11). Marmura famously contested this 
thesis, claiming that nothing in al-Ghazālī’s thought was incompatible with traditional Ash‘arism (especially 
‘Ghazālian Causes’; and ‘Ghazālī and Ash‘arism’). Abrahamov, ‘Ibn Sīnā’s Influence’, detected an Avicennan influence 
on al-Ghazālī’s divisions of the intellect, and on his doctrines of man’s knowledge and love of God. More recently, 
Griffel (Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology); and Treiger (Inspired Knowledge) have offered monographs on the 
Avicennan influence on (respectively) al-Ghazālī’s cosmology, and his theory of mystical cognition. Both conclude 
that al-Ghazālī’s thought bears the deep impression of falsafī logic, epistemology, and ontology (though Griffel 
qualifies some of Frank’s more radical conclusions). Shihadeh characterises al-Ghazālī’s integration of Aristotelian 
logic into his kalām as largely pragmatic (‘From al-Ghazālī’, 144-148). 
162 Al-Ghazālī, Mī‘ār, 118-121. 
163 Al-Ghazālī, Maqṣad, 47. 
164 Al-Ghazālī, Maqṣad, 64 and 70; and see Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System, 16-27. 
165 Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 25.  
166 Indeed, in defining the subject of kalām in his discussion of various sciences in his Musṭafā, al-Ghazālī writes that it 
is the study of ‘the most general thing, the existent’, which is divided in a primary way into eternal (qadīm) and 
temporally originated (ḥādith), suggesting that this remains his basic distinction between God and other existents 
(Musṭafā, 1, 5). 
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virtue of itself’. Al-Ghazālī’s ready acceptance of Ibn Sīnā’s terminology paved the way for the 
central role played by the possibility vs necessity distinction among later Ash‘arīs. However, 
the impact of Ibn Sīnā here on his own thought is only surface deep. He adheres to the classical 
Ash‘arī paradigm in his understanding of the world’s need for a cause: namely, its subjection to 
actual non-existence.167  He refuses to concede the notion of the world’s ‘ontological 
dependence’ on God, believing it to have problematic implications for the nature of God 
himself; as Goodman puts it, this notion of causedness seems to imply to al-Ghazālī that ‘God is 
the ground of being, but nothing more’.168  
3.i.b Al-Shahrastānī 
Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and necessary of existence is a mainstay of al-
Shahrastānī’s conception of the God-world relationship.  According to al-Shahrastānī, God’s 
precedence over the world is ontological (fī l-wujūd). God exists necessarily. No contingency or 
non-existence can ever be ascribed to him, these being incompatible with his essence. By 
contrast, the world exists derivatively. In itself, the world is only possible. Therefore, it depends 
for existentiation on something else. In his existence, then, God is prior to the world, and the 
world depends on God for its existence.169 
Unlike al-Ghazālī, but in keeping with Ibn Sīnā, al-Shahrastānī does not deem an existent 
possible in relation to an actual state of non-existence. Early on in his discussion, he establishes 
that: ‘The world is possible of existence in relation to itself, whether we consider it spatially and 
temporally finite or infinite.’170 Possibility, on this reading, is a mode in which a being exists, 
																																																						
167 Al-Ghazālī is critical of many other aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction. For instance, he does not accept that God’s 
existence entails that he has no real attributes (Ghazālī, Maqṣad, 50).  Ormsby claims that al-Ghazālī accepts ‘outright’ 
Ibn Sīnā’s notion that the contingency of the world ‘denote[s] that which can be and not be, as well as that which is 
caused by another’ (contrasting it with ‘the notion of contingency which al-Ghazālī received from his theological 
predecessors [which] emphasised the nature of the world as the temporally caused product of an eternal cause’) 
(Ormsby, ‘Creation in Time’, 261). By contrast, Frank observes, with reference to the Maqṣad, that in his use of the 
distinction between necessary and possible existence in that work, ‘al-Ghazālī seems to do little more than borrow 
the language’ of Ibn Sīnā (Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System, 17). This seems true across the board of al-Ghazālī’s 
works. 
168 Goodman, ‘Ghazālī’s Argument’, 76-7. This is revisited later in the thesis. 
169 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 7-8, 15.  
170 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 12. 
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characterised by susceptibility to non-existence. This is a significant development in the 
reception of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology, marking a new phase in discourse on creation. Causedness is, 
in al-Shahrastānī’s view, a function of susceptibility to non-existence, and not of actual non-
existence prior to existence. This means that the existence of the world’s cause is no longer 
proven in connection with the world’s actual non-existence. Rather, the world can be shown to 
require a cause with reference to its essential possibility, since ‘the existence of every existent 
which is possible by its essence is bestowed by something else’.171 Indeed, for al-Shahrastānī (as 
I will demonstrate in Chapter 5) the fact that the world depends on a cause by virtue of its 
essential possibility makes the question of whether or not the world actually underwent non-
existence somewhat secondary. 
3.i.c. Al-Rāzī  
To recap, I have shown that in al-Ghazālī’s thought, God is described as ‘Necessary of Existence’, 
and the world as ‘Possible’, but that his understanding of these attributions does not depart 
from the classical Ash‘arī conception thereof. For him, the fundamental distinction between 
God and the world remains that between eternal and temporally originated existence. For al-
Shahrastānī on the other hand, the designations ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ do indeed refer to 
states in which beings exist, the latter entirely derivative. In his thought, these designations 
replace the eternal/temporally originated dichotomy entirely. 
Part of al-Rāzī’s originality, and a key factor in his influential integration of falsafa and kalām, is 
his explicit and comprehensive comparison of key notions from each thought system. Unlike al-
Ghazālī, he does not appropriate Ibn Sīnā’s terminology of possibility and necessity whilst 
retaining an Ash‘arī view of their meanings. Unlike al-Shahrastānī, he does not readily abandon 
basic kalām distinctions without expansive critical analysis. In the case of al-Rāzī’s reception of 
Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possible and necessary existence, this entails a critical comparison between 
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this and the eternal vs temporally originated dichotomy of the theologians. I will survey a 
selection of works to demonstrate this point.172 
Despite the Avicennan orientation of the work, in his discussion of ‘Common Things’ (al-umūr 
al-‘āmma) in the Mabāḥith, al-Rāzī includes both the Necessary/Possible and the 
Eternal/Temporally originated dichotomies, describing both as ‘primary divisions of existence’ 
according to ‘certain [different] considerations’.173  The structure of the Muḥaṣṣal, which 
straddles the traditions and has less of an Avicennan orientation, reflects a similar 
methodology.174  This explicit acknowledgement of the distinction between these two 
categorisations of existence allows for al-Rāzī’s critical analysis of the contentious question of 
which of these divisions best accounts for the causal relationship between one category and the 
other. In other words, it allows al-Rāzī, more precisely than his predecessors, to get to the heart 
of the contention over the nature of the world’s dependence upon God.  
Structured as it is according to traditional kalām parameters, the Arba‘īn has no independent 
section dealing with the strictly metaphysical topic of existence and its divisions. Indeed, like 
most works of classical Ash‘arism, the work begins with a section establishing the world’s 
temporal creation. At first glance, this suggests that, like his pre-Avicennan school members, al-
Rāzī primarily divides existents into Eternal and Temporally originated. However, by this point, 
the Necessity/Possibility distinction is established as al-Rāzī’s own accepted division of 
existents. In the preliminaries to his first section, a defence of creation ex nihilo, al-Rāzī writes: 
 ‘[As] the theologians have said, the world comprises all existents other than God. And 
the [way to] establish this statement is to say that the existent is of two divisions, since 
the existent is either that which in itself is never susceptible to non-existence, or that 
																																																						
172 I consider four works, representative of the various orientations of his thought: the Mabāḥith, committed to an 
evaluation of Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics and Physics; the Arba‘īn and Muḥaṣṣal, two middle-period works, the former 
reflecting a kalām orientation and the latter an experimental comparative critique of the two traditions; and finally, 
the Maṭālib, al-Rāzī’s latest work, his fullest integration of falsafa with kalām. 
173 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 1, 6. 
174 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 93-116 and 117-118.  
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which in itself is susceptible to existence… [The former] is the Necessary of Existence by 
virtue of itself… [, the latter] the Possible of Existence by virtue of itself’.175  
As will become clear, al-Rāzī’s use of this terminology is not superficial, but reflects careful 
appropriation of key aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics.  
As in the Arba‘īn, al-Rāzī’s primary categorisation of existents in the Maṭālib is Necessary vs 
Possible.176 Yet in this work, the product of a later stage in al-Rāzī’s integration of the traditions, 
no longer does either the experimental comparative approach of the Muḥaṣṣal, or the kalām 
orientation of the Arba‘īn, inform the work’s organisation. Rather, al-Rāzī explains his 
procedure with reference to Ibn Sīnā’s notion of necessary existence. In Volume 1, al-Rāzī 
justifies the priority given to discussion of the Divinity by arguing that God is the ‘most noble’ 
(ashraf) of subject matters.177 One of his five reasons is that ‘the Necessary of Existence is none 
other than [God], and everything other than him is Possible of Existence by virtue of itself, 
requiring a cause. This entails that everything other than Him depends upon Him.’178 There is 
no reference in these preliminaries to God’s eternity or to the temporal origination of the 
world, and it is quite clear that Ibn Sīnā’s distinction has supplanted this as al-Rāzī’s primary 
ontological distinction.  
As Shihadeh has shown in discussion of al-Rāzī’s commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt wa-l-
tanbīhāt, al-Rāzī is responsible for explicitly identifying possibility, in Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine, as the 
determinant (‘illa) of an effect’s reliance on its cause.179 Al-Rāzī’s close critical analysis of Ibn 
Sīnā’s conception of causedness is unprecedented, and a highly prominent theme across his 
philosophical-theological works. It is true to say of all the Rāzian works considered in this 
																																																						
175 Al-Rāzī, Arba‘īn,  1, 16. 
176 I have not been able to establish with certainty that al-Āmidī had access to the Maṭālib. Even if not, this last work 
of al-Rāzī’s contains his fullest expression of the metaphysical doctrines he had long upheld, so that its treatment 
here (and throughout the thesis) is useful even for the purpose of clarifying the views with which al-Āmidī had 
certainly become acquainted through al-Rāzī’s earlier works.  
177 Note the distinction between this and the Mabāḥith, which follows the Avicennan precept of proceeding from that 
which is ‘more general’ (or ‘universal’) to that which is more particular (c.f. Ibn Sīnā’s justification of his approach to 
metaphysics in the Najāt, 2, 47). 
178 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 1, 37. 
179 Shihadeh, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Commentary’, 321. 
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section that the determinant of the effect’s reliance on its cause is held to be its essential 
possibility (i.e. its susceptibility to both existence and non-existence), and not its origination ex 
nihilo. In the first volume of the Mabāḥith, al-Rāzī asserts and establishes against imagined 
opponents that ‘possibility is what requires a cause’ (al-imkān huwa al-maḥūj ilā al-sabab).180 He 
also argues negatively, within his section in the same volume on eternity and temporal 
originatedness, against the notion that ‘temporal origination could be a reason for the [effect’s] 
need for a cause’ (al-ḥudūth yumkin an yakūn sababan li-l-ḥāja ilā al-sabab).181 His position in the 
Muḥaṣṣal, Arba‘īn, and Maṭālib is the same.182  
For al-Rāzī, however, a second issue arises with regard to Ibn Sīnā’s position. Accepting that the 
sole determinant of the effect’s reliance on its cause is its possibility, al-Rāzī asks whether 
temporal originatedness ought nonetheless to be considered a condition (sharṭ) of that reliance. 
That is to say that whilst the possible of existence requires a cause due to its essential 
possibility, must it also come to exist after not having existed in order to be considered 
dependent upon a cause? This becomes a crucial theme in many of his philosophical-theological 
discussions. Indeed, he writes in the Mabāḥith that ‘the greatest of investigations into temporal 
originatedness and eternity is whether or not temporal originatedness is a condition of the 
effect’s reliance on its cause.’183 Later in the work, within his discussion of causality, al-Rāzī 
argues with ten proofs that causal action is not conditioned upon the preceding non-existence 
of the effect.184 This understanding of the relationship between cause and effect is later used as 
a premise in the proof for the world’s eternity which arises in the third volume of the work.185   
																																																						
180 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 125-128. This work was written before the Sharḥ, and this is perhaps reflected in the relative 
simplicity of the terminology used to examine and defend Ibn Sīnā’s position. 
181 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 1, 134-5. 
182 See al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 113-4; Arba‘īn, 1, 101; Maṭālib, 1, 200-202, 214 and 4, 31 and 231-239, where he presents 
fourteen proofs for this position. 
183 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 1, 136.  
184 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 1, 485-492. 
185 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 2, 515-516, in a brief section entitled ‘on the eternity (dawwām) of God’s action’. The Mabāḥith 
does retain a note of uncertainty over this question characteristic of the presence of inconsistencies in this early 
work (see Shihadeh, ‘From al-Ghazālī’, 171). In presenting proofs for God’s existence, al-Rāzī primarily relies on Ibn 
Sīnā’s proof from possibility. However, he acknowledges that others have relied in their proofs for God on the 
doctrine that ‘the determinant of the effect’s reliance on its cause is its temporal originatedness alone’, whilst others 
have said that it is ‘possibility, [but] on the condition that the effect be something temporally originated’. 
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In the Muḥaṣṣal, al-Rāzī again holds that possibility alone, and not possibility conditioned upon 
temporal originatedness, determines an effect’s reliance on its cause. He does present proofs for 
God’s existence from the possibility of the world and from its temporal origination. However, 
his proofs from temporal origination rely on the premises ‘every temporally originated existent 
is only possible by virtue of its own essence’ and ‘every possible of existence relies on a cause 
for its existence’. This means that it is possibility alone which determines dependence upon a 
cause. It is only in their essential possibility that temporal occurrences require a cause.186  
The same observations apply to al-Rāzī’s proofs for God in the Maṭālib, where these premises are 
explored and defended in far greater depth. In that work, al-Rāzī also discusses proofs which 
aim to establish God’s existence on the basis of the world’s temporal originatedness without 
any reference to its essential possibility. He acknowledges that theologians using such proofs 
would argue either a) that the temporally originated existent’s need for a cause is known 
immediately, or b) that it is proven by demonstration, identifying specific theologians with 
each position. He argues against both groups, re-iterating his own position that it is possibility 
which determines an existent’s need for a cause.187 As in the Muḥaṣṣal, the proof for God from 
temporal originatedness which he supports (and against which, as I demonstrate in Chapter 5, 
al-Āmidī argues) relies on the premise that all temporally originated existents are in 
themselves only possible - a premise he defends with several proofs.188   
																																																						
Confusingly, he then adds: ‘this final position is strong’ (Mabāḥith, 2, 450-51). Nevertheless, al-Rāzī does not (in this 
work) develop proofs for God based on either of these latter positions. The overall commitment of the work is to the 
position that temporal originatedness is not a factor in an effect’s reliance on its cause. 
186 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 213-4. 
187 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 1, 207-214. 
188 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 1, 200-206. The Arba‘īn is anomalous when it comes to al-Rāzī’s general departure from the 
classical Ash‘arī emphasis on temporal originatedness in consideration of causedness. Al-Rāzī states: ‘according to us, 
temporal originatedness (al-ḥudūth) is not a consideration in the establishment of [the effect’s] reliance [on its cause], 
neither as its determinant, nor as a condition.’ (Arba‘īn, 1, 101).  However, he also argues that all possible existents 
are temporally originated, on the basis that a cause acts on its effect at the point of its origination (a position against 
which he consistently argues elsewhere) (Arba‘īn, 1, 52-53, 65). This implies that temporal originatedness is a 
condition of an effect’s reliance on its cause. We will see the implications of this for al-Rāzī’s views on creation in this 
work in Chapter 5.  
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The supplanting of the distinction between eternal and temporally originated existents in al-
Rāzī’s thought is a significant chapter in the history of Ash‘arism.189 It remains to consider how 
al-Āmidī’s thought relates to this development. 
3.ii Al-Āmidī’s Works of falsafa  
3.ii.a. Al-Nūr al-bāhir 
Al-Āmidī’s theory and uses of the distinction between the possible and necessary of existence in 
the Nūr broadly concur with Ibn Sīnā’s. Al-Āmidī asserts that existents are divided into those 
which exist necessarily and those whose existence is possible at the end of his Book on causes 
and effects. Unlike Ibn Sīnā, he does not explore the basis of our knowledge of this division.190  
He defines the necessary of existence as that which ‘has claim to existence by virtue of its own 
essence, and which, if its non-existence were postulated, an impossibility would be entailed’; 
the impossible as that which ‘has claim to non-existence by virtue of its own essence, and 
which, if its existence were postulated, an impossibility would be entailed’; and the possible as 
that which ‘has claim neither to existence nor to non-existence by virtue of its essence, and for 
which neither its non-existence nor its existence would result in impossibility’.191  
Al-Āmidī employs the distinction in the next book, firstly, to prove the existence of the 
Necessary of Existence, and then each of his attributes. What marks out al-Āmidī’s discussions 
methodologically from Ibn Sīnā’s is that he asserts his proof for each of these doctrines (for 
instance, the existence of God) very briefly (in the case of his proof for God’s existence, in less 
than one folio), then expends considerable discussion dealing with objections (treatment of 
																																																						
189 Wisnovsky discusses this post-Avicennan development in terms of its relevance to kalām discussions of God’s 
oneness and attributes in his ‘One Aspect of the Avicennian Turn’. 
190 Ibn Sīnā argues that the concepts of possibility and necessity are primary concepts, and, as such, cannot be 
defined without circularity (Ilāhiyyāt, I.5, 27-28).  
The brevity of al-Āmidī’s explanation of the basic concepts may testify to its prevailing acceptance among post-
Avicennan philosophers (even those, such as Abu l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, who had significant disagreements with Ibn 
Sīnā), and indeed, theologians. See Mu‘tabar, 3, 20-23, where al-Baghdādī asserts the doctrine in commencing his own 
Metaphysics.  
191 Nūr, 5, 173. 
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objections against the proof for God’s existence covers five folios).192 The question of what 
determines an existent’s reliance on its cause is articulated, according to Ibn Sīnā’s own 
treatment of the question, as a response to those who wrongly ‘thought that the dependence 
(iftiqār) of the effect on its cause is on account of [the effect’s] origination after non-existence.193 
Unsurprisingly, al-Āmidī sides with Ibn Sīnā here, arguing that it is on account of the essential 
possibility of an existent that it relies on a cause. 
Like Ibn Sīnā, al-Āmidī also employs the distinction to establish the pre-eternal emanation of 
the world, 194 the notion that efficient causes are essentially and not temporally prior to their 
effects,195 the view (key to Neoplatonic cosmology) that multiplicity cannot proceed directly 
from God,196 and a range of other doctrines. In each of these contexts, al-Āmidī deals with 
objections. Within his discussions of these objections, al-Āmidī demonstrates some critical 
evaluation of Ibn Sīnā’s theory, leading to a modified theory, which will occupy us in the 
following sections. 
3.ii.b. Kashf al-tamwīhāt 
The Kashf stands alone in its commitment to the letter of Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārat. It goes without 
saying, then, that the primacy of the distinction between possibility and necessity is supported. 
On the question of what determines an existent’s need for a cause, al-Āmidī is more concerned 
with accusing al-Rāzī of misreading Ibn Sīnā than with the substance of the discussion. He 
responds to al-Rāzī’s claim that Ibn Sīnā has failed to address the central question of whether it 
is essential possibility or temporal originatedness which determines an existent’s need for a 
cause. He concedes al-Rāzī’s point that this is, indeed, the central question in the debate 
between the two sides. However, he claims that Ibn Sīnā has, in fact, addressed this matter. He 
																																																						
192 Nūr, 5, 176-182. 
193 Nūr, 5, 143. There is no trace of the influence of al-Rāzī’s articulation of this debate in terms of the determinant 
(‘illa) of causedness, confirming the impression that at the stage of his authorship of the Nūr, al-Āmidī was not yet 
responding to al-Rāzī. 
194 Nūr, 5, 210-211. 
195 Nūr, 5, 143. 
196 Nūr, 5, 182 and 223. 
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cites Ibn Sīnā’s words in V.3: ‘[the possible of existence’s] not being necessary of existence by 
virtue of itself, but [by virtue of] something other than it can occur in two ways: the first, that it 
is always necessary of existence by virtue of something other than itself; the second, that it is 
necessary of existence by something other than itself at a particular time’.197 He then explains 
that the meaning of this statement is that the eternal existent can be of the kind which relies 
for its existence on a cause, which is to say that Ibn Sīnā has, in fact, stated his position on what 
constitutes an existent’s need for a cause, namely, its essential possibility. 
But al-Rāzī has claimed that in making this statement, Ibn Sīnā has committed the logical 
fallacy of begging the question (al-muṣādara ‘alā l-maṭlūb), since he has not provided support for 
his conclusion. Al-Āmidī disagrees. The conclusion which Ibn Sīnā is aiming for is ‘it is not 
impossible for the eternal [existent] to rely on a cause’. He has argued for this conclusion with 
the statement ‘it is not impossible for that which relies on a cause to be eternal’. The two 
statements are not identical, rather, the latter is the opposite of the desired conclusion (‘aks al-
maṭlūb). It is, says al-Āmidī ‘[logically] sound to prove the veracity of a statement by the 
veracity of its opposite’. Al-Āmidī’s defence of Ibn Sīnā here trivialises al-Rāzī’s point, which is 
that Ibn Sīnā has not provided sufficient evidence that causedness may be attributed to eternal 
existents.  
Al-Āmidī provides an additional tack which turns out to be no more substantial. He cites Ibn 
Sīnā’s statement that ‘[the possible of existence’s] connection to something other [than itself] is 
more general than its being temporally originated’, a statement which al-Rāzī claims is the 
worst of Ibn Sīnā’s begging of the question, Ibn Sīnā simply stating his desired conclusion 
without argument. Al-Āmidī defends Ibn Sīnā on the basis that the statement is not intended as 
an argument (laysa dhālik madhkūran fī jihat al-dalāla ḥattā yakūn muṣādaran ‘alā l-maṭlūb). Rather, 
says al-Āmidī, Ibn Sīnā is simply making a logical observation on his initial division of caused 
existents into eternal and possible, which is to say that an existent’s state of being caused is a 
more general attribute than either of the states ‘eternal’ or ‘temporally originated’ with which 
																																																						
197 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, V.3, 494-5. 
	 87	
the existent can also be attributed. Al-Āmidī succeeds here only in attacking al-Rāzī’s logic, and 
his arguments here should be taken as such, his stated aim in the work being precisely to 
expose the errors of his contemporary. We must look to other works for al-Āmidī’s own 
developing opinions on Ibn Sīnā’s ontology. 
3.ii.c. Rumūz al-kunūz 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in Rumūz al-kunūz, al-Āmidī distinguishes between aspects of falsafa 
which can be used in the defence of kalām doctrine, and those which must be rejected. The work 
is structured identically to the Nūr, and is remarkably accommodating of Ibn Sīnā’s falsafa. Al-
Āmidī strictly rejects only those parts of falsafa which directly contradict established Ash‘arī 
doctrines, such as the doctrine of God’s attributes. Because the topics are ordered according to 
the falsafī approach, the discussion of the distinction arises in the same contexts as in the Nūr. 
Al-Āmidī’s theory is barely developed, despite his altered commitments. Essentially, he accepts 
the distinction between the possible and necessary of existence, using it, like Ibn Sīnā, to prove 
God’s existence and attributes.  
In this work, al-Āmidī does not specifically address the question of what determines 
causedness. However, in discussion of the notion that pre-eternal existents may be caused, al-
Āmidī hints at his view on the question. He notes divergent opinions on the question of pre-
eternal effects. Some have said that describing a pre-eternal existent as caused implies the 
‘bringing into existence of that which already exists’ (ījād al-wujūd), an absurdity. Others (the 
falāsifa), say that the possible of existence relies on its cause during its existence in the sense 
that if it were not for the cause, it could not exist. This need not imply ijād al-wujūd in the way 
that the opponent imagines. Al-Āmidī’s opinion is subtly stated. He writes that the truth of the 
matter is clear ‘to the one who reflects on the fact that that which relies on a cause is possible 
by virtue of its own essence’.198 He seems to imply here that the possibility of an existent is the 
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determinant of its reliance on a cause (Ibn Sīnā’s view), though as we will see later, he does not 
support the idea of the existence of eternal effects in this work. 
Despite significant developments between al-Āmidī’s works of falsafa with regard to his 
doctrinal commitments and intellectual projects, the distinction between the possible and 
necessary of existence, and the notion that it is on account of their essential possibility that 
existents require a cause, are consistent features of al-Āmidī’s thought. In this respect at least, 
Ibn Sīnā’s influence on al-Āmidī’s philosophical thought is straightforward. 
3.iii Al-Āmidī’s works of kalām  
Turning to al-Āmidī’s Abkār takes us into an entirely new phase in his thinking. This phase is 
marked by overt and vehement commitment to Ash‘arī kalām doctrines, and equally vehement 
opposition to the views of those he characterises as the falāsifa. Despite this opposition, al-
Āmidī relies on many aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s falsafa. It is clear by this stage that the resources, 
both falsafī and kalām, both pre-Avicennan and post, upon which al-Āmidī could draw for his 
theory of possibility and necessity in his own works of kalām were very rich. In this section I 
demonstrate that he appropriates both Ibn Sīnā’s basic distinction, and his view that it is an 
existent’s essential possibility which determines its need for a cause. 
No reader of the Abkār or Ghāya can miss the centrality of the distinction between the necessary 
and possible of existence to the works. In the Abkār, the distinction is used to frame al-Āmidī’s 
discussions of God and the world. In Volume 1, in a section entitled ‘on the existent’, al-Āmidī 
writes: 
The existent is either that which it is impossible to imagine (farḍ) not existing with 
respect to itself, or that which it is not impossible to imagine not existing with respect to 
itself. The former is the necessary of existence by virtue of itself (wājib al-wujūd li-dhātihi). 
	 89	
The latter is the possible of existence (jā’iz al-wujūd). And we must discuss each one of 
these in turn.199 
On the basis of this division, al-Āmidī structures the entirety of the next three volumes. 
Nowhere does he justify this division of existents, nor discuss its epistemological foundations. 
The distinction between the possible and necessary of existence is taken as basic, that is to say, 
in need of no demonstration.  
In Ghāyat al-marām, the distinction appears immediately after al-Āmidī’s introductory 
comments, in the context of proving God’s existence. Al-Āmidī frames the discussion in such a 
way as to narrow the gap between Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the dichotomy of existents, and the 
traditional Ash‘arī conception of God and the dependence of all other existents on him. He 
begins: 
Insightful Muslims (al-muḥaqqiqūn min al-islāmiyyīn), as well as the people of the religions 
of the past, and some of the metaphysicians, hold that the existence of a being whose 
existence is by virtue of itself (wujūduhu lahu li-dhātihi) is necessary: [a being] which 
depends on nothing other than itself for existence, and upon whose creation (ibdā‘), the 
existence of everything else depends.200 
Having framed the discussion, al-Āmidī proceeds to establish that existents in the world do not 
have existence ‘by virtue of themselves’ (li-dhātihā), and on this basis, to provide his proof for 
God’s existence. His manner of introducing the distinction with an appeal to his kalām heritage 
illustrates an important point which can be reiterated here: the intuition that the world is 
contingent and that God, by contrast, is not, is of course embedded in kalām doctrine. It is for 
																																																						
199 Abkār, 1, 220-1. Al-Āmidī uses the term jā’iz to refer to possible existence. This is the term used most commonly by 
previous mutakallimūn (e.g. al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 266; al-Ghazālī, Al-qisṭās al-mustaqīm, 26). Al-Āmidī elsewhere uses the 
terms mumkin and jā’iz synonymously. He may use the latter term here by way of identifying the basic division with 
the kalām tradition. Perhaps he also favours the term jā’iz to refer to the logical permissibility of an existent, in which 
case, his use of the term can be seen to emphasise his tendency to view possibility in logical rather than substantial 
terms (to be discussed). 
200 Ghāya, 9. 
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this reason that Ibn Sīnā’s highly developed distinction between the possible and necessary of 
existence served his Islamic philosophical theology so well, and was subsequently so influential. 
Also influential on al-Āmidī was Ibn Sīnā’s use of the distinction in his proof for God. There is no 
trace in al-Āmidī’s kalām of the traditional Ash‘arī procedure of proving the world’s origination 
in time, and inferring therefrom its need for a creator. Rather, in both the Abkār and Ghāya, the 
existence of God is proven on the basis of the possible existent’s need for a preponderator to 
give it existence in place of non-existence.201 Al-Āmidī writes that the possible of existence is 
that for which ‘existence and non-existence are both possible’ (al-wujūd wa-l-‘adam ‘alayhi jā’iz), 
and that for this reason, such an existent requires a preponderator (murajjiḥ) to determine that 
it exists. 202 There is no reference to the actual non-existence of the possible of existence in 
relation to its need for a cause within al-Āmidī’s proof for God.  
Since the possibility of the existence of beings in the world is not inferred from their 
temporality, the traditional kalām identification of the possible of existence with temporally 
originated existents is not immediately made by al-Āmidī. Furthermore, in the Abkār, al-Āmidī’s 
proof for God is separated (by two volumes) from his defence of the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo. Furthermore, as we shall see in Chapter 5, in both the Abkār and Ghāya, al-Āmidī infers 
the world’s temporal creation from his proof for God’s existence (and not the inverse, as in the 
traditional kalām procedure). Like al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī thus clearly concedes Ibn Sīnā’s 
understanding that it is essential possibility, and not temporal originatedness, which 
determines an existent’s need for a cause. 
Despite adopting Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possibility as the determinant of causedness, al-Āmidī 
expresses somewhat contradictory opinions on the same issue elsewhere in the Abkār. The 
confusion is brought about by his dialectical objective of undermining al-Rāzī. The issue arises 
in three dialectical contexts. Firstly, in defence of his proof for God, al-Āmidī counters a 
hypothetical opponent who denies that the possible of existence requires a cause. Al-Āmidī has 
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an opponent argue that the possible of existence cannot rely on a cause because the need (ḥāja) 
for a cause is a real, existent (thubūtī) attribute of the possible. Being an existent, the need for a 
cause must itself be either necessary or possible of existence. Yet it can be neither: it cannot be 
necessary of existence, because it is an attribute of the possible. But if it were possible of 
existence, an infinite regress of possible existents would be engendered.203 Al-Āmidī responds 
by writing that the existent’s need for a cause is not itself an existent entity, but simply the fact 
that without the cause, the possible of existence would not exist. This diverts the discussion 
away from the question of whether possibility or temporal originatedness determine 
causedness. An existent’s dependence on a cause simply reverts to the fact that without the 
cause, the existent could not exist. As such, its dependence on a cause need not be said to have a 
determinant (‘illa).  
This is clearly intended as a diversion from al-Rāzī’s way of framing the discussion, though it 
does not represent a philosophical judgement on the question of causedness itself. The second 
context is al-Āmidī’s refutation of al-Rāzī’s Arba‘īn proof for creation ex nihilo, which is premised 
on the notion that all possible existents are temporally originated, and will be treated in 
Chapter 5. Suffice to note for now that in the context of responding to al-Rāzī’s evaluation of 
this notion, al-Āmidī himself argues robustly that temporal originatedness does not determine 
causedness.204 Finally, in his defence of Ash‘arī occasionalism, al-Āmidī presents and refutes his 
version of two Rāzian arguments which are premised on the notion that the determinant of 
causedness is possibility alone.205 He rejects the proofs on the basis that since possibility is not 
an existent entity, it cannot be the determinant of causedness. Instead, he argues, possibility is 
the condition (sharṭ) of an existent’s reliance on its cause.206  
Compiling al-Āmidī’s comments on this issue, we can surmise that he holds that temporal 
originatedness is not what determines the need for a cause, that the possible of existence 
always relies on a cause in the sense that without its cause, it would not exist, and that this 
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204 Abkār, 3, 314.  
205 Al-Rāzī, Arba‘īn, 1, 333-335. 
206 Abkār, 2, 236-8. 
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dependence upon a cause is conditioned upon its essential possibility. Thus, despite al-Āmidī’s 
reluctance to articulate his position in the manner of al-Rāzī, it is clear that al-Āmidī endorses 
Ibn Sīnā’s view on this point. 
The overall importance of the distinction between the possible and necessary of existence for 
al-Āmidī’s kalām is clear. To this extent, his thought bears an Avicennan stamp, for it is 
undeniable at least that never before Ibn Sīnā had the distinction been used so coherently nor 
so prominently. The integration of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of what determines an existent’s need for a 
cause in al-Āmidī’s thought is also a very significant development, with considerable 
ramifications for the role of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Yet 
closer examination of what al-Āmidī intends by ‘possible of existence’ will reveal that the 
Avicennan influence is in other respects superficial. For his ontology of possibility, his 
understanding of where it inheres, and of how the possible of existence relates to its cause, al-
Āmidī relies on his Ash‘arī heritage, as I will show. 
4. The Ontology of Possibility  
Al-Āmidī rejects Ibn Sīnā’s notions of what possibility is, where it inheres, and what the terms 
‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ qualify. In Section 2, I showed that Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical discussions 
of possible and necessary existence are informed by his natural philosophy, and specifically, 
that he strongly associates the possible essence with unactualised matter. We saw that one of 
Ibn Sīnā’s most prominent proofs for the pre-eternity of the world is based on this connection, 
Ibn Sīnā arguing that possibility requires matter as a substrate in which to inhere. In this 
section, I demonstrate al-Āmidī’s rejection of the conceptualisation of possibility implied, 
taking account, firstly, of precedents for his view. 
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4.i. Post-Avicennan Ash‘arī Precedents 
4.i.a. al-Ghazālī 
In the First Discussion of his Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī presents Ibn Sīnā’s argument from the notion of 
possibility as the Fourth Proof in the philosophers’ defence of the pre-eternity of the world. In 
response, he asserts that possibility is a logical concept, rather than a metaphysical reality. He 
writes that possibility is merely a ‘rational proposition’ (qaḍā’ al-‘aql).207 He gives a number of 
arguments to undermine Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possibility. One is that human souls have ‘a 
possibility preceding their origination, but there is nothing [material] to which this possibility 
relates’.208 We will shortly see that al-Āmidī’s uses the same argument in his discussion of 
possibility in the Nūr.209  
Al-Ghazālī consistently opposes Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possibility across the contexts in which 
it arises. The third discussion of the Tahāfut attempts to undermine the philosophers’ ability to 
prove that God is the maker of the world. Al-Ghazālī is highly critical of Ibn Sīnā’s emanationist 
cosmology, describing it as ‘darkness upon darkness’.210 He opposes Ibn Sīnā’s explanation of 
the emanation of multiplicity from the simple First Intellect, which relies in part on the notion 
that the possibility of the essence of the First Intellect is the source of the matter of the outer 
celestial sphere. 211 Al-Ghazālī argues that the possibility of the First Intellect cannot be the 
source of a further existent. He holds that if the possibility of the First Intellect is taken to 
entail plurality, then the same must be said of God’s Necessity of Existence, in which case ‘let 
one allow the emanation of multiple things from him because of this multiplicity’.212  
																																																						
207 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 43. See Dutton (‘al-Ghazālī on Possibility’, 27-45) on al-Ghazālī’s reduction of possibility to a 
logical concept and its implications for his theory of causality. McGinnis demonstrates that Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) 
also understood possibility in terms of ‘concept compatibility’. The problematic implications of viewing possibility in 
relation to matter were perceived by theologians across the traditions (McGinnis, ‘The Eternity of the World’, 12-13).  
208Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 45. 
209 The argument also occurs in al-Shahrastānī’s Nihāya, 34. Al-Shahrastānī describes possibility as no more than ‘an 
estimation [made] in the mind’ (taqdīr fī l-dhihn), echoing al-Ghazālī’s (and the classical Ash‘arī) view. 
210 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 68. 
211 See fn 228 below for further explanation. 
212 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 69. 
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We will see that the echo of the Tahāfut is clear in al-Āmidī’s own objection to Ibn Sīnā’s 
cosmology in the Nūr. In discussion of emanation in the Kashf, al-Āmidī attacks al-Rāzī’s 
objections on the basis that none of them are original, but rather, taken from ‘Ṣāḥib al-tahāfut’.213 
This reference to al-Ghazālī confirms the impression that al-Āmidī’s discussions of possibility 
are, indeed, influenced by the Tahāfut. More generally, however, the kalām conception of 
possibility outlined in Section 3 is the backdrop to both al-Ghazālī’s and al-Āmidī’s critiques of 
Ibn Sīnā. 
4.i.b. al-Rāzī 
Al-Rāzī is thorough in his analysis and critique of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of possibility. Two 
features of his critique are relevant here; his treatment of Ibn Sīnā’s essence/existent 
distinction in relation to his view of what the attributes ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ qualify, and 
his insistence, against Ibn Sīnā, that possibility has no objective reality such that it should 
require a material substrate.  
I argued earlier that the position that existence is determinate and super-added to the possible 
essence should not be attributed to Ibn Sīnā. In fact, its longevity as a reading of Ibn Sīnā is 
attributable to al-Rāzī. According to al-Rāzī, the logical upshot of Ibn Sīnā’s notion that the 
Necessary of Existence is no more and no less than its existence, is that existence is equivocal 
(which is to say that it varies between existents), and that in the case of the possible of 
existence alone, existence is additional to essence. Al-Rāzī’s own opinion, however, is that 
existence is entirely univocal (mushtarik), and additional to essence in the case of all existents, 
including God. 214 This is a position distinct both from Ibn Sīnā’s, and from that of the classical 
																																																						
213 Kashf, 2, 874. 
214 E.g. Al-Rāzī, Mabāhith, 1, 18-23 (that existence is univocal, proven here with an argument to the effect that 
existents are unalike, but that they have something in common not shared by the non-existent), 23-30 (that the 
existence of possible existents is additional to (zā’id ‘alā) their essence), 30-41 (that the existence of the Necessary of 
Existence is identical with his essence); Arba‘īn, 1, 82-88, where these discussions are subsumed under the classical 
kalām debate over whether or not the non-existent (al-ma‘dūm) is a thing (shay’). Eichner treats al-Rāzī’s position and 
its reception in ‘Essence and Existence’; Mayer also treats al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt expression of this 
doctrine in On Existence, 195-208; on the notion that existence is super-added in the case of possible existents as a 
Rāzian innovation, see Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence’. 
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Ash‘arīs (for whom essence and existence are indistinct). According to al-Rāzī’s understanding 
of the relationship between essence and existence, it is the essences of existents which are 
qualified as either possible or necessary, and not existence itself, which is entirely 
homogenous.215 
As well as disagreeing with Ibn Sīnā on the relation between essence and existence, al-Rāzī 
consistently opposes his notion of possibility as a real relation. His commentary on the Ishārāt 
exemplifies his view. Ibn Sīnā’s proof for the pre-eternity of matter from his notion of 
possibility appears, more concisely, in the metaphysics of the Ishārāt, V.6.216 In his commentary, 
al-Rāzī objects to the notion that possibility is ontologically real. Firstly, he challenges the idea 
that temporal occurrences have a determinate possibility associated with them prior to their 
existence (laysa hunāk amr muta‘ayyin mutamayyiz). Rather, prior to a temporal occurrence, he 
argues, there is only its ‘pure non-existence’ (al-nafī al-ṣirf).217 Secondly, he concedes that 
temporal occurrences are preceded by possibility, but argues that this possibility is not an 
‘affirmative thing’ (amr thubūtī).218 This he supports with three arguments, to which al-Āmidī 
will respond in his Kashf. In the course of one of his arguments, al-Rāzī expands on his notion of 
possibility, claiming that it is an accidental attribute of the essence of a thing in relation to its 
existence. For instance, when I say that the existence of a chair is possible, I make a statement 
relating the essence of the chair to its existence in reality. The possibility is thus accidental to 
the chair.219 Al-Rāzī thus presents possibility as a rational attribution referring to the 
compatibility of the existence of an occurrence with reality. In this regard, he shares the 
perspective of the classical Ash‘arīs and of al-Ghazālī before him.  
 
																																																						
215 Al-Shahrastānī also holds that existence is a factor common to the possible and necessary of existence (amr 
yu‘amm al-wājib wa-l-jā’iz). This may be a precedent for al-Rāzī’s position (al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 15). 
216 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, V.6, 507-513. 
217 This corresponds to the Ash‘arīs’ absolute identification of ‘thingness’ with existence, though al-Rāzī is not 
expressing a commitment to the Ash‘arī theory.  
218 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 403-408.  He comments: The sound minded man does not require that possibility has extra-
mental existence, but [Ibn Sīnā] has required [this]’, Sharḥ, 2, 407; c.f. Arba‘īn, 1, 79-80. 
219 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 406. 
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4.ii Al-Āmidī’s works of falsafa 
4.ii.a al-Nūr al-bāhir 
In the Nūr, al-Āmidī upholds the doctrine that the world is pre-eternal, but rejects Ibn Sīnā’s 
proof from possibility. He first presents his own version of the proof which the ‘greatest minds 
(al-jahābidha min al-fāḍilīn) found reliable’. Having represented Ibn Sīnā’s view, he rejects it, 
arguing that possibility is not existent (wujūdī), but negational (salbī). That is to say that when 
we describe something as ‘possible’, we simply mean that it is neither inconceivable for that 
thing to exist, nor for it not to exist (salb al-muḥāl min farḍ wujūdihi wa-‘adamihi). Al-Āmidī thus 
views possibility in rational terms, as a reference to the compatibility of our conceptualisation 
of X with existence. If we describe X as possible, we only mean that we can rationally conceive 
of both its existence and its non-existence. He adds that rational, negational attributions do not 
require a substrate of matter in which to inhere.220  
In order to disprove the affirmative existence of possibility, al-Āmidī presents two arguments. 
One is an argument ad hominem: since possibility precedes every temporal occurrence, it 
precedes human souls, which are immaterial. The opponent (Ibn Sīnā) has argued that the 
possibility preceding temporal occurrences requires a substrate of matter. Therefore, according 
to his argument, immaterial beings are preceded by a substrate of matter. This is impossible.221 
We have already seen the Ghazālian precedent for this argument. 
Al-Āmidī anticipates a response to the objection. He acknowledges his opponent’s claim that 
the possibility of the human soul inheres in the matter to which the soul is related (that is, the 
human body).222 However, he argues ad hominem that if the possibility of the soul inheres in the 
body, Ibn Sīnā’s thesis that the possibility of X cannot inhere in the agent of X (premise 3 of his 
argument above) collapses. This is because the body is the form which gives existence to the 
																																																						
220 Nūr, 5, 168-169.  
221 Nūr, 5, 168-170. 
222 This is Ibn Sīnā’s own claim in Ilāhiyyāt IV.2, 137, where he writes ‘as for the soul, it does not come into existence 
except with the existence of a bodily subject, at which point the possibility of its existence would be in that [body], 
subsisting in it because of that matter being specifically related to it.’  
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soul, making it the agent of the soul. If the possibility of the soul inheres in the body, the 
possibility of the soul inheres in its agent. Since this has been denied, the inherence of the 
possibility of the soul in the body cannot be maintained. Al-Āmidī completes the objection by 
arguing that if the possibility of the immaterial soul inheres in body, then the possibility of 
other immaterial substances, namely the intellects, must also be said to have a substance in 
which to inhere.223  
Despite refuting this aspect of Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of possibility, al-Āmidī accepts the 
doctrine that the world is pre-eternal. To this end, he provides an alternative proof for the pre-
eternity of matter, based on the Ishārāt’s first proof for the doctrine.224 Al-Āmidī’s critique of Ibn 
Sīnā’s understanding of possibility is not, then, doctrinally motivated. Rather, it results from his 
own separation of the concept from its natural philosophical context: implicit to his negation of 
Ibn Sīnā’s conception is a loosening of Ibn Sīnā’s association of matter with possible existence. 
Possibility is reduced to a logical, rational concept, removed from its natural philosophical 
connections. 
Al-Āmidī’s discussions of potency and privation in the Physics of the Nūr illuminate this 
separation.  In his exposition of the principles of nature, al-Āmidī, like Ibn Sīnā, describes hayūla 
as that which ‘does not exist in actuality’ without that which inheres in it.225  Similarly, he 
defines privation according to Ibn Sīnā’s definition as the absence of a determined form.226 
However, this does not lead him (as it did Ibn Sīnā) to question whether or not a material 
substrate must precede this privation. Rather, al-Āmidī is preoccupied with refuting opponents 
(including Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, who held to an alternative conception of hayūla).227 In 
turn, the Nūr contains no equivalent to Ibn Sīnā’s III.11, in which he proves that the possibility 
																																																						
223 This overlooks the fact that Ibn Sīnā has argued that only existents generated from non-existence require a 
preceding substrate of possibility, distinguishing between temporal and pre-eternal existents in this regard (e.g. 
Ta‘līqāt, 54).  
224 Nūr, 5, 167-168, c.f. Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, V.4-5, 499-506. 
225 Nūr, 3, 12. 
226 Nūr, 3, 21. 
227 E.g. Nūr, 3, 14. On Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s denial of prime matter as a substrate for body, see Shihadeh, 
‘Avicenna’s Corporeal Form’, 5-6. 
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of motions precedes them and requires a substrate of matter in which to inhere. This means 
that the question of whether natural bodies are necessarily preceded by a substrate of matter is 
not addressed in the Physics of the Nūr. Neither are privation and potency explicitly associated 
with possibility. This helps explain why al-Āmidī’s conception of the ontology of possibility is so 
different to Ibn Sīnā’s when it arises in his Metaphysics.  It is also clear that al-Āmidī has been 
influenced by al-Ghazālī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possibility, since his arguments 
closely concur with those found in the Tahāfut, discussed above.228 
Ambiguities are raised with regard to al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s essence/existence 
distinction by his modification of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of possibility. Al-Āmidī’s notion of 
possibility in the Nūr is that it is a rational judgement relating to our ability to conceptualise a 
given occurrence in existence. Yet al-Āmidī endorses the essence/existence distinction 
throughout the Nūr. 229 This distinction entails the opinion that the characteristics of things, 
including their possibility or necessity of existence, are determined by their essences. This 
means that the designation ‘possible’ is objective, in that it characterises the essence of the 
possible. We might ask how al-Āmidī reconciles 1) the view that things are designated possible 
according to our ability to conceptualise them and 2) the view that things are designated 
																																																						
228 Al-Āmidī rejects Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possibility as a relation requiring matter in every doctrinal context in 
which it arises in the Nūr. One is Ibn Sīnā’s emanationist cosmology, specifically, the question of how multiplicity in 
the world emanates from the Necessary of Existence, who is completely simple. In the Nūr, al-Āmidī presents his 
interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s explanation of multiplicity in the Ishārāt as follows: from the First Intellect’s 
apprehension of God, the soul of the outermost sphere is produced. From its apprehension of itself, the form of the 
outer sphere is created. The possibility of the First Intellect produces the matter of the outer sphere. The necessity 
which the First Intellect derives from God produces a second intellect (Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, VII.39, 645-657). Al-Āmidī 
upholds the emanationist doctrine but objects to Ibn Sīnā’s explanation for multiplicity. His most significant 
objection, for which he provides a reductio ad absurdum, is that possibility and necessity in the First Intellect are not 
existent attributes (ṣifāt wujūdiyya) such that they could cause the existence of anything else. Yet al-Āmidī proposes 
an alternative theory and defends it extensively (Nūr, 5, 226-7). Again, he critiques Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of 
possibility and necessity (the Tahāfut precedents for which are discussed above) without any objection to the 
doctrine it is used to uphold. 
229 E.g. Nūr, 5, 227 (‘everything which is necessary by something other than it, its existence is additional to its 
essence’). Unlike al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, in the Nūr, does not interrogate the distinction. Rather, he concurs with Ibn Sīnā 
in quite simple terms that only in the case of the possible of existence is existence additional to essence, since the 
essence of the possible does not demand that it exist, in contrast with the necessary of existence, the essence of 
which demands its existence (e.g. Nūr, 5, 173). As such, al-Āmidī does not attempt to further clarify this distinction in 
relation to questions such as the univocity (or otherwise) of existence. This seems to confirm al-Āmidī’s lack of 
exposure to al-Rāzī’s works at this early stage. 
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possible according to their essences? The answer is not provided by al-Āmidī. It is conceivable 
that he holds that our ability to conceptualise an essence in existence is what makes its essence 
possible, i.e. that the reality of essences consists in our conceptualisation of them. On this view, 
however, essences are no more than conceptual entities.  
This, of course, is a major modification of Ibn Sīnā’s theory as I have outlined it, in which 
essences are associated with specific material privations, and by which an essence is only 
deemed possible if an instance of it extra-mentally exists.230 The tension in al-Āmidī’s view 
results from his dissociation of possible essences from potency in matter. We have seen that in 
Ibn Sīnā’s view, the possibility of the possible of existence is associated with its essence, and 
inheres in a material substrate. Possibility and possible essences are thus fully objective and not 
determined by our ability to conceptualise them. Al-Āmidī has abandoned the material 
objectivity of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possibility, but not his distinction between essence and 
existence. He has not acknowledged the resultant weakening of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of essence.  
The classical Ash‘arī conception of possibility as purely rational is consistent with the doctrine 
that things have no reality except as extra-mental existents. According to classical Ash‘arism, 
until actualised as existents, possibilities are no more and no less than ideas in the mind. On the 
other hand, Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possibility as a real relation corresponding to privations in 
matter is itself consistent with his own notion that essences are ontologically inseparable and 
yet distinct from existents. It is al-Āmidī’s compromise between, on the one hand, accepting 
that the possible essence is distinct from its existence, and on the other, maintaining that 
possibility is the purely rational designation of synchronic alternatives, that confuses the 
matter. It becomes unclear what exactly determines the designation ‘possible’, and in what 
sense essences are any more than logical concepts. Al-Āmidī has, in his Nūr at least, succumbed 
to the obscurity inherent to the unresolved integration of two highly differentiated ontologies. 
																																																						
230 Ibn Sīnā goes so far as to say that essences have ‘special existence’ (al-wujūd al-khāṣṣ) (contrasted with ‘affirmative 
existence’ (al-wujūd al-ithbātī)), to emphasise the fact that they have a real ontological status apart from their 
existence (Ilāhiyyāt, I.5, 24).  
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4.ii.b. Kashf al-tamwīhāt 
In response to al-Rāzī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possibility in his Sharḥ (discussed 
above), al-Āmidī argues in the Kashf for the opposing view (namely, Ibn Sīnā’s view that 
possibility is a real existent). Al-Āmidī cites al-Rāzī’s commentary on this topic almost in its 
entirety.231 The details of al-Āmidī’s arguments for the ontological reality of possibility do not 
concern us. Suffice to observe that al-Āmidī consistently opposes al-Rāzī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s 
notion of the existence of possibility. In discussion of the process of emanation, al-Rāzī argues, 
similarly to al-Āmidī in the Nūr, that none of the aspects of the First Intellect which Ibn Sīnā 
holds responsible for the emanation of other existents are sufficient causes. As part of this, he 
argues against the affirmative existence of possibility.232 Al-Āmidī argues against him in this 
context, too, that possibility is an affirmative existent.233 There is a clear contradiction between 
al-Āmidī’s stance maintained here in the Kashf, and his opinion expressed earlier in the Nūr. The 
project of the Kashf is to undermine al-Rāzī’s arguments against Ibn Sīnā. As such, the theory 
presented is anomalous in relation to all of al-Āmidī’s other extant works. Here we gain insight 
only into al-Āmidī’s encounter with al-Rāzī’s critical evaluation of Ibn Sīnā’s theory. 
4.ii.c. Rumūz al-kunūz 
In the Rumūz, al-Āmidī’s basic commitments have changed. As in his Nūr, the question of what 
possibility constitutes arises in al-Āmidī’s treatment of the question of the pre-eternity of 
matter, within a section entitled ‘On the generated (al-ḥādith) and the eternal (al-qadīm), and on 
what must precede generated things by way of time and matter’.234 In line with his overall 
commitment to kalām doctrine in this work, al-Āmidī rejects the doctrine that generated things 
are preceded by matter. However, al-Āmidī’s conceptualisation of possibility and its relation to 
matter has not changed between the Nūr and Rumūz. 
																																																						
231 Kashf, 2, 866-7.  
232 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 499-500. 
233 Kashf, 2, 875-6. 
234 Rumūz, f. 107b; c.f. Nūr, 5, 165. Indeed, as observed elsewhere, the Nūr and Rumūz are structurally identical, 
indicating al-Āmidī’s heavy reliance on the former in composition of the latter. 
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Ibn Sīnā’s proof from possibility for the eternity of the world is treated with extreme brevity; 
al-Āmidī presents the proof in five lines, and refutes it in two! He argues that Ibn Sīnā’s proof 
from the need for a substrate in which the possibility of a temporal occurrence inheres before 
its existence ‘is only correct if the preceding possibility is existent (wujūdī)’.235 He argues that 
the possibility is non-existent (‘adamī) as follows: the non-existence of the possible of existence 
is possible. Therefore, possibility is an attribute of non-existence. Existence cannot be an 
attribute of non-existence. Therefore, possibility is non-existent.236  Al-Āmidī does not expand 
on his notion of possibility, so it is unclear in what sense the possible non-existent is considered 
possible prior to its existence, and whether or not that possibility relates to a determinate 
essence. In any case, he certainly seems to understand possibility as a rational designation, as in 
the Nūr. Al-Āmidī also opposes Ibn Sīnā’s explanation of the process of emanation in the Rumūz, 
strongly opposing the emanationist cosmology as a whole. As in the Nūr, his discussion includes 
refutation of the notion that possibility is an affirmative existent such that it could be a 
sufficient cause for a further existent. 237 Despite changing theological commitments, there is no 
development in al-Āmidī’s rejection of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possibility as a real relation 
requiring a material substrate. 
The Kashf, with its dialectical agenda, represents the only exception to al-Āmidī’s consistent 
opposition to Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of possibility in his works of falsafa, with its clear background 
in the alternative conception of possibility dominant in his intellectual context.  
4.iii Al-Āmidī’s works of kalām 
The discussions of Abkār al-afkār and Ghāyat al-marām alike follow traditional theological 
topics.238 As such, despite the prominent use of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and 
necessary of existence, al-Āmidī’s ontology of possibility and his notion of where it inheres 
																																																						
235 Rumūz, f. 107a. 
236 Rumūz, f.107b. 
237 Rumūz, f.112b-113a.  
238 In this respect, al-Āmidī’s writings can be contrasted with al-Rāzī’s. In particular, al-Rāzī initiates a trend (which 
al-Āmidī does not follow) of treating metaphysical questions separately from ‘pure theology’, as Eichner has 
demonstrated (e.g. Eichner, ‘Dissolving the Unity’, especially 150-154). 
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feature in traditional kalām contexts. In particular, the discussion of God’s attributes of power 
and knowledge, and the discussion of existence and essence are important focal points for al-
Āmidī’s treatment of possibility, and will be treated in this section. 
In line with his Ash‘arī commitments, al-Āmidī presents a sustained defence of God’s eternal 
attribute of power (al-qudra al-qadīma). In Section 3, I made it clear that in al-Ash‘arī’s view, 
God’s power extends to ‘that which can be enacted’ (mā yaṣiḥḥ an yakūn maqdūran).239 Al-Āmidī 
writes that the meaning of an occurrence being within God’s power (maqdūr) is ‘nothing other 
than that in consideration of itself (bi-l-naẓar ilā dhātihi) it is possible (mumkin)’.240 Despite the 
Avicennan overtones of the reference to something being possible in itself, al-Āmidī’s 
statement entails nothing more or less than al-Ash‘arī’s. God’s power extends to that which is 
possible, and not to that which is impossible. We must look elsewhere for al-Āmidī’s 
understanding of what it means for an occurrence to be ‘possible in itself’. 
We saw that in Ibn Sīnā’s proof for a substrate in which possibility inheres, he refutes the 
identification of the power of the agent with the possibility of that which it enacts (al-qudra ‘alā 
l-ījād aw jawāz al-ījād laysa huwa jawāz al-wujūd).  He argues that if that which is possible is 
identified with that which is within the agent’s power to enact, the power of the agent is 
trivialised.241 This is because we are effectively saying that the ‘agent can do what the agent can 
do’. We saw that McGinnis identifies this as the kalām view. 242 It is difficult to tell whether or 
not Ibn Sīnā had the mutakallimūn in mind when he formulated this argument. In any case, it is 
clear that the Ash‘arī view, which al-Āmidī here clearly adopts, does not equate possibility with 
God’s power. Rather, possibility is a rational designation referring to the way something is in 
itself. It remains true, however, that God can enact all possibilities.243 
																																																						
239 Mujarrad, 101; see Gimaret, La Doctrine, 284. See pages 72-73 above. 
240 Abkār, 1, 296-7. 
241 Ibn Sīnā, Tabī‘īyāt, III.11, 1, 359-60; Ilāhiyyāt, IV.2, 139-140.  
242 McGinnis, ‘The Eternity of the World’, 279. 
243 The association of possibility with God’s power may, however, have some precedent in debates between Mu‘tazila 
and Ash‘arīs. Frank shows that for the Baṣran Mu‘tazila, the possibility of the existence of a thing corresponds to 
God’s power to enact it. Nonetheless, the thing’s possibility by virtue of its own essence is logically prior to God’s 
power to enact it (see Frank, ‘Al-ma‘dūm wa-l-mawjūd’, 200-203; Adamson, ‘Al-Kindī and the Mu‘tazila’, 58). Abū Rashīd 
	 103	
So far, we observe that al-Āmidī views possibility as a rational designation - an opinion which 
concurs with that expressed in the Nūr and Rumūz. The question of whether or not possibility is 
also an objective designation, that is, whether the expression ‘in itself’ (bi-dhātihi) refers to an 
object called ‘self’ (dhāt), remains. Let us consider how al-Āmidī conceives of the notion of 
essence in his works of kalām. 
The Ash‘arīs famously identified the reality of things exclusively with their existence, opposing 
the Mu‘tazilī view according to which both non-existents and existents could be described as 
‘things’, the ‘thing’ being co-extensive with that which is known (al-ma‘lūm), rather than with 
that which exists (al-mawjūd).244 The Mu‘tazilī position can be seen to imply that the 
characteristics of things are independent of their creation by God. This is because non-existent 
things have not been enacted by God’s power, but can still be conceptualised and ascribed 
characteristics. In response to the Mu‘tazilī notion of the thing, the Ash‘arīs strongly assert that 
God is responsible for both the existence of things and their characteristics, since according to 
the Ash‘arī view, they have no characteristics except when they exist.245  
Al-Āmidī fully defends the Ash‘arī doctrine, most expansively in a section in the Abkār on ‘the 
non-existent’. He opposes the notion, which he identifies with al-Jāḥiẓ and the Baṣran Mu‘tazila, 
that the non-existent is a thing. He also refutes the view that ‘essences (al-dhawāt) are affirmed 
in their state of non-existence’. His use of the term dhāt may imply that he associates Ibn Sīnā’s 
conception of possible essences with the Mu‘tazilī view of the non-existent thing.246 One proof 
upon which he relies in disproving the Mu‘tazilī view is intended to show that belief in non-
existent essences implies that ‘the Lord exalted is not the giver-of-existence (mūjid) or the 
																																																						
al-Niṣabūrī (d. after 415/1024), like Ibn Sīnā, argues against the idea that the possibility of an existent is grounded in 
God’s power to enact it (see Frank, ‘Al-ma‘dūm wal-mawjūd’, 208, citing Ziyādāt al-sharḥ, published in Fī l-tawḥīd,  287). 
This suggests that some real opponent made the opposing assertion. 
244 See Frank, ‘Al-ma‘dūm wal-mawjūd’, 207 on the Mu‘tazilī position that before an existent there is negation (al-nafī), 
but not pure negation (al-nafī al-ṣirf), as the Ash‘arī’s hold. 
245 For al-Shahrastānī’s discussion of this point, see his Nihāya, 157. 
246 It is worth re-stressing, however, that though Ibn Sīnā held that possible essences are susceptible to non-
existence, his view is unlike the Mu‘tazilī view in that for him, possible essences are co-extensive with possible 
existents. Thus, whilst the Mu‘tazila imagined a realm of unactualised possible things, Ibn Sīnā’s possible essences 
correspond to actual existents.  
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creator (mukhtari‘) – and this is unbelief (kufr)’. Its premise is that the power of God must have 
efficacy (takūn mu’athira) in relation to its object. It is argued that if the Mu’tazilī affirmation of 
non-existent essences is upheld, God cannot be said to be the creator of essences when they do 
exist, since they are affirmed independently of God in their state of non-existence.247 Al-Āmidī 
upholds the doctrine of his tradition at some length.  
At another point, al-Āmidī specifically critiques al-Rāzī’s notion of essences. In a brief 
preliminary to his proof for God, al-Āmidī cites the notion that existence is univocal (al-mafhūm 
min al-wujūd wāḥid fī kull mawjūd), and that it is additional to the essence of each existent (zā’id 
‘alā dhāt al-mawjūd).248 Elsewhere, he refers to this position as the one which ‘the best of the 
later [scholars] (afḍal al-muta’akhkhirīn) inclined towards’. 249 He consistently opposes the view, 
arguing that though the word ‘existence’ is common to all existents, it has no unified reality. 
Rather, the essence of each thing is its existence, and its existence, its essence. This is a 
restatement of the classical Ash‘arī understanding of the thing, presented in deliberate 
opposition to al-Rāzī. It is noteworthy that it is al-Rāzī’s position on the relation between 
essence and existence, and not Ibn Sīnā’s, that al-Āmidī addresses. 
Given his sustained denial of the theory of non-existents essences, what, then, can we take al-
Āmidī to mean when he describes an occurrence as ‘possible in itself’ (bi-dhātihi)? Al-Āmidī 
primarily designates an occurrence possible in relation to our ability to conceptualise its 
existence. Yet he also streses that the realm of conceptual possibilities is identical with the 
scope of God’s power. In refutation of proofs for the pre-eternity of the world, al-Āmidī 
discusses Ibn Sīnā’s opposition to the notion that possibility is identified with the power of the 
agent.250 He responds to Ibn Sīnā that possibility can be associated with the power of the agent 
without the logical fallacy of defining power by power (ta‘līl al-shay’ bi-nafsihi). This is because 
though that which is possible of existence is correctly defined as that which can be enacted by 
the agent, among its concomitants are the fact that if we imagine the possible of existence in 
																																																						
247 Abkār, 3, 394. 
248 Abkār, 1, 219-220. 
249 Abkār, 3, 23.  
250 Abkār, 3, 343.  
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existence, no absurdity results. What is possible can thus be determined in relation to our 
ability to conceptualise it as well as in relation to God’s power.251 Here, al-Āmidī equates the 
possible of existence with the objects of God’s power (al-maqdūrāt), and defines these both in 
relation 1) to God’s power, and 2) to our ability to conceptualise their existence. His statement 
does suggest that God’s power to enact an existent is prior to our ability to conceptualise that 
existent as a determinant of the possibility of its existence. Yet the implications of this are not 
worked out, and in the remainder of the work, conceptualisation seems to be the primary 
determinant of what is possible. Nonetheless, both grounds enter into the definition of what is 
possible. 
Al-Āmidī’s designation of possibility in relation to our ability to conceive of a concrete instance 
of its existence is implied in his initial definition of the possible of existence as that which ‘it is 
not impossible to posit (farḍ) not existing with respect to itself’.252 The terminology of this 
statement echoes Ibn Sīnā’s definition of the possible as that for which existence is not 
necessary when it is ‘considered in itself (idhā u‘tubira bi-dhātihi)’.253  The distinction between 
the two views of possibility is thus easily missed. It should be clear by now, however, that when 
al-Āmidī describes something as possible in itself in his works of kalām, this is not an objective 
designation, but a purely rational one.  
A passage in al-Shahrastānī’s Nihāya illuminates the kalām precedents for al-Āmidī’s position. In 
the context of defending the Ash‘arī doctrine that the non-existent is not a thing, al-
Shahrastānī explains how the non-existent can be known (ma ‘lūm), without being a thing. He 
writes: 
																																																						
251 Abkār, 3, 356.  
252 Abkār, 1, 220-1.  
253 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 1.6, 30. 
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Knowledge is not connected with the non-existent qua non-existent except in relation to 
our conceptualisation of its existence. Absolute non-existence is [only] known and 
conceptualised in relation to absolute existence.254 
Our knowledge of infinite possible non-existents relates to our conceptualisation of an instance 
of their existence. This clarifies how al-Āmidī can describe something as possible by virtue of 
itself without implying an essence distinct from the existence of the possible being. Al-Āmidī’s 
understanding on this point has progressed from his works of falsafa, in which the designation 
‘possible’ is viewed as a rational and objective designation describing the compatibility of an 
essence, viewed as a determinate entity, with existence. The connection of possible existence 
with matter, key to Ibn Sīnā’s theory, is completely lost. This is indicative of the extent to which 
al-Āmidī draws upon and adheres to Ash‘arī materials for his understanding of the possible of 
existence in his works of kalām, despite his appropriation of the distinction as a framework for 
discussion, and in his proof for God.   
 Al-Āmidī’s discussion of the non-existent further illuminates his conception of the ontology of 
possibility. We have already seen that al-Āmidī upholds the Ash‘arī view that the non-existent 
is not a thing. Yet he also divides the non-existent into categories, namely, the possible 
(mumkin), and the necessary (wājib), in relation to our ability to rationally conceive of them. The 
necessarily non-existent is that whose existence we cannot conceptualise. It is also called the 
impossible. Examples al-Āmidī gives are uniting two contraries (for instance, the same object 
being both hot and cold), uniting affirmation (al-ithbāt) and negation (al-nafī), and the presence 
of one atom in two places at one moment. On the other hand, the possible non-existent is 
exemplified by the world prior to its existence and by things which are presently non-existent, 
but whose existence is expected.255  
Al-Āmidī engages a debate over the question of whether the non-existent is correctly described 
as known, which has kalām precedents in discussion of the nature of knowledge. He answers the 
																																																						
254 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 153; see Frank, ‘Al-Ma‘dūm wal-mawjūd’, 190 for the contrasting Mu‘tazilī position, namely, 
that a non-existent is known not in relation to its past or potential existence, but in its non-existence, as an entity. 
255 Abkār, 3, 379.  
	 107	
Mu‘tazilī Abū Hāshim, who claimed that the possible non-existent is known, but the impossible 
non-existent unknown.256 For his part (and in line with his Ash‘arī predecessors), al-Āmidī 
argues that all categories of non-existents are known.257 If non-existents can be designated 
known, God must have knowledge of them. In his defence of God’s attribute of knowledge, al-
Āmidī firstly affirms the proper association of God’s knowledge with ‘everything that can be 
known (ṣiḥḥat ta‘alluqihi bi-kull mā yaṣiḥḥ an yu‘lam).’258 This entails affirmation of God’s 
knowledge of all possible non-existents. He poses the question of whether or not the objects of 
God’s knowledge are infinite. His answer is that they are ‘infinite in possibility (ghayr mutanāhin 
imkānan)’, as opposed to in actuality (bi-l-fa‘l). He adds that whilst it is impossible for 
particularised existents (al-mawjūdāt al-‘ayniyya) to be infinite, possibilities (al-umūr al-
imkāniyya) may well be infinite.259 According to al-Āmidī, then, an infinity of possible non-
existents are known to God. This is radically incompatible with Ibn Sīnā’s view of possibility, in 
which all possibilities must be actualised, and God has knowledge of possibilities only in their 
actualised states. For al-Āmidī as for his Ash‘arī predecessors, possibilities represent genuine 
synchronic alternatives which are infinite, and purely conceptual.  
5. The relation of the Possible non-Existent to a Cause 
I will demonstrate in Chapter 5 that the question of the relationship between the cause of the 
possible of existence and its non-existence comes to the fore as one of the most significant 
issues in post-Avicennan discussions of creation. It is around this axis that the debate over the 
characteristics of the world’s cause revolves, as I will explain. In this section, for the purposes of 
completing my analysis of al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possible existence, I 
focus on the narrow question of how post-Avicennan Ash‘arīs, and al-Āmidī himself, respond to 
																																																						
256 Indeed, impossibilities were not included within the category of al-ma‘dūm by the Baṣran Mu‘tazila (see Frank, ‘Al-
Ma‘dūm wal-mawjūd’, 189). Thus both al-ma‘dūm and al-ma‘lūm were broader categories for the Ash‘arīs. 
257 Abkār, 3, 382; c.f. al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 137-9. 
258 Abkār, 1, 351; c.f. al-Ash‘arī, Mujarrad, 70. 
259 Abkār, 1, 351. 
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Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine that the cause of the possible of existence has no relation to its non-
existence. This will be taken up in the context of the creation debate in Chapter 5. 
5.i Post-Avicennan Ash‘arī Precedents 
I begin by accounting for al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī’s responses to the specific question of the 
relation between the non-existence of the possible of existence and its cause. In the course of 
his refutation of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation in the Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī directly addresses the 
philosophers’ claim that true causes are related exclusively to the existence of their effects, and 
not to their non-existence, or to their origination from non-existence. His response is to argue 
that agents are connected with their acts upon the moment of their origination. Al-Ghazālī in 
fact concedes that the agent has no direct relation to the prior non-existence of its effects. 
However, he holds that non-existence is a condition of the relation between agent and act. 
Therefore, according to al-Ghazālī, an eternal existent can never be described as ‘enacted’.260 
This becomes significant in later discourse, and will be treated in Chapter 5. 
We have seen in discussion of al-Rāzī’s view of what determines causedness that he holds that 
causal action is not conditioned upon the preceding non-existence of the effect. Rather, the 
temporally originated existent relies on a cause on account of its essential possibility alone.261 In 
arguing for this position, al-Rāzī concurs with Ibn Sīnā that the non-existence of possible 
essences is not related to their cause. Indeed, he argues in his commentary on the Ishārāt that 
this is a non-issue, there being consensus over the fact that it is the existence of the effect 
which requires a cause.262  
 
 
 
																																																						
260 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 62-63. 
261 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 1, 485-492. 
262 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 387; see Shihadeh, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Commentary’, 322-323. 
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5.ii Al-Āmidī’s Works of falsafa 
5.ii.a al-Nūr al-bāhir 
Al-Āmidī fully embraces Ibn Sīnā’s theory of efficient causation in this early work. Like Ibn Sīnā, 
al-Āmidī argues that possible beings are exclusively associated with their efficient causes 
during their existence.263 Furthermore, the effect of an efficient cause must concur with it 
temporally. Like Ibn Sīnā, al-Āmidī asserts that the cause whose effect is never non-existent is 
superior to the cause which does not prevent the absolute non-existence of its effect. The 
former kind of causation is described as ibdā‘, or ‘absolute creation’, and the theological 
implication, that a God who creates a pre-eternally existing world is more powerful than the 
one who gives the world existence after non-existence, accepted.264 Just as the possible essence 
requires a cause in order to exist, so it requires a cause for its non-existence, since both states 
are possible for it. The cause of its non-existence is, however, none other than the absence of 
the efficient cause.265  Finally, the cause of that which is possible of existence impacts on its 
existence alone, and does not determine its essence.266  
5.ii.b. Rumūz al-Kunūz 
I showed in the previous section that al-Āmidī implies in the Rumūz, as in his other works, that 
the determinant of causedness is the possibility of an existent and not its temporal 
originatedness. His position on the relation between the possible non-existent and its cause in 
this work is not clear. Al-Āmidī holds that the possible of existence relies on a cause for the 
origination (ibtidā’) of its existence as well as for its continued existence (dawām), but does not 
explain how the non-existence of the effect is related to its cause.267 This ambiguity is typical of 
the Rumūz and is a product, in part, of the work’s brevity. 
																																																						
263 Nūr, 5, 143-145, and see Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 6.1, 11-17.  
264 Nūr, 5, 145; Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, V.9, 524-5. 
265 Nūr, 5, 181-2; Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 1.5, 31. 
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Al-Āmidī also makes an elusive statement regarding the relation of the cause of the possible of 
existence to the ‘nature’ of its effect. He cites an opponent attempting to disprove that a 
possible being requires a cause. His opponent states that if the possible being relies on its cause 
for its existence, it ought also to rely on a cause for its nature (ḥaqīqa). But this would imply that 
when the cause was absent, the possible non-existent had no nature. Al-Āmidī responds by 
conceding this point. The possible of existence, when it ceases to exist as a result of the absence 
of the cause, will also lose its nature (al-khurūj ‘an al-ḥaqīqa).268 This point is not elucidated. 
However, it suggests the Ash‘arī theory, in which the characteristics of a thing are absolutely 
identified with a concrete instance of its existence. This is a progression from the Nūr, in which 
al-Āmidī concurs with Ibn Sīnā that the cause of that which is possible of existence is 
responsible for its existence but not its essence, to a more Ash‘arī-oriented notion of the cause’s 
responsibility for both the existence and the characteristics of its effect. It is frustrating that 
the position is not articulated clearly. 
5.iii Al-Āmidī’s Works of kalām 
For al-Āmidī as for his classical Ash‘arī predecessors, God, as a voluntary agent, is associated 
with both the world’s existence, and its non-existence. In al-Āmidī’s Abkār, this doctrine arises 
in response to the following question: ‘Is that which God exalted knows will not come to be still 
within his power (maqdūr lahu), or is it impossible for him?’269 Al-Āmidī writes that all agree that 
the impossible non-existent is not within God’s power. Over the subject of the relation of the 
possible non-existent to the power of God, however, there is some dispute. Al-Āmidī cites the 
Baṣran Mu‘tazilī ‘Abbād ibn Sulaymān al-Ṣaymarī (d. 250/864) as having denied God’s power 
over the possible non-existent.270 However he writes that anyone who holds this view has 
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270 C.f. al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 2, 236. Al-Ash‘arī also cites ‘‘Abbād’ on this question. Al-Āmidī has simplified al-Ṣaymarī’s 
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simply misunderstood the meaning of possible existence. The possible is that which can be 
known but need not come into existence, and describing God as powerful to enact it does not 
imply that it must exist. Once the maqdūr is understood as that which is rationally possible, no 
contradiction is entailed by the statement that God is powerful over the possible non-existent.  
In defence of God’s attribute of power in the Ghāya, al-Āmidī coins an expression with its roots 
in the Ash‘arī conception of God’s power, but which bears the imprint of Ibn Sīnā’s terminology. 
He describes the possible non-existent as ‘impossible by virtue of something other than itself’ 
(mumtani‘an bi-i‘tibār ghayrihi).271 This elegantly expresses the classical Ash‘arī view. Whilst God 
necessitates the existence of some possibilities, he also prevents the existence of others by the 
exercise of volition and power. Al-Āmidī’s explanation of God’s causal relation to non-existent 
possibilities is crucial to his doctrine of creation. In his proof for God, al-Āmidī presses Ibn 
Sīnā’s notion of efficient causality into service in explaining how a voluntary agent is 
responsible for both actualised and unactualised possibilities. However, al-Āmidī’s innovative 
discussions on this point must await analysis in Chapter 5, given their direct applications for 
the creation debate. 
6. Conclusions 
Several findings have emerged from this study of al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s original 
distinction between the possible and necessary of existence, both in relation to al-Āmidī’s own 
intellectual project, and by extension, with regard to the encounter of Avicennism and 
Ash‘arism in this period.  
Firstly, concerning the basic development of al-Āmidī’s commitments, I have demonstrated 
that he begins a committed Avicennist. In the Nūr, al-Āmidī advances and defends Ibn Sīnā’s 
worldview, including his doctrine of the world’s eternity. Accordingly, Ibn Sīnā’s distinction 
between the possible and necessary of existence is, for al-Āmidī as for Ibn Sīnā, the backbone of 
the metaphysical system he presents. I have shown his Rumūz to represent a middle stage in al-
																																																						
271 Ghāya, 87. 
	 112	
Āmidī’s thought in which his doctrinal commitments have changed, but his promotion of the 
essential metaphysical framework of Ibn Sīnā persists (despite ambiguities inherent to the 
brevity of the work). Finally, the extent of al-Āmidī’s adherence, in his mature works of kalām, 
to the doctrines of classical Ash‘arism, here the school’s notion of possibility and its relation to 
God’s power, has also become clear.  
From a theoretical perspective, it has emerged that despite al-Āmidī’s early commitment to 
Avicennism in the Nūr, he never fully embraces Ibn Sīnā’s conception of possibility as a real 
relation between essences and their existence requiring a substrate of matter in which to 
inhere. In none of the doctrinal contexts in which this understanding of possibility is applied by 
Ibn Sīnā does al-Āmidī support this aspect of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction. I have shown that this is in 
part because in the Nūr, al-Āmidī isolates the discussion of possibility from its natural 
philosophical context in a manner which is alien to Ibn Sīnā’s own, integrated project. Unlike 
Ibn Sīnā, al-Āmidī never makes the connection between the potency of unactualised matter, 
and the possible essence. I have argued that this makes his own conception of what the possible 
essence constitutes ambiguous in the Nūr.  
I have shown, furthermore, that as he turns to embrace a commitment to Ash‘arī kalām, al-
Āmidī’s ontology of possibility  becomes progressively alienated from Ibn Sīnā’s. It is, instead, 
the rich resources of Ash‘arī kalām upon which al-Āmidī draws to elucidate his own theory of 
possibility and necessity. In his later works, al-Āmidī rejects outright Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of 
possibility, and the concomitant conception of essence as distinct from existence. Here, he 
denies the extra-mental reality of possibility. Instead, he fully endorses the Ash‘arī 
understanding, in which the possibility of things being other than they are is no more than a 
conceptual fact, and essences are none other than concrete existents.  I have highlighted the 
importance of the natural philosophical context here, and shown that Ash‘arī beliefs 
concerning matter influence al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possibility to a 
significant extent. 
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Despite his rejection of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology of possibility and the concomitant conception of the 
possible essence, the impact of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics even in al-Āmidī’s most Ash‘arī-oriented 
works is unmissable. Most significantly, al-Āmidī accepts across his works that it is possibility, 
and not temporal origination, which determines an existent’s need for a cause. This marks a 
departure from the kalām understanding that beings are designated possible on the basis of 
their temporality, and is fundamental to al-Āmidī’s proof for God. In Chapter 5, I will 
demonstrate the significant impact of this aspect of the Avicennan influence on al-Āmidī’s 
doctrine of creation, especially in the re-orientation of the creation debate around discussion of 
the character of the world’s cause, the existence of that cause being established by the 
distinction between the possible and necessary of existence alone. More generally, al-Āmidī’s 
use of the distinction to structure his major work of kalām itself represents a departure from 
the conceptual paradigm of classical Ash‘arism.  
Finally with regard to al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and 
necessary of existence, I have demonstrated the significance of the question of the possible 
non-existent’s relation to a cause. It is around this question that the distinction between Ibn 
Sīnā’s necessitating cause of the universe and the voluntary agent of the Ash‘arīs centres. Al-
Āmidī accepts, in the Nūr, that the non-existence of possible essence is absolutely unrelated to a 
cause, but progresses to the view that a volitional agent can be responsible for both the non-
existence and the existence of the objects of its power. Al-Āmidī’s explanation of this and its 
implications for his views on creation will be explored in Chapter 5. 
From a contextual perspective, I have demonstrated the deep and ongoing significance of al-
Āmidī’s intellectual opposition to al-Rāzī’s philosophical and theological project. The Kashf is 
the prime example of this motivation, with its agenda of undermining al-Rāzī’s method and 
doctrine, even where that involves al-Āmidī contradicting his own position, as in the case of his 
opinion on the ontology of possibility. More broadly, I have highlighted the centrality of al-Rāzī 
in the reception of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between essence and existence. In appropriating Ibn 
Sīnā’s conception of the possible of existence, a central question for those belonging to the 
Ash‘arī tradition concerned the relation between essence and existence. Ibn Sīnā’s own position 
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is subtly expressed, and has been variously interpreted from the earliest days of its reception. 
Specifically, al-Rāzī reads Ibn Sīnā’s conception of essence as entailing the super-addition of 
existence in the case of the possible essence. Against that reading, he devises and promotes his 
own, innovative position. I have shown that it is al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā’s position against 
which al-Āmidī reacts. This confirms the prevalence of al-Rāzī’s readings of Ibn Sīnā.  
A final finding arises from our observation of the extent to which of al-Āmidī conflates 
discussions taken from both intellectual paradigms in his treatment of possibility and necessity. 
Our appreciation of Ibn Sīnā’s elegant and coherent metaphysical system ought not obscure the 
presence of analyses of necessity and possibility in extant works of Ash‘arī kalām. There can be 
little doubt that there are non-extant resources for the Ash‘arī conception of possible existence, 
as reflected by al-Juwaynī’s reference to the opinion of al-Isfarā’īnī in this context. Al-Āmidī’s 
approach demonstrates that post-Avicennans had more than one source for the conception of 
God’s power as it relates to possibility, and that the integration of Ibn Sīnā’s most compelling 
ideas therefore entailed the need to grapple with some complex and interesting theological 
problems. We will see in Chapter 5 how al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics of 
possibility and necessity relates to his defence of the classical kalām vision of creation. 
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Chapter 4 
Al-Āmidī’s Physical Theory  
 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the role played by physical theory in classical Ash‘arī doctrine. I 
argued that Ash‘arī atomism provides the major framework within which the school’s doctrine 
of creation is defended. In this chapter, my objective is to establish the extent to which al-
Āmidī’s works of kalām endorse classical Ash‘arī physical theory, and whether or not he 
attributes to physical theory the significance conferred it among classical Ash‘arīs. In context of 
the aims of the thesis, this chapter’s investigations demonstrate the nature and extent of al-
Āmidī’s allegiance with classical Ash‘arism, as part of the evaluation of the influences on his 
thought. 
The chapter begins with an exposition of Ash‘arī physical theory, detailing its most salient 
aspects, and demonstrating its place within theological discussion. For the purposes of this 
investigation, I define physical theory as a set of postulates pertaining to the categorisation, 
definition and configuration of the constituents of the world. In Section 2, I briefly indicate 
some of the key challenges brought to Ash‘arī physical theory by Ibn Sīnā, arguing in particular 
that he challenges the conception of the role of discussion of the physical world maintained by 
classical Ash‘arīs. In Section 3, I consider al-Āmidī’s works of philosophy. I demonstrate that al-
Āmidī begins (in the Nūr) a committed Avicennist with respect to physical theory. This entails 
staunch opposition to atomism, inspired by Ibn Sīnā’s own refutation of the theory. Al-Āmidī’s 
doctrinal commitments have changed by the time of his writing of the Rumūz, such that he 
supports major Ash‘arī doctrines such as creation ex nihilo. Significantly, however, I show that 
in this work, he does not support classical Ash‘arī physical theory, nor utilise physical theory in 
defence of theological doctrine. This, I argue, is important background to his approach to 
physical theory in his works of kalām, the analysis of which occupies Section 4.  
In that section, I treat al-Āmidī’s theories on substance, accident and body as expressed in Abkār 
al-afkār. I find that al-Āmidī is committed to the letter of Ash‘arī physical theory, which he 
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styles as a robust alternative to Avicennan natural philosophy. I argue that there is, however, 
evidence of a deep Avicennan influence in several key respects: firstly, in that the unity of 
physical theory and theology which was a hallmark of classical Ash‘arism is disintegrated. 
Physical theory is presented as a field of investigation in its own right, not merely as prop to 
theology proper. Secondly, I show that al-Āmidī expresses doubts over key tenets of Ash‘arī 
physical theory as a result of his exposure to Ibn Sīnā’s thought. I will also show that al-Āmidī’s 
intellectual opposition to al-Rāzī, coupled with a quest to demonstrate his own methodological 
superiority, is a consistent motivation in his discussions of physical theory. Finally, I note that 
al-Āmidī’s lack of attention to physical theory in the Ghāya indicates its declining theological 
significance for his intellectual project. 
1. Classical Ash‘arī Physical Theory 
The kalām theory of atom (jawhar) and accident (‘araḍ) has been somewhat side-lined in Islamic 
studies, in part because it seems both alien and outmoded in relation to modern physics.272 
However, as already demonstrated, classical Ash‘arī atomism was a physical theory of 
paramount metaphysical importance, and is of interest in this connection at least. The 
following account illustrates both the main contents of Ash‘arī physical theory – defined as in 
the introduction to this chapter – and, at once, its centrality to theology proper among classical 
Ash‘arīs.  
1.i The Basic Ontology of Classical Ash‘arism 
For classical theologians (Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī alike), all existents other than God are either 
‘atom’ or ‘accident’. I have stressed the exhaustiveness of this division, and that classical 
																																																						
272 Ess, in 60 years After, suggests some reasons for the historical inattention to Islamic atomism in Western 
scholarship since Shlomo Pines’ Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomlehre. He attributes it partly to the historical and 
sociological emphasis of the study of Islamic theology in the West; atomism, he writes, was not exciting 
sociologically. Existing studies include Baffioni’s Atomismo e Antiatomismo; Gimaret’s discussions of atomism within 
his La Doctrine; Sabra’s two articles on kalām atomism (‘Kalām Atomism’; and ‘The Simple Ontology’); Dhanani’s book 
length study (Phyical Theory) and his subsequent articles, focusing especially on Mu‘tazilī atomism, and more 
recently, Setia’s study of al-Rāzī’s treatment of atomism in the Maṭālib; and Atlaş’ analysis of al-Rāzī’s Risāla: al-jawhar 
al-fard. 
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Ash‘arīs resolutely deny the existence of immaterial substances. Al-Bāqillānī, for instance, 
proves the existence of substance on the basis that ‘the elephant is larger than the grain of 
corn’, which is to say that mass, and the variable masses in the world around us, are explicable 
only on the basis that substance exists. Clearly, the only kind of substance al-Bāqillānī envisages 
is the material, mass-giving, kind.273 Indeed, one definition of substance common to the Ash‘arīs 
(although not al-Bāqillānī’s preferred definition) is the ‘space-occupying [existent] (al-
mutaḥayyiz)’.274 Even if not so defined, space-occupation is considered by classical Ash‘arīs to be 
one of the essential attributes (ṣifat al-nafs) of substance, illustrating their absolute 
identification of substance with matter.275  
The absence of immaterial substance in Ash‘arī ontology is not without far reaching theological 
implications. It entails, for instance, the denial of body-soul dualism: man is no more than the 
composite of atoms which form his body and the accidents of life, knowledge, faith, and so on, 
which inhere within those atoms.276 The opening statement of al-Bāqillānī’s proof for the 
world’s creation ex nihilo also confirms that the exhaustive classification of worldly existents 
into material substance and accidents is the proof’s first premise: ‘the entire celestial and 
terrestrial world does not exceed (lā yakhruj ‘an) the two categories ‘substance’ and ‘accident’, 
and these are [both] temporally originated’.277  
Yet despite the theological significance of the denial of immaterial substances, it is remarkable 
that classical Ash‘arīs do not attempt specifically to disprove their existence rationally. This 
may be because the alternative natural theories they are intent on opposing, such as versions of 
the Ancient Greek notion of the world’s constitution of combinations of the four elements, do 
not entail the existence of immaterial substance as such.278 The closest classical Ash‘arīs get to a 
																																																						
273 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 16-17.  
274 E.g. al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 142. 
275 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 157-158. 
276 See Shihadeh, ‘Classical Ash‘arī Anthropology’, who shows (in pages 465-466) that the exhaustiveness of the atom-
accident dichotomy proved problematic for classical Ash‘arīs in defining the human spirit (rūḥ) mentioned in the 
Qur’ān. 
277 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 22. 
278 See al-Bāqillānī’s sustained denial of the theory of the four elements in Tamhīd, 37-41. Similarly, he attacks the 
notion that the world is essentially composed of light and darkness, denying the corporeity of light and darkness (60-
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defined theory of immaterial substance is the contemporary Christian theory that God himself 
is substance. In refuting this, al-Bāqillānī re-asserts the position that the only kind of substance 
in the observable realm (al-shāhid) is the ‘space-occupying [entity which is] receptive to 
accidents’, arguing that if his opponent should claim that God is unlike observable substances, 
he should simply concede that God is not substance.279 Al-Bāqillānī thus denies that substance is 
anything other than space-occupying matter, without actually attempting to disprove that 
substance can be non-space-occupying. This reflects his primary concern to defend God’s status 
as transcending the categories applied to existents in the world; the focus is not on the question 
of immaterial substance per se. For the Ash‘arīs, the dichotomy between material and 
immaterial existents was entirely accounted for by the atom-accident disjunction. Thus, the 
notion of immaterial substance was something of a non-issue for most classical Ash‘arīs. 
We will see later in the chapter that the lack of proofs against this category of existents leaves 
post-classical Ash‘arīs under-resourced for the encounter with Ibn Sīnā’s ontology, with its 
numerous intellects, souls, and other immaterial entities.280 
1.ii The existence and nature of accidents 
Despite the distinctiveness of the Ash‘arī conception of substance as indivisible parts of matter, 
it is the school’s theory of accidents which is both the most intriguing, and most theologically 
significant, aspect of its physical theory. Because of their denial of both natural forces and 
immaterial substances, Ash‘arīs had to explain all observable reality aside from matter itself, 
from the phenomenon of colour and its perception, to motion and rest, to the experience of 
																																																						
61). See Crone, ‘Ungodly Cosmologies’ for identification of many of opponents of the theologians as real historical 
groups, though note that the theologians often fail to suffiently differentiate between these groups; see Genequand, 
‘Philosophical Schools’, who shows (in agreement with al-Ghazālī’s assessment of the efforts of previous 
mutakallimūn) that the kalām characterisation of competing natural philosophies was often inaccurate. 
279 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 77; c.f. al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 571-575, who opposes the definition of substance purportedly 
favoured by the Christians, namely ‘the self-subsisting [existent]’, which permits for the existence of immaterial 
substance. 
280 Ibn Sīnā’s was not the first ontology including immaterial substances known to the theologians – Neoplatonism 
was not new to the Muslim world. Yet classical Ash‘arīs did not focus on the question of immaterial substance, and 
Ibn Sīnā was the first to make the doctrine widely familiar. Shihadeh shows that al-Juwaynī is the first theologian to 
directly address the problem, as part of his critique of the use of the argument from ignorance (Shihadeh, ‘The 
Argument from Ignorance’, 198-200). Yet this is not typical of the classical tradition. 
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pleasure and pain, through to the question of what it means to be human, in the terms of their 
doctrine of accidents.281 Thus the non-corporeal category ‘accident’ covers all the visible 
characteristics of physical bodies (though the accident is held by the Ash‘arīs to inhere in 
individual atoms, not bodies), as well as invisible attributes such as knowledge, volition, life, 
and even death. 
Al-Anṣārī gives a systematic account of the classical Ash‘arī classification of accidents. These 
include accidents of spatial occupation (al-akwān), taste (ṭa‘m), scent (rā’iḥa), heat (ḥarāra), cold 
(burūda), moist (ruṭūba), dryness (yubūsa), softness (līn), roughness (khushūna), life (ḥayāt) and 
its associated accidents of knowledge (‘ilm), power (qudra), volition (irāda) and their contraries, 
pain (alam), pleasure (ladhdha), hearing (sam‘), sight (baṣar), and other accidents of perception 
and their contraries.282 The existence of accidents is not taken for granted. Al-Juwaynī defends 
the belief in accidents against some early Mu‘tazilīs and ‘a group of non-believers’ who denied 
their existence, and ‘claimed that there are no existents beside substances’.283 His proof is 
premised on observation of the body in motion. In sum, al-Juwaynī holds that since it is 
logically possible (min al-mumkināt) either for the substance to remain in its original locus, or to 
move, there must be something additional to the substance which causes (muqtaḍī) motion. This 
he holds to be an accident of spatial location.284 
The Ash‘arī conception of the nature of accidents supremely serves them in their denial of 
potency in the realm outside of God, because it is with their doctrine of accidents that the 
Ash‘arīs oppose alternative explanations of the characteristics and behaviours of physical 
bodies. Prominent among these is al-Naẓẓām’s theory that bodies possess certain latent 
																																																						
281 The importance of the doctrine of accidents is taken from the Mu‘tazila. Ibn Mattawayh’s (fl. fifth/eleventh 
century) al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-a‘rāḍ illustrates well the scope of the doctrine of accidents; under the 
remit of the discussion of accidents, which spans part of the first volume and the entirety of the second, 
epistemological, psychological, physical theoretical, and a number of other themes are treated.  
282 Al-Anṣārī, Ghunyā, 1, 296-7. 
283 This may be a reference to the early Mu‘tazilī, al-Aṣamm (d. ca 200/815), who denied the existence of accidents. 
Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), a near contemporary of al-Juwaynī who opposed the predominant Bahshamī 
Mu‘tazila of his day on several points of theology, also denied that accidents were objects, understanding accidents 
as changing states within the body. This is not obviously, however, the theory al-Juwaynī has in mind here. 
284 Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 18-19. 
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properties, the manifestation of which amounts to the unfolding of a set of causal processes 
begun by God’s initial act of creation.285 Another important set of theories to which the Ash‘arī 
doctrine of accidents responds are those upheld by aṣḥāb al-ṭabā’i‘, proponents of the notion of 
the world’s constitution of a set of natures, or elements, whose configurations determine the 
properties of physical bodies and phenomena.286 More immediately, the Ash‘arīs oppose the 
theory of tawallud, the generation of certain accidents from others, maintained among 
contemporary Mu‘tazila. According to this theory, although all things are ultimately produced 
by agents, they can be indirectly produced by intermediate causes (asbāb).287   
 
By contrast, the Ash‘arīs firmly deny the capacity of one accident to cause another. In the 
course of al-Bāqillānī’s response to the dualists, he stresses that accidents have no causal 
capacity, on the basis of the doctrine (established elsewhere) that true causes (fā‘il) must be 
living, powerful and volitional, attributes existing within the cause. Accidents may not be so 
characterised, since accidents are not receptive to other accidents (istiḥālat qubūl al-a‘rāḍ li-l-
a‘rāḍ).288 Thus the theory of accidents provides a vehicle by which al-Bāqillānī denies natural 
causal processes.289  
Another way in which the doctrine of accidents is used by the Ash‘arīs to oppose any degree of 
autonomy in the created order is through their insistence that accidents do not endure. Against 
the standard Baṣran Mu‘tazilī position, the Ash‘arīs insist that no category of accidents has 
endurance: Ibn Fūrak cites al-Ash‘arī as having held that ‘no accident can ever endure (shay’ min 
																																																						
285 On al-Naẓẓām’s theory of latency and manifestation, see Bennett, The Spirit of Ahypokeimenonical Physics, 61-70. 
286 See Crone, ‘Ungodly Cosmologies’, 115-119, for identification of various positions subsumed within this general 
category. Important opponents included certain early Mu‘tazila who maintained their own theories of natures. Al-
Mu‘ammar (d. 215/830), for instance, maintained that bodies had independent natures predisposing them to certain 
behaviours (see Frank, ‘Al-Ma‘nā’, 257-259). Al-Naẓẓām also maintained the existence of natures, but held that they 
were not independent of God’s creation.  
287 See al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 2, 86-92, for an account of various positions on the theory of tawallud; on the Mu‘aztilī 
conception of intermediate causes (asbāb), see Frank ‘Al-Ma‘nā’, 251.  
288 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 25-26.  
289 The denial of the causal capacity of accidents is of course one aspect of the occasionalist doctrine. Al-Ash‘arī’s 
insistence on God’s exclusive agency in the creation even of human accidents of qudra is the apex; see Frank ‘The 
Structure of Created Causality’. Both the causal capacity of accidents, and of the human in which they may be 
created, is denied. 
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al-a‘rāḍ lā yajūz ‘alayhā l-baqā’ bi-ḥāl)’.290 This means that the characteristics of the physical world 
have no inherent capacity to sustain themselves in existence, but are entirely impermanent and 
contingent.  
The school’s theory of motion also illustrates how the drive to eliminate potency from the 
world is expressed through the doctrine of accidents. Motion is understood to be an accident of 
spatial location characterising individual atoms instantaneously. Al-Ash‘arī is said to have held 
that the motion of an atom from one locus to another is ‘the [atom’s] second coming-to-be in 
the second locus (al-kawn al-thānī fī l-makān al-thānī).’291 This conception of motion stresses the 
contingency of the physical world at each instant. This is because a new accident of motion is 
required for the change in the position of the atom at each instant, and because, in their denial 
of the Baṣran Mu‘tazilī belief in the generation of certain accidents from others, the Ash‘arīs 
held God to be the sole agent responsible for the creation of each accident at each instant. This 
deliberately opposes the notion that there is inherent continuity and compulsion in the 
unfolding of physical processes. The doctrine of accidents as developed by the Ash‘arīs can be 
understood in general, then, to provide a physical theoretical framework for the exclusion of 
potency from the created order. 
Furthermore, the doctrine that accidents exist and that they explain the behaviours and 
characteristics of material bodies is, obviously, essential to the proof from accidents for 
creation ex nihilo. So is the theory that accidents are temporally originated, expressed in terms 
of the accident’s non-endurance as well as through arguments against an infinite regress of 
temporally originated accidents. Al-Juwaynī describes establishing that accidents exist as 
‘among the most important objectives in proving the world’s creation ex nihilo’, and ‘the first 
premise’ of the proof for creation.292  
 
																																																						
290 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 248. 
291 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 253. 
292 Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 19. 
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1.iii The existence of substance 
The indivisible part (al-juz’ alladhī lā yatajazza’ or al-jawhar al-fard) is the corporeal component of 
kalām physical theory. Thus, though the theologians often use the same term as the 
philosophers to refer to substance (jawhar, from the Persian gawhar), for them, the term is 
restricted in scope to the corporeal atom.293 The defence of the classical Ash‘arī conception of 
substance is particularly effected in opposition to competing early views according to which 
the world is constituted either of the mixture of irreducible ‘property-bodies’ (al-Naẓẓām), or of 
bundles of accidents (al-Najjār).294 Thus, for classical Ash‘arīs, defending the existence of 
substance as a distinct ontological category was imperative. Al-Juwaynī argues against these 
competing views, which he attributes to al-Naẓẓām, al-Najjār, and ‘certain philosophers’, with 
an argument which contests the notion that accidents can ever possess space-occupying 
properties.295 
In line with his occasionalist worldview, al-Ash‘arī claimed that, like accidents, atoms were 
inherently impermanent, not possessing of themselves the capacity to continue in existence. 
Ibn Furak writes that al-Ash‘arī held that ‘[that which] endures only endures because it 
possesses [an accident of] endurance (baqā’)’.296 Thus, although it is maintained that matter does 
endure when an accident of endurance is created within it, matter itself is conceived of as 
inherently both spatially and temporally finite.297 Al-Juwaynī cites the view in the name of ‘the 
majority of the [Ash‘arī] teachers’, describing the accident of endurance (baqā’), as ‘the 
condition of the continued existence (sharṭ istimrār al-wujūd) [of substance].’ 298 Al-Bāqillānī 
modifies the belief: he is cited by al-Juwaynī as having held that matter endures in itself as long 
as it is not devoid of a certain number of accidents. If matter ceases to exist, according to al-
																																																						
293 See Dhanani on kalām and falsafī uses of the term (Physical Theory, 55-62). 
294 On al-Naẓẓām’s theory, see Bennett, The Spirit of Ahypokeimenonical Physics, 57-63 (the term ‘property-bodies’ is 
coined by Bennett); on the theory of the world’s constitution of accidents, Dhanani, Physical Theory, 4-5. 
295 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 148-153. 
296 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 247. 
297 On the kalām ontology as a set of coordinates within which spatial and temporal occurences occur, see Sabra, ‘The 
Simple Ontology’, 71, 77. 
298 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 270-271, and 711-713. 
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Bāqillānī, this is as the direct result of the exercise of the agent’s will for its non-existence.299 
Nevertheless, even according to al-Bāqillānī’s view, if God chooses not to recreate its set of 
inherent accidents, matter will cease to exist. So it remains true of all classical Ash‘arīs that 
matter is continually dependent upon God’s constant creation. 
The doctrine of the indivisible part is considered a hallmark of Ash‘arī physical theory. The 
classical kalām dialectical context for this was the alternative conceptions of matter just 
mentioned.300 And although it is still very much the case that the origins of kalām atomism are 
obscure, as Dhanani illustrates, the particular debate over the divisibility of matter is an ancient 
one.301 Arguments both for and against the indivisible part of matter thus abounded and for 
classical Ash‘arīs, the defence of the atom, often with multiple proofs, is integral to the physical 
theoretical project in which they are involved.  
Despite the high prominence of the defence of matter’s indivisibility, however, it is significant 
that the doctrine is not inherently requisite to the proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo. 
For this proof, all that is required is that substance exists, and that it cannot be devoid of the 
accidents inhering within it. It is true that atomism is characteristic of Ash‘arī physical theory, 
and that it is an important focus for the school’s refutation of alternative worldviews. We can 
also observe that the notion that matter is ultimately indivisible sits well with the classical 
Ash‘arī understanding of the nature of the world’s constant dependence upon God, in that it 
can be used to stress that matter is dependent upon a cause even for its apparent continuity 
within various observable bodies. And yet, atomism itself is not required to establish the 
world’s temporal finitude, nor its dependence upon a cause. Nevertheless, classical Ash‘arīs 
themselves never conceded the dispensability of atomism. The importance of these 
																																																						
299 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 270. 
300 The conception of substance held to by adherents of the philosophical tradition, in which matter was understood 
to be infinitely divisible, was not broadly addressed by classical Ash‘arīs, whose primary focus in such questions were 
the Mu‘tazila. The inverse is not true – as Endress shows in his study of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s (d. 363/974) critique of 
atomism, Islamic philosophers were occupied with refuting atomism, in line with the commitments of Aristotle 
himself (Endress, ‘Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s Critique’). Ibn Sīnā was responsible for making hylomorphism of immediate 
concern to the theologians. 
301 Dhanani, Physical Theory, 5. 
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observations will become clear in the analysis which follows, where we will see that the 
doctrine was called into question by post-classical Ash‘arīs. 
That substance can never be completely devoid of accidents is one of the central premises of 
the proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo, since it is on the basis of the temporal 
origination of accidents, and their necessary inherence in substance, that the temporal 
origination of substance is established. And yet most classical Ash‘arīs not only held that 
substances must at all times bear some accident or another, but that substances always bear at 
least one accident from each class of accidents or its contrary. Thus articulations of this 
doctrine are formulated both as responses to those proponents of the world’s eternity (al-
dahriyya) who held that substance (hayūla or mādda) existed pre-eternally completely formless 
and devoid of accidents, and in the context of Ash‘arī-Mu‘tazilī debate over the classes of 
accidents from which substance could be devoid.302 In the context of the proof from accidents, 
where it only need be proven that substance cannot be completely accident-free, the focus is on 
establishing that substance is never devoid of an accident of spatial occupation. These include 
aggregation (ijtimā‘), separation (iftirāq), motion (ḥaraka), rest (sukūn).303 We will see in Chapter 5 
how al-Rāzī will develop a version of the proof from accidents which focuses on the 
impossibility of matter’s being devoid of both motion and rest, and of the pre-eternity of matter 
either in motion or at rest. 
1.iv The Definition of Body  
The most prevalent classical Ash‘arī definition of body is ‘the aggregate’ (al-mu’allaf or al-
mu’talif). The school position was that the body was simply the sum of the atoms of which it was 
constituted, held together by individual atoms of composition (ta’līf), inhering in each atom. 
Classical Ash‘arīs did not believe that accidents could inhere in more than one atom, or in the 
body they constituted, bodies not being genuine unities. The Ash‘arī conception of body is a 
salient feature of the school’s occasionalist, theocentric worldview. The implications of the 
																																																						
302 For instance al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 204-215; Irshād, 23-35. 
303 On accidents of spatial location in Mu‘tazilī kalām see Frank, Beings and Their Attributes, 98-104. 
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school’s conception of body are far-reaching, as illustrated, for instance, in Shihadeh’s study of 
Ash‘arī anthropology.  There are no unifying essences in classical Ash‘arī anthropology, which 
means that there can be no genuine definitions. Rather, identifying the attributes of an 
elephant, for instance, will amount to no more than a nominal definition describing what is 
conventionally known as an elephant on account of its being distinct from other configurations 
of atoms and accidents.304 We will shortly see how Ibn Sīnā’s conception of body is alien to this 
position, and the response of later Ash‘arīs to this challenge. 
1.v The Place of Physical Theory within Classical Ash‘arism  
In concluding this brief survey of classical Ash‘arī physical theory, it is worth revisiting the 
question of what role that theory plays within the tradition, in anticipation of al-Āmidī’s 
distinctive conception of the place of physical theory. We have seen, both here and in Chapter 
2, the theological value attached to the major tenets of the school’s physical theory. However, 
scholars are not united on the role of physical theory within kalām in general.  Dhanani 
describes kalām as a ‘philosophical tradition’ on the basis of the predominance of the discussion 
of epistemology, cosmology, anthropology, and other strictly non-theological topics. He argues 
that questions of the nature and attributes of the things which constitute the world are a highly 
prominent field of enquiry within kalām, and sees this as evidence that kalām is not ‘theology’ 
per se, but a ‘philosophical metaphysics’ to rival that of the falāsifa. 305 In this he concurs with 
Sabra, who discussed kalām physical theory as an aspect of the tradition’s ontology, which he 
saw as a philosophical account of the world’s constitution intended as an alternative to that of 
Hellenistic philosophical cosmology.306 On the other hand, Frank characterises kalām as 
theology, arguing that ‘the primary function of kalām - its end and its activity - is to rationalise 
the basic beliefs of the Muslims as they are given in the Koran and the Sunna’.307 And although 
																																																						
304 See Shihadeh, ‘Classical Ash‘arī Anthropology’, 438; Frank ‘The Structure of Created Causality’, 15. 
305 Dhanani, Physical Theory, 2-3; also Bennett, who argues of Mu‘tazilism that the ‘interrelation of [the school’s 
natural philosophily, theory of the divine attributes and of human action] amounted to a system of philosophy in its 
own right’ (Bennett, ‘The Early Mu‘tazilities’, 146). 
306 See especially, Sabra, ‘Kalām Atomism as an Alternative Philosophy’. 
307 Frank, ‘The Science of Kalām’, 22; also Shihadeh, ‘From al-Ghazālī’, 144 on the objectives of kalām according to Ibn 
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he acknowledges the attention given to non-theological topics including physical theory, he 
argues that ‘kalām never had, or aspired to have, the universality that philosophy has 
traditionally claimed for itself.’308  
It is outside of the scope of this study to contribute to this important discussion in a general 
way. Indeed, the classical kalām tradition, taken as a historical whole, is rather more 
heterogenous than either of the two positions outlined suggests. It would therefore be 
necessary to consider Mu‘tazilism separately from Ash‘arism in order to make a valid 
judgement on whether discussions of physical theory constitute a philosophical field of enquiry 
among the mutakallimūn. 309 However, the role of physical theory in the theology of al-Āmidī’s 
most important classical Ash‘arī influences is significant context for the role it plays within his 
own theological project, and is therefore worth pausing over. For al-Āmidī’s classical Ash‘arī 
predecessors, physical theory was never more than a prop to theology proper, serving the 
peculiarly Ash‘arī vision of God and the God-world relationship. This is significant because the 
same cannot be said of al-Āmidi. 
We know from Ibn Fūrak’s Mujarrad that al-Ash‘arī was heavily involved in the discussion of 
physical theory, engaging with the views of a variety of Mu‘tazila and developing his own 
positions on many questions. In that work, physical theory appears separately from strictly 
theological topics, under the category of ‘subtle questions’, although this, of course, is Ibn 
Fūrak’s manner of ordering al-Ash‘arīs thought. In many discussions of physical theory, the 
Mujarrad records clearly the theological significance attached to the questions at hand. So in 
																																																						
308 Frank, ‘The Science of Kalām’, 16. For more recent contributions on the question of the place of natural philosophy 
within kalām, see Dallal, Islam, Science and the Challenge of History, especially Ch 3; Morrison, ‘What was the Purpose of 
Astronomy’. 
309 Indeed, it would be necessary to consider various phases of and trends in Mu‘tazilism separately in order to 
sufficiently answer the question, given the heterogeneity of early Mu‘tazilism in particular (on which, see Gimaret, 
Mu‘tazila; Bennett, ‘The Early Mu‘tazilites’, 144-145). Among early Mu‘tazilīs (as we have seen) are real opponents of 
the atomist ontology which by the later classical period was the basic framework shared by all mutakallimūn. In the 
absence of general consensus on such questions, it may be that physical theory occupied a more significant space 
than it later would. And as Dhanani has shown, the evidence of the titles of early Mu‘tazilī texts preserved in Ibn al-
Nadīm’s Fihrist shows that there was a greater variety of text types, representing a significant non-theological aspect 
to kalām, in the early Mu‘tazilī period (Dhanani, Kalām and Hellenistic Philosophy, 37-40). What is true of early 
Mu‘tazilism may not, however, be true of kalām taken as a historical whole, and the question needs further 
investigation. 
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recording al-Ash‘arī’s positions on the finitude of matter and its ultimate indivisibility, Ibn 
Fūrak asserts that al-Ash‘arī associated denial of these doctrines with disbelief.310 And in 
defence of the notion that single accidents (for instance, accidents of human capacity [qudra]) 
are associated with single effects, Ibn Fūrak points out that al-Ash‘arī insisted that ‘he who 
disagrees with this cannot prove the unicity of God’s essence’.311 On questions such as the 
nature of height, width, depth, and weight, al-Ash‘arī’s doctrine, which accounts for these 
phenomena as functions of the accident of aggregation, and nothing more, can be seen to 
deliberately emphasise the lack of autonomy in the physical world.312 This is not to say that al-
Ash‘arī’s interest in physical theory is restricted to topics with direct theological bearing, but 
that the major focus is on developing a version of atomist ontology which is, to the greatest 
extent possible, theocentric. In his Kitāb al-Luma‘, al-Ash‘arī is barely concerned with questions 
of physical theory, though they do arise somewhat haphazardly in connection with the defence 
of theological topics. For instance, his defence of his notion of human agency as a process of 
acquisition of capacity created directly by God, relies on his ontology, and specifically, on his 
understanding that one accident cannot inhere in another.313 The role of physical theory as 
prop to theology proper is clear. 314 
Among later school members, Ash‘arism is concerned in a more focused and exclusive way with 
properly theological discussions. There are no known Ash‘arī texts devoted to subjects outside 
of theology proper, and I agree with Gimaret that ‘it would be hard to imagine’ such texts 
occurring within the Ash‘arī tradition.315 It is almost universally true among classical Ash‘arīs 
that physical theory is treated either a) within the context of establishing creation ex nihilo, or 
b) in the course of responding to alternative natural philosophies such as versions of the theory 
of the world’s constitution of four elements. The only exception of which I am aware is al-
																																																						
310 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 211. 
311 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 214. 
312 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 214-215. 
313 Al-Ash‘arī, Luma‘, 94. In al-Ash‘arī’s al-Ibāna, physical theory is almost never discussed. 
314 On the original adoption of atomism by the Mu‘tazila as ‘an instrument of monotheism’, see Ess, The Flowering, 86-
87. Regardless of whether or not the Mu‘tazilī interest in physical theory was part of a broader philosophical system, 
it is true that atomism had always suited the theological project of kalām. 
315 Gimaret, Mu‘tazila. Gimaret draws a contrast between Mu‘tazilism and Ash‘arism in this regard. 
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Juwaynī’s Shāmil, in which, after giving an exposition of Ash‘arī physical theory in the 
conventional place of the proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo, al-Juwaynī later entertains 
significant discussions of the nature of accidents of spatial occupation. This involves extensive 
treatment of various positions including those of early Mu‘tazilī figures, not all of which have 
obvious or direct theological implications.316 However, this seems to be a function of the work’s 
self-proclaimed comprehensiveness – in the Irshād, which becomes the basis for al-Anṣārī’s 
Ghunyā, al-Juwaynī limits his discussion of physical theory to his defence of creation ex nihilo. 
Furthermore, even in the Shāmil, al-Juwaynī styles these discussions as part of the section of the 
work’s Kitāb al-tawhīd, which is to say that he presents it as part of his establishment of God’s 
being unlike anything in the physical world. In this context, he demonstrates some concern to 
establish the general theological significance of the physical theories under discussion. So 
before commencing his discussion of accidents of spatial location, he asserts that it is required 
in order to demonstrate that God is not in space.317 Similarly, his discussions of body are 
presented as requisite to his demonstration that God is not body.318 
 In describing kalām as a philosophical tradition, Dhanani mentions the later Ash‘arī al-Ījī’s 
Mawāqif, with its separate section on Physics. This he cites as an example of the attention given 
to physical theory as a field in its own right in kalām.319 Similarly, Sabra uses the Mawāqif as 
evidence of his own thesis on kalām as philosophy.320  I will argue later in this chapter, however, 
that the conception of physical theory in that work is attributable to the Avicennan influence 
and is not indigenous to Ash‘arism. Physical theory for al-Ash‘arī and his classical disciples has 
no soteriological value of its own, and in the context of the objectives of classical Ash‘arī kalām, 
this means that it is not a worthy field of enquiry except in relation to its value in supporting 
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318 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 408. 
319 Dhanani, Physical Theory, 2-3. 
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doctrines which do have such value.321 This is significant for the present thesis because of 
departures al-Āmidī makes from this aspect of the conventions of his school.  
2. The Challenge of the falāsifa 
Later in this chapter, I show that al-Āmidī’s deep familiarity with Avicennan philosophy 
impacts on his reception of Ash‘arī physical theory. It is therefore necessary briefly to 
highlight, before treating al-Āmidī’s own thought, the major ways in which Ibn Sīnā’s thought 
represents a challenge to that physical theory. In many respects, Ibn Sīnā’s approach to natural 
philosophy represents a continuation of his Aristotelian heritage, so that al-Āmidī’s encounter 
with Ibn Sīnā in this context can be seen more generally as an encounter between kalām and 
Aristotelan approaches to the investigation of the material world. Nevertheless, since al-
Āmidī’s exposure to the latter tradition is via Ibn Sīnā, I describe the challenge as represented 
by him. 
It is firstly worth commenting on Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the purpose of Physics, and of its 
place within his broader philosophical project. I have demonstrated that for classical Ash‘arīs 
physical theory is not a field in its own right, independent of theological discourse. For Ibn Sīnā, 
by contrast, and in keeping with his Aristotelian heritage, natural philosophy is a distinct 
science with its own subject matter, namely, the sensible body in so far as it is subject to change 
(al-jism al-maḥsūs min jihat mā huwa wāqi‘ fī l-taghayyur).322 Since the purpose of philosophy is ‘to 
ascertain the realities of all things’, this makes the goal of natural philosophy for Ibn Sīnā 
ascertaining all realities connected with the body in its being subject to motion.323 The subject 
matter of this science is distinct from that of Metaphysics, and therefore, their goals are 
distinct, though both are seen as contributing to the ultimate objective of attaining true 
knowledge. The Deity, though not the subject matter of Metaphysics, is part of its 
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322 Ibn Sīnā, Tabī‘īyāt, I.1, 1, 3; c.f. Najāt, 1, 121; Madkhal, 14.  
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investigations; thus, theological topics are treated within the Metaphysics.324 This is not to say 
that natural philosophical subjects do not have theological implications – we saw, in Chapter 3, 
that Ibn Sīnā’s hylomorphic conception of body underlies his understanding of the nature of 
potency and possibility, with all its significance for his understanding of creation. And yet, the 
sciences are carefully delineated, natural philosophy being an independent science with its own 
merit and objectives. I will show later how this conception of physics, so at odds with that of 
the classical Ash‘arīs, impacts on al-Āmidī’s reception on the physical theory of his school.  
The content of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology is also deeply at odds with Ash‘arī physical theory. This can 
be illustrated by considering how many of the tenets of the proof from accidents are challenged 
by aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology. Most obviously, Ibn Sīnā’s belief in immaterial substances 
immediately nullifies the proof from accidents, since it is only on the assumption that the world 
is composed entirely of corporeal substance and its inherent accidents that its creation ex nihilo 
is established by the proof from accidents. For Ibn Sīnā, substance is defined (in the 
Metaphysics) as ‘the existent not inhering in any other thing (al-mawjūd ghayr an yakūn fī shay’ 
min al-ashyā’)’, incorporating material and immaterial substances.325  The belief in immaterial 
substances obviously also undermines the classical Ash‘arī belief that substance cannot exist 
devoid of accidents. Immaterial substance, should it exist, cannot be proven always to have 
inherent accidents, and it is therefore impossible to prove its temporal origination in relation 
to that of accidents. 
The Ash‘arī understanding of accidents is challenged by Ibn Sīnā’s notion of nature, by which 
he explains a whole spectrum of phenomena which, for the classical Ash‘arīs were explicable 
via the doctrine of the continual recreation of accidents. In defining ‘nature’, Ibn Sīnā writes 
that there are ‘actions and movements which proceed from [natural bodies] on account of [the 
bodies themselves] in such a way as they are not attributable to an external cause’. These 
include those actions which result from volition, but nature is specifically, ‘a power that brings 
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about motion and change, and from which the action proceeds according to a single course, 
without volition’. Examples would be the cooling of water after a source of heat is removed, and 
the germination of a seed and its growth into plant.326 Ibn Sīnā’s notion of matter as a substrate 
‘capable of acquiring some factor which it did not previously have’, that is, as imbued with 
potency, also presents an obvious challenge to the Ash‘arī doctrine of accidents, in which God’s 
continual recreation of accidents is the sole reason for change in matter (and even for matter’s 
continuation in existence).327 
Ibn Sīnā’s belief that matter is a continuum is perhaps the most obvious site of difference 
between his natural philosophy and Ash‘arī atomism. It is a theory over which he directly 
challenges – indeed, refutes at some length – the opposing view of the theologians (though he 
does not name them).328 This is partly because as an Neoplatonising Aristotelian, he inherited 
the debate over the finitude of matter which had long featured in that tradition, between the 
Greek Atomists and their Neoplatonic, Stoic, and other opponents. Aristotle himself, for 
example, in his Physics (especially Book 4), refutes Democritean atomism. Ibn Sīnā’s belief in 
matter’s infinite divisibility is just one aspect of the worldview which also sees time and motion 
as infinitely divisible continuums, extending from pre-eternity, and by necessity. It is obvious 
how this package represents a challenge both to Ash‘arī physical theory, and to its concomitant 
worldview, even if the infinite divisibility of matter alone does not necessarily entail the 
world’s eternity. 
Ibn Sīnā’s conception of essences and, correspondingly, of real definitions, is deeply alien to the 
Ash‘arī notion of body as ‘the aggregate’. Whilst for classical Ash‘arīs, there are no real 
definitions because complex entities are not genuine unities, we have already seen that for Ibn 
Sīnā, the way things are corresponds to real essences responsible for the characteristics and 
qualities of all existents in the world around us. Though Ibn Sīnā’s theory of essences is a 
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metaphysical doctrine, the challenge that it signifies to the Ash‘arī conception of physical 
bodies as no more than the sum of their atomic parts is clear. 
The purpose of this very brief survey has been to highlight some of the key issues that come to 
the fore at the encounter of classical Ash‘arī physical theory with Avicennan philosophy. I will 
demonstrate later in the chapter that al-Āmidī is deeply influenced by aspects of the Avicennan 
challenge to Ash‘arī physical theory in his works of kalām. First, I show how al-Āmidī regards 
kalām physical theory in his works of falsafa. 
3. The Atomist Ontology in al-Āmidī’s works of falsafa 
In this section, I briefly discuss al-Āmidī’s reception of kalām physical theory in two of his works 
of falsafa, al-Nūr al-bāhir and Rumūz al-kunūz. In the former, al-Āmidī is essentially an Avicennist, 
and this is reflected in his natural philosophy. In the latter, he presents as a theologian 
attempting to accommodate as much of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy as does not contradict the 
essential tenets of kalām. This results in ambivalence towards the physical theoretical 
underpinnings of classical kalām. Al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophy in these 
works merits close examination. However, that is not the subject of the present chapter. Rather, 
the intention is to demonstrate how, in his works of falsafa, al-Āmidī perceives the kalām 
physical theory of atoms and accidents.  
In the introduction to the Physics of the Nūr, al-Āmidī states his commitment to the tradition of 
falsafa, specifically praising Aristotle (al-mu‘allim al-awwal).329 He is critical of certain individuals 
who have attempted to explain Aristotlean philosophy, describing their efforts as falling short, 
and his stated task in this part of the work is to address such errors. He lists ‘Ancient 
[philosophers], [contemporary] philosophers, and practitioners of kalām’ as among those who 
have erred in their natural philosophies.330  Despite his direct allusion to Aristotle, it is Ibn 
Sīnā’s natural philosophy which is the subject of the volume. Indeed, al-Āmidī broadly 
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embraces Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophical doctrine in the Nūr. Thus, he is a hylomorphist, and 
so a natural critic of atomist physical theory. Ibn Sīnā’s opponents are likewise al-Āmidī’s. This 
leads him to critique post-Avicennan philosophers in their criticisms of aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s 
natural philosophy, such as Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (shayk al-yahūd, with reference to his 
Jewish background).331 	
More relevant for our purposes in this chapter, it leads him to a critique of the ontology of the 
mutakallimūn, focused in a refutation of the doctrine of the indivisible part. The Physics of the 
Nūr contains a refutation of atomism equivalent to the extended refutation sustained by Ibn 
Sīnā in the Shifā’.332 Neither Ibn Sīnā nor al-Āmidī limit their critique to the kalām atomists: the 
opponents in question are not identified, and surely include ancient atomists like the 
Democriteans whose arguments were known to Aristotle. However, all of the pro-atomist 
arguments discussed in the Shifā’ and Nūr feature in, and some are exclusive to, the kalām 
defence of atomism. Both Ibn Sīnā and al-Āmidī begin with proofs against the indivisible part. 
They then list proofs proffered by atomists in support of its existence. This is followed in both 
cases by a sustained refutation of each pro-atomist proof.  
I will highlight one example, revisited later in the chapter in connection to its appearance in 
Abkār al-afkār. Ibn Sīnā briefly summarises a proof for the existence of an indivisible part of 
matter as follows:  
																																																						
331 Al-Āmidī objects to Abū l-Barakāt’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s notion that Prime Matter (hayūla) is entirely non-
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They said that if the body were infinitely divisible, the parts of a mustard seed would 
equal the parts of an enormous mountain, which is absurd.333 
Al-Āmidī expands the proof in al-Nūr al-bāhir, providing clarification. He explains that if all 
bodies, whether large or small, were divisible into infinite parts, then both the smallest body 
(exemplified by the mustard seed) and the largest (exemplified by the mountain) would contain 
an equivalent infinity of parts. But on the assumption that the number of parts of the mustard 
seed and mountain are equivalent, the two bodies must be of equivalent size. This is on the 
basis that the size of a body is related to the number of its parts.334 Both Ibn Sīnā and al-Āmidī 
subsequently refute this proof, as I later demonstrate in relation to its appearance in al-Āmidī’s 
Abkār. It is clear, then, that al-Āmidī concurs with Ibn Sīnā’s assessment of the atomist doctrine. 
This is hardly surprising given al-Āmidī’s commitments in this work. There is no other direct 
comment, within the Nūr, on kalām physical theory, and this, too, reflects the work’s orientation 
around the concerns of Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophical project. 
We saw in the previous chapter that in his Rumūz, al-Āmidī aims to demonstrate that the 
majority of falsafī theories do not contradict orthodox Ash‘arī doctrine. Indeed, he expresses 
support, in the introduction to the Daqā’iq, of which the Rumūz is an abridgement, for ‘most of 
the Physics’ of the philosophers. 335 In the Rumūz, the creation of the world in time is established 
negatively, by refuting the proofs used by eternalists to establish their own doctrine.336 Thus, 
the kalām proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo does not feature. Indeed, in contrast to the 
writings of classical Ash‘arīs, atomism has no place in discussion of any theological doctrine. As 
in the Nūr (following the Shifā’), the only aspect of Ash‘arī physical theory which receives any 
discussion in the Rumūz is the indivisible part. Al-Āmidī presents a list of ten proofs against the 
indivisible part, the first of which is Ibn Sīnā’s original proof (to be discussed later in the 
chapter).337 He then presents just four proofs for the indivisible part. This is followed by a brief 
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refutation of all four proofs for the indivisible part. Al-Āmidī stresses that matter is infinitely 
divisible in potential, rather than having an infinite number of actual parts. Proofs against the 
indivisible part are not refuted.338 The outcome of this discussion is that al-Āmidī endorses Ibn 
Sīnā’s position on the divisibility of matter. More generally, kalām physical theory receives no 
support within this work. Rather, Avicennan natural philosophy is proffered as an explanation 
of the natural world. 
Atomist physical theory, represented by the single, controversial doctrine of the indivisible 
part, is not supported in either the Nūr or the Rumūz. This is to be expected in the Nūr, given al-
Āmidī’s clear commitment to Avicennan natural philosophy. In the context of the intellectual 
project of the Rumūz, the lack of support for atomism results from al-Āmidī’s overwhelming 
support for all aspects of Avicennism which do not directly contradict foundational Ash‘arī 
theological doctrines such as creation ex nihilo. This is no insignificant development. It suggests 
the possibility that Ash‘arī physical theory is not so indespensible to the theological project of 
the school, and its particular conception of creation, as had traditionally been understood. It 
lays the foundations of al-Āmidī’s subsequent disintegration, in his works of kalām, of physical 
theory from theology proper. Al-Āmidī was, at an early stage in his career, a committed 
Avicennist. He seems then to have become convinced of the truth of theological perspective on 
the major questions of creation and of God’s nature and attributes. And yet, at the point of 
writing the Rumūz, he remained impressed by philosophical theories and methods, pressing 
them into the service of kalām. At this stage, he was not concerned with defending kalām 
physical theory, since it did not seem central to the defence of core theological doctrines. This 
is a striking position for a committed theologian, indicative of a new era in the interactions 
between philosophy and theology.  
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4. Al-Āmidī’s Physical Theory in Abkār al-afkār 
Against the background of al-Āmidī’s view of the atomist ontology in his works of falsafa, I turn 
to the main analysis. I consider how al-Āmidī receives, represents and defends atomist physical 
theory in his major theological work. I argue that al-Āmidī is conservative in his commitment to 
the letter of classical Ash‘arī physical theory, which he presents as a natural philosophy worthy 
to rival that of the philosophers. However, I also demonstrate the significant Avicennan 
influence both on al-Āmidī’s presentation of physical theory, and in terms of uncertainty he 
expresses over fundamental aspects of the theory of classical Ash‘arism. I also demonstrate the 
significance of al-Rāzī as an intellectual competitor in these discussions. The analysis of this 
section puts us in the positition, in the final chapter, to assess what role atomism plays in 
expression of the world’s causedness and creation in al-Āmidī’s works of theology. 
4.1 Al-Āmidī’s Conception of the Place of Physical Theory 
Before discussing the theories themselves, it is important to consider how al-Āmidī conceives of 
the study of the physical world. I have demonstrated that Ibn Sīnā represents a challenge and 
alternative to the Ash‘arī conception of physical theory as integral to their theological project. 
So, if on the one hand, for the classical Ash‘arīs, physical theory is part and parcel of ‘theology 
proper’, and on the other, for Ibn Sīnā, natural philosophy constitutes a separate field with its 
own subject matter and objectives, what, for al-Āmidī, is the place of physical theory? I 
demonstrate that al-Āmidī is influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s conception of natural philosophy as a 
field separate from metaphysics and theology. A preliminary consideration of key precedents 
for al-Āmidī’s approach, namely those of al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī, demonstrates the intellectual 
context. 
4.i.a Post-Avicennan Ash‘arī Precedents 
Despite his well documented and controversial interest in Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of causality, al-
Ghazālī is far less interested in questions of physical theory than his classical Ash‘arī 
	 137	
predecessors.339 In fact, he is overtly critical about the priority given to the discussion and 
defence of Ash‘arī physical theory among his predecessors. Even in his Iqtiṣād, where (as 
discussed in the next chapter), al-Ghazālī relies on the proof from acccidents for creation ex 
nihilo, physical theory does not have the same prominence as for classical Ash‘arīs. For instance, 
though he agrees in this work with the classical Ash‘arīs that accidents exist and that substance 
cannot exist except with inherent accidents, he objects to the classical Ash‘arī priority given to 
the discussion of accidents, writing that ‘responses to [questions on the subject of accidents] 
were drawn out within the pages of kalām, though they do not merit such protraction (qad 
ṭawwala jawābuhu fī taṣānīf al-kalām wa-laysa tastaḥiqq al-taṭwīl)’. According to al-Ghazālī, no right-
minded person denies the existence of accidents – for do we not all experience pain, hunger 
and thirst? And do we not all observe the changing states of other bodies in the world? Those 
who deny the existence and originatedness of accidents are simply obstinate.340 Accordingly, he 
does not entertain extensive physical theoretical discussions. Indeed, he describes physical 
theory for its own sake as being ‘extraneous to the [main] objective’ of his Iqtiṣād. 341  
In other works, al-Ghazālī demonstrates a similar attitude. In his Munqidh, al-Ghazālī specifically 
criticises the theologians for having thought they were defending the faith by investigating ‘the 
realities of things’, delving into the investigation of ‘substances, accidents and their properties’ 
without it being relevant to their theology.342 Indeed, in that work, he suggests that the 
majority of the Physics of the falāsifa is non-problematic for the theologian. This suggests that 
his own project does not involve investigation of physical realities for their own sake. His 
discussions in the Tahāfut occasion two critiques of proofs derived from atomist physical 
theory. In one instance, he writes simply that ‘the indivisible part is connected with 
geometrical matters, the discussion of which is too involved’.343 In the other, he cites a proof 
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against the atom, and again, states that the discussion required to refute this proof would be 
too elaborate.344 His discussions in the Tahāfut especially, and elsewhere, show that he is far 
more interested in the metaphysics of the process of causation, given its theological 
implications, than in the formation and constitution of the physical world per se. 
In al-Ghazālī’s thought we see a radical reduction in the attention given to questions of physical 
theory, as compared with classical Ash‘arism. Al-Ghazālī does not hold physical theory itself to 
have much place within theological discussion, nor in the refutation of views which he 
considers heretical. Neither is he interested in physical theory as a separate field of inquiry. He 
simply does not seem very interested in questions relating to the nature of matter and body. 
This makes sense against the background of his theological pragmatism – al-Ghazālī is 
interested in protecting the belief of ordinary folk by providing evidence for theological 
doctrine which is simple and convincing.345 For al-Ghazālī, natural philosophy is not an end 
unto itself, and the theologian should focus on matters which strictly serve the cause of 
defending sound doctrine. 
In al-Rāzī’s works, we see an evolving conception of physical theory. In his earlier works, the 
parameters of classical Ash‘arism are upheld, and physical theory is integral to the theological 
project. Unsurprisingly, his Ishāra is structured much the same as al-Juwaynī’s Irshād and al-
Bāqillānī’s Tamhīd. The first topic after epistemological preliminaries is the defence of God’s 
existence. The first premise of his defence of this doctrine is the temporal originatedness of 
bodies. In order to establish this premise, physical theoretical doctrines, including the 
impossibility of matter’s existing devoid of accidents, are proven.346  
Despite the considerable space devoted to physical theory in his Nihāya, the work is in fact 
mostly comparable to the Ishāra in terms of its conception of physical theory. Like the Ishāra, 
the Nihāya has no separate section for physical theory. Rather, although al-Rāzī does present a 
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variety of proofs for the world’s creation ex nihilo (discussed in Chapter 5), the proof from 
accidents appears first, and as part of its defence, several points of physical theory are 
established.347 For instance, in this context, al-Rāzī develops the classical Ash‘arī notion that 
substance cannot exist devoid of accidents, specifically accidents of motion or rest. Here he also 
argues that establishing that motion is an existent, such that it is classified as an accident, relies 
on the establishment of the indivisibility of matter.  This occasions presentation of proofs for 
the atom.348 Opinions on natural philosophical questions also arise when al-Rāzī treats 
alternative proofs for the world’s creation ex nihilo; in his defence of a proof premised on the 
world’s essential possibility (also treated in the next chapter), the physical theory of 
hylomorphism is treated.349 Thus, although this work is not typical of classical Ash‘arism, 
engaging the philosophers to an unprecedented extent, al-Rāzī’s conception of physical theory 
as integral to the defence of theological doctrine is, at this stage, largely that of his school.350  
Al-Rāzī’s Mabāḥith is distinct from his other works in its approach towards philosophy, and 
concomitantly, in the place of physical theory therein. The work’s structure, although not 
ordered according to the standard Aristotelian pattern of Logic-Physics-Metaphysics, 
nevertheless reflects a basically falsafī orientation and objectives. Metaphysics, Physics and 
Theology are treated in distinct sections, and the objective of each science is the ascertainment 
of knowledge of reality, pertaining, in the first instance, to ‘common things’ connected with 
existence, in the second, to the world, and in the case of theology, to God and his attributes.351 
Significantly for al-Āmidī’s own approach in the Abkār, al-Rāzī accounts for the contents of 
Physics using Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the necessary and possible of existence, writing 
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348 Al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 245. 
349 Al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 350-351. Al-Rāzī establishes the proof’s first premise, namely that the world is only possible of 
existence, using an argument which he describes as ad hominem (ilzāmī) on the basis that it is premised on the 
physical theory of hylomorphism which he rejects, but the philosophers accept. 
350 For Shihadeh’s characterisation of the Nihāya, see Shihadeh, ‘From al-Ghazālī’, 163-170. Ibrahim writes of the 
Nihāya that ‘it does not attempt to advance a positive or independent approach to the study of natural reality, but is 
primarily focused on defending Ash‘arite creedal views’ (Ibrahim, Freeing Philosophy, 210). Despite his focus on 
defending Ash‘arī doctrine in this work, al-Rāzī does suggest innovative positions on physical theory which he will 
develop in later works; see Atlaş, ‘An Analysis and Editio Princeps’, 91 and 100, who shows that al-Rāzī already 
departs from the teaching of his school in suspending judgement over the indivisible part. 
351 On al-Rāzī’s isolation of metaphysics from theology and its reception, see Eichner, ‘Dissolving the Unity’.  
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that the second book, ‘concerns [all] categories of possible [existents]’. He holds that the 
possible of existence is further categorised exhaustively as either ‘substance’ or ‘accident’, and 
that each will be treated in turn.352 Al-Rāzī endorses Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophy in this work. 
Yet the classical kalām convention of organising discussion of physical theory around the 
substance-accident dichotomy is also present. Although he does not organise or define his 
natural philosophy in the manner of Ibn Sīnā, what is significant for our purposes is the 
departure from classical Ash‘arism marked by al-Rāzī’s treatment of questions of physical 
theory as constituting a field of inquiry in their own right, and not only as premises in support 
of theological doctrine.  
In his more mature works, al-Rāzī’s approach to physical theory is distinct both from that of 
classical Ash‘arism, and from his philosophically oriented works. The programme of each is 
unique to it, according to his developing falsafa-kalām synthesis. The Muḥaṣṣal is described by 
Shihadeh as ‘one of the heights of al-Rāzí’s experimentalism’.353 It is structured in part around a 
comparative exposition of the major divisions of existents maintained within each tradition. So, 
after epistemological preliminaries, the work begins with discussions of necessary, and then 
possible existence, at an abstracted, metaphysical level. This is followed by an equivalent 
discussion of the notions of eternality and temporal origination by which the theologians 
categorise existents. Then, al-Rāzī discusses first the division of the possible of existence 
according to the philosophers, and second, the division of temporally originated existents 
according to the theologians. Here, many questions of physical theory arise. However, these 
discussions are highly eclectic, ranging from discussion of the philosophers’ understanding of 
the reality of time (with respect to the Aristotelian doctrine that measures are accidents), to 
kalām-oriented discussions on the topic of human agency (with respect to the notion that 
temporally originated power is an accident). This is followed by further extensive discussions of 
the schools’ respective conceptions of accidents and body, in which both purely natural 
philosophical and theological questions (like that of the creation of the world) are covered. 
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Only in the latter part of the work does al-Rāzī treat the major theological questions of God’s 
existence and attributes. Al-Rāzī’s experimentalism here results in an eclectic work of 
integrative philosophical theology. Physical theory accordingly arises in various contexts as the 
comparative project demands. It is not presented as a separate field, but neither is it discussed 
in the narrow context of classical kalām convention. 
In his Arba‘īn, too, questions of physical theory are not treated in the restricted context of the 
proof from accidents, but nor does the work have a separate section devoted to the study of the 
natural world. Here, however, due to the more strictly theological orientation of the work, 
questions of physical theory arise in various contexts in which they are requisite to the defence 
of theological discussion. Yet this is not according to the conventions of classical kalām. This is 
partly because the physical theory of atom and accident does not provide the basic framing 
device for discussion of the world as it does in classical kalām. Instead, Ibn Sīnā’s category of the 
possible of existence provides the context for al-Rāzī’s treatment of creation. In discussion of 
this category, al-Rāzī treats the difference between space-occupying and non-space-occupying 
existents, as well as the question of whether or not non-space-occupying (immaterial) 
substances exist.354 Al-Rāzī’s approach here is obviously more eclectic than that of al-Bāqillānī, 
for instance, as necessitated by his greater accommodation of and interest in falsafī physical 
theories, especially as they relate to theological questions. Another example of al-Rāzī’s 
dynamic intertwining of natural philosophical and theological topics is his discussion of 
matter’s indivisibility. The discussion does not occur in his initial treatment of substance 
(where it would in a classical summae), since it is not requisite to the problem context in which 
that initial treatment occurs (the discussion of creation). Rather, it appears much later, prior to 
the discussion of the resurrection, because as al-Rāzī explains, ‘before we pursue the question of 
the resurrection, we must [first] establish two premises, one being knowledge of [the nature of] 
the soul, which itself relies upon knowledge of the indivisible part’.355 In the Arba‘īn, then, 
natural philosophy is not treated as a field in its own right. However, questions of physical 
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theory arise frequently and are explored thoroughly in their relation to theological questions, 
in a manner that anticipates falsafī alternatives to kalām physical theories. 
The Maṭālib is a complex work, and physical theoretical discussions arise in various 
metaphysical and theological contexts throughout. For instance, questions of the nature of 
space occupation, motion and rest are key to al-Rāzī’s exposition of proofs for creation ex nihilo, 
including his own version of the proof from accidents.356 Some parts of the work are devoted in 
a more focused manner to questions of physical theory. For instance, the sixth part of the work 
is entitled ‘on prime matter (fī l-hayūla)’, and al-Rāzī writes in his introduction that his intention 
is ‘the explanation of the states of the body qua body, and the explanation of prime matter, 
from which the body is generated (yatawallad).357 Although this is somewhat comparable with 
Ibn Sīnā’s account of the purpose of natural philosophy (as the study of the body insomuch as it 
is susceptible to change), al-Rāzī’s treatment of questions of physical theory has its own 
character. This is not a straightforward quest for the knowledge of the realities of the physical 
world for their own sake. Rather, theological themes are expressed throughout. To give one 
example, before exploring the question of whether bodies are homogenous, in his section on 
the properties of body, al-Rāzī describes the question as ‘a crucial foundation of Islamic 
principles (aṣl aẓīm fī taqrīr al-uṣūl al-islāmiyya)’. This is because the notion that bodies are 
homogenous provides a premise in proofs from particularisation for a voluntary agent who 
caused the world, and in establishing the miracles of the prophets.358 So despite al-Rāzī’s 
departure from the convention of classical Ash‘arism, in which physical theory is treated in 
restricted contexts, particularly that of the proof from accidents, his departure is not into the 
methods of Ibn Sīnā. Natural philosophical questions are part of an inquiry into the nature of 
reality, but the theological implications of the findings of this inquiry take priority. Natural 
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357 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 6. 
358 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 189. 
	 143	
philosophical questions are synthesised with theology in such a manner that al-Rāzī’s project is 
different in kind from that of the classical Ash‘arīs without imitating Ibn Sīnā’s.359 
Al-Rāzī’s conceptions of physical theory and its place within philosophical and theological 
enquiry are as varied as the number of his works. As Shihadeh has pointed out, subsequent 
Ash‘arīs, who often included sections on physics in their theological compendia, had more than 
one of al-Rāzī’s works for inspiration in this choice.360 It should be clear by now that by the time 
of al-Āmidī’s own theological endeavours, major shifts were already occurring in the 
relationship between physical theory and theology among Ash‘arī scholars. I turn now to 
consider al-Āmidī’s own conception of physical theory against this background. 
4.i.b The Place of Physical Theory within Abkār al-afkār 
Al-Āmidī’s physical theory appears in the third volume of the Abkār. The volume is entitled ‘on 
the existent [which is] possible of existence’ (fī l-mawjūd al-mumkin al-wujūd), that is, all 
existents other than God. This follows his treatment of the strictly theological topics of God’s 
existence, and his attributes and acts, discussed under the category ‘the Necessary of Existence’ 
within the previous two volumes. Although the creation of the world is typically a highly 
theological question, it is discussed in the third volume of the work, since al-Āmidī’s defence of 
creation ex nihilo relies on the physical theories he establishes there. 
The structure of Abkār al-Afkār is unique to it. There is a Rāzian inspiration: specifically, the 
influence of the Mabāḥith is probable. As we have seen, the Mabāḥith contains a natural 
philosophical section presented as the study of categories of ‘the possible of existence’. This is a 
possible inspiration for al-Āmidī’s isolation of topics relating to the physical world by way of 
the distinction between the necessary and possible of existence.  Nevertheless, unlike al-Rāzī in 
his philosophically oriented works, al-Āmidī does not discuss metaphysics as an independent 
field. Rather, for him, the organising principle of the distinction between the necessary and 
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possible of existence provides a new way of structuring a theological enquiry (and not an 
independent approach to philosophy). More significantly, and again unlike al-Rāzī in his 
philosophical works, although al-Āmidī presents physical theory as a distinct field of enquiry 
through his organisation of the work, this does not reflect endorsement of Avicennan natural 
philosophy. So whilst in the Mabāḥith, al-Rāzī’s essentially positive attitude towards the major 
tenets of Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophy correlates with his conception of natural philosophy as 
an independent field, there is no such correlation in al-Āmidī’s Abkār. Whilst he organises his 
theological project around the basic distinction between questions concerning God and his 
attributes, and questions concerning the world and its constituents, he will deliberately, 
consistently, and often starkly oppose Ibn Sīnā’s beliefs about the natural world. 
Indeed, al-Āmidī’s distinction between theological and physical theoretical study in this work 
seems to be a deliberate methodological choice, designed to allow him to refute Ibn Sīnā’s 
natural philosophy by presenting Ash‘arī atomism as the true alternative. This is made obvious 
early in al-Āmidī’s discussions of physical theory. He commences the volume with a preliminary 
section (muqaddima) in which he presents a summary of the philosophers’ divisions of  the 
possible of existence. He writes: 
I know of no dispute between intellectuals on the exhaustive division (ḥaṣr) of the 
possible existent into substance and accident.361 
He then provides the definition of substance which he identifies with the philosophers, namely 
‘the existent not in a subject’.362 He proceeds to list the various divisions of substance according 
to the philosophers, along with their definitions. For instance, the intellect is the simple 
substance with no connection to a composite (i.e. material) substance. The human soul is the 
simple substance connected to the composite (i.e. the human body). There are two simple 
substances which form constituent parts of the composite substance, one of which inheres in 
the other. The simple substance which inheres in another to form composite substance is 
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corporeal form. That in which it inheres is corporeal matter. The composite substance (i.e. the 
composite of form and matter) is the body.363 In this way, based on analysis of a term (jawhar) 
common to the two traditions, al-Āmidī economically presents both the basic elements of Ibn 
Sīnā’s natural philosophy (i.e. his conception of form, matter, and body), and other 
metaphysical aspects of his thought which diverge from the materialist ontology of the 
mutakallimūn, namely, his conception of immaterial intellects, souls, and so on. The procedure 
of listing the categories of substance is inspired by a very short passage in the Metaphysics of 
the Shifā’, by which Ibn Sīnā introduces his more in depth discussions of substance, and which 
al-Āmidī expands upon in his Nūr, and this probably provides the basis of his summary of 
philosophical positions here in the Abkār.364 He also refers his reader to two of his works of 
falsafa, namely Daqā’iq al-ḥaqā’iq and Rumūz al-kunūz, for further details of the philosophers’ 
categories of substance and accident.365 Here in the Abkār, however, the philosophical view thus 
summarised will be directly contrasted with the kalām understanding of substance.  
Thus the term jawhar serves al-Āmidī as a framing device, making highly disparate paradigms 
readily comparable. The same method is used by al-Rāzī in his comparison between the 
traditions. We have seen that, in the Muḥaṣṣal, al-Rāzī conducts an examination of the 
philosophical categories of possible existent, and then the theologians’ categories of temporally 
originated existents. In discussing the philosophers’ possible existents, al-Rāzī uses the method 
I have just described in relation to al-Āmidī. Al-Rāzī presents a basic dichotomy between 
‘substance’ and ‘accident’, defines substance according to the philosophers (as ‘that which is 
not in a subject’), then details the philosophers’ divisions of substance. These include (as in al-
Āmidī’s presentation) form, matter, body, soul and intellect, though al-Āmidī’s exposition is 
more expansive.366 This is an efficient method by which al-Rāzī finds focus for a comparison 
between two ontologies with widely divergent theories about the constituents of the realm 
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outside of God. It is possible that al-Āmidī was influenced by al-Rāzī’s method in his own work, 
as well as borrowing his summary of Ibn Sīnā’s position from his own works of philosophy. 
However, al-Āmidī’s presentation of the philosophical categories of substance and accident 
does not serve the same purpose as al-Rāzī’s. Al-Rāzī’s exposition of the philosophical 
categories of substance and accident in the Muḥaṣṣal is a neutral account which serves his 
comparative project. He does present theological rebuttals to aspects of the philosophers’ 
doctrines; for instance, he explains that for the theologians, measures (time, quantity, etc) are 
not accidents, since there are no relational accidents. He presents a proof to this effect.367 
However, the account overall is explanatory, al-Rāzī not primarily concerned with undermining 
the philosophical positions entailed. By contrast, al-Āmidī is set on demonstrating the 
inferiority of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology to that of classical Ash‘arism.  
Having presented the philosophical categories of possible existents, al-Āmidī refutes several of 
the definitions of the various kinds of substance he has presented. He begins: ‘this division [of 
possible existents] although the best of the contemporary philosophers inclined towards it, is 
deficient’.368 What follows is not a comprehensive critique, but a rather haphazard targeting of 
individual doctrines. For example, al-Āmidī writes that the philosophers hold that the celestial 
bodies are categorised as ‘simple substances not susceptible to generation or corruption’. He 
challenges this definition on the basis that he does not concede that there is any kind of 
substance which is not susceptible to corruption. This is a reference to the classical kalām 
doctrine which he will defend later in the work, that all substance ultimately ceases to exist.369 
Though al-Āmidī does not expand on his refutation, it is clear that that there are theological 
implications to the view he is refuting. The notion that the celestial bodies are incorruptible 
accords with the doctrine of their pre-eternal and perpetual motion, and is therefore at odds 
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with the kalām doctrine of creation. This may be an underlying factor in his selection of this 
aspect of the philosophical categorisation of substances for critique. 
A second notion which is targeted is the belief that measures are accidents. Al-Āmidī rejects the 
doctrine using an argument ad hominem to show its theological implications for the 
philosophers. Measures refer to relations (iḍāfa) between existents. If measures are existent 
accidents, then God is characterisable as receptive to accidents, which are existent and 
additional to his essence. This is because the philosophers (and here it is obvious that Ibn Sīnā is 
the target) hold that God is characterisable according to relational and negational accidents. 
For instance, his attribute of power, according to Ibn Sīnā, reverts to the relational attribute of 
his necessity of existence bestowing existence on all else. Yet according to Ibn Sīnā, God’s 
essence is absolutely simple, and he does not possess either entitative or accidental 
attributes.370 Al-Āmidī writes that ‘there is no way for them to escape [this conclusion] except 
by contradicting one of their principles: either [by conceding that] God is characterisable by 
attributes additional to his essence, or [by conceding that] relation (al-iḍāfa) is not one of the 
classes of possible existents.’371 Again, al-Āmidī targets a natural philosophical belief, this time 
in terms which deliberately highlight its theological implications. Specifically, it is probably no 
coincidence that al-Āmidī raises the question of God’s attributes, for the Ash‘arīs crucial to 
God’s personality as they understood it. Al-Āmidī takes this rather unlikely opportunity to 
oppose Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the divine essence, as well as his understanding of the nature of 
accidents. 
In this part of his discussion, al-Āmidī clearly intends to undermine the falsafī tradition of 
natural philosophy as a preliminary to his own discussions of substance, accident and body. The 
equivocal term jawhar allows for comparison between the thought systems, for the ultimate 
purpose of proffering the kalām paradigm as a superior natural philosophy. It seems clear that a 
major motivation behind al-Āmidī’s presentation of the discussion of physical theory as a 
separate field of enquiry is his staunch opposition to the philosophical tradition. By extracting 
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classical Ash‘arī physical theory from its conventional theological context, al-Āmidī can 
economically pit that physical theory against the natural philosophy of the philosophers, 
characterised as opponents of sound doctrine. This way of framing the discussion styles Ash‘arī 
physical theory as a viable alternative to falsafī natural philosophy, not just an accidental 
addendum to, or set of premises in support of, theological discussion. And yet it is clear that 
despite this negative motivation, al-Āmidī is also subject to the influence of Avicennan 
philosophy in these choices. It is Ibn Sīnā’s dichotomy of existents into the categories 
‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ which provides al-Āmidī with the structuring device of his major work 
of theology. And Ibn Sīnā’s pursuit of natural philosophy as a separate field also clearly informs 
al-Āmidī’s approach. 
A word on Ghāyat al-marām is called for. In that later work of theology, in which al-Āmidī’s 
stated aim is to cover the most important theological topics with concision, attention to 
physical theory is conspicuous by its absence. The implications of this for al-Āmidī’s proofs for 
creation in that work will be discussed in the next chapter. At this juncture, it is simply worth 
reflecting on the break this marks with al-Āmidī’s Ash‘arī predecessors. The process of 
divorcing the fields of physical theoretical and strictly theological enquiry from one another in 
the Abkār leads al-Āmidī to dispense with the former entirely in his latest work. This is 
unprecedented in classical Ash‘arism and also in the thought of al-Āmidī’s closest 
contemporary and rival, al-Rāzī.  
Physical theory often appears in later Ash‘arī works as a separate field, the most enduringly 
influential example being al-Ījī’s Mawāqif. This has been attributed to the influence of multiple 
Rāzian works, including the Mabāḥith, in which Physics is separate from theological enquiry.372 
Al-Ījī’s Mawāqif appears to be influenced by the eclecticism of the Muḥaṣṣal, and by the structure 
of the Mabāḥith, rather than by the Abkār.  The third and fourth of al-Ījī’s seven mawāqif are 
devoted to a wide spectrum of natural philosophical questions (entitled, ‘on accidents’ and ‘on 
substance’) and together occupy a significant portion of the work. Structurally, the work is 
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comparable to the Mabāḥith and Muḥaṣṣal, beginning with the discussion of metaphysical 
questions (under the title, ‘common things’), moving onto natural philosophy, and ending with 
strictly theological questions. A direct Āmidian influence is therefore unlikely in this respect. 
4.ii Al-Āmidī’s Conception of Substance 
I turn to the content of al-Āmidī’s physical theory, beginning with his conception of substance. 
Al-Āmidī’s discussion of physical theory comprises five principles (uṣūl), the first three of which 
are relevant to this chapter, namely: 
1. On substances and their properties (aḥkām) 
2. On accidents and their properties 
3. On the attributes of substances and accidents. 
Although in classical kalām works, these topics are integrated with more properly theological 
discussions, al-Āmidī’s ordering of topics does reflect the standard classical kalām order. Each 
principle is divided into sub-discussions. Section 1 contains discussion of a) the properties of 
substances in general b) the properties of the indivisible part and c) the properties of bodies. 
Each sub-discussion in turn consists in a number of topics. For instance, sub-discussion a), on 
the properties of substances, contains seven topics, each treated at length. This illustrates the 
great comprehensiveness of al-Āmidī’s treatment of physical theory. It is not my aim to 
comprehensively replicate al-Āmidī’s theory of substance. Rather, I treat its most significant 
features, focusing on explicating the influences on his approach.  
4.ii.a Defining Substance 
It is clear that for al-Āmidī, the need for a robust definition of substance to differentiate his 
view from competing views is pressing. Discussion of the definition of substance occupies an 
extended section ‘On the nature of substance and its definition’.373 Apart from Ibn Sīnā’s 
competing definition, which, as we have seen, encompasses immaterials, another notion to be 
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refuted is the Mu‘tazilī view. Given that, for the Mu‘tazila, both non-existents and existents can 
be described as ‘things’, the substance may be a non-existent or existent thing. Thus one 
Mu‘tazilī definition of substance, which al-Āmidī cites, is ‘that which is space-occupying when it 
exists’.374 Al-Āmidī defines substance in accordance with Ash‘arī doctrine, in deliberate 
contradistinction with both philosophical and Mu‘tazilī views.  
Consequently, much of this section is negativistic. Al-Āmidī’s first tack is to refute the 
definition of substance he associates with the philosophers, namely ‘the existent not inhering 
in a substrate’.375 He argues ad hominem that the definition would include God, since God, 
according to the philosophers, is a self-subsisting existent, not requiring a substrate.376 He 
anticipates a counter-argument derived from the philosophical distinction between God’s 
essence and the essences of other existents. The objection is that substance is distinct from God 
in that its existence is additional to (zā’id ‘alā) its essence. In God, by contrast, essence and 
existence are one.  In this way, God is distinguished from substance. 
This is not a hypothetical argument, but derived from one which al-Rāzī devises in the Mabāḥith 
to safeguard the philosophical definition of substance and to distinguish clearly between the 
definitions of substance and of the Necessary of Existence. He argues that what is meant by ‘the 
existent not in a substrate’ in the case of substance is that if a certain essence comes to exist 
extra-mentally, it will not inhere in a substrate. However, such essences, he argues, prior to 
their existence, are universal forms inhering in a substrate, namely, intellect. By contrast, God’s 
essence and existence are identical, so that there is no case in which God can be described as 
inhering in a substrate. Unlike the universal essences of substances, then, God is always self-
subsisting.377 This argument relies upon al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā on the relationship 
between essence and existence which, I have argued, is distinct from that of Ibn Sīnā. Al-Āmidī 
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that which, if it exists, bears accidents’.   
375 Abkār, 3, 23. 
376 Indeed, according to Ibn Sīnā, the Necessary of Existence requires no relation to any other existent (Ilāhiyyāt, I.6, 
30). In the Ishārāt, Ibn Sīnā calls God al-qayyūm on the basis of his necessity. This Qur’ānic word is the most common 
expression of God’s self-subistence (Ishārāt, IV.9, 447; c.f. Qur’ān 2:255). 
377 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 1, 141-142.  
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does not represent the full argument, but it is clear that al-Rāzī’s defence of Ibn Sīnā’s 
definition of substance is the one he has in mind. 
In response, al-Āmidī writes that the theory that essence and existence are distinct in 
substances is the one which the ‘best of the latter day [philosophers] (al-muta’akhkhirīn) inclined 
towards’, but that he has already refuted it in the course of the Abkār.378 This refers to a 
preliminary discussion of the nature of existence in volume 1, discussed in the previous 
chapter.379 Al-Āmidī there cites the ‘philosophers’’ claim that existence is univocal (al-mafhūm 
min al-wujūd wāḥid fī kull mawjūd), and that it is additional to the essences of existents. He 
strongly opposes this notion, writing that although the word ‘existence’ is common to all 
existents, it has no unified reality. Rather, the essence of each thing is its existence, and its 
existence, its essence. Thus existents do not have common existence. This is a restatement of 
the classical Ash‘arī understanding of the thing.380 Thus, by affirmiming that essence and 
existence are one in all existents, al-Āmidī critiques al-Rāzī’s conception of Ibn Sīnā’s 
distinction between substance and God.381 Ibn Sīnā’s definition of substance is thus shown to be 
incapable of preserving God from the status of ‘substance’.  
In the same way, al-Āmidī also refutes the definition of substance he has ascribed to the 
Mu‘tazila, namely ‘that which is space-occupying when it exists’.382 He shows that the definition 
is premised on the notion that the non-existent is a thing. Later in the Abkār, in the section on 
‘the non-existent’, al-Āmidī will extensively refute the Mu‘tazilī notion that the non-existent is 
																																																						
378 Abkār, 3, 23.  
379 Abkār, 1, 219-220. 
380 Al-Juwaynī, in denying that existence is a mode (ḥāl), writes that ‘the reality (ḥaqīqa) of the essence is existence (al-
wujūd) and existence is not something additional to the essence’ (Shāmil, 129). Nevertheless, the term ‘existent’ is 
used univocally as a referent of all existents, since they all share in the attribute of being in actuality. It is in this 
sense that existents are alike; see Frank, ‘Primary Entities’, 165, 218. 
381 In his Rumūz, by contrast, al-Āmidī endorses al-Rāzī’s defence of Ibn Sīnā’s definition of substance (without naming 
his peer), stating that since, in God, essence and existence are one, God is distinguished in his self-subsistence from 
substance (Rumūz, f 96a). At this stage in his career, where his approach to falsafa is largely pragmatic, it seems that 
al-Āmidī uncritically accepts al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of essence and existence. 
382 For a defence of the predominant classical Mu‘tazilī definition of substance, see al-Nīsābūrī’s Masā’il, 37-47; also 
Dhanani, Physical Theory, 61. 
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a thing.383 If the non-existent is not a thing, then the Mu‘tazilī definition of substance is 
nonsensical. 
Earlier, in the course of his preliminary discussions, al-Āmidī briefly offers a definition of the 
term jawhar to contrast with the Avicennan definition, namely ‘the possible existent not in a 
substrate (al-mawjūd al-mumkin…lā fī maḥal)’. This is deliberately differentiated from the 
philosophical definition he has given, which refers to the existent per se, defining substance as 
‘the existent not in a substrate’.384 The former definition, which relies on Ibn Sīnā’s distinction 
between the possible and necessary of existence, accommodates the philosophical conception 
of substance as a category which includes immaterial possible existents. It is a definition upon 
which consensus could be reached. It does not permit the inclusion of God within the category 
‘substance’, but nor does it specify the space-occupying property of substance. It seems to be 
offered by al-Āmidī as an improvement upon the philosophers’ own definition of substance, and 
yet, in the section under discussion, al-Āmidī will stress definitions of substance which 
emphasise the materiality of substance. 
Al-Āmidī accommodates a number of definitions proffered by Ash‘arīs, including ‘that which is 
receptive to accidents’, ‘that which has some mass’, ‘that which cannot exist [where] a second 
substance [exists]’, and ‘that which is space-occupying.’ 385 Implicit to the latter three 
definitions is the denial of immaterial substances. Indeed, the third definition also constitutes a 
definition of ‘space-occupying’.386 This sets al-Āmidī’s ontology apart from Ibn Sīnā’s (in which 
immaterial substances appear), and the Mu‘tazila’s (in which the non-existent, and thus non-
space-occupying, substance, is nonetheless a thing). It emphasises the Ash‘arī beliefs that 1) 
everything other than God is entirely material and 2) that apart from its existence, the world 
has no reality. Thus God is made the sole immaterial being in existence, and the sole source of 
																																																						
383 Abkār, 3, 387-404. 
384 Abkār, 3, 16; c.f. Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, II.1, 45. 
385 The first is favoured by al-Bāqillānī (Tamhīd, 17).  
386 E.g. al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 156; see Dhanani, Physical Theory, 63-64.  
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all reality apart from himself, in line with Ash‘arī theocentricism. Al-Āmidī’s definition of 
substance overtly establishes these distinct features of Ash‘arī ontology.387 
The importance of Ibn Sīnā as opponent of Ash‘arī physical theory is clear in the attention and 
priority al-Āmidī gives to his definition of substance. And yet it is al-Rāzī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā 
which is the direct subject of critique. This speaks of the importance of al-Rāzī as a reader of Ibn 
Sīnā and as intellectual competitor for al-Āmidī. The Ash‘arīs’ more traditional opponents are 
also still in view.  
4.ii.b Al-Āmidī’s View on the Indivisibility of Matter 
Despite al-Āmidī’s insistent defence of Ash‘arī atomism as characterised thusfar, he has been 
influenced by Ibn Sīnā such that there are significant areas in which he expresses uncertainty 
over the Ash‘arī conception of substance. One of these is the doctrine that matter is ultimately 
indivisible. We saw in Section 2 that al-Āmidī’s earliest extant philosophical work, the Nūr, 
follows Ibn Sīnā’s Shifā’ in effecting a refutation of the doctrine of the indivisible part. Despite 
his clear change of allegiance within the Abkār, this background is keenly felt. 
That the substance is an indivisible part of matter (al-juz’ alladhī lā yatajazza’) is not implied in 
al-Āmidī’s thirty-page long discussion of ‘the absolute properties of substance’ (aḥkām al-jawāhir 
muṭlaqan), nor does his definition of substance necessarily entail the indivisibility of substance. 
The ‘defence’ of the indivisible part (ithbāt al-jawhar al-fard) appears as an addendum to the 
discussion of substance, rather than as inherent to its definition.388 Al-Āmidī’s defence of the 
atom turns out not to be a robust defence at all. Rather, as a result of awareness of compelling 
proofs against the atom, al-Āmidī ultimately suspends judgement. This is no small break from 
his school. 
Al-Āmidī’s procedure is firstly to present eight classical proofs for the atom, each of which he 
shows to be undemonstrative; secondly, to present two reliable proofs for the atom; thirdly, to 
																																																						
387 Dhanani shows how earlier theologians also deliberately defined substance in a manner that demonstrates the 
dissimilarity of their doctrine vis-à-vis the philosophical notion of substance (Dhanani, Physical Theory 55-6). 
388 Abkār, 3, 53-74.  
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present sixteen proofs against the atom; and finally, to suspend judgement. To illustrate his 
influences, I discuss a number of these.  
 Refuting Traditional Proofs for the Atom 
Of the eight kalām proofs for the atom refuted by al-Āmidī, two are discussed here. The first has 
already been mentioned in relation to its appearance in the Nūr. It is instructive to consider its 
appearance in the Abkār with respect to the relation between the works. It is the argument that 
on the assumption that all bodies are divisible into an infinity of parts, the number of parts of 
the mustard seed would not be greater than those of the mountain, which would entail the 
absurd result that neither mustard seed nor mountain would be greater in size.389 This is a well-
established kalām proof; Dhanani infers from references found in al-Ash‘arī’s Maqālāt and al-
Khayyāt’s Intiṣār that its kalām roots are in the work of the Mu‘tazilī Abū l-Hudhayl.390 In al-
Āmidī’s closer context, al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī also have versions.391  
The argument is problematic in that it entails several unproven philosophical assumptions. The 
first is that the infinite divisibility of matter entails the existence of an actually infinite number 
of parts. Yet the conception of matter as infinitely divisible refers to a potential state, 
describing the characteristic of matter as continuous and not discrete. The opponent would not 
concur that the infinite division of matter could actually occur. Indeed, the opponent would 
argue that an actually infinite set is impossible, such that speaking of the ‘infinite number’ of 
the mustard seed and mountain’s respective parts is nonsensical. Ibn Sīnā, for his part, opposes 
the existence of an actually infinite set, maintaining that numbers in an ordered series, bodies, 
and magnitudes, cannot be infinite.392A further assumption, which, we will see, informs al-
Āmidī’s rejection of the proof (as Ibn Sīnā’s), is that the size of a body is directly concomitant 
with the number of its constituent parts, as opposed to the size of those parts. 
																																																						
389 Abkār, 3, 56-7. 
390 Dhanani, Physical Theory, 164. 
391 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 17-18; al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 146. 
392 Ibn Sīnā, Tabī‘īyāt, III.8-9, 2, 325-343. 
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Given the prevalence of the proof among classical theologians, al-Āmidī’s refutation is a break 
with the tradition of his school. The source of his response is immediately traceable to his 
version of Ibn Sīnā’s refutation as it appears in the Nūr. The starting point of the counter-
argument in both Abkār and Nūr is to oppose the posited connection between the size of a body 
and the number of its parts. Al-Āmidī argues that things which can increase infinitely need not 
share the same magnitude. In support of this argument, he provides a mathematical example. 
We can potentially multiply a given quantity x by 10 ad infinitum. We could also multiply x by 
100 ad infinitum. Yet x multiplied by 10 ad infinitum will never be equivalent to x multiplied by 
100 ad infinitum. A further thought experiment concretes the argument. If one imagines 
doubling the size of the mustard seed ad infinitum, and also doubling the size of the mountain ad 
infinitum, the result would not be equivalence of size between the mountain and mustard 
seed.393 Similarly, dividing both ad infinitum would not result in their equivalence in size. The 
origin of this counter-proof is Ibn Sīnā’s refutation of the proof, though al-Āmidī makes no 
acknowledgement.394 Al-Rāzī’s Mabāḥith records a similar refutation, arguing simply that the 
size of the parts of an elephant (exemplifying large bodies, as in al-Bāqillānī’s Tamhīd) is greater 
than those of the mustard seed.395 
Let us consider one further pro-atomistic proof. Here, al-Āmidī responds negatively to an 
argument which appears in classical Ash‘arism, but which has been developed by al-Rāzī.396 The 
proof is based on the notion that the point at which a sphere placed on a flat surface contacts 
that surface must be indivisible.397 The point of contact between the sphere and the flat surface 
is conceptualised as a small surface, and it is argued that such a surface cannot be infinitely 
divisible.  The proof appears in al-Shahrastānī’s presentation of the atomism debate as follows: 
if the point at which a sphere meets a plane is divisible, the sphere must actually be angular. 
Since this is impossible, the point of contact must be an indivisible part.398 The assumption here 
																																																						
393 Abkār, 3, 57-8; al-Nūr, 3, 162-3. 
394 Ibn Sīnā, Tabī‘īyāt, III.5, 2, 304-5. 
395 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 2, 37. 
396 On al-Rāzī’s geometrical proofs for the atom in the Maṭālib, see Setia, ‘Atomism vs Hylomorphism’.  
397 Abkār, 3, 61-64. 
398Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 508. 
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is that a genuine sphere is not simply a conceptual, geometrical possibility, but must exist in 
actuality. 
In discussion of the indivisible part, al-Rāzī significantly develops this proof, and it is al-Rāzī’s 
version which al-Āmidī cites. Al-Rāzī applies axioms from Euclidean geometry to develop three 
sub-proofs, of which I discuss one.399 The argument is as follows: 
If one imagines a sphere rolling along a flat surface, one can postulate a straight line drawn 
between the points on the sphere at which contact occurs as the sphere rolls along (i.e. between 
the sphere’s two points of contact with the surface at moments T1 and T2). According to Euclid, 
every straight line connecting two points falling on the circumference of a sphere must fall 
within that circle (fig. 2); 
  
 
 
 
    Figure 2. 
Suppose points A and B are the points of contact between sphere and surface at moments T1 
and T2. Take point A. If point A is divisible, a straight line traced from one division of that point 
to another must occur on the outside of the circumference. This is because all divisions of point 
A are simultaneously in contact with the surface. However, given Euclid’s statement, this would 
necessitate that the straight line fall both within and outside of the circumference. This is 
inconceivable. Therefore, the sphere must be composed of indivisible parts. 
																																																						
399 Al-Rāzī, Arbaʻīn, 8; Mabāḥith, 2, 28-30; Maṭālib, 6, 47-52 (in this latter work, a fourth sub-proof is appended). 
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In response, al-Āmidī does not directly refute the arguments set forth. Instead, he uses 
Euclidean principles to the opposite argumentative effect, that is, to prove that the infinite 
divisibility of matter follows from the existence of the sphere. He argues that a circle composed 
of indivisible parts is inconceivable, as follows. If we postulate a line composed of indivisible 
parts forming a circle, those parts must come into contact at the internal extremity of the line. 
The external extremity of the line must be conceived of in one of two ways:  
1. The indivisible parts come into contact at the external extremity of the line as well 
as the internal extremity (illustrated on the top half of fig. 3) 
2. The indivisible parts do not come into contact at the external extremity, but only at 
the internal extremity (illustrated on the bottom half of fig. 3) 
Figure 3. 
 
Both possibilities are inconceivable because:  
1. If the parts did come into contact on the internal and external extremities of the 
line forming the circle, this would make the surface extent of the inside of the line 
equal to the surface extent of the outside of the line. This would mean that a line 
forming a concentric circle traced immediately around the first circle would have 
an inner surface extent equal to the internal surface extent of the first line. The 
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more circles we postulate traced around the first, the more the inconceivability of 
this becomes apparent (fig. 4) 
Figure 4. 
 
2. If, however, the parts did not come into contact at the external extremity of the 
line, this would mean that the parts were divisible (there being one aspect in 
contact with other parts and another aspect without contact). It would also make 
the line of the circle angular; another inconceivability.  
This counter-proof assumes the Ash‘arī conception of the atom as possessing magnitude, and 
therefore, as having distinct extremities (see Section 1 above), although to many atomists, 
including certain Mu‘tazila, the atom is point like and without extension. It is only on the 
assumption that atoms (and therefore lines) have distinct extremities that al-Āmidī’s refutation 
of al-Rāzī’s development of the original proof stands.  
The geometrical intuition behind al-Āmidī’s counter-proof is not original. It appears within Ibn 
Sīnā’s own proofs against the atom. He writes: 
The existence of atoms would necessarily entail that there be no circles, right-angled 
triangles, or many other [geometrical] figures, since the circle requires that the outside 
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circumference be larger than any inside circumference that is contiguous with it, but what 
is contiguous is equal to that with which it is contiguous, not larger.400 
Once again, al-Āmidī opposes a kalām proof for the atom, this time one that has received 
sophisticated development. Conceptual inspiration for his counter-argument is present in Ibn 
Sīnā’s anti-atomist arguments, and thus it is clear that al-Āmidī’s encounters with falsafa have 
permanently shaped his approach.401 The intellectual effort al-Āmidī expends on refuting al-
Rāzī’s proof seems surprising, given his ultimate suspension of judgement. It is an indication of 
his intellectual rivalry with al-Rāzī, confirming al-Rāzī’s significance for al-Āmidī’s intellectual 
project. More generally, it is characteristic of his dialecticism in this work. 
A Reliable Proof for the Atom 
Al-Āmidī presents two proofs for the atom which he considers reliable (mu‘tamad). Both are 
markedly different in character from traditional proofs, formed in context of close engagement 
with the falsafī framework for investigation of matter.402 Both are premised on denial of the 
notion that motion is a continuum, and on the necessity of correspondence between motion 
and matter in continuity or discreteness. I discuss one proof. 
Al-Āmidī’s argument is as follows: if substance were potentially infinitely divisible, a necessary 
correlate (lāzim) would be that motion would not exist. Since the correlate is impossible, 
substance must be indivisible. The proof of the proposed correlation (al-mulāzima) is that if 
matter were infinitely divisible, the parts of any distance must be likewise infinitely divisible. 
Any distance can be traversed by motion, and since the motion corresponds to the distance 
covered, the infinite divisibility of distances would entail the infinite divisibility of motion.  
																																																						
400 Ibn Sīnā, Tabī‘īyāt, III.4, 2, 284-5. 
401 We should observe that al-Rāzī is well aware that Euclidean geometry relies on the concept of continuity. Indeed, 
he also lists a number of proofs against the atom based on Euclidean principles in al-Maṭālib, 6, 131-138. Perhaps al-
Rāzī utilises Euclidean principles in defence of the atom in part to demonstrate that appeal to the authority of ‘the 
ancients’ was not the exclusive right of the anti-atomists. Atlaş discusses the use of geometrical arguments among 
theologians in ‘An Analysis and Editio Princeps’, 94-99, arguing that al-Rāzī’s geometrical arguments are part of his 
demonstration of the limitations of geometry as a basis of philosophical argumentation. 
402 Abkār, 3, 65-66. 
	 160	
Next, al-Āmidī argues against the infinite divisibility of motion: the motion that occurred in the 
past and that will occur in the future can have no existence simultaneous with the motion 
occurring in the present. However, if the part of motion occurring in the present is susceptible 
to infinite division, then some of its divisions must occur prior to others, making some past 
occurrences, and some future occurrences. But these cannot have simultaneous existence, 
meaning that that which we have called the present part of motion does not exist. But without 
the present part of motion, no part of motion can exist, since that which is called the past part 
of motion is that which was the present part, and that which is called the future part is that 
which is anticipated in the present. The existence of motion is known necessarily; therefore, it 
can only be that motion is not a continuum. Matter, likewise, must be composed of indivisible 
parts. Al-Āmidī describes this proof as sound (qawī), demonstrative (yaqīnī), and correctly 
formed (ṣaḥīḥ al-ṣūra).403  
The proof originates in the context of philosophical debates over the nature of time, 
particularly as developed by Ibn Sīnā. For Ibn Sīnā, time objectively exists, and is the magnitude 
of motion.404 The existence of time is not to be taken for granted, but established against those 
who deny it.405 In his own discussion of time, al-Āmidī appears ultimately to prefer the classical 
kalām understanding that time is the coordinate of events, but the majority of his discussion is 
preoccupied with the details of the debate as inherited from Ibn Sīnā.406 This includes 
presentation of proofs against the objective existence of time, including the following:  
If time were existent, either it would be divisible, or indivisible. 
																																																						
403 Abkār, 3, 66. 
404 On Ibn Sīnā’s conception of time, see McGinnis, Time and Time Again, Ch 7-8; Lammer, The Elements of Avicenna’s 
Physics. 
405 See Lammer, ‘Time and Mind Dependence’, Section 1 for an account of the historical context for the philosophical 
debate over time’s existence and essence. Lammer demonstrates the contrast between Aristotle, who is (perhaps 
deliberately) silent on the question of time’s existence, and Ibn Sīnā.  
406 Abkār, 3, 224-230. For a discussion, see Lammer, ‘Time and Mind Dependence’. Al-Āmidī’s own position on time is 
admittedly not explicitly stated. However, his focused and extensive account of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of time is 
typical of the attention he gives to Avicennan natural philosophy in other parts of the volume, and his subsequent 
critique of aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of time should be read as a refutation. By contrast, al-Āmidī suggests and does 
not critique the kalām notion of time as the coordinate of events (Abkār, 3, 230), describing the position as ‘not 
unlikely’. Although this does not represent a strong commitment, it appears to be al-Āmidī’s preferred explanation. 
	 161	
If it was divisible, either [a] all of its parts would exist simultaneously, or [b] only some 
parts would exist in the present. 
The former [a] is impossible, since this [would entail] that the past [parts of time] were 
simultaneous with the present [parts], which is impossible. 
But in the case of [b] the parts [existent in the present] would either be divisible or 
indivisible. If [divisible], the disjunction [already conducted] would apply, entailing an 
impossible regress. 
If [indivisible], this contradicts [the philosophers’] principles, because time corresponds 
in its parts to the parts of motion, and motion corresponds in its parts to the parts of 
distance (al-masāfa), and the parts of distance according to [the philosophers] are 
infinitely conceptually divisible.407  
 
 This is an argument ad hominem against the existence of time. On the basis that the opponent 
will not concede that distances are ultimately indivisible, the proof forces the opponent to 
concede that time cannot exist either as a continuum or as a succession of instants. This being 
an exhaustive division of the possibilities for time’s existence, the opponent must concede that 
time does not objectively exist at all. This proof appears in the Shifā’, the first in Ibn Sīnā’s list of 
the ‘Skeptical Puzzles’ of those who deny time’s existence. 408 Its connection with the proof for 
the atom presented by al-Āmidī, just listed, is clear. On the basis that motion, time and distance 
must correspond to one another in continuity or discreteness, any argument which establishes 
either the ultimate indivisibility of the parts of motion or of time will also establish the 
indivisibility of distance, and thus the existence of an indivisible part of matter.  
Yet al-Āmidī’s use of the proof for the atom from the indivisibility of motion calls for further 
investigation. Nowhere does al-Āmidī make explicit the connection between establishing that 
time, should it exist, must be composed of indivisible parts, and this proof for the indivisible 
part. Although he acknowledges in his discussion of time that time, motion and distance must 
																																																						
407 Abkār, 3, 229. 
408 Tabī‘īyāt, II.10, 1, 220 (McGinnis’ translation). 
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correspond to one another in indivisibility, his use of the term distance (al-masāfa), rather than 
substance (jawhar) or matter (mādda) in this context rather dissociates his discussion of time 
from his treatment of matter’s divisibility. A clear contrast is in the thought of al-Rāzī, which 
suggests that al-Rāzī, and not al-Āmidī, may have been responsible for devising this proof from 
the indivisibility of motion for the indivisible part. The proof against time’s objective existence 
discussed above appears in several of al-Rāzī’s works, including the Muḥaṣṣal. Unlike al-Āmidī, 
in the final stage of his presentation of the argument, al-Rāzī refers to ‘the composition of 
bodies from a succession of points, which is [according to the philosophers] impossible’.409 This 
is a more explicit association of time’s divisibility with that of matter. 410	
Later in the Muḥaṣṣal, the proof for the atom just discussed in relation to al-Āmidī’s version 
appears.411 It is in the Maṭālib, however, where the connection between al-Rāzī’s discussions of 
time, and his subsequent proof for the atom based on the nature of time, is clearer. The first 
section of proofs for the atom in the Maṭālib is derived from ‘analysis of the states of motion and 
time’.412 In introducing this section, al-Rāzī is clear that if it is proven that motion is a 
succession of obtainments in space (ḥuṣūlāt muta‘āqiba), and that time is composed of successive 
instants (ānāt mutatāliyya), it can be established that body is likewise composed of indivisible 
parts.413 The first proof he presents in this section is precisely the proof used by al-Āmidī, 
detailed above.414 It seems likely that this proof was first devised by al-Rāzī in the context of his 
engagement with Ibn Sīnā’s discussions of continuity. Al-Āmidī has found it convincing and 
replicated it, without explicit association with its original context, nor mention of its probable 
source - indeed he claims not to have found this proof in the work of any other thinker. The 
proof for the atom which al-Āmidī considers demonstrative is thus cleft from the conceptual 
framework in which it finds its inspiration. This is typical of al-Āmidī’s approach to natural 
																																																						
409 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 131. 
410 Ibn Sīnā himself closely links discussions of the divisibility of time, motion, and matter: e.g. Ṭabī‘īyyāt, III.6, 
especially 2, 311; Ishārāt, II.5, 2, 144. 
411 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 165. 
412 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 29-46. 
413 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 29. 
414 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 30-32; c.f. Sharḥ, 2, 6-7. 
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philosophy in the Abkār. He tends to isolate problems and arguments because his investigations 
are conducted according to the parameters and conventions of classical kalām. 
 Proofs against the Atom 
Al-Āmidī concludes his discussion by listing, without refutation, no less than sixteen proofs 
against the atom.415 Their presentation is imprecise, and their ordering apparently random. For 
instance, the first and fifth proofs are almost identical. Proofs from a variety of sources are 
collated without reference to their original contexts.416 This suggests that al-Āmidī’s purpose is 
not critical engagement, but to demonstrate that considerable evidence exists which would 
undermine the existence of the atom. One brief example illustrates this point.  
Al-Āmidī lists Ibn Sīnā’s proofs against the atom without distinction among the other proofs 
listed. One is an innovative argument which is the main counter-atomistic proof in the Ishārāt, 
and the first of many in the Shifā’.417 The proof draws on Aristotle’s notion that an indivisible 
cannot possess distinct extremities. Ibn Sīnā writes that two atoms on either side of a third 
atom must either each have contact with the third atom at the same part of that third atom, or 
not. If they do, convergence is occurring, which is inconceivable, since it would mean that 
whatever the increase in the number of atoms, they could never create any magnitude. Yet if 
the points at which the two outside atoms contact the third atom are distinct, the third atom 
must be divisible (fig. 5). Al-Āmidī lists this proof in brief, and gives no counter-proof. He does 
not acknowledge its source. 
Figure 5. 
   
 
																																																						
415 Abkār, 3, 66-73. 
416 For instance, three of the proofs against the atom were developed by al-Naẓẓām in support of his doctrine of the 
leap (al-ṭafra), that is, that it is possible for a body in motion to traverse a distance without moving through each of 
its parts (see Dhanani, Physical Theory, 160-1).  
417 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, I.1, 2, 130-4; Ṭabī‘īyyāt, III.4, 2, 282-4. Shamsi names this proof ‘Ibn Sīnā’s Argument’ in recognition 
of the fact that it is not found before him (Shamsi, ‘Ibn Sīnā’s Argument’). 
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The outcome of al-Āmidī’s list is a sense of the mass of proof against the atom; their sheer 
number is double that of the ‘weak’ proofs for the atom refuted by al-Āmidī. This leads al-Āmidī 
to overt suspension of judgement (al-tawaqquf) over the question of matter’s divisibility. He 
writes: 
‘The final outcome of [this matter] is that these proofs necessarily contradict the proofs 
of the Orthodox, and [it is] necessary to suspend judgement on this question, following 
[the example of] a group of the most eminent theologians.’418 
It is unclear who the theologians in question are. However, there is a precedent for al-Āmidī’s 
suspension of judgement in the thought of al-Rāzī, whose discussions of atomism I have 
continually referenced. Al-Rāzī’s own stance on the indivisible part has evoked a variety of 
interpretations. Setia claims that even in his early philosophical works, al-Rāzī was critical of 
hylomorphism, and that by the time of writing his final work, the Maṭālib, al-Rāzī was an 
‘articulate, erudite and effective defender of atomism’.419 In discussion of proofs for atomism 
described as ‘weak’ by al-Āmidī, we have already come across al-Rāzī’s extensive elaborations of 
traditional proofs. It is easy to see where Setia draws support for his conclusion.420 Earlier 
scholars claim that he went through an initial stage of rejecting atomism, followed by a period 
of ambivalence, finally returning to a self-critical acceptance of atomism.421 Ibn Taymiyya 
claimed that he was simply confused!422 More recently Ibrahim has advanced the theory that al-
Rāzī’s apparent inclarity on this question actually reflects a broader philosophical methodology 
which denies that knowledge of the noumenal entities underlying natural phenomena is 
possible. Upon this reading, al-Rāzī rejects both hylomorphism and atomism on the basis that it 
																																																						
418 Abkār, 3, 73. 
419 Setia, ‘Atomism vs Hylomorphism,’ 113; and ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on Physics’, 169.  
420 However, Setia overlooks statements which express uncertainty. For instance, he quotes al-Rāzī’s division of ‘the 
space-occupying existent’ into body and indivisible part, but fails to cite the end of al-Rāzī’s sentence, where he adds 
‘according to those who affirm [the atom]’ (‘and man yaqūl bi-ithbātihi) (Setia, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on Physics’, 169; c.f. 
Maṭālib, 4, 9). 
421 E.g. Zarkan, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 425-7. Zarkan suggests that despite his various positions, belief in the atom was al-
Rāzī’s true opinion. A more recent assessment also arguing for al-Rāzī’s ultimate support for atomism is Atlaş’, ‘An 
Analysis and Editio Princeps’, 100-101. 
422 Darʼ taʻāruḍ al-ʻaql wa-l-naql, 1, 157-8; see Zarkan, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 425. 
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is not possible for humans to acquire knowledge of the nature of matter beyond the palpable, 
phenomenal body.423 A little known Rāzian text published by Shihadeh, entitled Risālat dhamm 
ladhdhāt al-dunyā, and which is his last work, quite explicitly records al-Rāzī’ suspension of 
judgement on the question of the divisibility of matter.424 In this work, al-Rāzī records a 
compelling proof against the existence of the atom (‘Ibn Sīnā’s proof’, discussed above), then his 
own original proof for the atom (related to a proof against time’s existence, also discussed 
above). He comments:  
These proofs are contradictory. And no satisfactory refutation can be found for either one. 
Yet we know that one [must be] true. So [the other] must contain a false premise, but our 
intellects instinctively affirm the veracity [of that premise], becoming convinced of it.425 
Al-Rāzī is making a broader point about the limitations of human intellect (discussed in relation 
to his doctrine of creation in the next chapter) but the implication is clear - he is not convinced 
one way or another about the nature of matter. Despite the unprecedentedly extensive 
evidence al-Rāzī develops for the atom, this does not indicate his acceptance of the doctrine. 
Rather, it is typical of his method of adducing evidence for a variety of positions.426 Al-Rāzī’s 
stance on the question of the indivisible part is clearly comparable with al-Āmidī’s. Suspension 
of judgement on the divisibility of matter is an unsurprising conclusion for two thinkers who 
have both been deeply influenced by the thought of Ibn Sīnā, and encountered his critique of 
atomism. 
Neverthless, al-Āmidī’s apparently favourable tone here in referring to the group of theologians 
who suspended judgement on the question of the atom is anomalous in relation to a large 
number of other references to al-Rāzī. This makes it seem unlikely that he is favourably 
claiming al-Rāzī’s influence on his thought.  One possibililty is that al-Āmidī is shirking 
																																																						
423 See Ibrahim, Freeing Philosophy, 411-7. 
424 See Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 11 for discussion of the date of the work.  
425 Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 255; and ‘Avicenna’s Corporeal Form’, 382, fn 80. 
426 See Shihadeh, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Commentary’, on al-Rāzī’s method in his commentary on the Ishārāt. This 
methodology also explains the approach of the Maṭālib.   
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responsibility for his own departure from Ash‘arī doctrine at this juncture, by claiming to be 
following the example of his intellectual rival. This is impossible to establish with certainty. 
There is no doubt that the suspension of judgement over matter’s divisibility marks a break 
with centuries of kalām doctrine, Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī alike.  Discussions between these schools 
on a wide spectrum of theological topics had long assumed the existence of the indivisible part. 
Abandonment of belief in its existence would touch on a variety of questions, including the 
nature of man, human agency, and the question of secondary causation. Concession to the 
continuity of matter would demand at least that the relevant theories be re-framed. For 
instance, the occasionalist doctrine assumes the existence of the atom in that each accident is 
re-created at each instant in each atom. However, this is not to say that the existence of the 
atom is indispensible to occasionalism. It is conceivable that the doctrine could be reworked on 
the assumption of the continuity of matter, since it is the nature of the relationship between 
matter and the characteristics inhering within it, and not the nature of matter per se, upon 
which the occasionalist doctrine is premised. In fact, the doctrine of the indivisible part, despite 
providing the framework within which many classical doctrines were expressed, turns out not 
to be inherent to the doctrines themselves. Al-Āmidī’s uncertainty, though clearly a break from 
Ash‘arī custom, need not compromise creedal tenets of that tradition. 
4.ii.c Immaterial Substances 
Another area in which al-Āmidī’s thought exhibits the influence of Ibn Sīnā’s is the question of 
immaterial substance, the theological importance of which I have repeatedly stressed. It is clear 
from al-Āmidī’s primary definition of jawhar, namely the space-occupying existent, that 
immaterial substances have no place in his ontology. In his discussion of the space-occupying 
properties of substance, al-Āmidī expresses this by describing space-occupation as an essential 
attribute (ṣifat al-dhāt) of substance, claiming that it is impossible for us to conceive of a 
substance without conceiving of its space-occupation. 427 He then cites an objection to his 
association of substance with space-occupation. The hypothetical opponent raises the 
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philosophical view that possible existents also comprise substances which do not occupy space, 
such as intellects and celestial and human souls. The existence of such beings would undermine 
al-Āmidī’s view of substance, and must be disproven. Thus, al-Āmidī sets up a dialectical 
scenario in which we expect him to defend his notion of substance by refuting the existence of 
immaterial substances. 
Al-Āmidī describes the question of immaterials as having ‘perplexed the greatest theologians, 
and the most well-versed people, such that some were unable to respond’. He also claims that 
‘some have confused [this issue] in a manner which is not convincing to those who obtain 
[truth]’.428 Al-Rāzī is a possible target of al-Āmidī’s critique here. In his Maṭālib, al-Rāzī is highly 
critical of the theologians, writing that though they deny non-space occupying possible 
existents, they present no proof for their claim. He points out that this compromises their proof 
for creation ex nihilo (namely, the proof from accidents), by which they establish only that 
material existents are temporally originated.429  
Al-Āmidī presents two proofs proffered by Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī theologians against 
immaterials, describing them both as ‘weak’. The first argues that it is impossible to prove by 
rational or scriptural proofs that immaterial substances exist. There is no evidence which 
compels one to believe in their existence, nor is their existence self-evident. If the existence of 
such substances cannot be proven, it must be the case that they do not exist. This proof is an 
argument from ignorance. Al-Āmidī describes it as an argument which ‘denies [the existence of] 
the object of proof on the basis of absence of proof for it’ (nafī al-madlūl l-intifā’ dalīlihi). He 
writes that he has already refuted the validity of this type of proof, referring his reader back to 
the epistemological part of his work.430  
																																																						
428 Abkār, 3, 28.  
429 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 12. 
430 Abkār, 3, 28. The section to which he refers is 1, 208-210, within a broader section ‘On that which they believed to 
be convincing proofs, but which are not’ (Abkār, 1, 207-214). See Shihadeh, ‘The Argument from Ignorance’, who 
shows that al-Juwaynī was the first to reject the argument from ignorance, and that al-Rāzī declared it a fallacy in the 
epistemological review in his Nihāya. 
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Having deemed the existing proofs deficient, al-Āmidī then makes a further reference to ‘a 
certain great [theologian]’, who introduced ‘confusion and fruitless discussions’ with respect to 
this question. Al-Āmidī writes that he will avoid such discussions in order to ‘save time’ by not 
mentioning that which has no benefit.431 His own conclusion on the topic is rather uncertain. He 
writes that, as classical Ash‘arīs have rightly said, there is no rational proof which compels one 
to uphold the existence of immaterial substances. That for which there is no rational proof 
cannot be affirmed. That is to say that if the existence of immaterial substances cannot be 
disproven, at least it can neither be proven. This is tantamount to a suspension of judgement 
over the existence of such beings.432  His final word on the subject within this section speaks of 
his own uncertainty. He admits that others might have something else to contribute in 
disproving immaterial substances, and advises his reader to endeavour to solve this problem 
(al-ijtihād fī ḥall al-ishkāl).433 It seems clear that al-Āmidī has no confidence either in previous 
attempts, or in his own, to disprove the existence of immaterial substances. 
Al-Āmidī does have more confidence in his ability to refute the philosophers’ proofs for the 
existence of specific immaterial substances. He refers the reader to the section in which he has 
refuted the philosophers’ belief ‘in a creator other than God’.434 This section is his refutation of 
the emanationist cosmology. Here, al-Āmidī opposes the notion that the world emanates from 
God via a series of immaterial intellects. In his view, all existents are created directly by God. 
Thus, no immaterial substances operating in the realm between God and material existence 
need be posited. This represents one aspect of his defence of the comprehensiveness of his own 
ontology of God-Atom-Accident. However, nowhere does al-Āmidī disprove the existence of 
immaterial substance per se.  
In general, al-Āmidī’s discussions of substance in the Abkār reveal overt and staunch opposition 
to Avicennan philosophy, but also the influence of that philosophy on his thought. Even in his 
two definitions of substance, a tension between the two thought paradigms is present, but not 
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432 Abkār, 3, 29. 
433 Abkār, 3, 29. 
434 Abkār, 2, 254-260.  
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fully explored. For in his preliminaries, and in response to Ibn Sīnā, al-Āmidī defines jawhar as 
the ‘self-subsisting possible existent’, whilst in his main discussion of substance, his definition is 
‘the space-occupying existent’. The former definition demonstrates the centrality of Ibn Sīnā’s 
possible/necessary distinction to al-Āmidī’s thought; the latter represents his rejection of Ibn 
Sīnā’s inclusion of immaterial beings within the category ‘substance’.   
The fact that al-Āmidī does not explore the relation between these two definitions is indicative 
of a more general tendency in the work. He has a strongly dialectical approach to the definition 
of substance, informed by opponents old and new. Yet he also fails to express certainty over the 
exhaustiveness of the material substance-accident dichotomy. We will see in Chapter 5 how this 
threatens al-Āmidī’s applications of Ash‘arī physical theory in defence of creation ex nihilo. 
Suffice it for now to observe the deep impression of Avicennan philosophy on al-Āmidī’s 
conception of substance, despite overt opposition to the philosophical notion of substance 
presented in his preliminaries.   
4.iii Al-Āmidī’s Conception of Accidents 
Like the term jawhar, the term translated ‘accident’ (‘arḍ) features in both falsafa and kalām. In 
this section I consider al-Āmidī’s approach to the discussion of accidents, arguing that he is 
motivated by his commitment to the letter of classical Ash‘arī doctrine (again in opposition to 
Avicennan natural philosophy), and by underlying opposition to the methods of al-Rāzī. 
4.iii.a Framing the Discussion of Accidents 
We have seen that in his preliminary discussion, al-Āmidī presents the philosophical division of 
existents according to the kalām substance-accident dichotomy. In the same section, al-Āmidī 
presents many of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical divisions under the category ‘accidents’.435 These 
include quantity (kamm), position (waḍ‘), relation (muḍāf), quality (kayf), where (ayn), when 
(matā), having (mulk), action (an yaf‘al) and being acted upon (an yanfa‘il). Within each of these 
divisions, al-Āmidī includes sub-divisions which together account for the characteristics and 
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behaviours of beings. In concluding his brief summary, al-Āmidī observes that together with 
substance, these constitute ‘all genera of possible existents’ according to the philosophers, and 
advises the reader to consult his Daqā’iq al-ḥaqā’iq or Rumūz al-kunūz.436 The genera listed by al-
Āmidī as classes of accidents are the Aristotelian philosophers’ Categories.437 This is in keeping 
with Ibn Sīnā’s description of the nine Categories other than substance itself as accidental 
(rather than substantial) characteristics of body.438 By describing these as accidents, without 
reference to the Categories, al-Āmidī once more renders Avicennan philosophy readily 
comparable with Ash‘arī physical theory. The purpose is to facilitate refutation of that 
competing philosophical framework. As in his refutation of the philosophical understanding of 
substance, al-Āmidī selects a number of points within the philosophers’ understanding of 
accidents for critique.439 Having done so, he proceeds to his main discussions of substance and 
accident, conducted according to the topics conventionally covered within works of Ash‘arī 
kalām. The overall impact is to dismiss Avicennan natural philosophy from the outset, clearing 
the way for Ash‘arī physical theory. 
4.iii.b That accidents have no endurance   
In order to characterise al-Āmidī’s approach to the doctrine of accidents, I consider his 
discussion of two key components of the classical Ash‘arī doctrine. The first is the doctrine that 
accidents have no endurance (baqā’). The reason for selecting this discussion is its significant 
theological applications within Ash‘arī kalām. One major application is in defence of 
occasionalism; another is within the proof from accidents. Al-Āmidī is overt about the 
theological importance of the belief: 
																																																						
436 Abkār, 3, 10-11. Al-Āmidī always cites these two works of philosophy, and never the Nūr or Kashf. This is probably 
because the latter two works do not evidence commitment to kalām doctrine. 
437 For Ibn Sīnā’s list of categories, see ‘Uyūn al-ḥikma, 2-3; for extensive discussion of many of the Categories, Ilāhiyyāt, 
III, and the section on ‘al-Maqūlāt’ in the Logic of the Shifā’, though note that the Shifā’ is the only work in which Ibn 
Sīnā discusses the Categories within the logic, given his contention against Aristotle that the Categories have no 
useful function within the logical process (see Gutas, ‘Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition’, 265-267). 
438 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, III.1, 71-73. 
439 Abkār, 3, 13-16.  
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The doctrine of the rightly-minded Ash‘arīs (ahl al-ḥaqq min al-ashā‘ira) is that all 
accidents are without endurance. Rather, they are constantly renewed and God - 
exalted - has power to create every single one at any point of time he wills without [any 
external determining factor] specifying one time over another. And [our doctrine is] 
that [the accidents] he created at [any given] time, he could have created after that 
time or before it.440  
Positions on the endurance of accidents among mutakallimūn ranged from the extreme 
occasionalism of al-Naẓẓām, who seems to have held that both accidents and the bodies in 
which they inhere cease to exist at every moment, through to belief in the endurance of certain 
classes of accidents and the non-endurance of others. The view that some accidents endure was 
held by most Baṣran Mu‘tazila, and is reported by al-Ash‘arī in the name of Abū l-Hudhayl and 
al-Jubbā’ī. 441 We have seen that al-Ash‘arī’s view is in between: atoms endure by an accident of 
endurance (baqā’), but no accidents endure. The Baghdādī Mu‘tazilī view concurred with the 
Ash‘arī opinion.442  
Al-Āmidī identifies al-Naẓẓām and al-Ka‘bī with the doctrine of the non-endurance of all 
accidents. He defends it against ‘the philosophers’, who held that all accidents besides time and 
motion endure, and against individual Mu‘tazila. Specifically, he identifies al-Jubbā’ī, his son 
(Abū Hāshim), and Abū l-Hudhayl as having held that some classes of accidents, namely colours, 
tastes and scents, endure, whilst others, including will, knowledge, sound and speech, do not.  
Having briefly listed these views, al-Āmidī presents three ‘weak’ (ḍa‘īf) proofs for the Ash‘arī 
doctrine, followed by a proof from Abū Hāshim against the endurance of the accidents of sound 
and will. He refutes them all. One proof for the non-endurance of accidents is as follows: 
postulate an atom possessing an accident of whiteness. All agree that it is within God’s power to 
																																																						
440 Abkār, 3, 164. On the question of matter’s endurance, al-Āmidī endorses al-Bāqillānī’s view that matter endures 
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(Abkār, 1, 440-449, 3, 36-38 and 164-175). 
441 Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 2, 47-48; see Dhanani, Physical Theory, 43-47. 
442 Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 2, 46-47. Al-Ash‘arī specifically identifies Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (head of the Baghdādī 
Mu‘tazila, d. 319/931), Ibn ‘Alī al-Shaṭawī (d. 296/909), and Ibn Malik al-Aṣbahānī (d. ?) with this view.  
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create a second accident of whiteness at the second instant of the atom’s existence. But if the 
initial accident of whiteness endured beyond the first instant of its existence, it would be 
impossible for God to create a second accident. This is because it is impossible for two identical 
accidents (mithlayn) to inhere in a single substrate at a single moment. Since nothing is 
impossible for God, the first accident must cease to exist after the first instant of its existence. 
Al-Āmidī’s brief refutation is as follows: when God creates the second accident of whiteness, it 
must be by causing the first accident to cease to exist. It is not possible for God to create a 
second accident without destroying the first, because as the opponent has said, no two 
homogenous accidents can exist in a single substrate at the same moment. So we agree that 
God, if he creates a second accident, causes the first to cease to exist. However, the possibility 
that the first accident ceases to exist (should God act to this effect) does not necessitate the 
impossibility of its endurance. Thus, this method fails to prove that accidents necessarily cease 
to exist after the first instant. Al-Āmidī subsequently provides his own proof, an extensive 
disjunction ad absurdum the detail of which need not concern us. 443 What is important for our 
purposes is to observe al-Āmidī’s endorsement of one of the most distinguishing features of 
classical Ash‘arī physical theory, with full regard to its theological significance. There is no 
indication of uncertainty brought about by Ibn Sīnā’s opposing doctrine of natures. With regard 
to his method, we observe again al-Āmidī’s insistence on the deficiency of previous arguments 
for a doctrine which he upholds, and his attempt to provide a proof which he considers 
superior. 
4.iii.c That substances cannot exist devoid of accidents  
The doctrine that substances cannot exist devoid of accidents is another premise of the proof 
from accidents for creation ex nihilo. This section reads like a compendium of defective proofs.444 
Al-Āmidī ostensibly supports al-Ash‘arī’s view that atoms must always bear an accident from 
each class, or its contrary. These classes include the accidents of coming-to-be in space (the 
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akwān), the accidents responsible for sensible qualities of substances (their maḥsūsāt), and 
accidents in living things accompanying the accident of life.445 Most generally, this doctrine is 
defended against ‘the eternalists’ (al-dahriyya), who according to al-Āmidī claim that substances 
can exist free from accidents, in accordance with their view of the pre-eternity of the world’s 
formless matter.446    
Inevitably, al-Āmidī’s other opponents are Mu‘tazila, holding various views, including the belief 
attributed to the Mu‘tazilī al-Ṣālihī (d. end of C9th), as to the Dahriyya, that substances can be 
free from all accidents.447 Al-Āmidī claims that the Baṣran Mu‘tazilī view is that substances 
cannot be free from accidents of space-occupation, but can be devoid of other classes of 
accidents. By contrast, according to al-Āmidī, the view of the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila is that 
substances cannot be free from an accident of colour, but that they may be free of other classes. 
In reality, there were variations within the Baghdādī and Baṣrān schools on this matter, many 
recorded by Ibn Mattawayh. He personally holds that ‘it is only impossible for substance to be 
free from [an accident of] space-occupation (innamā nuḥīl wujūdahu ‘ariyyan ‘an al-kawn)’, but not 
from other accidents. However, he claims that both the Baṣrān figurehead, al-Jubbā’ī, and the 
Baghdādī leader, Abū l-Qāsim, believed that atoms could not be free from any class or its 
contrary. By contrast, the Baṣran Abū Hāshim held that atoms could be free from accidents 
including colours and tastes on condition that they never possessed such accidents, but that 
once accidents of colour and taste inhered within the atoms, these would only be removed by 
the inherence of their contrary or by the destruction of their substrate. 448 Al-Āmidī thus 
reduces Baghdādī and Baṣran views to a simple dichotomy. Yet none of the Mu‘tazila appear to 
																																																						
445 See Sabra, ‘The Simple Ontology’, 74-76 on accidents according to the mutakallimūn. 
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power to create an accident-free substance); al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 205. Al-Ṣālihī’s position stems from his extreme 
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atoms devoid of accidents (see Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, 46; Goodman, ‘Ghazālī and the Philosophers’, 61-64). 
448 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadkhira, 1, 52; c.f. al-Nīsābūrī, al-Masā’il, 23-57. 
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have held (as al-Āmidī claims that the Baghdādīs did) that atoms could ever be free from 
accidents of space-occupation. His representation is flawed, perhaps deliberately.449  
In any case, al-Āmidī does not discuss their implications of each view. Rather, he deals with 
several invalid proofs against the generalised position that atoms can be free from some or all 
classes of accidents. His priority is to defend the doctrine that atoms cannot be accident-free. 
Al-Āmidī’s favoured proof is as follows: postulate two atoms. These must either be joined to or 
separated from one another.450 Aggregation (ijtimā‘) and separation (iftirāq) both determine the 
space-occupation of an atom. Attributes of space-occupation are accidents. The fact of an 
atom’s existing in a particular place (ikhtiṣāṣuhu fī ḥayz) is an existing attribute (ṣifa wujūdiyya). 
Existent attributes are accidents. On this basis, al-Āmidī concludes that atoms can never be 
completely free from accidents.451 This he describes as a proof against the Dahriyya, al-Ṣāliḥī, 
and the (purported) view of the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila.452 He defends the proof extensively.  
Despite ostensibly upholding the classical Ash‘arī view that atoms must always contain an 
accident from each class of accidents, nowhere does al-Āmidī specifically defend this position. 
This indicates that his primary intention is to defend the notion that all atoms must contain at 
least one accident - all that is required to establish the temporal origination of atoms.453 There is 
a comparison to be drawn between al-Āmidī’s and al-Rāzī’s approaches. In his Muḥaṣṣal, al-Rāzī 
takes the stance of overtly disagreeing with classical Ash‘arīs. According to him, bodies can be 
devoid of accidents of colour, taste and scents. By contrast, accidents from which bodies cannot 
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neither joined together nor separated (Abkār, 3, 46). 
451 Al-Juwaynī uses this proof specifically to refute the doctrine of the dahriyya (Shāmil, 205-6). 
452 Abkār, 3, 46-7. This proof is often used to establish the existence of accidents. 
453 Towards the end of his discussion, al-Āmidī makes explicit the importance of the doctine that atoms cannot be 
devoid of accidents, writing that those who claim that atoms can be free from accidents will have difficulty 
establishing the temporal origination of atoms (Abkār, 3, 50-51).  
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be devoid are those which are not removed except by the inherence of their contrary. For 
instance, the accident of motion remains but for the inherence of the accident of rest. 
According to al-Rāzī, accidents of colour, taste, and so on, do not require the inherence of their 
contrary for their removal. Indeed, such accidents are not required at all: here he points to the 
colourlessness of air as proof that bodies can be devoid of accidents of colour.454 By contrast, al-
Āmidī ostensibly defends the classical Ash‘arī doctrine, yet without actually demonstrating that 
substance cannot be devoid of any class of accidents. This is typical of his conservative 
approach. Al-Āmidī presents himself as defender of orthodox Ash‘arism. Given what we know of 
al-Rāzī’s overt departures from aspects of the school’s doctrine, al-Āmidī may be reacting to his 
intellectual rival by overtly upholding all the tenets of their common school’s physical theory. 
Al-Āmidī’s discussion of accidents is marked by conservatism and dialecticism. He upholds all 
the tenets of the classical Ash‘arī doctrine of accidents, confronts a variety of opponents, and 
extensively defends the proof he upholds against numerous hypothetical and real opponents. 
The theological significance of the physical theories at hand are also in full view in al-Āmidī’s 
analysis, and seem obviously to motivate their staunch defence. In his theory of accidents, then 
(in contrast with his theory of substance), there is little evidence of an Avicennan influence. 
This may be because Ibn Sīnā nowhere directly addresses kalām ideas on accidents. Whilst in his 
discussions of substance, al-Āmidī’s deep familiarity with (and past support for) Ibn Sīnā’s 
refutation of atomism clearly provokes uncertainty, here in the discussion of accidents, Ibn 
Sīnā’s alternative explanation of the non-substantial phenomena of nature has not impinged on 
al-Āmidī’s defence of classical Ash‘arī physical theory. 
4.iv Al-Āmidī’s Conception of Body 
Of the Abkār’s thirteen discussions under the heading ‘On the Body and its Properties’, no less 
than nine are exclusively devoted to refutation of falsafī doctrines, while the remaining four 
incorporate refutations of relevant philosophical views. 455 For the purposes of this chapter, I 
																																																						
454 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 189. 
455 Doctrines which receive sustained refutation include for instance: the philosophical doctrine of the elements 
(‘anāṣir) (Abkār, 3, 130-133; c.f. Ibn Sīnā, Al-kawn wa-l-fasad, 6, 122-132; Ilāhiyyāt, 9.5, 334-338; and ‘Thesis Two’ on the 
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have selected just one discussion, namely, the definition of body.  This is because al-Āmidī 
engages Ibn Sīnā’s conception of body here in a manner which illuminates the relationship 
between his encounter with Avicennan natural philosophy and his approach to classical Ash‘arī 
physical theory. Al-Āmidī’s treatment of Neo-platonic natural philosophy, however, merits 
further research in its own right, and the vast space occupied by anti-philosophical discussions 
must not go unobserved. 456 I argue that in his discussions of body, al-Āmidī is primarily 
motivated by opposition to Ibn Sīnā, but that his earlier suspension of judgement over the 
indivisibility of matter renders his defence of the Ash‘arī definition of body ineffective. 
Al-Āmidī’s definition of body occurs in context of his refutation of Ibn Sīnā’s hylomorphic 
conception of body. He cites Ibn Sīnā’s definition of body in the name of ‘the philosophers’.457 
The definition is: ‘that in which one can posit three dimensions perpendicular to each other’ 
(i.e. length, breadth, and depth).458 This definition isolates body qua body from the actual 
dimensions present in particular bodies, by referring to posited dimensions. It intends thus to 
define the essence of corporeity, rather than to describe the phenomenal body. It also reflects 
Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine that body is constituted of two internal principles. One is Prime Matter (al-
hayūla al-ūla). This principle is devoid of all corporeity. It is the passive recipient of the second, 
active principle, namely Corporeal Form (al-ṣūra al-jismiyya). Only together do these principles 
constitute body. That is to say that there is no corporeal substrate underlying palpable bodies; 
																																																						
four elements in his al-Qanūn fī l-ṭibb, 34-56 ); the view that all bodies contain a natural principle of motion (Abkār, 3, 
123-125 and see Ibn Sīnā, Ṭabī‘īyyāt, IV.12, 1, 485-496); and the view that a physical realm beyond the present universe 
is impossible, based on the impossibility of void space (Abkār, 3, 146-147; c.f. Ibn Sīnā, Ṭabī‘īyyāt, II.8, 1, 177-209).  
456 A brief example illustrates the general nature of these discussions.  In refuting a natural principle of motion for 
bodies, al-Āmidī adduces the classical Ash‘arī position on motion. He argues that any repulsion (madāfi‘) or 
downward inclination (thiql) observed in natural bodies results from the creation of the power (khalq al-qudra) to 
remain or to move, and not from anything internal to the body (Abkār, 3, 118). He thus externalises all observable 
forces acting on natural bodies. This is typical of his approach in this section, where defence of Ash‘arī occasionalism 
is prioritised.  
457 Somewhat disingenuously, al-Āmidī claims that the definition is one upon which ‘the philosophers agreed’ (Abkār, 
3, 82). It is not the case that al-Āmidī was unaware of alternatives to Ibn Sīnā’s definition of body, found for instance 
in the works of Arabic Aristotelian predecessors such as al-Farābī’s Kitāb iḥṣā’ al-‘ulūm, 93-94, where he defines body 
as a substance constituted of component substances of matter and form, and in the form of challenges to Ibn Sīnā’s 
views from later philosophers including Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (Mu‘tabar, 2, 10–12; and 3, 195–6 and 202–3; see 
Shihadeh, ‘Avicenna’s Corporeal Form’, 369-370) and al-Rāzī (e.g. Sharḥ, 2, 16-19). This tendency to stereotype the 
views of the philosophers is observed throughout the Abkār. 
458 Abkār, 3, 82; c.f. Ibn Sīnā, Ṭabī‘īyyāt, I.2, 1, 13. 
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rather, an entirely incorporeal substrate is imbued with particular forms for the creation of 
particular bodies. Corporeity itself is the combination of these two principles.459 In his 
exposition of this doctrine, al-Āmidī presents his version of the proof for Prime Matter and 
Corporeal Form found in Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt.460 As Shihadeh shows, this had already become the 
most often debated of Ibn Sīnā’s proofs for Prime Matter. I shall present al-Āmidī’s simplified 
version of the original. 
The original proof is premised on Ibn Sīnā’s denial of matter’s indivisibility. The infinite 
divisibility of matter is proven, in the Ishārāt, as a preliminary to the proof for Prime Matter. 
Nowhere does Ibn Sīnā imply that the divisibility of matter is known immediately. Rather, he 
states that his reader has ‘come to know’, through proofs, that matter is infinitely divisible.461 
However, al-Āmidī does not explicitly acknowledge that the divisibility of matter is a premise of 
Ibn Sīnā’s proof for Prime Matter. This point is important for al-Āmidī’s subsequent refutation 
of the proof. 
Al-Āmidī has his opponent simply assert that body is susceptible to discontinuity (infiṣāl) and 
division (inqisām). He then presents the following disjunction: that within the body which is 
susceptible to discontinuity is either a) the dimensions of the body, or b) something other than 
the body’s dimensions. It cannot be a) the dimensions of the body, because if the body is 
actually subjected to discontinuity and division, these dimensions do not remain, since 
dimensions express continuity. Thus, that which is susceptible to divisibility and discontinuity 
must be (b) something other than the dimensions of the body. This is matter (mādda), the 
material substrate of body. The dimensions by which bodies are differentiated from one 
another are imbued by Corporeal Form. Thus, body is the composite of matter and form.462 
																																																						
459 Shihadeh, in ‘Avicenna’s Corporeal Form’, gives the first extended study of Ibn Sīnā’s proof for Prime Matter. For 
explanation of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine, see especially 366-369. 
460 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, I.6, 2, 145-150; see Shihadeh, ‘Avicenna’s Corporeal Form’, 375-378. Shihadeh also discusses 
alternative proofs for Prime Matter found in the Shifā’, Najāt and ‘Uyūn al-ḥikma (370-375). 
461 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, I.6, 2, 145; for the proof of this doctrine, Ishārāt, I.1-4, 2, 130-143. 
462 Abkār, 3, 82-83.  
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There are strong precedents for the disputation and development of Ibn Sīnā’s proof for Prime 
Matter. Shihadeh has shown how Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt proof for this doctrine was critiqued by al-
Mas‘ūdī in his Shukūk, likely inspired by Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s earlier critique in his 
Mu‘tabar. Both thinkers object to the notion that that within the body which is receptive to 
discontinuity (Ibn Sīnā’s Prime Matter) must be something other than that which is continuous 
(his Corporeal Form). For both thinkers, that which is receptive to discontinuity is corporeal 
matter, which remains unchanged despite alterations to its shape and dimensions brought 
about by changing forms.463 Particular bodies are the combination of corporeal matter and 
particular forms, but corporeity itself is inherent to matter. Al-Rāzī takes up the discussion in 
his commentary on the Ishārāt, where as well as highlighting deficiencies in Ibn Sīnā’s proof, he 
devises an alternative proof for Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine from a different premise, namely the unity 
of phenomenal bodies.464 It is clear from both the Nūr and the Kashf that al-Āmidī was aware of 
these precedents. In his treatment of Prime Matter in the Nūr, al-Āmidī addresses the objections 
of Shaykh al-yahūd, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, to Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of Prime Matter.465 In his 
Kashf, he addresses al-Rāzī’s critique of the proof in his Sharḥ, and presents a defence of Ibn 
Sīnā. He fails, in the Kashf, to represent or respond to al-Rāzī’s proposed alternative proof, 
which is typical of the project of the work, where he presents al-Rāzī as a critic of Ibn Sīnā.466  
Despite this extensive background, it is striking that in his Abkār, al-Āmidī completely overlooks 
previous engagements with the proof and takes his own, dialectical approach to undermining 
Ibn Sīnā’s conception of body. Specifically, al-Āmidī rejects Ibn Sīnā’s proof for Prime Matter. 
Firstly, he concedes that dimensions, when actually subjected to discontinuity and division, 
cease to be dimensions. However, he does not agree that this entails that corporeity is other 
than the dimensions of body. This is because, against Ibn Sīnā, he argues that upon the 
																																																						
463 Al-Mas‘ūdī, Shukūk, 197-199; see Shihadeh, ‘Avicenna’s Proof’, 378-381; c.f. al-Baghdādī, Mu‘tabar, 2, 10-12 and 3, 
195-6.  
464 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 19; see Shihadeh, ‘Avicenna’s Proof’, 379-393. The proof is original and interesting, but beyond 
the scope of this chapter, since al-Āmidī does not engage al-Rāzī’s discussions here. 
465 Nūr, 3, 13-14; see fn 331 above. 
466 Kashf, 2, 548-551. Al-Āmidī is typically scathing of al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā, claiming that al-Rāzī has shown 
‘ignorance’, overlooking Ibn Sīnā’s clear intention (548).  
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destruction of the dimensions of body, it ceases to be body. That is to say, he does not uphold 
the notion that there must be a separate principle in body which is inherently subject to 
divisibility and discontinuity. This is because he does not hold to Ibn Sīnā’s notion that matter 
is infinitely divisible. Rather, in his view, a dimension is nothing other than an aggregate of 
atoms producing a continuous body (‘andanā, lā ma‘nā li-l-ba‘d ghayr ittiṣāl al-jawāhir al-farda). 
Upon the decomposition of the aggregate, dimensions cease, and so does corporeity.467 
I pointed earlier to the fact that al-Āmidī fails to make the doctrine that matter is infinitely 
divisible an explicit premise of his opponent’s argument. Only in the course of his refutation 
does he address this point, treating it as an assumption, and presenting the doctrine of matter’s 
indivisibility as a counter-argument. That is to say that al-Āmidī fails to take Ibn Sīnā on his 
own terms. He does not contest Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between infinitely divisible matter and 
corporeal dimension. Rather, he simply denies matter’s infinite divisibility. Al-Āmidī here and 
elsewhere avoids serious engagement with the alternative conception of matter inherent to Ibn 
Sīnā’s conception of body, preferring an approach which pits the classical Ash‘arī view of body 
against Ibn Sīnā’s. 
It is within the context of this refutation of Ibn Sīnā that al-Āmidī gives his own definition of 
body, namely, ‘the aggregate’ (al-mu’talif), with reference to its being a composite of indivisible 
parts. This is the classical Ash‘arī definition, and as al-Āmidī points out earlier in a preliminary 
discussion, also the normal lexical usage.468 One obvious issue here is that, just two sections 
previously, al-Āmidī suspended judgement over the question of the divisibility of matter. This 
seriously compromises his argument against Ibn Sīnā’s view of body, and also his own 
definition of body. Although he embraces the classical Ash‘arī definition of body, he has not 
fully embraced the doctrine of the indivisible part upon which it is premised. This creates 
weakness in his physical theory. 
																																																						
467 Abkār, 3, 86. 
468 Abkār, 3, 79-81.  
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Again, an illuminating contrast is with the equivalent discussion in al-Rāzī’s Maṭālib, where he 
evaluates the philosophical opinion, particularly critiquing its claim to define the essence of 
body. In conclusion, al-Rāzī suggests that a definition of body should not attempt to ascertain 
its essence, but refer to what is observable in particular bodies. He suggests a modified version 
of the philosophical definition, namely ‘the body is the expression (‘ibāra) of this mass, and this 
thickness, and one of its characteristics is that three perpendicular dimensions can be obtained 
within it’.469 This conclusion better accords with a suspension of judgement over the 
indivisibility of matter. Neither hylomorphism nor atomism are implied by a definition of body 
which relies on reference to body as a phenomenon observable through particular bodies. 
In his definition of body, al-Āmidī supports the classical Ash‘arī conception of the nature of the 
physical world. Yet far more of his discussion is devoted to refuting erroneous views, and 
particularly Ibn Sīnā’s conception of corporeity, than to exploring the implications of his own 
definition. Al-Āmidī does not acknowledge the inherent tension between his uncertainty over 
matter’s divisibility, and his definition of body as the aggregate of indivisibles. In the context of 
the thesis, this finding is significant, since it demonstrates one aspect of the outcome of the 
conflicting influences on al-Āmidī’s thought. It suggests that a greater dynamism than al-
Āmidī’s was required to successfully deal with issues, such as the doubt cast on the doctrine of 
the indivisible part, which arise at the encounter of Ash‘arism with Avicennan natural 
philosophy.  
5. Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to establish the extent and nature of al-Āmidī’s adherence to 
classical Ash‘arī  physical theory, as a case study of his mode of Ash‘arism. Al-Āmidī begins, in 
the Nūr, without sympathy to the tradition of Ash‘arism, manifested in his support for 
Avicennan hylomorphism and his outright opposition to a doctrine which is a hallmark of 
																																																						
469 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 15-8; c.f. Ibrahim, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’, 411-417. Unlike al-Āmidī, al-Rāzī is explicit about the 
premises of different positions on the nature of body: ‘investigation into the… definitions of body reverts to [the 
question of] whether the body is composed of indivisible parts’ (Maṭālib, 6, 9). 
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classical kalām, the existence of the atom. The Rumūz is a tantalisingly brief work which is an 
experiment in the accommodation of philosophy within a broader framework of commitment 
to the core doctrines of classical kalām. In it, we witness a kind of theology the approach and 
methods of which are alien to the paradigms of classical Ash‘arism. Ash‘arī  physical theory 
does not feature as part of the theological project of the work. Avicennan natural philosophy 
receives general support, and the kalām doctrine of the indivisible part is treated with 
ambivalence at the most. Despite the brevity of the work, the way in which it disintegrates the 
classical Ash‘arī  connection between physical theory and major doctrines such as the existence 
of God represents important background to the approach evidenced in the Abkār. 
Paradoxical trends can be observed in al-Āmidī’s approach to the reception of Ash‘arī physical 
theory in that work. The most obvious feature of al-Āmidī’s approach to Ash‘arī atomism is his 
prevailing support for the doctrine as a whole. Substance, accident and body are all defined 
according to classical Ash‘arī definitions. Substance is ‘the space-occupying existent’, accident 
the transient characteristic inhering within it and determining its configuration and behaviour. 
Body is ‘the aggregate’. Moreover, the discussions supporting the Ash‘arī conceptions of 
substance, accident and body are formulated in overt opposition to the doctrines of opponents 
of the Ash‘arīs, primarily the Mu‘tazila and the philosophers. Indeed, the natural philosophical 
doctrines of those whom al-Āmidī groups together as ‘the philosophers’ feature much more 
prominently than in classical Ash‘arī works, and yet, as in the works of his predecessors, these 
doctrines appear as a set of anti-Orthodox beliefs to be subjected to robust refutation. There is 
no trace of overt concession to any Avicennan or other philosophical belief about the nature of 
the physical world.  
However, in key areas of physical theory, al-Āmidī has been influenced by such beliefs, though 
the influence is not in the form of appropriation of philosophical doctrines. Rather, it is a 
negative influence. Engagement with Avicennan natural philosophical discussions leads al-
Āmidī to deep uncertainty over doctrines traditionally considered fundamental to Ash‘arī 
physical theory. His suspension of judgement over the existence of an indivisible part of matter 
results from his exposure to Ibn Sīnā’s extended refutation of atomism, as evidenced in his own 
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philosophical works. His explicit hesitation over the existence of immaterial beings also reflects 
the prevalence of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of substance in al-Āmidī’s milieu and in his own thought. 
The suspension of judgement on both questions is far from insignificant. Al-Āmidī’s failure to 
establish the indivisibility of matter creates incoherence in his subsequent definition of body as 
‘the aggregate’, whilst his uncertainty over immaterial beings calls into question the 
comprehensiveness of the Ash‘arī division of existents, as well as threatening his use of the 
proof from accidents, as we shall see in the next chapter. There we will also see that in his final 
work of kalām, Ghāyat al-marām, al-Āmidī avoids all discussion of Ash‘arī physical theory. 
Furthermore, he explicitly acknowledges, in that work, the problematic implications of his 
inability to disprove the existence of immaterials. It will thus become increasingly clear that al-
Āmidī’s difficulties in the reception of Ash‘arī physical theory are of no little consequence for 
his theological approach. 
More broadly, al-Āmidī has been influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s conception of Physics as a science 
separate from metaphysics and theology. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, al-Āmidī is 
influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and necessary of existence to the 
extent that it replaces the eternal-temporally originated dichotomy of classical Ash‘arism 
within his thought. For this reason, physical theory is no longer integral to the defence of God’s 
existence, and therefore, can be presented as a distinct subject. Perhaps equally significantly, 
al-Āmidī’s driving opposition to the philosophers in this work is also a motive for his 
presentation of physical theory as an independent field. By styling physical theory thus, al-
Āmidī more readily opposes Avicennan natural philosophy and presents the theories of his 
school as the correct alternative to the falsafī worldview.  
This is a significant development in terms of the nature of post-Avicennan Ash‘arism. I argued 
in Section 1 that in classical Ash‘arism, physical theory is integral to theological argumentation. 
Yet in the post-Avicennan period, certain theologians are ‘dissolving the unity’ of Ash‘arī 
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kalām.470 Al-Āmidī is one such theologian: though he gives support to atomist physical theory, 
he presents it as a natural philosophy to rival Ibn Sīnā’s, rather than as integral to theology. I 
observed that this is distinct from al-Rāzī’s mature theological approach, in which, although 
physical theory does not appear according to the conventions of classical Ash‘arism, it remains 
integrated into the discussion of theological topics, its interest primarily in this connection. 
Later Ash‘arīs like al-Ījī were influenced in their separation of theology from natural philosophy 
by al-Rāzī’s method in his more philosophically oriented works. And yet al-Āmidī’s Abkār is also 
a precedent for the conception of physical theory as a distinct field of enquiry. 
Al-Āmidī’s conception of and approach to the discipline of kalām helps explain the paradox 
between his staunch opposition to falsafī doctrine on the one hand and the influence of that 
doctrine on the other. Upon analysis of al-Āmidī’s arguments in defence of Ash‘arī physical 
theory, it becomes clear that for him, kalām argumentation serves a defensive, apologetic 
objective. Classical definitions are defended by elaborate and extensive argumentation. 
Opposing opinions, such as Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of Prime Matter and its proof, or the doctrine 
that substance is no more than the aggregate of accidents, are represented, sometimes 
imprecisely, for the sole purpose of their subsequent refutation. This leaves little room for the 
kind of innovation required for a more genuine engagement with the alternative conception of 
the physical world implied. Rather, this intellectual project is characterised by a scholastic 
approach to knowledge.  
Despite al-Āmidī’s departure from the conventions of classical Ash‘arism in the space he gives, 
in the Abkār, to physical theory as a distinct subject of discussion, his is not a genuine 
philosophical enquiry into the nature and attributes of the constituents of the world. Rather, 
his ends are apologetic. He does not advance a developed version of classical Ash‘arī physical 
theory, nor do his uncertainties over that theory lead him to embrace either Ibn Sīnā’s 
alternatives or to formulate his own. Rather, his focus is on refutation of alternative natural 
																																																						
470 I am borrowing the phrase Eichner uses in relation to the parallel separation of metaphysics from theology proper 
in al-Rāzī’s thought, to highlight the fact that both Avicennism and Ash‘arism were being transformed in multiple 
ways in this period. 
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philosophies. In a certain sense, al-Āmidī shares a perspective on physical theory that can be 
ascribed to some classical Ash‘arīs, in that he does not appear to believe that the natural world 
is of inherent interest to the theologian in its own right. 
Al-Āmidī’s approach is readily contrasted with that of al-Rāzī, who tends to collect all opinions 
on a given doctrine and furnish each with as much evidence as possible, before effecting a 
critique in order to establish the correct doctrine, if that is possible. There is no doubting that 
al-Āmidī was aware of al-Rāzī’s discussions of both Avicennan and Ash‘arī natural philosophy. 
We have seen that he often includes proofs drawn from al-Rāzī’s works. At times, he subjects 
these to extensive critique (as in the case of al-Rāzī’s geometrical proof for the atom). In other 
instances, he appropriates al-Rāzī arguments without identifying their source. The strong 
distinction between the methods of the two thinkers, however, may suggest that al-Āmidī’s 
staunch conservatism and dialecticism in his own treatment of physical theory is in part a 
response to al-Rāzī greater concession to falsafī views and to his efforts to provide proofs for 
even those doctrines with which he disagrees. Al-Āmidī follows the more traditional kalām 
approach of representing the views of his opponents only in order to refute them, and there 
may be an inherent criticism of al-Rāzī’s alternative approach within al-Āmidī’s own method. 
In Chapter 3, I characterised the nature of the Avicennan influence on al-Āmidī’s thought by 
means of a case study in his appropriation of Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and 
necessary of existence. Together with the findings of this chapter, that analysis serves the 
following chapter, in which I consider how al-Āmidī utilises Ash‘arī atomism on the one hand, 
and the distinction between the possible and necessary of existence on the other, as 
expressions of the causedness of the world, and examine how the theories function in his 
doctrine of creation. 
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Chapter 5 
Al-Āmidī’s Doctrine of Creation 
 ‘al-tawḥīd ifrād al-qadīm min al-ḥādith’ 
[True] belief is to distinguish between the eternal and [that which is] originated.471 
Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī, in his treatise on the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, is zealous about its 
irreducibility as a foundation of true Islamic belief: 
‘If it is verified that the world was not, and then came to be (lam yakun thumma kān), 
then it becomes incontrovertible that its existence has a cause; for its existence is not 
from its own essence: and if [this were] not [the case], its existence would be eternal – 
so [it must] be by way of something other [than it]. [This] then leads to determining the 
attributes of that ‘other’, establishing that he is living, able, voluntary, knowing, seeing, 
hearing, speaking; [that] he sends prophets and verifies their authenticity through 
miracles; [that] he commands his servants [to do good] and prohibits [them from doing 
evil] at the tongues [of the prophets]; and that he rewards the obedient and punishes 
the disobedient – and the other fundamentals of religion, and branches of the revealed 
law. All of this only after verifying the existence of His essence – and this is only proven 
by establishing the temporal creation of the world – so this issue is the basis of the 
fundamentals (aṣl uṣūl) of religion’472  
Al-Āmidī is as vehement as Ibn Ghaylān that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo must not be 
relinquished in the face of the eternalists. Yet I will argue in this chapter that in al-Āmidī’s 
theological project, the doctrine is devoid of the significance attached to it in the classical 
Ash‘arī tradition. It has become an end unto itself – a hallmark of kalām, no longer requisite to 
the defence of the particular Ash‘arī vision of the character and workings of God. 
																																																						
471 Al-Qushayrī, Risāla 4. 
472 Ibn Ghaylān, Ḥudūth, 3.  
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This chapter is built on the findings of the previous two chapters. In it, I treat only al-Āmidī’s 
discussions in his works of kalām, since it is there that we find his original perspectives on 
creation.473 In the first section, I provide context to al-Āmidī’s doctrine of creation through 
discussion of precedents in the thought of al-Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī. I argue that, 
under the influence of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation, and of his metaphysics of possibility and 
necessity, the defence of creation ex nihilo is increasingly orientated around a defence of God’s 
volition and power, and not around proving God’s existence. Against this background, in 
Section 2, I discuss the theological significance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in al-Āmidī’s 
thought using the findings of Chapter 3. I will argue that he depends not on that doctrine, but 
on analysis of necessary and possible existence, for his proof for the existence of God; and 
furthermore, that al-Āmidī also departs from the Ash‘arī tradition in proving that God is 
voluntary and omnipotent aside from the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Together, these features 
of his thought render the doctrine superfluous to al-Āmidī’s defence of the Ash‘arī vision of 
God. 
In Section 3, I consider the place of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics in al-Āmidī’s discussions of creation. 
The focus is on al-Āmidī’s reception of a proof for creation ex nihilo developed by al-Rāzī which 
relies on Ibn Sīnā’s notion of causedness. I argue that al-Āmidī rejects the adoption of Ibn Sīnā’s 
notion of possible existence for the defence of creation ex nihilo. However, I also demonstrate 
his concession to key aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of efficient causality. In Section 5, against the 
background of Chapter 4, I consider al-Āmidī’s reception of proofs for creation ex nihilo 
dependent on physical theoretical premises. I will show that though, in the Abkār, al-Āmidī 
clings to Ash‘arī physical theory to establish creation ex nihilo, in his Ghāya, he rejects the use of 
physical premises to establish the doctrine and shows no indication of a commitment to 
atomism. I argue that this is indicative of the decline of aspects of the classical Ash‘arī paradigm 
for explaining the God-world relationship, suggesting the dwindling theological utility of 
Ash‘arī atomism.  
																																																						
473 The objective of determining the progression of al-Āmidī’s commitments across his works was satisfied in 
previous chapters. 
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1. The Doctrine of Creation ex nihilo among post-Avicennan Ash‘arīs 
Before treating al-Āmidī’s doctrine of creation, I trace its immediate context in the thought of 
post-Avicennan Ash‘arīs of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. I will argue in this section that 
in the thought of al-Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī, we observe a fundamental shift in the 
theological significance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, brought about by the impression of 
Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between the possible and necessary of existence. My approach is to treat 
these thinkers’ responses to Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation, and specifically his belief that 
creation is God’s efficient causation of the world through the process of emanation. My central 
argument is that the defence of creation ex nihilo comes to constitute a defence of God’s 
character as conceived of in the Ash‘arī tradition (in deliberate distinction to Ibn Sīnā’s 
theology), but no longer functions in defence of his existence. 
1.i. Al-Ghazālī 
In Chapter 3, I argued that al-Ghazālī’s concession to Ibn Sīnā’s modal ontology is only skin-
deep. I showed that despite his adoption of Avicennan terminology to describe God and the 
world, al-Ghazālī remains committed to the classical Ash‘arī conception of contingent 
existence. Specifically, he holds that a possible existent’s reliance on its cause is determined by 
its temporal origination, and not by existential contingency. This means that in his thought, the 
world’s creation ex nihilo remains fundamental to the defence of God’s existence.474 I will now 
argue that though al-Ghazālī advances the classical Ash‘arī understanding of creation, the 
creation debate is re-oriented in his thought around the question of God’s attributes of volition 
and power. This is in response to Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of necessary causation, and lays an 
important precedent for subsequent school members. 
In the Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī very famously rejects Ibn Sīnā’s notion that the God-World 
relationship is the pre-eternal necessary relationship between efficient cause and effect. God’s 
																																																						
474 As Goodman puts it, for al-Ghazālī, ‘theism itself stands or falls with the doctrine that being once emerged from 
nothingness’, and ‘eternalism is tantamount to atheism’ (Goodman, ‘Ghazālī’s Argument’, 67). 
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causation of the world by necessity is vehemently denied, and an eternal world seen as a logical 
impossibility.475 Instead, al-Ghazālī holds that God exercised volition in the creation of the 
world, and defends this extensively. Across his works, al-Ghazālī holds that volition is ‘an 
attribute the function of which is to differentiate between a thing and its like’, and on this basis, 
defends God’s selection of a given time for the origination of creation. 476 In the Iqtiṣād, he 
applies this definition in arguing for creation by God’s exercise of volition. Having already 
established the creation of the world ex nihilo, he writes that temporally originated existents (al-
ḥawādith) are only possible in themselves in that their existence is as likely as their continued 
non-existence (istimrār al-‘adam). It is impossible that the divine essence alone determines 
either the existence or non-existence of such beings. This is because the divine essence, unlike 
the attribute of volition as al-Ghazālī has defined it, has a single, undifferentiated relation to 
opposing alternatives.477 In response to Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī denies that the causal relationship 
between the Necessary of Existence and the world can be necessary and essential. Rather, an 
attribute of volition must feature in the causation of the world. This totally accords with the 
classical doctrine of his school.  
I discussed in Chapter 2 the manner in which Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of eternal creation Islamicises 
a philosophical conception of the relationship between the world and its cause. That is to say 
that Ibn Sīnā claims that the necessary efficient causal relationship that he has posited between 
God and the world can be correctly described as a Creator-creation relationship, and the cause 
described as ‘voluntary’. In the third discussion in the Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī seeks to undermine 
the Islamic credentials of this belief, as part of his demonstration that proponents of the 
doctrine of the eternal world are heretics.478 He claims that his opponents have only cloaked 
																																																						
475 Al-Ghazālī’s refutation of the philosophers on this topic occupies the whole of the first discussion (Ghazālī, 
Tahāfut, 12-46). He argues for the impossibility of an eternal world using proofs for the impossibility of an infinite 
regress of motions (18-20).  
476 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 22. 
477 Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 101; see Ormsby, Creation, 253. 
478 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 55-77. 
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their doctrine in the terminology of the theologians in order to endear themselves to the 
Muslims.479  
Al-Ghazālī holds that a cause can only be named an ‘agent’ if ‘it wills, chooses, and knows what 
it wills’.480 He claims that the philosophers’ necessary cause of the world, being free from 
attributes, causes by compulsion, without any capacity to choose, and cannot be described as an 
agent. He points out that in the philosophers’ view, it is impossible for God to act otherwise, 
and sees this as a nullification of genuine agency.481  In the second part of his discussion al-
Ghazālī argues that an effect can only be described as an ‘act’ if it undergoes non-existence and 
is then brought into existence.482 Thus, only a temporally created world can be described as the 
act of God. Here al-Ghazālī directly addresses the philosophers’ claim that efficient causes, 
which they deem ‘agents’, are responsible exclusively for the existence of their effects (named 
‘acts’), and not for their non-existence, nor for their origination from non-existence. His 
response is to argue that agents are connected with their acts upon the moment of their 
origination. Thus, although he accepts that the agent has no direct relation to the prior non-
existence of its effects, he holds that non-existence is a condition of the relation between agent 
and act. Therefore, according to al-Ghazālī, an eternal existent can never be described as an 
act.483 Al-Ghazālī does not deny that eternal effects (such as God’s ‘being a knower’, as the effect 
of his knowledge) exist. His objection is to their being characterised as acts. This becomes 
significant in later discourse.484 
																																																						
479 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 59. As Dutton writes, ‘it is a leitmotif of the Tahāfut that God is a voluntary agent who acts by 
the free choice of his will’ (‘Al-Ghazālī on Possibility’, 34-35). 
480 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 55. 
481 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 56. In the course of his refutation, al-Ghazālī demonstrates awareness of Ibn Sīnā’s claim, most 
clearly articulated in the Ishārāt, that the term ‘act’ (fi‘l) is more general than either voluntary agency (al-fi‘l bi-qaṣd) 
or natural action (al-fi‘l bi-ṭab‘) (Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, V.2, 488-490). He strenuously denies this, arguing that the 
expression ‘he acted by choice’ is tautologous, and therefore that action entails will (al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 57). See 
Swanstrom, The Metaphysics, 65-67, for explanation of how Ibn Sīnā’s views God’s emanation of the world as an act of 
voluntary creation.  
482 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 62; c.f. the Iqtiṣād, where he also asserts that an ‘act’ (fi‘l) is that which is exposed to non-
existence and then existence (Iqtiṣād, 104).  
483 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 62. 
484 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 63. 
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Al-Ghazālī’s denial of the agency of Ibn Sīnā’s necessary cause of the world is directly premised 
on the classical Ash‘arī distinction between agent causes (fā‘il) and determinants (‘illa, or ma‘nā 
mūjib). Agents, according to the classical Ash‘arīs, act by volition and are responsible for the 
origination (ḥudūth) of their effects, but not for their ongoing existence. God is for the Ash‘arīs, 
of course, the prime agent cause, but humans, acting according to God-given accidents of 
volition and capacity, are also considered agents in a particular sense. By contrast, 
determinants act by necessity, are responsible for the existence of their effects, and temporally 
concur with their effects. Examples of determinants are God’s attributes (God’s being a ‘knower’ 
is the effect of his attribute of knowledge) and accidents (the created accident of motion is the 
determinant for the existence of motion in its material substrate). Indeed al-Juwaynī’s proof for 
accidents, which is taken up by later Ash‘arīs, relies on the distinction between agent causes 
and determinants. As al-Mutawāllī puts it, accidents must exist, because motion cannot be the 
effect of an agent, on the basis that ‘the [already] existent is not enacted: rather, it has no need, 
in its existence, for an agent’.485 
Neither agent causes nor determinants have, according to classical Ash‘arīs, efficacy in relation 
to the non-existence of their effects. In the case of the determinant, the absence of an effect 
reverts to the absence of its cause. 486 In the case of agent causes, the non-existence of the effect 
reverts not to the absence of the agent, nor to the absence of its power or volition to enact its 
effect. Rather, volition is understood as an attribute the very nature of which is to particularise 
the timing of the existence of its effect, such that it can precede its effect in existence.487 Al-
																																																						
485Al-Mutawāllī, al-Mughnī, 5-6; c.f. al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 19, ‘the existent, in its endurance (al-bāqī), is not enacted.’ 
486 In a section on ‘what can and cannot be caused’, al-Juwanynī clearly asserts that ‘among that which cannot be 
caused (yu‘allal) is non-existence’. He is referring here specifically to determinants, to the exclusion of agent causes 
(Shāmil, 686). 
487This conception of volition is embedded within the kalām proof from the principle of particularisation. Al-Bāqillānī 
defends the compatibility of eternal attributes of volition and power with a temporally originated world against the 
‘naturalists’. He writes: ‘according to us, [God’s volition] is the volition for the delayed origination of its effect (kawn 
al-fi‘l ‘alā l-tarākhī)’ (Tamhīd, 36). The attribute of volition is, in al-Bāqillānī’s account, emphatically not the 
determinant, or necessitating cause of its effect (laysat ‘illa li-wujūd al-murād). Rather, volition is a distinct attribute 
which, when present in the agent, permits the particularisation of the agent’s acts.  
Nevertheless, al-Bāqillānī’s manner of expressing the classical Ash‘arī notion that non-existent possibilities are 
within God’s power is somewhat ambiguous in terms of the relation between the non-existence of the possible and 
its agent cause. Al-Bāqillānī writes that ‘the non-existent object of God’s power (al-ma‘dūm al-madqūr) is that which 
can enter into existence’ (Tamhīd, 36). Al-Juwaynī also notes of al-Bāqillānī that he holds that when substances cease 
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Ghazālī, then, is simply asserting this conception of agency, articulating it in response to Ibn 
Sīnā in terms of the non-existence of the effect as a condition of its being enacted. 
The clear emphasis in al-Ghazālī’s defence of the core theological doctrine of creation ex nihilo is 
on demolishing Ibn Sīnā’s radical re-interpretation of the Qur’ānic characterisation of God as 
voluntary and possessed of power. This is crucial for the subsequent history of post-Avicennan 
Ash‘arī discussions of creation. 
1.ii. Al-Shahrastānī 
I explained in Chapter 3 that al-Shahrastānī embraces Ibn Sīnā’s notion that the world’s 
existence, in contrast to God’s, is derivative. I showed that this, and not the eternal-temporal 
distinction, constitutes his central dichotomy between God and the world. I will now argue that 
this results in the orientation of his response to Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation around the 
question of God’s volition. Al-Shahrastānī’s contribution to the creation debate is unique, and 
under-appreciated in present scholarship. It deserves attention both in its own right, and 
because of its influence on subsequent theologians including al-Āmidī.488 
Despite accepting that the world’s causedness is determined by its essential possibility, like al-
Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī does not accept Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the necessary causal 
relationship between God and the world. Al-Shahrastānī has a distinctive approach to 
disproving Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the God-world relationship. He argues that Ibn Sīnā has 
conflated two distinct classes of precedence within his notion of essential precedence. For Ibn 
																																																						
to exist, they do so as the direct result of God’s action (bi-i‘dām Allah), meaning that the non-existent possibility is 
non-existent as a result of God’s power and will for its non-existence  (Shāmil, 270). For his part, al-Juwaynī holds that 
the non-existence of a possibility is explicable not by God directly acting to produce non-existence, but by his not 
acting to produce existence (specifically, in the case of substances which cease to exist, by his not producing an 
accident of endurance) (Shāmil, 270). The problem of the creation of non-existence is a theme of debates with the 
Mu‘tazila, many of whom, because of their doctrine of the endurance of accidents, posited God’s creation of an 
accident of cessation (fanā’) to explain the destruction of substance. See al-Āmidī’s own treatment of the problem in 
Abkār, 3, 364-374 (fī fanā’ al-jawāhir wa-l-a‘rāḍ). 
The question of the relation of God’s volition to the non-existence of its effects is highly prominent in al-Āmidī’s 
discussions of creation, as we shall later see. 
488 Davidson treats al-Shahrastānī’s discussion of creation in ‘Arguments from the Concept’; Lammer has a 
forthcoming paper on the subject (‘Two Sixth/Twelfth-Century Hardliners on Creation’) to which, however, I 
obtained access too late to consider it here.   
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Sīnā, the precedence of God’s essence (which is Necessary of Existence) over the world’s (which 
is only possible of existence) is one and the same as God’s causal precedence over the world as 
necessary cause of its existence. Al-Shahrastānī argues that two distinct types of precedence 
are being conflated by Ibn Sīnā.489 
Al-Shahrastānī examines the philosophers’ five categories of precedence, posteriority and 
concurrence, namely, 1) temporal, 2) spatial, 3) in rank or honour (e.g. the precedence of the 
knowledgeable over the ignorant), 4) essential (e.g. the precedence of the cause over its effect), 
and finally, 5) natural (e.g. the precedence of the number one over the number two).490 He 
specifically contests the notion of essential precedence. Firstly he asserts that by ‘essential 
precedence’, the philosophers are really referring exclusively to causal precedence, citing their 
examples of the precedence of the motion of the hand over the ring that it bears, and the 
precedence of the sun over its rays. He writes: 
When using the expression ‘essential [precedence]’, they [really] mean ‘causal’ 
[precedence]: but ‘essential’ is more general that ‘causal’, so they ought really to have 
said ‘causal precedence’.491 
Thence, he proposes a sixth category, namely ontological precedence (al-taqaddum bi-l-wujūd). 
For him, the relation between the numbers one and two is an example of this kind of 
precedence, rather than of ‘natural precedence’ (as Ibn Sīnā claims).  The number two is 
posterior to the number one in that its existence could not occur without the number one. 
However, number one is not ‘essentially prior’ to number two as the philosophers understand 
essential priority, since number one is not the cause of number two. 492 Thus al-Shahrastānī 
																																																						
489 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 7. 
490 C.f. Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, IV.1, 124-6; Najāt, 2, 74-5. 
491 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 7.  
492 For Ibn Sīnā, the priority of ‘1’ over ‘2’ is natural, not causal: ‘it is not a condition for the existence of [the number 
one] that plurality should exist, whereas it is a condition for the existence of plurality that the one should exist. This 
is not a matter or whether or not the one bestows existence on plurality, but only that it is needed so that through 
the combination of it plurality would have existence’ (Marmura’s translation, Avicenna on Causal Priority, 74; see the 
same article for discussion of Ibn Sīnā’s classes of precedence and their theological applications). 
Al-Shahrastānī stresses the ontological precedence of the number one over plurality, in the sense that the existence 
of plurality is impossible without the existence of the number one. His emphasis is on the fact that despite plurality 
	 193	
proposes a kind of precedence which is neither causal nor temporal. Precedence in existence 
does not necessarily entail (as he accuses Ibn Sīnā of assuming it must) causal precedence. 
In this way, al-Shahrastānī wrenches apart two notions which in Ibn Sīnā’s conception of 
creation are inseparable. For Ibn Sīnā, the superiority of God’s existence over the world’s 
derivative existence is one and the same as his causal priority over the world. God’s existence, 
being necessary, necessitates the existence of the world. God’s essential precedence over the 
world is precisely his precedence as necessary cause of the world. For al-Shahrastānī, by 
contrast, one can agree that the world’s existence is derivative, and therefore that the world is 
ontologically posterior to God, without affirming that God caused the world by necessitation.   
Like al-Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī argues that creation is a volitional act. He proceeds directly from 
establishing that the world relies on a cause for its existence (wujūduhu bi-ījād ghayrihi), to 
establishing that the causal relationship between necessary and possible existents must be that 
of a voluntary agent and its acts. He does so negatively, by presenting several arguments 
against the philosophers’ thesis that the Necessary of Existence causes by its essence.493 His 
conclusion is that ‘existentiation by choice (al-ījād al-ikhtiyārī) has been established, and this is 
what we wanted to show.’494 
Al-Shahrastānī’s first objective was, then, to establish God’s ontological priority over the world 
– God’s being prior in existence is, for al-Shahrastānī, the true sense of the expression ‘God was, 
and the world was not’.495 Secondly, he has focused on undermining the notion that God’s 
ontological priority entails the causation of the world by necessity, thereby affirming the 
																																																						
being derivative, it is not caused by the existence of the number one. Ibn Sīnā would agree. However, al-Shahrastānī 
would broaden this category. For him, such ontological priority does not only occur in the case of naturally ordered 
existents such as numbers, but also to the God-world relationship, where God’s existence is superior to the world’s. 
By describing God’s precedence as exclusively ontological, the necessary causal connection between God and the 
world is eliminated.  
This articulates al-Ghazālī’s notion of God’s ontological priority over the world in Avicennan terms. In the first 
discussion in the Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī states that ‘God has existence without the world (li-illah wujūd wa-lā ‘ālam 
ma‘ahu)’, and stresses that this entails neither temporal nor necessary causal precedence (Tahāfut, 35). 
493 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 15-16; c.f. Muṣāra‘a ,110-114. I discuss some of these arguments in detail later in the chapter 
in relation to al-Āmidī’s reception thereof. 
494 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 17.  
495 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 10. 
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presence of volition and power in the world’s creation. Davidson has understood al-
Shahrastānī’s proof also to entail the world’s creation in time.496 And yet, this does not 
accurately reflect al-Shahrastānī’s unique conception of the meaning of origination from 
nothing. According to al-Shahrastānī, the very notion of creation ex nihilo needs to be 
reinterpreted by philosophers and theologians alike.  When interrogated by a hypothetical 
opponent of his proof, who argues that his proof for God’s ontological priority over the world 
and its creation by his attributes of volition and power does not imply creation ex nihilo (al-
ḥudūth ‘an al-‘adam) al-Shahrastānī pronounces his understanding of creation ex nihilo. 
According to him, the expressions ‘it came to exist from, or after non-existence (‘an al-‘adam aw 
ba‘d al-‘adam’), or it was preceded by non-existence (sabaqahu al-‘adam)’, denote, in the common 
imagination, an existent ‘before’. But since time is bound up in the existence of the world, there 
is no time before the world. Rather, the true meaning of origination ex nihilo (ḥudūth al-shay’ ‘an 
al-‘adam) is ‘the existence of something from nothing (wujūd al-shay’ lā min shay’)’.497 It is in the 
sense that it is a changeable, temporal entity, susceptible to non-existence, that the world ‘has a 
beginning’, and it is in this sense the world is reliant on the timeless God.498   
Indeed, for al-Shahrastānī, when we ask whether or not the world is eternal, we are asking the 
wrong question. He disagrees with the philosophers who claim that the world is ‘eternal with 
God’, not primarily because of the implication that the world is without beginning, but because 
temporal concurrence between God and the world implies God’s being subject to time. As he 
puts it ‘if the Most High was eternally existent (dā’im al-wujūd) with the eternity of the world… 
either the existence of the Most high would be temporal, or the existence of the world would be 
essential, and both are false’.499  Rather, God’s eternality (dawām) is precisely his necessity, his 
																																																						
496 Davidson reads al-Shahrastānī’s argument against the world’s essential origination as a version of the proof from 
particularisation, and holds that it establishes that the world’s agent ‘could not have acted from eternity’ (Davidson, 
‘Arguments from the Concept’, 307).  
497 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 17-18.  
498 This advances a theme of al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut, where, responding to the philosophers’ accusation that creation ex 
nihilo implies a finite period of time between God’s existence and the world’s, he argues that God is ‘outside time’. 
Instead, he sees God as being prior to the world in ‘existence’; in his words, ‘God has existence without the world (li-
illah wujūd wa-lā ‘ālam ma‘ahu)’, regardless of time (Tahāfut, 31-36). A similar idea is present among Christian 
theologians such as Augustine (d. 430) and Anselm (d. 1109). 
499 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 19; c.f. Muṣāra‘a , 115-117. 
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being, essentially, ‘the beginning without beginning (al-awwal bi-lā awwal)’. The world’s 
eternality, on the other hand, is ‘a temporal eternality (dawām zamānī), susceptible to possibility 
and to non-existence, to decrease and increase, to continuation or cessation.’500 For al-
Shahrastānī, the world could not be anything but temporally eternal, because it is meaningless 
to speak of a beginning in time for time itself.  
Al-Shahrastānī does deny the possibility of an infinite regress of motions, and argues for this 
point against Ibn Sīnā specifically. Yet because the existence of time is bound up in the 
existence of the world, this does not imply for al-Shahrastānī the world’s beginning ‘in time’.501 
Nor would the possibility of an infinite regress of motions contradict God’s priority in existence 
over the world. As al-Shahrastānī puts it, ‘the supposition of an infinitely extended body, 
though we know it to be impossible, would not entail God’s concurrence with the world in 
space; and in the same way, the supposition of an infinite regress of motions would not entail 
God’s concurrence with the world in time.’502 And since, for al-Shahrastānī, God’s ontological 
priority over the world entails his exercise of volition and power in its creation, the existence of 
an infinite series of motions would not negate his exercise of power and volition.  As such, the 
notion that the world’s motion does not regress infinitely, though upheld, has nothing of the 
significance to al-Shahrastānī in terms of the world’s need for a cause that it held among 
classical Ash‘arīs. For him, the world has an eternality of its own, because through the creation 
of the world, time itself exists. But this does not make the world beginningless, since its 
beginning is precisely the fact that by virtue of its own essence, it would not exist, or in other 
words, that it is preceded essentially by its own non-existence and therefore entirely 
dependent upon God. 
With al-Shahrastānī, there is a decisive shift in the creation debate that in important respects is 
related to subsequent discourse. Most crucially, for al-Shahrastānī, establishing 1) the mode of 
God’s priority over the world, and 2) the presence of volition in the relation between God and 
																																																						
500 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 19.  
501 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 19 and 23-30. 
502 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 10. 
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the world take centre stage in refuting the philosophical doctrine of God’s eternal necessitation 
of the world. This is because the causedness of the world is known by analysis of the nature of 
its existence, and is an area of consensus between the philosophers and theologians. 
Furthermore, proving that the world has a beginning in time is not merely secondary to the 
agenda of proving the presence of volition in its creation, it is meaningless because of the 
world-bound nature of time itself. Al-Shahrastānī, we will see, is both an important target and a 
significant influence in al-Āmidī’s discussion of creation. 
1.iii. Al-Rāzī 
Al-Rāzī’s discussions of creation are extensive and thorough. I will show later in the Chapter that 
al-Āmidī’s response to al-Rāzī significantly informs his own discussions of creation. Thus, al-
Rāzī’s discussions require the most attention here. I explained in Chapter 3 that al-Rāzī is like al-
Shahrastānī in his acceptance of the notion that the effects of God’s power depend on their cause 
because of their existential contingency, and not because they are temporally originated. In light 
of this fact, the importance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo for al-Rāzī’s theology is a point of 
interest. Iskenderoğlu, in his study of al-Rāzī’s doctrine of creation, has argued that he suspends 
judgement on the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.503 I will argue that al-Rāzī upholds the doctrine, 
and that its significance for him primarily pertains to his understanding of God’s character.  
Only in his Mabāḥith (in line with its Avicennan orientation) does al-Rāzī express support for 
Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine that creation consists in the Necessary of Existent’s eternal bestowal of 
existence on the world.504 In his other works, al-Rāzī opposes Ibn Sīnā on the world’s eternity. 
Al-Rāzī does not, however, deny the possibility of a necessary, eternal relationship between a 
cause and its effect. Rather, he openly acknowledges its conceivability but denies its 
applicability to the God-world relationship. That is, al-Rāzī denies that God is the kind of cause 
which would produce its effect eternally. 
																																																						
503Iskenderoğlu, Fakhr al-Dīn, 72-73. 
504 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 2, 515-516. The work, which explains Avicennan philosophy, may not represent al-Rāzī’s own 
opinion, in which case he nowhere supports the doctrine. 
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This is expressed clearly in passages in both the Sharḥ and the Muḥaṣṣal. In the Sharḥ, the point 
arises in critique of Ibn Sīnā’s proof for the world’s eternity. Al-Rāzī argues that Ibn Sīnā’s 
argument assumes that proving the plausibility of an eternal cause-effect relationship is the 
key premise in establishing that the world is eternal. He writes:  
The theologians agree [with the philosophers] that the world’s being eternal does not in 
itself contradict its being caused, but [they hold that] the doctrine of the efficient cause-
effect [relationship between God and the world] is false. But they …argue this in relation to 
their doctrine that the cause (al-mu’aththir) of the world’s existence must be possessed of 
power. And as for the philosophers, they agree [with the theologians] that an eternal world 
cannot be the effect of an agent who acts solely by intention and will.505  
Here al-Rāzī re-articulates al-Ghazālī’s insistence on the classical Ash‘arī distinction between 
causes (‘illa) and agents (fā‘il).506 He stresses that the theologians are not ignorant of the 
distinction between causes in general, and causes which are called agents because their 
causation results from volition. As we saw al-Ghazālī explain, the theologians do, indeed, 
uphold the existence of eternal determining causes such as God’s attribute of knowledge as 
determinant of his being knowing. But these do not possess the true agency which must, 
according to the theological worldview, be attributed to God. Ibn Sīnā’s error, claims al-Rāzī, is 
to focus, in proving the world’s eternity, on establishing that causes can act on their effects 
eternally – a point on which there is consensus. Instead, he ought to have focused on the 
question of whether or not a voluntary agent can act eternally. This observation underlies al-
Rāzī’s approach to the defence of creation ex nihilo in the Muḥaṣṣal and Maṭālib. Al-Rāzī explicitly 
re-centres the debate over the world’s creation. The key question, according to al-Rāzī, is not 
																																																						
505 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 394-5; c.f. al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 119, where a very similar statement is made, al-Rāzī citing the 
theologians’ assent to the notion that God’s eternal state of knowing is an essential, necessary effect of his eternal 
attribute of knowledge; c.f. al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 194, where in the context of arguing for the impossibility of the non-
existence of the eternal, he expresses the kalām view that that which is eternal cannot be the product of a powerful 
cause (maqdūr). 
506 Due to their concession to forms of secondary causation, the Mu‘tazilī category for non-agent causes (asbāb) is 
broader than the Ash‘arī category ‘illa. Al-Rāzī probably has both concepts in mind. 
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whether or not an eternal effect is possible, but whether or not the world is, in fact, the effect of 
a necessitating efficient cause.507  
In Volume 3 of the Mabāḥith, al-Rāzī readily describes the Necessary of Existent’s eternal 
causation of the world as his ‘action’ (fā‘iliyya).508 Even in subsequent works where he defends 
creation by volition and power, and unlike al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī sees the philosophers’ use of the 
terms ‘agency’ and ‘act’ to describe eternal causation by essence as no more than a semantic 
issue.509 The real question, according to al-Rāzī, is not whether an eternal world produced 
necessarily by its cause is correctly described as the act of an agent, but whether or not the 
world’s cause is, in fact, a necessitating cause. In an equivalent discussion in the Muḥaṣṣal, al-
Rāzī claims that although the philosophers deem their cause of the world an ‘agent’, they would 
in fact agree with the theologians that an agent acting by choice could not produce an eternal 
world (law i‘taqadū fīhi kawnahu fā‘ilan bi-l-ikhtiyār la-mā jawwazū kawnahu mawjad li-l-‘ālam al-
qadīm).510 That is to say that though the philosophers (namely, Ibn Sīnā) describe the world’s 
necessitating cause as an ‘agent’, and attribute to that agent ‘volition’ as they understand it, 
they do not claim that such an agent acts by choice –  and moreover they would agree that the 
presence of choice on the part of the cause of an eternal world is impossible. 
The notion that an agent acting by choice cannot cause an eternal world is not explicitly proven 
by al-Rāzī, but his use of the term ‘choice’ (ikhtiyār) makes his argument clear. The presence of 
choice on the part of the world’s cause entails the selection of one out of multiple synchronic 
alternatives. The cause of an eternal world does not select the point of its origination, and 
therefore is not possessed of the capacity to choose. According to al-Rāzī, no one would dispute 
this. This is a crucial axis around which all of al-Rāzī’s discussions of creation revolve. It means 
that the real question is not (as he claims Ibn Sīnā believes) whether an eternal world can be 
deemed caused, but whether or not the world’s cause is possessed of choice. 
																																																						
507 In the Maṭālib, too, al-Rāzī defends the notion that the doctrine that the world is eternal does not negate its being 
caused (though ultimately he disagrees that the world is such an effect, as we shall see) (al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 231-239). 
508 Al-Rāzī, Mabāhith, 3, 515. 
509 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 119. 
510 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 120. 
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Al-Rāzī argues, in both the Muḥaṣṣal and the Maṭālib, that the God-world relationship is not that 
of a necessitating cause and its effect. In both works, al-Rāzī presents multiple proofs for 
creation ex nihilo (as well evaluating proofs for the world’s eternity). However, the ultimate 
argument employed by al-Rāzī in both works is that the world’s cause is a voluntary, wise and 
omnipotent agent, and that the effect of such an agent can only be a temporally created 
world.511 Establishing the nature of the world’s cause has become the central concern in al-
Rāzī’s discussions of creation in these works, given the agreement with Ibn Sīnā that the fact of 
the world’s causedness is established apart from the issue of its creation ex nihilo.  
In the Muḥaṣṣal, opening his discussion of creation, al-Rāzī writes: ‘when we affirm a wise 
creator (al-ṣāni‘ al-ḥakīm) we necessarily concede the temporal origination of the world’.512  In 
the ensuing discussion, he presents his original proof for creation ex nihilo from motion and rest 
(to be explored).513 He then refutes philosophical proofs against creation ex nihilo.514 His closing 
statement on the debate in this work responds to an imagined opponent who observes that if 
the world is caused essentially, it must be eternal. He responds simply ‘we shall prove, God 
willing, that the Most High is a voluntary agent.’515 The doctrine of creation ex nihilo is taken in 
this work as expression of the fact that the world’s cause is a freely acting Creator. 
The discussion in the Maṭālib is more complex and the train of al-Rāzī’s thought more difficult 
to follow. Indeed, in many respects the Maṭālib follows a unique programme for theological 
investigation.  This has led Iskenderoğlu to argue, from a preliminary discussion in al-Rāzī’s 
treatment of creation, that he suspends judgement on the world’s eternity and believes that 
‘the theory of the eternity of the world is not contrary to the main principles of religion, in 
which case it might have to be rejected, but an alternative theory to the theological 
																																																						
511 On al-Rāzī’s expression of this point as a development of the classical kalām principle of particularisation, see 
Davidson, ‘Arguments from the Concept of Particularisation’, 307-8. 
512 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 174.  
513 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 176-181. 
514 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 184-185.  
515 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 185. 
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formulation'.516 However, al-Rāzī’s view in the Maṭālib is, in fact, entirely consistent with the 
view expressed in the Muḥaṣṣal.  
Al-Rāzī’s discussions of creation must be understood in the context of certain epistemological 
considerations discussed in the first volume of the work. These therefore require comment. In a 
passage entitled ‘On whether or not the human intellect can obtain absolute certitude in the 
science [of divinalia]’, al-Rāzī presents a number of arguments establishing the limits of human 
reasoning in relation to the knowledge of God’s essence. The outcome of the discussion is that 
though God’s essence cannot be truly known by the intellect, it is the responsibility of the 
rational minded individual to grapple with the evidence and settle on the ‘most likely’ (awlā) 
and ‘most compelling’ (akhlaq) solution to theological questions.517 In discussing creation in the 
Maṭālib, al-Rāzī will arrive at the conclusion that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is indeed the 
‘most likely’ position and therefore the doctrine he defends.518  
The preliminary discussion treated by İskenderoğlu, rather than resulting in suspension of 
judgement over the world’s eternity (as İskenderoğlu claims), is a comment on the limits of 
both scriptural evidence and human rationality pertaining to this question, fully in step with 
the epistemological observations of Volume 1.519 Al-Rāzī argues that there is no clear scriptural 
																																																						
516 Iskenderoğlu, Fakhr al-Dīn, 72-73.  
517 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 1, 44-46. This is repeated in the context of the discussion of God’s knowledge in relation to 
creation in 3, 108, where al-Rāzī comments that the very title of the work is intended to reflect the fact that the 
subjects investigated go beyond our human capacity to fully ascertain them. In illustrating the limits of human 
reason, al-Rāzī identifies several philosophical questions about which a satisfactory solution cannot be obtained. 
These are the nature of time and place, and the question of matter’s divisibility, as well as certain geometrical 
questions; see Abrahamov, ‘Knowability’, 217-8, on the arguments presented by al-Rāzī in Volume 1 to this effect. 
Al-Rāzī’s epistemological caution has generally gone undetected: for instance, in Heck’s study of scepticism in Islamic 
theology, he describes al-Rāzī, ‘albeit a complex thinker’, as having ‘[secured] for the mind the role of arbiter of all 
truths both human and divine’ (Skepticism, 157). However, Shihadeh discusses al-Rāzī’s view, expressed in the Maṭālib, 
that a moderate degree of scepticism is appropriate in theological enquiry. Here scepticism is not an end unto itself, 
but a non-satisfactory situation where al-Rāzī is not convinced of his own ability to achieve certainty. He permits, 
however, that the most probable view be affirmed, and allows for the possibility of progress by other thinkers 
(Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics, 189-203).  
Thus, when al-Rāzī does not make his own opinion obvious on a given issue, this does not necessarily reflect a 
straightforward suspension of judgement in response to compelling evidence on either side, but a more fundamental 
restraint about the nature of human knowledge. This is certainly the case in the creation debate, as I will show.  
518 E.g. al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 327. 
519 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 29-33. 
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evidence demanding either the eternity of the world, or creation ex nihilo. He also focuses on 
what scripture does demand, namely the presence of power and volition in God’s creation of 
the world.  
Al-Rāzī treats terms used in the Qur'ān to describe God's creation of the world, showing that 
though none demand that he created ex nihilo, all demand that he created by volition and 
power. For example, he discusses Q 36:83 'Surely His Command, when He wills a thing, is only to 
say to it: Be! and it is'. He argues that the imperative 'be' (kun) signals the exercise of power and 
will, but that this alone does not demand the conclusion (al-maṭlūb) drawn by the theologians, 
namely the creation of the world ex nihilo. Rather, it implies that God formed (kawwana) the 
world by power, and that 'whatever he willed', he formed.520 According to al-Rāzī, none of the 
scriptural expressions he discusses necessarily contradict the eternity of matter.521 
The outcome of this passage is two-fold: 1) al-Rāzī establishes that scriptural evidence is not 
sufficient in proving the doctrine of creation ex nihilo – indeed, that the theologian who uses 
scripture in support of creation ex nihilo is really begging the question.522  He also establishes 2) 
that scripture does demand the creation of the world through the exercise of power and 
volition.523 This passage is therefore primarily a comment on the limits of scripture in the 
creation debate, and not on the validity of either doctrine. Al-Rāzī concludes by stating that the 
absence of a clear scriptural statement on the question of the world’s eternity proves that ‘the 
question is… the very greatest difficulty’, expressing hesitation over man’s ability to draw a 
reliable conclusion about the topic.524  Despite this note of tentativeness, al-Rāzī proceeds to a 
																																																						
520 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 30-31. 
521 Al-Ghazālī himself stresses that the Qur’ān demands the existence of a Creator (sāni‘, fā‘il) on account of the 
evidence of design in the world, and does not claim that Scripture implies creation ex nihilo (Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, 1, 96; see 
Goodman, ‘Ghazālī’s Arguments’, 69). 
522 For instance, he criticises a hypothetical theologian who would claim on the basis of the Qur’ānic expression ‘kun 
fa-yakūn’ that God created ex nihilo, asking rhetorically, ‘is this not the very site of contention’ (hal al-nizā‘ ilā fīhi)? 
(Maṭālib, 4, 32). His argument here is that use of the verbal root k-w-n does not itself entail either the origination in 
time of the thing which comes to be, nor its eternity, but rather, its originatedness per se, in the sense that it depends 
on something external to itself.  
523 For instance, in interpreting Q6:1, ‘Praise be to God who created the heavens and the earth’, al-Rāzī argues that the 
meaning of ‘create’ (khalaqa) is ‘to enact by power’ (al-taqdīr) (Maṭālib, 4, 29).   
524 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 33. 
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fully-fledged rational enquiry into the question. His comments on the limitations of scriptural 
evidence, and on the difficulty of this question, should not be taken to permit either view. 
Rather, just as he expresses the difficulty of obtaining knowledge of God’s essence before 
proceeding to an in depth philosophical-theological investigation into that very topic, whose 
objective is to establish the most convincing doctrine attainable to the human intellect, so too 
he proceeds to apply rational enquiry to the question of the world’s creation. This is the course 
pursued in the remainder of al-Rāzī’s discussion.  
Al-Rāzī supports the doctrine that the world’s cause is possessed of volition and power, using 
both scriptural evidence and evidence ‘taken from the principles of the philosophers’.525 A key 
question to be addressed, then, is whether or not the creation of the world by power and 
volition entails its creation ex nihilo. It is my view (contra İskenderoğlu’s) that in the Maṭālib as 
much as in other earlier works, al-Rāzī upholds the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, in large part 
because he believes that creation by volition does entail creation ex nihilo.526 Although al-Rāzī 
comprehensively supplies proofs for both the doctrine of the world’s eternity and its creation 
ex nihilo, his most conclusive statements (those which receive no subsequent counter-critique) 
support the latter doctrine. Most significantly, he is very clear on his belief that the creation of 
the world by a voluntary agent does demand a temporal beginning of that effect.527  
Most explicitly, al-Rāzī closes a teleological proof for God’s volition and power with the 
following statement: 
																																																						
525 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 325. The first section of the third volume of the Maṭālib (7-100) relates to the definition of 
power. Al-Rāzī holds that the effect of an agent consists in the power to act and the presence of motivation (al-dā‘ī) 
based on the knowledge that some benefit or avoidance of harm will result (especially 7-12 and 37-43). In Volume 4, 
al-Rāzī extensively presents a variety of teleological, scriptural and other proofs which establish God’s identity as 
voluntary, omnipotent creator (325-360). 
526 E.g. al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 174 and 185. 
527 See for instance, al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 270-271 and 273-4, referring to 231-239. Here, as part of his presentation of 
proofs for an eternal world, he presents fourteen arguments to the effect that an eternal effect is possible, but 
emphasises that these arguments only apply in the case of necessary causation, and not in the case of the voluntary 
agent (232). He claims that the philosophers agree that necessitating causes, but not voluntary agents, may produce 
eternal effects. In responding to a similar objection later in the discussion, al-Rāzī simply states ‘it is clear that every 
act of a voluntary agent is temporally originated’ (Maṭālib, 4, 304-305). 
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If we contemplate the heavens and the planets, the states of the four elements, the celestial 
signs, minerals, plants and animals – but most especially mankind, we discover grand 
organisation, and dazzling proofs… It is clear that these considerations are most convincing 
(awlā) as proof of the existence of a voluntary agent, who is wise and merciful. And when a 
voluntary agent is proven, the temporal origination of the world is also proven by 
necessity.528 
In al-Rāzī’s thought more than in the thought of any previous theologian, the creation debate is 
re-orientated around a defence of God’s attributes of volition and power. Belief in creation ex 
nihilo is somewhat secondary, a function of the doctrine that God is a voluntary creator.529 The 
debate with the philosophers is no longer primarily over whether or not an eternal world can 
exist (indeed al-Rāzī stresses its hypothetical possibility), but over whether or not the world’s 
cause is a voluntary, omnipotent agent. The conclusion is that it is, and thus that the world has 
a beginning. Thus, the identification of the divinity which is at the heart of classical Ash‘arism 
and of kalām more broadly is preserved through this view of the origins of the world. 
A brief consideration of the Arba‘īn brings this point into greater relief. We saw in Chapter 3 
that al-Rāzī holds, in that work, that possible existents are all temporally originated, and the 
implication that temporal originatedness is in fact a condition of the effect’s reliance on its 
cause. In that work, the place of God’s exercise of volition in creation is not emphasised.530 The 
defence of creation ex nihilo there centres around the world’s need for a cause per se, and not 
around the voluntary and omnipotent nature of that cause. It is only in those works where al-
Rāzī fully abandons the classical kalām association between causedness and temporal 
																																																						
528 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 327. Al-Rāzī’s teleological proofs for the doctrine that the world’s cause is a voluntary, 
omnipotent agent acting by intention and design span a large part of this volume, covering extensive evidence of 
design in the characteristics and benefits of the sun, the moon, the planets, minerals, plants, animals and humans (al-
Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 325-252). These discussions serve to establish that the world’s cause acts by design and power. 
Ultimately, in al-Rāzī’s view, it is this, and not the impossibility of an eternal effect, which proves that the world is 
created ex nihilo. Note the use of the term ‘awlā’ in this passage. Here al-Rāzī expresses his own view, but his restraint 
is evident in that he holds that this is the ‘most likely’ position, which accords with view on the limits of intellectual 
enquiry. 
529 This is, of course, comparable to al-Shahrastānī’s take on the debate. 
530 Al-Rāzī, Arba‘īn, 1, 52-53. 
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origination that the defence of creation ex nihilo becomes a defence of God’s volition, design and 
power. This is because the other major function fulfilled by the doctrine among classical 
Ash‘arī’s, namely in establishing the existence of a cause for the world, is no longer relevant to 
al-Rāzī’s defence of the temporal origination of the world. 
2. The Doctrine of Creation Ex Nihilo in al-Āmidī’s Theology 
I argued in Chapter 2 for the indispensability of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo for classical 
Ash‘arīs in proofs for both the existence of God, and for their specific vision of what it means 
for God to be voluntary and possessed of power. I have just explained that among certain post-
classical Ash‘arīs, the former of the classical theological functions of the doctrine came to be 
satisfied through Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between possible and necessary existence, meaning that 
the creation debate now hinged on important differences regarding the nature of the world’s 
creator. 
I turn at last to al-Āmidī’s own doctrine of creation, and focus initially on its theological 
significance within his works of kalām. I argue that al-Āmidī, like al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī, 
does not require the doctrine of creation ex nihilo for his defence of God’s existence. This results 
from his acceptance of one of Ibn Sīnā’s most compelling metaphysical propositions, namely 
the idea that causedness is a function of the inherent possibility of the existence of beings other 
than God (demonstrated in Chapter 3). I will also demonstrate that al-Āmidī, following al-
Shahrastānī’s precedent, does not depend on creation ex nihilo for his defence of the Ash‘arī 
conception of the attributes of the world’s cause either.  
2.i. Structure 
The structure of al-Āmidī’s works of kalām is a clear indication of the place of the defence of 
creation ex nihilo in relation to other doctrines. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Abkār al-afkār is 
primarily structured around the basic dichotomy of the necessary and possible of existence. 
After epistemological preliminaries, al-Āmidī categorises the objects of knowledge (ma‘lūmāt), 
and proceeds to his treatment of the existent (al-mawjūd), which occupies the majority of the 
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first three volumes. God’s existence and his attributes (Volume 1) and his unicity, action and 
the nature of his causation of events in the world (Volume 2) are discussed under the category 
‘the necessary of existence’. Discussion of the world, including its categorisation into substance 
and accident, the definition and nature of substance, accident and body, and its origination ex 
nihilo, are treated in Volume 3 under the heading ‘the existent which is possible of existence (al-
mawjūd al-mumkin al-wujūd)’. 
This structure is, to my knowledge, unique to the Abkār. It represents an original attempt to 
maintain the key components of the Ash‘arī procedure for theological discussion, and at once to 
incorporate the most theologically compelling of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical distinctions. The 
procedure of commencing with a discussion of knowledge (‘ilm) and rational speculation 
(naẓar), then continuing to elucidate the categories of objects of knowledge, is typical of 
classical Ash‘arī theological compendia. Al-Bāqillānī’s Tamhīd, al-Juwaynī’s Shāmil, and al-
Anṣārī’s Ghunyā all follow this schema.531 Al-Āmidī’s use of the divisions of the objects of 
knowledge to frame the greater part of his theological summa reflects identification with the 
broad parameters for rational speculation established within the classical Ash‘arī tradition.532 
Yet within the category ‘the existent’, the basic dichotomy is not between eternal and 
temporally originated existents, as is consistently the case in the works of the theologians just 
mentioned.533 Rather, it is that between the necessary and possible of existence. God’s existence 
is proven as part of the investigation of the necessary of existence. The world’s origination is 
established in discussion of the possible of existence. This means that these two topics, 
classically intertwined and inseparable, are cleft apart, isolated from one another within the 
work by two volumes. It is clear how this represents a break with the theological procedure of 
generations of Ash‘arīs set out in Chapter 2. 
																																																						
531 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 6-16; al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 97-139; al-Anṣārī, Ghunyā, 1, 221-287.  
532 Identification with the school and its methods is also firmly established in that within the opening four pages of 
his treatment of the definition of knowledge, al-Ash‘arī, al-Bāqillānī, Ibn Fūrak and al-Isfarā’īnī are all mentioned by 
name (Abkār, 1, 73-5). 
533 Al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 16; al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 139; al-Anṣārī, Ghunyā, 1, 287. See also al-Ghazālī, Musṭaṣfā, 1, 5. 
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The structure of Ghāyat al-Marām is directly comparable to the Abkār with respect to the places 
of the two doctrines of God’s existence and creation ex nihilo. The first subject treated in the 
work, without even the epistemological preliminaries of the Abkār, is the proof for God’s 
existence. This is followed by proofs for each of his attributes and for his unicity, proofs against 
God being substance, body, or existing in place or time, and the discussion of God’s acts, 
including the defence of Ash‘arī occasionalism. Only after all this does the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo receive its defence. Again, the two topics are cleft from one another in accordance with 
the truncated theological significance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in al-Āmidī’s thought. 
It is also immediately noteworthy from the topics present within Ghāyat al-Marām that unlike in 
the Abkār, physical theoretical topics are not treated at all. The significance of this for al-
Āmidī’s defence of his understanding of creation will be discussed later in the chapter. 
2.ii. The Proof for God’s Existence 
I will now demonstrate that al-Āmidī does not premise his proof for God’s existence on the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Furthermore, al-Āmidī’s analysis of the relationship between the 
necessary and possible of existence within his proof for God is the context for his establishment 
of God’s attributes of volition and power.  
Al-Āmidī’s proof for God is summarisable as follows: 
1. Existents in the world are possible in themselves; 
2. The possible of existence require a preponderator (murajjiḥ) in order to exist;  
3. A series of possible existents each of which is caused by a further possible existent 
regressing infinitely is impossible;  
4. Therefore, the world of possible existents must originate in an existent which is 
necessary in itself. 534 
																																																						
534 Abkār, 1, 227-8 (the proof); an extensive discussion of one of its premises, namely, the impossibility of an infinite 
regress of causes (229-235); objections from al-Āmidī’s imagined opponents; and responses (235-251). The Ghāya 
version of the proof appears on pages 9-23. 
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Al-Āmidī’s two works of theology do not differ in regard to this procedure. As is clear from this 
summary, the essential possibility of existents has supplanted the doctrine of creation ex nihilo 
as the foundation of the proof for God. This accords with my finding from Chapter 3 that al-
Āmidī holds the determinant of causedness to be essential possibility.  Al-Āmidī’s proof for the 
existence of God is premised on the understanding of the nature of causedness which he has 
inherited from Ibn Sīnā. There is no reference, within the establishment of the world’s 
dependence on a cause, to its temporal finitude.  
We saw that al-Ghāzālī’s Tahāfut diatribe against the eternalists stems in part from his 
conviction that God’s characteristic of voluntary agency, so central to the Ash‘arī vision of the 
Creator, is irrevocably premised on the temporal finitude of the world. I have also argued that 
al-Rāzī holds that the world is created ex nihilo because he believes this to be the only way in 
which a voluntary, omnipotent agent could have caused the world’s existence. It emerges, 
within al-Āmidī’s defence of his proof for God, that his analysis of the relationship between the 
necessary and possible of existence provides him with sufficient evidence of God’s voluntary 
agency. Typically of his approach in the Abkār, al-Āmidī uses the dialectical method of classical 
kalām to unravel the implications of his conviction that the possible of existence relies on its 
cause, and in particular, to differentiate his view from competing views. In defence of the 
second premise of his proof for God (that the possible of existence require a preponderator), al-
Āmidī’s understanding that this preponderator is a voluntary particularising agent is made 
plain.  
Al-Āmidī has a hypothetical opponent argue that the possible of existence does not rely on a 
cause for its existence, on the basis that this would entail that it also relies on a cause for its 
non-existence.535 This is because neither existence nor non-existence is a more likely state for 
the possible. However, argues the opponent, the possible essence cannot rely on a cause in its 
non-existence for three reasons. Firstly, because non-existence cannot be said to be an effect. 
																																																						
535 This is precisely the procedure of al-Juwaynī in his own defence of God’s existence. The crucial difference is that 
for al-Juwaynī, the discussion centres around the temporally originated existent’s need for a cause, and not that of 
the possible existent per se (Shāmil, 268-272).  
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Rather, causes can only produce existent effects. The second reason is presented as a 
disjunction. Either the cause of the non-existence of the possible is a) identical with the cause of 
its existence, or b) a separate cause. It is impossible for the cause of the existence and non-
existence of the possible to be the same. This is because it is impossible that a cause which 
necessitates the non-existence of an essence should also necessitate its contrary, namely, the 
existence of the same essence. Also, because neither non-existence nor existence is more 
probable for the possible essence, and therefore there would be nothing to determine that a 
necessitating cause bestow existence at one time on the possible essence, and non-existence at 
another. The assumption here is that the cause of the possible of existence acts on its effect by 
necessity, and is therefore unable to particularise one of two equally likely alternatives, as al-
Āmidī will later discuss. Finally, if the cause of the existence of the possible is other than the 
cause of its non-existence, neither outcome will be realised, since neither cause has greater 
priority of action than the other in relation to the possible of existence.536 Again, this assumes 
that the causes in question are necessary causes, but also, more problematically, that all 
necessitating causes are totally undifferentiated from one another in relation to the potential 
effects of their power.  
Another reason, according to al-Āmidī’s hypothetical opponent, that it is impossible for the 
possible of existence to rely on a cause, is that such a cause can neither act on its effect 
eternally, nor after not having acted on it. This is because the eternal action of the cause on its 
effect would entail the eternal existence of the possible essence. This would exclude the 
temporal origination of possible existents. Yet some possible existents do not exist eternally. 
However, it is impossible that the necessary cause comes to act on its effect after not having 
acted on it. This is because transformation of the cause from its state of non-action on its effect 
to its state of acting on its effect itself requires a cause. This entails an infinite regress of causes, 
which al-Āmidī has earlier disproven.537 
																																																						
536 Abkār, 1, 235-236. 
537 Abkār, 1, 236. This argument is problematic. In Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of efficient causation, God is eternally the 
ultimate metaphysical efficient cause of all possible existents (via the proximate efficient cause, namely, the Agent 
Intellect), but this does not entail the existence in eternity of all possible existents. This is because possible existents 
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Al-Āmidī’s responds by agreeing that it is impossible for the possible of existence to be 
produced by its causes by necessity, and arguing instead for the presence of volition and power 
in causal processes.538 Firstly, he agrees with his opponent that the possible requires a cause for 
both its existence and its non-existence (if it were otherwise, then the postulated possible 
would, in fact, be either necessary, or impossible by virtue of itself). In response to the 
opponent’s first objection, namely that pure non-existence cannot be the effect of a cause, al-
Āmidī argues that the determinant (‘illa) of non-existence is not said to be a ‘cause’ with the 
meaning that it is an entity (shay’), but in the sense that without the cause, the effect would 
exist. On this understanding, the determinant of the non-existence of the possible is the 
absence of the cause of its existence. This does not entail the fallacy of an existent producing a 
non-existent. 
More significantly for our interests, al-Āmidī now argues that the cause of both the existence 
and the non-existence of the possible is one and the same. According to him, this is only 
impossible in the cause of necessary causation by essence. This is because the non-existence of 
the possible whose existence proceeds from the essence of its cause would entail the absolute 
non-existence of that cause. However, on the assumption that the possible is caused by the 
volition and power of its cause, the non-existence of that possible is only entailed by the 
‘absence of the application (ta‘alluq) of the power to bring [the possible] into existence (al-qudra 
bi-ījādihi) and of the will to particularise its [existence] at that point (al-irāda bi-takhṣīṣihi fī dhālik 
al-waqt)’.539 On this understanding, it is correct to say that the non-existence of each possibility 
																																																						
also have immediate efficient causes, either natural or voluntary. Such causes produce their effects when all 
impediments are removed. There are multiple intermediary causal links in the chain, so to speak, between God and 
the possible existents in existence today. So God’s eternal existence as ultimate efficient cause of the universe only 
necessitates the eternity of the universe as a whole, and not of all individual possible existents. See Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 
VIII.1, and for explanation of Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of the hierarchy of efficient causation, Richardson, 
‘Avicenna’s Conception’, 230-231.  
538 Abkār, 1, 243-4.  
539 Abkār, 1, 244; c.f Ghāya, 21. 
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which subsequently comes into existence is dependent on an eternal power and eternal volition 
which together differentiate and enact its existence at the appropriate moment.540  
This facilitates al-Āmidī’s response to the second objection, regarding the impossibility of 
either the pre-eternity or time-boundedness of the causation of the effect. The eternity of the 
power and volition to cause the possible do not entail the eternity of their object, since power is 
that which particularises existence over non-existence, not that which entails existence by 
necessity. So it is correct that the effects of the power and will of the cause are time-bounded 
despite the pre-eternity of those attributes.541  
In these discussions, al-Āmidī can be seen to develop the classical Ash‘arī distinction between 
agent and determinant causes in a unique response to Ibn Sīnā’s conception of efficient 
causality. We saw earlier the background to this in the classical Ash‘arī conception of volition as 
the attribute by which an agent particularises one possibility over another. Specifically, al-
Bāqillānī stresses that the attribute of volition is not a determinant cause (‘illa) such that it must 
temporally concur with its effect.542 Al-Ghazālī takes this up as a crucial aspect of his defence of 
creation ex nihilo in the Tahāfut, stressing that volition is the capacity to choose between like 
alternatives. Al-Āmidī supports the doctrine of his school, but accounts for the action of 
volition in terms which level the debate between the theologians and philosophers by 
incorporating a notion of necessary causation. This is to say that he explains the delayed effect 
of volition by introducing a determinant cause into the process of a volitional act. This is the 
application, or connection (ta‘lluq) of the agent’s volition to a particular event. It is this 
application, and not the attribute of volition, which is the determinant cause of the origination 
of its object. On this understanding, the presence of volition in pre-eternity alongside the non-
																																																						
540 Classical Ash‘arīs articulated this with reference to God’s volition specifying the delayed creation of the world (‘alā 
l-tarākhī), such that despite the eternity of God’s volition, its effect is temporally instantiated; e.g. al-Bāqillānī, 
Tamhīd, 36. 
541 Abkār, 1, 243. 
542 See fn 487 above. 
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existence of its effect is explained as the result of the absence of the determinant cause of the 
origination of the effect, namely, the application of the volition to its object.543  
Al-Āmidī’s explanation of agency is, to my knowledge, unique to him. It represents his full 
endorsement of his school’s insistence that it is part of the definition of volition that it can 
particularise one possibility over its equivalent. However, it is also heavily influenced by Ibn 
Sīnā’s conception of causality. For classical theologians, agent causes have little in common 
with determinant causes, and there is no need to posit any kind of necessity in the causal 
relation between the world’s cause and its origination. The voluntary agent occupies a category 
of its own. Furthermore, the voluntary cause is unique in being responsible for the origination, 
and not the continued existence, of its effect. For al-Āmidī, the world’s origination must have a 
determinant cause. To this extent, he is influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s notion that the non-existence 
of an effect is only explicable as the result of the absence of a determinant for its existence, and 
its ongoing existence, as the result of the presence of the determinant. Yet the agency of God as 
understood among classical Ash‘arīs is fully preserved by al-Āmidī in that the world is the 
necessary effect not of God’s essence, but of the application of his volition and power to its 
origination at a particular moment which he, according to his absolute freedom of action, 
selects above all others.544 
We have seen that another salient feature of al-Āmidī’s discussion is the total absence of 
reference to the origination of the whole world from nothing in support of the free and 
voluntary nature of its cause. Al-Āmidī has already posited the world’s need for a cause, due not 
to its temporal origination, but its essential possibility. He argues for the voluntary nature of 
that cause not on the basis of creation ex nihilo, but rather, by positing that the only valid 
configuration for the relationship between the necessary and possible of existence is one in 
																																																						
543 See Frank, ‘Some Reflections’, 252, on the difficulty of the change of state in God which seems to be implied by the 
origination of new objects of his power. He shows that the Mu‘tazilī ‘Abd al-Jabbār explained this with reference to a 
change of state in the object of God’s power. 
544 This whole argument, repeated in Ghāyat al-Marām, also accommodates the classical occasionalist position of al-
Āmidī’s school, since it allows for the claim that God’s eternal attributes of will and power are associated with all 
temporal effects (Ghāya, 9-23, especially 20-22). I have shown elsewhere that al-Āmidī fully endorses classical Ash‘arī 
occasionalism. 
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which the necessary of existence possesses volition. To this extent, his approach is shared with 
al-Shahrastānī, whom we saw argues for the world’s creation by a voluntary cause by refuting 
the possibility of its creation by the essence of its cause. In al-Āmidī’s case, however, this also 
facilitates his doctrine that the world was created from non-existence, since the attributes are 
seen to be characterised by their freedom to act on their effects after not having acted on 
them.545 It is not the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, then, but the analysis of the relationship 
between the possible and necessary of existence, which both provides al-Āmidī with his proof 
for the Creator God of classical Ash‘arism, and also permits for his doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 
The transformed theological significance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is clear, as is the 
respective importance of the notion that the world relies on a cause on account of its 
possibility.546 
I have demonstrated so far that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo does not serve al-Āmidī’s 
defence of God’s existence, nor of his volition and power. I turn in what follows to his 
discussion of the doctrine itself. The discussion of creation in the Abkār is arranged as follows: 
definitions of the terms ‘world’, ‘eternal’, and ‘originated’ (297-309); presentation of six 
contemporary proofs for creation ex nihilo which al-Āmidī deems undemonstrative and refutes 
(309-335); presentation of the proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo (335-336); objections to 
the proof from accidents followed by fourteen proofs for the world’s eternity (337-349); 
responses to these objections and refutations of the proofs for eternity (349-363). In Ghāyat al-
Marām, al-Āmidī structures his discussion into two main parts. The first lists and critiques 
proofs proffered by theologians past and contemporary against the eternity of the world (247-
																																																						
545 We saw that for al-Shahrastānī, the concept of ‘creation from nothing’ is reinterpreted as referring to the world’s 
ontological inferiority to its cause. Al-Āmidī’s discussion does not reflect al-Shahrastānī’s on this point.  
546 In a review of the Abkār, Griffel argues that al-Āmidī’s reconciliation of falsafa and kalām ‘leans more towards falsafa 
than Ash‘arism, a fact evidenced… by his insistence that God’s “will” is part of his essence’ (Frank, ‘Sayf al-Dīn al-
Āmidī’, 46). However, al-Āmidī’s stridently and consistently defends God’s attribute of will as understood in classical 
Ash‘arism in this work. The error is a misreading of al-Āmidī’s statement that God ‘wills with a will inhering in (irāda 
qā’ima bi) his essence’; this is the standard classical Ash‘arī position, the inherence of God’s entitative attribute of will 
in his essence not entailing the identification of God’s will with his essence. Al-Āmidī immediately proceedes to 
describe God’s will as ‘pre-eternal, perpetual, existent and singular (qadīma, azaliyya, wujūdiyya, waḥida), in which 
there is no multiplicity, [and which is] connected with all possibilities, infinite in respect to itself, and not its objects’ 
(Abkār, 1, 298). This is not a falsafī perspective. 
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257). The second does the same for proofs for temporal creation (258-263). Following this, al-
Āmidī presents a proof which he claims achieves both refutation of the world’s eternity and 
establishment of its temporal finitude simultaneously (263-4), before dealing with objections 
from the eternalists (265-274). 
My aim in what follows is not to exhaustively replicate al-Āmidī’s discussions. Rather, the focus 
is thematic. I represent the major thrust of al-Āmidī’s doctrine of creation by analysing, first, 
the role of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics therein, and secondly, the place of Ash‘arī physical theory. 
3. Avicennan Metaphysics in al-Āmidī’s discussion of Creation: Critiquing 
al-Rāzī’s Proof from Possibility 
Against the background of Chapter 3, I first consider the role of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology in al-Āmidī’s 
discussions of creation. As we saw in that chapter, al-Āmidī does not devote separate space in 
his works of theology to the discussion of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics. He generally prefers to pursue 
the classical kalām procedure for theological investigation. In the case of his discussions of 
creation, this means that aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics arise within the context of al-
Āmidī’s critique of proofs for creation ex nihilo which take impetus from Ibn Sīnā’s ontology. In 
particular, al-Āmidī critiques a proof from possibility developed by al-Rāzī for his defence of 
creation ex nihilo. In this section, I therefore consider al-Āmidī’s treatment of this proof.  
My analysis focuses on two main questions. Firstly, I examine how al-Āmidī here receives Ibn 
Sīnā’s doctrine of efficient causation. Secondly, I interrogate his attitude towards the use of 
Avicennan metaphysics as a framework for the defence of creation ex nihilo. We have already 
seen that al-Āmidī in fact concurs with many tenets of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of efficient causality. In 
analysis of this proof it emerges that as a result of his adoption of aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine, 
al-Āmidī allows for the hypothetical possibility that God could have created an eternal world 
through the exercise of his volition – a belief that is foreign to classical Ash‘arism and which we 
shall see is seized upon by later commentators as the hallmark of al-Āmidī’s doctrine of 
creation. I will argue, however, that al-Āmidī’s concession to the possibility of an eternally 
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willed world must be understood in the context of his opposition to al-Rāzī. Finally, and 
crucially, we shall see that al-Āmidī is more generally opposed to al-Shahrastānī’s and 
especially al-Rāzī’s dynamic integration of falsafa with kalām, and specifically, to their 
applications of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possible existence in defence of the classical kalām doctrine 
of creation.  
The Proof from Possibility for Creation Ex Nihilo 
The proof in question appears within al-Āmidī’s list of arguments for creation ex nihilo which he 
deems undemonstrative (the first in the Abkār and the fourth in the Ghāya). In Ghāyat al-Marām, 
al-Āmidī criticises those who use this proof for having ‘abandoned [classical proofs] which have 
no value in favour of [new proofs] which have no benefit’.547 I first outline the proof as it 
appears in the Abkār. Secondly, I demonstrate how al-Āmidī uses the proof as a vehicle to 
express his opinion on a number of metaphysical postulates. Finally, I consider the importance 
of his opposition to al-Rāzī for al-Āmidī’s reception of Avicennan metaphysics in the discussion 
of creation. 
The proof is premised on the world’s essential possibility. Different versions of the proof appear 
in al-Shahrastānī’s Nihāyat al-aqdām and al-Rāzī’s Nihāyat al-‘uqūl and Kitāb al-arba‘īn. Al-Āmidī 
amalgamates these versions. 
Minor premise: The world is possible of existence by virtue of itself 
Sub-proof 1: The world’s particulars (‘ayyān) are changeable; that which is 
changeable is possible of existence by virtue of itself (al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 15) 
Sub-proof 2: The world is a composite of parts. That which is composed of parts 
cannot be necessary of existence by virtue of itself (al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 15; 
al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 344-5 and 350-1; Arba‘īn, 1, 52) 
																																																						
547 Ghāya, 252. 
	 215	
Sub-proof 3: The world’s existence is additional to its essence; this characterises 
the possible of existence (al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 345-350) 
Major premise: That which is possible of existence by virtue of itself is created by a 
voluntary agent, and is therefore temporally originated 
The possible existent cannot be produced by the essence and existence of its cause:  
a) Because existence is univocal in all existents. Existence is said to produce the 
effect, but is identical in both the posited cause and its posited effect. Therefore 
the posited cause has no greater claim to cause the posited effect than the 
inverse, since it has no attributes or qualities which are distinct from the 
existence of the posited effect (al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 15-16) 548 
b) Because all possibilities are homogenous, and an essential cause cannot 
differentiate between likes (al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 16) 
c) Because if we postulate two essences with no relation nor likeness between 
them, one cannot have proceeded from the other. Since the Necessary of 
Existence is totally unlike all other existents, it is impossible that anything 
could have proceeded directly from his essence (al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 16) 
Therefore, the world must be originated by an agent possessed of volition and power 
(al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 17; al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 352-353. For al-Shahrastānī, the proof 
ends here).549 
That which creates by volition and power can only act on its effect at the point of its 
origination (al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 353; Arba‘īn, 1, 52-53) 
																																																						
548 Ibn Sīnā in fact anticipates this objection to his notion of causation by essence in Ilāhiyyāt, IV.2; see Marmura, 
‘Avicenna on Causal Priority’, 72, on his response. 
549 As demonstrated earlier in the chapter, al-Shahrastānī has a unique conception of creation ex nihilo. The goal of his 
version of this proof is therefore only to establish the presence of volition and power in God’s creation. Al-Āmidī 
obscures this fact. 
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Conclusion: The world is temporally originated.550 
Al-Āmidī’s presentation of this proof is best understood in terms of his dialecticism. Overall, the 
form of the proof, including the number and ordering of its sub-proofs, closely concurs with al-
Shahrastānī’s version. At points, the wording is identical. And yet, as I showed earlier in this 
chapter, al-Shahrastānī’s is not a proof for the temporal origination of the world, but for its 
creation by a voluntary agent; in closing his proof, al-Shahrastānī explicitly states: 
‘existentiation by choice (al-ījād al-ikhtiyārī) has been established, and this is what we wanted to 
show’.551 It is al-Rāzī who uses this proof to establish (in Nihāyat al-‘Uqūl) the temporal 
origination of the physical bodies (ajsām) of the world, and (in his Arba‘īn), the temporal 
origination of all existents besides God. Furthermore, adjustments al-Āmidī makes to 
Shahrastānī’s proof in the form of an additional sub-proof, and the final argument that that 
which is originated by volitional is temporally originated, reflect al-Rāzī’s proof. It is typical of 
al-Āmidī in the Abkār to misrepresent the arguments of his intellectual opponents, as he has 
here, forcing al-Rāzī’s version of the proof into the mold of al-Shahrastānī’s, despite the fact 
that the latter never intended to prove the world’s temporal origination in this manner. This 
may account for al-Āmidī’s general failure to name his opponents. 
Another aspect of al-Āmidī’s dialecticism is that he raises objections which could be levelled at 
his own later defence of creation ex nihilo (in the Abkār) via the proof from accidents. In 
discussion of the first sub-proof in support of the minor premise, which appears in al-
Shahrastānī’s version but in neither of al-Rāzī’s, al-Āmidī claims that the opponent has failed to 
prove that the world is only possible of existence because he has not dealt with the problematic 
question of immaterial existents. Al-Shahrastānī has argued that since the world is manifestly 
changeable, it cannot be necessary of existence, since that which exists necessarily cannot 
change. Al-Āmidī argues that this applies only to things ‘visible to the eye’, but that there may 
be a class of existents other than God which is ‘unseen, as the opponents (al-khuṣūm) claim’, and 
																																																						
550 Abkār, 3, 309. 
551Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 17 and see page 193 above. 
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whose characteristics are therefore unknown.552 By amalgamating the arguments of al-
Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī muddies the waters and implies weaknesses in al-Rāzī’s 
argument which are not present, since al-Rāzī does not argue for the world’s essential 
possibility on the basis of its changeability.  
The proof is also a vehicle by which al-Āmidī expresses a number of beliefs concerning tenets of 
Avicennan metaphysics. Al-Āmidī of course agrees that the world is only possible by virtue of 
its own essence, and that the possible of existence can only be created by the necessary of 
existence via attributes of volition and power. He objects, however, to several metaphysical 
postulates underlying the proof, among which, al-Rāzī’s insistence that a world created by a 
voluntary agent cannot be eternal. I will delineate four key metaphysical beliefs expressed by 
al-Āmidī in the course of his critique. 
Existence and Essence are Identical 
The third sub-proof in support of the world’s possible existence (the first premise) is based on 
the ontological principle that in the possible of existence, existence is additional to essence. It is 
argued that the world’s existence is additional to its essence. This sub-proof alone does not 
appear in al-Shahrastānī’s version of the proof, but only in al-Rāzī’s, where it is defended at 
length. As shown in Chapter 3, the notion that existence is additional to the essences of things 
is al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possible existence, and an integral part of his own 
metaphysics. Al-Rāzī holds that existence is additional to essence in all existents, including 
God.553  
Al-Āmidī takes the opportunity of this proof to oppose this notion as he did in discussion of 
existence in the first volume of the Abkār, presenting his belief that existence and essence are 
one in all existents as a re-articulation of the classical Ash‘arī belief that the ‘thing’ (shay’) and 
																																																						
552 Abkār, 3, 312. 
553 Al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Ishārāt is a focus for his articulation of his understanding of existence. See especially 
Sharḥ, 2, 353-362, commenting on Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV.17. At the background to al-Āmidī’s opposition to al-Rāzī here 
in the Abkār is his reception of al-Rāzī’s position on this subject in his Kashf, where he refutes each of al-Rāzī’s 
arguments in turn. See Kashf, 2, 759-762.  
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the existent (al-mawjūd) are co-extensive.554 Al-Āmidī implies here that his opponent has 
departed from Ash‘arī doctrine; this will become more explicit later in the discussion. Al-
Āmidī’s own belief that the world’s existence is only possible is not founded on concession to 
essence/existence dualism, and it is to this that he objects. 
The Possible of Existence Derives Existence and Necessity from its Cause 
In Ghāyat al-marām, al-Āmidī presents and critiques a sub-proof belonging to al-Shahrastānī 
which is not treated in the Abkār. The proof is for the belief that the necessary of existence 
cannot cause the possible of existence by its essence (key to the second premise), and entails an 
important critique of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of efficient causation. Al-Āmidī’s response reflects his 
endorsement of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of efficient causality against al-Shahrastānī. 
 Al-Shahrastānī argues, against Ibn Sīnā, that the world derives its existence, but not its 
necessity, from its cause. He defends this belief as follows: for the possible of existence, 
existence and non-existence are equally likely (jā’iz al-wujūd wa-jā’iz al-‘adam). The essence of 
the possible therefore requires a preponderator of its existence. It is contradictory, however, to 
say that for the possible of existence, necessity and possibility are equally likely (jā’iz al-wujūb 
wa-jā’iz al-imtinā‘), and that the possible existent requires a preponderator of its necessity. This 
is because possibility is essential to the possible existent, whilst the necessity bestowed upon it 
when it comes to exist is accidental to its existence. According to al-Shahrastānī, necessitation 
and the bestowal of existence must be strictly distinguished, and the latter identified as the 
reason for the world’s reliance on the Necessary of Existence. If we understand that the world 
relies on its cause for its existence alone, then the basis of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of necessary 
causation by essence is undermined. This is because the doctrine relies upon the notion that 
though cause and effect exist simultaneously, one is known to be the cause of the other on 
account of the fact that the effect acquires necessity through its cause. On this understanding, 
the process of necessitation is requisite (and not merely accidental) to the bestowal of 
existence. If the notion of necessitation is discarded here, it is unclear how the effect relies on 
																																																						
554 Abkār, 3, 313; see 1, 220 for his first statement of his position on the equivocality of existence. 
	 219	
its essential cause despite their co-existence. This objection to Ibn Sīnā occurs both in the 
Nihāya, and in al-Shahrastānī’s focussed refutation of Avicennan metaphysics, Kitāb al-
Muṣāra‘a.555  
Al-Āmidī sharply criticises al-Shahrastānī. He writes that his predecessor’s argument ‘shows a 
failure to grasp the meaning of the opponent when he describes the world as ‘necessary of 
existence through the Necessary of Existence’’.556 He argues that the phrase ‘necessary of 
existence’ is used equivocally. It can refer to a) the necessity belonging to an existent by virtue 
of its essence (in the case of God alone), b) the necessity possessed by an existent which is 
conditional upon something external to its essence (mashrūṭ bi-amr khārij ‘an al-dhāt), including 
i) the necessity which is conditional upon existence itself (mashrūṭ bi-nafs al-wujūd) (as intended 
when we say that ‘Zayd’s existence is necessary when he exists) and ii) the necessity which is 
conditional upon the presence of a cause of existence (mashrūṭ bimā huwa muta‘alliq ‘illat al-
wujūd) (as intended when we say that ‘the effect necessarily exists when its cause is present’). In 
the last sense, we understand the existent to be necessary by virtue of its cause in the sense 
that if the cause of the existent is present, it is impossible for its effect not to exist. In this sense 
alone, the necessitation of the effect through its cause is understood to be prior, and requisite 
to, the bestowal of existence; and the necessity bestowed essential, and not accidental to, the 
possible existent. 
Al-Shahrastānī has, al-Āmidī argues, confused the latter two categories, which is to say that he 
has conflated the two ways in which a possible existent can be said to be ‘necessary’. It is true 
that the necessity belonging to Zayd by virtue of the fact that he exists is accidental to his 
existence. But it is false to suggest that necessity is therefore only ever accidental to the 
existence of the possible existent. Rather, according to al-Āmidī, in the second sense, the very 
essence of the possible existent becomes necessary of existence, by virtue of its cause. It 
becomes impossible for the essence of the possible not to exist on the assumption of the 
existence of its cause. Thus, necessity is essential to the possible existent when its cause is 
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present. This means that al-Shahrastānī’s proof is unsound, since Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the 
process of necessitation stands.557  
Al-Āmidī agrees with al-Shahrastānī that the world is not caused by necessity. However, he 
agrees with Ibn Sīnā that the effect of an efficient cause must exist simultaneously with it, and 
that it becomes necessary through its cause. Yet for him (as we have seen) the efficient cause of 
the world is not God’s essence but the application (ta‘alluq), at a particular point in time, of his 
eternal volition and power to its instantiation. Al-Āmidī holds that God’s volition and power are 
unlike his essence in that they can be associated with both the existence and the non-existence 
of their effects, since it is the nature of God’s volition either to withhold or to assert the causal 
efficacy of his power. Yet this does not undermine the understanding that the non-existence of 
an effect is impossible upon the presence of its efficient cause. It is not the absence of God’s 
volition and power, but the absence of their application to their effects which prevents the 
existence of those effects. Al-Āmidī’s point here is that al-Shahrastānī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā is 
unsound, and cannot be used to undermine the doctrine of the world’s eternity. Al-Āmidī 
supports Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of efficient causation despite his opposition to the idea that 
the world’s efficient cause is God’s essence. 
Ibn Sīnā’s Categories of Precedence are Comprehensive 
That al-Shahrastānī’s response to Avicennan metaphysics is a target for al-Āmidī is confirmed 
when, in Ghāyat al-Marām, he identifies ‘Muḥammad al-Shahrastānī’ as the deviser of another 
concept which he critiques in this latter work alone.558 We came across the notion earlier in this 
chapter. We saw that al-Shahrastāni is critical of Ibn Sīnā’s five categories of precedence, 
specifically accusing him of conflating the categories ‘causal’ and ‘existential’ precedence 
within the category ‘essential precedence’. Al-Shahrastānī argues that there is a kind of 
precedence which relates to the mode of one being’s existence in relation to another, regardless 
of any causal relationship between the two. He uses the notion to argue that though God is not 
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temporally nor positionally prior to the world (since he is not in time or space), he is 
ontologically prior in the sense that his existence is in no respects concomitant with or 
equivalent to that of the world.559 This argument functions as proof against God’s necessitation 
of the world. 
Al-Āmidī writes that al-Shahrastānī devised a method which he thought would have allowed 
‘his predecessors to win [the creation debate]’ (ḥāz bihā qaṣb sabaq al-mutaqaddimīn), a claim 
which is al-Shahrastānī’s own.560 Al-Āmidī objects to al-Shahrastānī’s suggestion that there is a 
sixth category of precedence. He writes that the opponent could argue that the ‘ontological 
precedence’ of an existent is not distinct from other kinds of precedence. An existent may, 
indeed, have derivative existence and therefore be ontologically posterior to the existent whose 
existence is necessary. Yet two such existents must also be characterised according to one of 
the following configurations: 1) there is a period of time between the ontologically posterior 
existent and the ontologically prior existent, so that the ontologically posterior existent is also 
temporally posterior; 2) the two existents exist simultaneously in time and either a) the 
ontologically posterior existent relies for its existence on the ontologically prior existent 
(causal posteriority) or b) there is no causal relationship but the ontologically posterior existent 
is posterior i) by virtue of a characteristic of its essence (posteriority of honour); or ii) by virtue 
of an external factor (posteriority of space or rank).561 This means that an Avicennan can defend 
the comprehensiveness of Ibn Sīnā’s categories, and that al-Shahrastānī cannot refute Ibn Sīnā’s 
doctrine in this way.  
As I have repeatedly stressed, al-Āmidī is in total agreement that the world is not a product of 
God’s essence. His understanding that the world is caused by the application of God’s volition 
and power allows him, however, to fully endorse Ibn Sīnā’s categories of precedence and his 
concomitant theory of efficient causation. For al-Āmidī, the application (ta‘alluq) of God’s power 
to the instantiation of the world is both ontologically and causally prior to the existence of the 
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560 Ghāya: 258; c.f. al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 9. 
561 Ghāya, 260. 
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world. Yet this does not entail the world’s eternity, since the efficient cause in question is not 
God’s essence. 
An Eternal Will Could Produce an Eternal Effect 
In critiquing the proof’s second premise, al-Āmidī rejects the notion that an existent created by 
the volition of its cause is necessarily temporally originated. This is one of the most distinctive 
features of his discussion, and becomes an important hook upon which later commentators 
hang their readings of al-Āmidī on creation, particularly contrasting his position with that of al-
Rāzī.  
 In presenting objections to the final premise of the proof, al-Āmidī claims that one could argue 
that the will to create the world co-existed eternally with the world itself (qaṣduhu lahu 
muqārinan li-wujūdihi). He defends this on the basis that prior to the existence of a temporally 
originated world, it was eternally non-existent. This non-existence could not be deemed 
necessary, given the world’s subsequent existence. Therefore, the eternal non-existence of the 
world was only possible, and like all possibilities, required a preponderator ‘whether a 
preponderator by essence (murajjiḥ bi-dhāt) or by choice (murajjiḥ bi-l-ikhtiyār)’. This, he writes, 
undermines the view that ‘that which depends on a preponderator must be temporally 
originated.’562 This would mean that the temporal origination of a world created by volition is 
not more likely than its eternal existence through that cause. There is an aspect of confusion 
here in that though al-Āmidī uses the term murajjiḥ to conclude his argument, he must be 
referring specifically to a voluntary preponderator, since his opponent has claimed that the 
effect of such a preponderator (and not of preponderating causes per se) must be temporally 
originated.  
The background of al-Āmidī’s opposition to al-Rāzī is crucial here. Al-Āmidī’s expression of this 
point occurs in the context of his critique of every premise of al-Rāzī’s proof from possibility – 
including premises which he supports. For instance, we have seen in this context that al-Āmidī 
																																																						
562 Abkār, 3, 314. 
	 223	
refutes arguments for the world’s essential possibility, writing: ‘what prevents us from saying 
that the world is necessary?’.563 And in discussion of the notion that the world cannot be 
produced by the essence of its cause, he questions each of his opponent’s arguments against 
causation by essence.564 Both the world’s essential necessity and its creation by the essence of 
its cause are blatantly contradictory to al-Āmidī’s own view, so that his suggestion that the 
world could be eternally willed must also be received with caution. 
 It is, however, true, that al-Āmidī’s proof for God can also be taken to entail concession to the 
possibility of an eternally willed world, though this remains implicit. We saw in the previous 
section that he maintains there that the world’s creation ex nihilo is impossible on the 
assumption of necessary causation. This, he argues, is because the cause which acts by necessity 
must produce its effect as long as the cause exists. If the world’s cause is the essence of God, its 
effect can only be a pre-eternal world. It is partly on this basis that al-Āmidī constructs his 
argument that the world’s cause must act by volition. The inverse, however, is not true. That is 
to say that whilst al-Āmidī holds that the world’s creation ex nihilo is precluded by necessary 
causation, he does not argue that the world’s eternity is precluded by voluntary creation. He 
holds that in the case of causation by volition, the absence of the effect is attributable to the 
absence of the application of volition to the existence of the effect (and not to the absence of 
the volition). 565  Although al-Āmidī himself does not stress this point in this part of the work, 
his theory here does not necessarily preclude the application of volition to its effect in pre-
eternity. Thus, when he writes elsewhere that ‘the existence of an eternal power and volition 
does not entail (lā yalzam) the eternity of that which is particularised by them’, the expression 
‘lā yalzam’ permits for the possibility of an eternally willed world.566  
Despite the significance of this notion, it is not one which al-Āmidī develops in his doctrine of 
creation. This seems in large part to be because he firmly upholds creation ex nihilo as 
traditionally understood. Later commentators, however, perhaps beginning with al-Ījī, tend to 
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stereotype al-Āmidī’s doctrine of creation with reference to this particular point of his 
discussion. Al-Ījī, following al-Rāzī, writes of the consensus between the philosophers and 
theologians on the impossibility of an eternal world’s creation by a voluntary, powerful agent 
(al-qādir al-mukhtār). Like al-Rāzī, he holds that the theologians do not deny that if the world 
were the product of a necessitating cause, it would be eternal. He goes on: ‘as for [an eternal 
world’s] dependence upon a voluntary [agent], al-Āmidī permitted this, arguing that 
precedence [in the case of] existentiation by intention is the [same as] precedence [in the case 
of] existentiation by necessity: just as [the precedence of the necessary cause is] essential, not 
temporal, the same is possible in the case [of the voluntary cause]’.567 This he contrasts directly 
with the view of al-Rāzī, and opposes the former at length.  
Al-Ījī’s reading of al-Āmidī here takes at face value his concession to the world’s hypothetical 
eternity in the context of his critique of al-Rāzī, then interprets this position according to al-
Āmidī’s own account of the process of creation by volition. Al-Āmidī has argued that a 
temporally originated world is the product of a necessitating determinant cause (the 
application of God’s volition to its existence at a particular point). By extension, al-Ījī takes al-
Āmidī’s concession to the eternity of a world enacted by volition to imply the view that God’s 
volition is essentially prior to the world such that it could have been the cause of an eternal 
world. This reading of al-Āmidī appears to have become standard, appearing again in ‘The 
Precious Pearl (al-durra al-fākhira)’ of the fifteenth-century Ṣūfī ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī (d. 
897/1492), where he repeats al-Ījī’s statement of al-Āmidī’s view almost verbatim.568 Endress 
also claims that ‘among the characteristic opinions of al-Āmidī is that the effect of a divine act 
of will can be eternal, contrary to the prevailing conception of the falāsifa that the necessarily 
acting cause alone can be eternal’.569  
																																																						
567 Al-Ījī, Mawāqif, 74-5. 
568 Edited and translated by Heer as The Precious Pearl, 57-58, ‘the priority of bringing-into-existence by intention 
(qaṣdan) to the existence of the effect (al-ma‘lūl) is just like the priority of bringing-into-existence by necessity 
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contemporaneous with the thing intended (al-maqṣūd), but to be prior to it in essence.’ 
569 Endress, ‘Die Dreifache’, 128. Endress does not expand on this claim. 
	 225	
Yet it seems that the importance of this aspect of al-Āmidī’s discussion for his own doctrine of 
creation has been exaggerated, partly due to the importance of al-Rāzī’s belief that the effect of 
a voluntary cause must be created ex nihilo for subsequent debate. Given the significance of this 
Rāzian theory, it is those aspects of al-Āmidī’s discussion which appear to present an 
alternative which have been isolated and generalised as representing al-Āmidī’s most 
significant comment on the creation debate. However, although al-Āmidī’s theory allows for 
the possibility of an eternally willed world, he does not himself make this a significant theme in 
his discussion. It is true to say that al-Āmidī holds the application of God’s volition to the 
world’s creation to be essentially, and not temporally prior to the world. However, it is a 
misreading of his position to suggest (as al-Ījī does) that al-Āmidī holds God’s volition itself to 
be essentially prior to the world. Rather, he holds that God’s volition is temporally prior to the 
world (existing from pre-eternity), but comes to act on its effect in time through the 
determinant cause of its application to its effect. This, he holds, according to the doctrine of his 
school, is within the very nature of volition.  
Though al-Āmidī writes, in this context, that ‘the existence of an eternal power and will does 
not entail (lā yalzam) the eternity of that which is particularised by them’ (which implies, as we 
have seen, the hypothetical possibility of an eternally willed world) the following statement 
clarifies al-Āmidī’s own view: ‘[we argue rather for the world’s] dependence on an eternal 
power which determined its non-existence, and on an eternal will which determined the 
particularisation (iqtaḍat takhsis) of its non-existence at that time, just as it determined the 
particularisation of its existence at another time: and the preponderator of both [its non-
existence and existence] is one, with no multiplicity, even if the objects to which it is applied 
(muta‘alliq) are multiple.’570 Al-Āmidī is quite clear that though God’s volition is eternal, its 
effects are not. Though his theory allows for the possibility of an eternally willed world, al-Ījī’s 
interpretation of his theory generalises this view as representing al-Āmidī’s main contribution 
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to the creation debate, and in doing so obscures al-Āmidī’s firm commitment to creation ex 
nihilo, and the implicit and underdeveloped nature of his comments on this point.571  
Although his concession to the notion of an eternally willed world is not, in fact, as significant 
for al-Āmidī’s doctrine of creation as later commentators suggest, it is the opinion which most 
decidedly marks out al-Āmidī’s thought from that of his Ash‘arī predecessors and peers. I have 
shown that for al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is important primarily 
because it preserves the understanding that the world’s cause is possessed of will. I showed how 
the axis around which al-Rāzī’s defence of creation revolves is the notion that though eternal 
effects are possible, God’s being a voluntary agent entails that the world must have been 
created ex nihilo. Al-Āmidī here disagrees, allowing that it is plausible that the world’s cause is 
an agent possessed of an attribute of volition by which he determined the eternal existence of 
the world.  
Al-Āmidī’s final comments on the proof from possibility in the Abkār underline his intellectual 
project. He argues that the use of a metaphysical proof for the world’s creation ex nihilo by his 
opponent (this being al-Rāzī), is problematic in relation to the Ash‘arī doctrine that God’s 
attributes of knowledge, power, volition, etc, are entitative. This is because the opponent’s 
																																																						
571 Indeed, as Heer points out, al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390), in his Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, claims that al-Āmidī does not make this 
statement in his Abkār (Heer, The Precious Pearl, 82). Early on, theologians were having difficulty finding the source of 
al-Ījī’s reading of al-Āmidī. 
A contrast is the thought of Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, who narrows the gap between causation by volition (bi-l-
irāda) and causation by ‘power’ or ‘nature’ (quwwa aw ṭabī‘a, or bi-ghayr al-irāda) by claiming that in both cases, a 
delayed effect is impossible. He sees both as kinds of necessary causes (al-asbāb al-mūjiba), the existence of the effects 
of which must, in the absence of impediments, occur without delay (Mu‘tabar, 3, 34-35). My thanks to Andreas 
Lammer for giving me access to his discussion of this passage, which appears in his forthcoming ‘Two Sixth/Twelfth- 
Century Hardliners on Creation’. 
Al-Āmidī was probably aware of Abū l-Barakāt’s thought on creation, given his references to the philosopher in his 
Nūr. His acknowledgement of the hypothetical possibility of an eternally willed world may result from his awareness 
of Abū l-Barakāt’s position. It may even be that al-Āmidī’s theory that the application (ta‘alluq) of God’s volition to its 
effects is the efficient cause of their existence is inspired by Abū l-Barakāt’s conception of volitional and non-
volitional creation as types of necessary causation. In this case, al-Āmidī’s theory could represent a counter-critique 
of Abu l-Barakāt, whose objective is to insist that whether or not creation occurs by volition, the world must be 
eternal. By identifying the application of God’s volition, and not God’s volition itself, as the necessary cause of the 
world’s existence, al-Āmidī denies the necessity of the world’s eternity. 
However, al-Āmidī does not discuss his peer’s theory, nor reference his views of creation, and it is therefore difficult 
to establish a direct influence. Al-Āmidī’s more immediate opponent is al-Rāzī.   
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proof from the nature of possible existence entails establishing that only a single existent 
whose existence is of necessity can exist, and that everything outside this existent must be 
temporally originated. This is a reference to the second sub-proof for the minor premise, 
namely that a composite of parts cannot be necessary of existence by virtue of itself. Al-Rāzī 
argues for this point on the basis that the parts of the composite cannot be necessary of 
existence by virtue of themselves, because there can be no two beings which necessarily exist. 
But if the parts of the composite are only possible, the composite they produce cannot be 
necessary of existence. The argument for the impossibility of the necessity of the existence of 
the parts is the same as used in Ibn Sīnā’s proof for the unicity of the Necessary of Existence, 
adopted by al-Rāzī in his own works of theology.572  However, the use of this notion to prove 
that God’s essence alone is eternal calls into question the notion that there are eternally 
existing attributes additional to the essence of the necessary of existence itself. 
In this part of the discussion, the nature of al-Āmidī’s opposition to al-Rāzī is most transparent. 
Al-Āmidī believes al-Rāzī’s attempted integration of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics into the defence of 
the kalām doctrine of creation to have failed. He writes: ‘it may be that the proponent [of this 
proof] does not uphold the existence of entitative attributes additional to the essence of God’. 
However, he continues, ‘on the assumption that the proponent of this proof (al-mustadill bi-
hādhihi l-ṭarīqa) is an Ash‘arī who upholds the existence of additional attributes, he is forced to 
[deal with this matter]’..573 According to al-Āmidī, his opponent must admit either to having 
failed to prove that God has entitative attributes, but succeeded in proving creation ex nihilo, or 
the inverse. Al-Rāzī himself is conscious of this problem in his Arba‘īn version of the proof, 
writing that ‘it is a difficult question, for the resolution of which we must seek God’s help’.574 
What is important for our purposes is al-Āmidī’s explicit suggestion that his contemporary’s 
use of the Avicennan inspired metaphysical paradigm for establishing creation ex nihilo 
compromises his defence of core Ash‘arī doctrine. As conclusion to the discussion, this supports 
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the view that al-Āmidī looks unfavourably on al-Rāzī’s departure from the classical Ash‘arī 
physical theoretical paradigm for the defence of creation.575 This paves the way for his own 
assertion (in the Abkār) of the sufficiency and superiority of the classical Ash‘arī proof from 
accidents.  
Al-Āmidī’s theory of causality is primarily expressed in evaluation of proofs for and against 
creation ex nihilo, and its detail is therefore ascertained only through careful attention to these 
dialectics. My discussion of al-Āmidī’s treatment of the proof from possibility for creation ex 
nihilo has revealed some distinguishing features of al-Āmidī’s theory. Al-Āmidī opposes Ibn 
Sīnā’s notion of the duality of essence and existence as mediated by al-Rāzī, emphasising the 
validity of the classical Ash‘arī conception of the thing. However, he is highly accommodating 
of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of efficient causation. Al-Āmidī fully supports Ibn Sīnā’s notion of essential 
precedence as entailing both the ontological superiority of cause over effect and its causal 
priority in necessitating the existence of its effect. For him, Ibn Sīnā’s categories of precedence 
are thus comprehensive and his explanation of the process of causal efficacy via necessitation 
sound. Al-Āmidī distinguishes his own view from Ibn Sīnā’s, however, by arguing that it is not 
the essence of God which is the necessitating cause of the world, but the application of his 
attributes of power and volition. I have also argued that despite its importance for later 
characterisations of al-Āmidī’s views on creation, his concession to the hypothetical possibility 
of an eternally enacted world is not significant for his own doctrine. 
In this era in the history of kalām, the metaphysical analysis of the nature of existence was 
inescapably integral to the discussion of creation. Indeed, the evaluation of Ibn Sīnā’s modal 
ontology and his conception of efficient causation occupies the majority of al-Āmidī’s 
treatment of proofs for creation in Ghāyat al-marām. Al-Āmidī is, however, concerned with 
defending the sufficiency of classical kalām proofs. In this objective, al-Rāzī, ‘the philosophising 
Muslim’, is his primary intellectual opponent. 
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4. Ash‘arī Physical Theory in al-Āmidī’s Discussion of Creation  
4.i. Physical Theory in post-Avicennan Ash‘arī Discussions of Creation 
In this section, I consider al-Āmidī’s use of the physical theory of classical Ash‘arism in defence 
of creation ex nihilo. Here, the findings of Chapter 4 will be relevant. I begin by considering how 
physical theory features in the discussions of creation of the three post-classical theologians 
whose works form the immediate context for al-Āmidī’s. 
4.i.a. Al-Ghazālī 
As I have argued, in keeping with his insistence on the kalām conception of causedness as 
pertaining to the temporal originatedness of an existent, al-Ghazālī must prove the world’s 
creation ex nihilo in support of his proof for God. The Ash‘arī physical theoretical framework 
remains al-Ghazālī’s essential frame of reference in his proof for a freely acting creator. 
However, he also reacts against the priority given by classical Ash‘arīs to physical theory. 
Al-Ghazālī argues in the Iqtiṣād that in order to establish the world’s creation ex nihilo, one must 
prove the temporal origination of space occupying existents and the accidents inhering within 
them. He maintains that the world is ‘every existent other than God’, exhaustively categorised 
as ‘bodies and accidents’.  As we saw in Chapter 4, unlike his classical Ash‘arī predecessors, al-
Ghazālī does not spill much ink in defence of his ontology. He is not concerned with extensive 
physical theoretical deliberations with regard to the nature of body and accident. He simply 
states that there are space occupying existents, which, when unaggregated, are called 
substances, and when aggregated, bodies. Non-space occupying existents are either those 
which inhere within body, or God, the sole self-inhering immaterial existent according to al-
Ghazālī’s ontology.576 Al-Ghazālī insists that this much is known by basic sense perception, and 
does not, therefore, require demonstration. He is critical of what he sees as unnecessary debate 
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over the existence and nature of body and accident, and of immaterials. According to him, a 
reasonable minded person is convinced of the existence of bodies and accident by sensory data.  
Proof for the existence of immaterials, on the other hand, being unattainable via sense data, 
must be the subject of rational enquiry. Al-Ghazālī sees his proof for God as just that – a 
demonstration of the existence and nature of existents extraneous to the world which, for him, 
amount to a single existent responsible for the existence of everything else. He writes: ‘As for 
the existent which is neither a body nor an accident, this is not known by sensory perception. 
And we claim that [such an existent] does exist, and that the world exists through Him and by 
his power. And this is known by proof, not by the senses.’ 577  That is to say that rather than 
attempting to disprove the immaterial intellects and souls of the philosophers’ ontology, al-
Ghazālī will provide positive proof for the existence of a sole immaterial being responsible for 
the creation and sustainment of the world. He believes that this will eliminate, by default, the 
existence of innumerable other immaterials, since there is no room, within the resultant 
ontology, for such beings.578 To al-Ghazālī’s mind, then, the ‘problem’ of immaterials is not a 
problem at all. 
Therefore, al-Ghazālī can use a version of the proof from accidents in his defence of the 
origination of the world ex nihilo. He structures the proof as a syllogism based on the two 
premises 1) no body can be devoid of temporally originated existents (ḥawādith) and 2) that 
which is not devoid of temporally originated existents is itself temporally originated. The first 
premise he proves by arguing that a body must either be at rest or in motion. He then deals 
with objections to a) the existence of accidents of rest and motion and b) their temporal 
origination. This part of the discussion occasions a second critique of the excessive discussions 
of accidents among previous theologians (qad ṭawwala jawābuhu fī taṣānīf al-kalām wa-laysa 
tastaḥiqq al-taṭwīl). According to al-Ghazālī, no right minded person can deny the existence of 
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Marmura’s translation).  
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accidents – for do we not all experience pain, hunger and thirst? And do we not all observe the 
changing states of other bodies in the world? Those who deny the existence and originatedness 
of accidents are simply obstinate.579  
Al-Ghazālī does effect a defence of his proof, all the while complaining that furnishing that 
which is immediately known (al-wāḍiḥāt) with proof creates greater obscurity, and not clarity. 
This entails a response to objections such as that of the opponent who holds that motion is not 
temporally originated, but latent (kāmin) in the body at rest. Here al-Ghazālī writes: ‘if we 
concerned ourselves with topics outside the [main] objective in this work, we would first 
disprove latency and emergence in the discussion of accidents, but we are not bothered by that 
which does not undermine our [main] objective’. Therefore he concedes the existence of 
latency but argues that even latent motion within a body is temporally originated.580 Al-Ghazālī 
is explicit about his pragmatism here, and this entails something of a critique of classical 
Ash‘arism. Despite the familiar framework he uses for discussion of creation and of God’s 
existence, al-Ghazālī is unlike his Ash‘arī predecessors in being unconcerned with elaborate 
physical theoretical questions, since he believes them to be either settled through sense data 
and therefore not the subject of his rational investigations, or tangential to his overriding 
theological concerns.  
4.i.b. Al-Shahrastānī 
We have seen that al-Shahrastānī proffers a metaphysical proof for the world’s origination by a 
voluntary, omnipotent agent. The process that leads him to promote this proof reveals his 
attitude towards the classical Ash‘arī paradigm. Before presenting his metaphysical proof, he 
lists four classical proofs, first among which is the proof from accidents, the proof which ‘most 
of the theologians’ used. Other proofs are two which al-Shahrastānī identifies with al-Ash‘arī, 
and a version of the proof from particularisation for the creator identified with al-Juwaynī.581 
																																																						
579 Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 27. 
580 Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 28. 
581 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 11-14. 
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Despite developing this latter proof, he comments after citing these classical proofs that they 
rely on premises which may be hard to verify. These include proving that bodies are finite in 
dimension, establishing the existence of a void (such that the world can accurately be 
attributed the possibility of a position other than its actual position in support of the proof 
from particularization), and proving that existents other than God are exhaustively categorised 
into body (jirm) and that which inheres in body. With regard to this last premise, he points out 
that the opponent affirms existents outside these categories which ‘eternally exist [by virtue of] 
something other [than their own essences]’, that is, eternal immaterials such as the intellects. 582  
Thus, he casts doubt on the sufficiency of the physical theoretical premises of classical Ash‘arī 
proofs for creation by a voluntary agent. His preference for a metaphysical proof leads to his 
neglect of physical theory in this regard. 
4.i.c. Al-Rāzī 
Two main objections to the use of the kalām physical theoretical framework for establishing 
creation ex nihilo can be found in al-Rāzī’s thought. The first, which we came across in the 
previous section, relates to the contentious question of the existence of immaterials. In the 
preliminaries of his discussion of creation in the Arba‘īn, al-Rāzī argues that both classical and 
contemporaries theologians (al-awwalūn wa-l-ākhirūn) have relied on proofs for creation which 
prove only the temporal origination of bodies and accidents, relying on the exhaustive division 
of existents other than God into these categories. However, such proofs are deficient if there 
are immaterials other than God. He cites the theologians’ ‘strongest proof’ against the existence 
of immaterials, and shows that it is not demonstrative.583 From the outset, then, al-Rāzī casts 
doubt on the sufficiency of Ash‘arī physical theory as a paradigm for the defence of creation ex 
nihilo. These comments are echoed in his latest work, the Maṭālib, also within his preliminary 
discussions.584 
																																																						
582 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya, 14. 
583 Al-Rāzī, Arba‘īn, 1, 22-23. 
584 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 4, 12. 
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The second of al-Rāzī’s objections, which appears in the Maṭālib, is more general, and concerns 
the theologians’ mode of inferring knowledge about creation from the nature of the physical 
world. As we have seen, al-Rāzī presents several proofs from the nature of body for creation ex 
nihilo, of which he styles his own proof from motion and rest as the most superior. However, at 
the close of this discussion, al-Rāzī unfavourably compares kalām proofs for creation ex nihilo 
which are premised on the nature of physical body with philosophical proofs for eternity 
premised on the nature of the world’s cause. The basis of this unfavourable comparison is 
logical. Al-Rāzī argues that proofs which demonstrate the grounds of the thing proven (burhān 
al-lima, literally ‘demonstration of the why’, in this case, demonstration that the world is eternal 
because of the nature of its cause) are superior to those which simply demonstrate that 
something is the case (burhān al-anna, literally, ‘demonstration of the that’, in this case, 
demonstration that the world is created ex nihilo on the basis of observation of the world itself, 
without relating this to the grounds of its originatedness).585  
This functions as a statement against the classical Ash‘arī physical theoretical framework for 
the discussion of creation. Subsequently, al-Rāzī will focus on teleological proofs for the 
creation of the world ex nihilo which have their foundation in the metaphysical theory that that 
which is created by will and power must be temporally originated – that is to say, they are 
proofs inferred from the nature of the world’s cause. Despite his considerable efforts at refining 
the proof from accidents, at the background to this is al-Rāzī’s clear understanding that such 
proofs can only ever establish the temporal origination of the physical world to the exclusion of 
immaterials. He is aware that the impossibility of disproving the existence of immaterials will 
undermine any proof for creation premised on the nature of physical body. This is why he 
ultimately prefers proofs based on the nature of God. Like al-Shahrastānī before him, and 
unsurprisingly given his own reception of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical framework for the relation 
between the world and its cause, al-Rāzī moves away from the physical theoretical model for 
establishing the world’s creation ex nihilo. 
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4.ii. Al-Āmidī on Physical Theoretical Proofs for Creation Ex Nihilo 
I will argue in this section that al-Āmidī also ultimately abandons the physical theoretical 
model for the defence of creation ex nihilo. It is necessary to treat the Abkār and Ghāya distinctly, 
since al-Āmidī’s position evolves between the works. I begin with the Abkār. Al-Āmidī’s 
discussion of the proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo is the focus.586  
4.ii.a. Al-Āmidī’s use of the Proof from Accidents 
For all the impression Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics has made on his thought, and despite his high 
level engagement with the innovative use to which his contemporaries put this philosophy in 
defence of creation ex nihilo, in the Abkār, al-Āmidī prefers to use the physical theoretical 
framework of classical Ash‘arism. I argue that this stems from the desire to show the sufficiency 
of that framework, and of the school of thought it represents, in the face of a radically different 
way of viewing the world. 
Al-Āmidī identifies the proof as ‘the famous method of the Ash‘arīs’ (al-maslak al-mashhūr li-l-
aṣḥāb).587 It is presented as follows: 
Minor Premise: The world is a composite of temporally originated parts. 
Major Premise: That which is a composite of temporally originated parts is itself 
temporally originated. 
Conclusion: The world is temporally originated. 
This presentation formalises the proof from accidents according to Aristotelian conventions for 
demonstration, like both al-Ghazālī’s and al-Rāzī’s Nihāya versions of the proof.588 There is an 
																																																						
586 It is worth noting, however, that in this section al-Āmidī extensively critiques al-Rāzī’s version of the proof from 
accidents, which focuses on the impossibility of motion or rest in eternity (Abkār, 3, 327-335). Although al-Āmidī is 
indeed opposed to al-Rāzī’s use of the metaphysical framework for discussion of creation (as shown in the previous 
section), the fact that he critiques his opponent’s refined version of the proof from accidents, demonstrates that he is 
primarily opposed to al-Rāzī as an intellectual. See al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 223-344 for al-Rāzi’s version of the proof from 
accidents and his careful and extensive critique and defence, which leads to his proof from motion and rest, found in, 
e.g. Arba‘īn, 1, 32-37, defended 37-49; Maṭālib, 4, 245-256. 
587 Abkār, 3, 335. 
588 Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 24; al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 223. 
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adjustment in al-Āmidī’s version, namely that the major premise refers to the temporal 
originatedness of that which is composed of temporally originated parts. Both the classical 
version and al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī’s formalised versions refer instead to the temporal 
originatedness of that which is not devoid of temporally originated parts, a principle which al-
Āmidī subsumes within the minor premise. Though this adjustment seems innocuous enough, it 
actually reflects a departure from the parameters of classical Ash‘arī ontology, as I shall 
explain. 
Al-Āmidī writes that the minor premise relies on a further syllogism whose premises are a) the 
categorisation of existents in the world into substance and accident and b) the temporal 
originateness of both substance and accident. Al-Āmidī writes that he has already proven each 
of these premises, as part of his discussion of ‘the possible existent’, in the course of his physical 
theoretical discussions. This refers to his having already established the following premises: the 
exhaustive categorization of the possible existent into material substance and accident 
(premise 1); the existence of accidents; their non-endurance; that substance cannot be devoid 
of accident; the impossibility of an infinite regress of temporal occurences; and that things 
which cannot be devoid of that which is temporally originated are themselves temporally 
originated (premise 2). The importance of al-Āmidī’s defence of Ash‘arī physical theory, 
discussed in Chapter 4, is unmissable. 
In proving the second premise, al-Āmidī argues that if all the parts of the world are temporally 
originated, the ‘unifying structure’ (al-hay’a al-ijtimā‘iyya) of the world must also be temporally 
originated, a fact he claims is known immediately. This argument is straightforward in itself, 
though the notion that composite existents possess a unifying principle is alien to classical 
Ash‘arī ontology. In classical Ash‘arī ontology, no existent amounts to more than the sum of the 
atoms of which it is composed. On the assumption of this ontology, the major premise in this 
argument is superfluous: all that needs to be proven is that the world’s atoms and accidents are 
temporally originated. It is only when the composite is held to be other than the sum of its 
parts that the major premise is required. The addition of this premise is surprising given that 
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al-Āmidī nowhere departs from the Ash‘arī ontology elsewhere in the work: we saw (in Chapter 
4) that he embraces the atom-accident dichotomy of classical Ash‘arism.  
However, the ambiguity of his position regarding the status of complex entities is also reflected, 
for instance, in his discussion of the nature of the human. Classical Ash‘arīs held that the 
human was not a genuine unity, but simply the aggregate of its atoms.589 Shihadeh shows how 
this stems from the theocentric ontology of the Ash‘arīs. 590 Al-Āmidī does not endorse any 
alternative (such as the body-soul dualism of the philosophers). However, he ultimately 
suspends judgement on the question.591 This creates room for speculation about his position on 
complex entities, which he nowhere clarifies. 
The ambiguity may reflect a Rāzian influence. In his epistemological discussions, al-Rāzī makes 
a basic division between complexes and simples, and holds that the unifying structure (al-hay’a 
al-ijtimā‘iyya) of a complex entity (ḥaqīqa murakabba) is one of the parts of which it is 
composed.592 Ibrahim argues that al-Rāzī holds a phenomenalist understanding of the nature of 
scientific knowledge – which is to say that he believes that we may not have access to 
knowledge regarding the noumenal entities of which bodies in the natural world are composed, 
but only pertaining to complex phenomenon.593 Al-Āmidī borrows the terminology of al-Rāzī’s 
discussions of body here in his own proof from accidents without reflection on the associated 
epistemology.  
Following the proof, al-Āmidī presents several objections. Strikingly, these are mostly formal, 
which is to say that al-Āmidī is primarily concerned to defend the logical validity of the proof. 
The critique of the form of the proof is also found in al-Rāzī’s discussion in the Nihāya.594 One 
example will suffice. As one objection to the form (ṣūra) of the proof, al-Āmidī has his opponent 
																																																						
589 Within this general position, there were debates as to the constitution and location of the human soul. Al-Āmidī 
reviews many of these positions (Abkār, 4, 274-276). 
590 See Shihadeh, ‘Classical Ash‘arī Anthropology’, 474-475.  
591 Abkār, 4, 302. 
592 Al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 111. 
593 See Ibrahim, ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’, especially 401-2.  
594 Al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 229-234. 
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examine the statement made in the major premise: ‘the composite of temporally originated 
parts (al-mu’allaf min al-ajzā’ al-ḥāditha) is temporally originated.’ The opponent argues that the 
subject (‘the composite of temporally originated parts’) must refer either to a) only certain 
composites, or b) all such composites, in which case it is taken to include the world as a whole. 
If the scope of the subject is taken to be limited to certain composites, it does not produce the 
conclusion desired by the proof (lā intāj), because of the possibility that the composites to which 
the predicate ‘are temporally originated’ applies do not include the world.  
However, if the subject in this minor premise (‘the composite of temporally originated parts’) is 
taken to refer to all composites of temporally originated parts, this entails the logical fallacy of 
assuming the conclusion of the argument within one of its premises (begging the question, al-
muṣādara ‘alā l-maṭlūb), since the major premise ‘the composite of temporally originated parts is 
temporally originated’ contains the concealed claim that ‘the world is temporally originated’.595 
Al-Āmidī’s response to this objection to the form of his proof begins with a definition of the 
logical fallacy al-muṣādara ‘alā l-maṭlūb. He writes that a proof only contains this fallacy if the 
proof’s conclusion is found concealed within one of the premises of the syllogism. The proof he 
has presented does not fit this characterisation. This is because the major premise, ‘the 
composite of temporally originated parts is temporally originated’ does not contain the 
conclusion, as the opponent has argued. Rather, the conclusion is derived from the premise in 
that the world is only deemed temporally originated with respect to its composition (ta’līf), and 
not per se. That is to say that the minor premise provides the condition by which the world is 
deemed temporally originated, i.e. with respect to its being composed of temporally originated 
parts.596  
Al-Āmidī deals with several such objections, all of which appear to be hypothetical. It seems 
that his intent is to show that the classical Ash‘arī proof has all the logical rigour required in 
the post-Avicennan age of kalām. With regard to his hypothetical opponent’s critique of the 
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veracity of the proof’s premises, al-Āmidī simply refers his reader back to the earlier physical 
theoretical discussions, where he says these premises have been established.597 
4.ii.d. Problems with the Proof from Accidents 
In the Nūr, al-Āmidī the philosopher critiques the proof from accidents, attributing it to ‘a 
certain genius from among the opponents’ and describing it as ‘far from demonstrative’ (ba‘īda 
‘an al-taḥṣīl).598 His refutation is brief and focused on one fatal flaw in the proof, namely, its 
inability to disprove the eternity of immaterial existents. It is strange, then, that within the 
Abkār, where al-Āmidī relies upon this proof in establishing the world’s temporal creation, this 
flaw persists. Al-Āmidī has acknowledged at several points in the Abkār the difficulty of 
disproving the existence of immaterials aside from God, as discussed in Chapter 4.599 Indeed, we 
even observed that his first criticism of the proof from possibility, discussed above, concerned 
its failure to account for immaterials. 
There is a deep tension here between al-Āmidī’s desire to prove the sufficiency of the classical 
Ash‘arī physical theoretical framework for the defence of creation ex nihilo, and his insecurity in 
the face of an alien ontology, which he once himself endorsed, and which undermines the very 
framework he is keen to uphold. Al-Āmidī must surely have been aware of this issue with his 
use of the proof from acccidents. His failure to address it is perhaps symptomatic of his driving 
intellectual agenda in this work, which is to provide a conservative reaction to al-Rāzī’s radical 
rethinking of the boundaries between falsafa and kalām. He seems so intent on undermining the 
methods of al-Rāzī (and the doctrines of Ibn Sīnā) that he fails to sufficiently address key issues 
at the encounter of the ontologies. Thus, he employs a physical theoretical framework for the 
defence of creation which has lost its overriding theological significance, and been severely 
																																																						
597 Abkār, 3, 329 (the objection); 351-2 (al-Āmidī’s response). 
598 Nūr, 5, 220. 
599 Abkār, 3, 29 and 4, 294 (although, see 4, 298, where, shortly after claiming that it is difficult to disprove the 
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compromised by his inability to sufficiently disprove the alternative ontology proffered by Ibn 
Sīnā.  
These inconsistencies remain unresolved in the Abkār, but we will see how the Ghāya approach 
reflects al-Āmidī’s acknowledgement of the issues at hand. 
4.iv. Ghāyat al-Marām: The Abandonment of Atomism  
Commitment to Ash‘arī physical theory in al-Āmidī’s later work of theology is conspicuous by 
its absence. This alone speaks volumes about the declining significance of that frame of 
reference for a coherent Ash‘arī theology in the post-Avicennan era.  Al-Āmidī’s stated subject 
matter in the work is ‘the essence of the necessary of existence, his attributes, his actions and 
his concomitants’.600 This is, of course, the universal and central quest of the true theologian, 
and certainly for his Ash‘arī predecessors. But whilst for al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī and other 
classical Ash‘arī greats, physical theory was integral to the project of establishing the nature of 
God, for al-Āmidī it manifestly is no longer. It goes without saying, then, that the proof from 
accidents is not al-Āmidī’s favoured proof for creation ex nihilo in this work. Indeed, he will 
discuss two proofs whose premises are borrowed from physical theory and explicitly critique 
them.  
The first proof premised on physical theory treated by al-Āmidī is al-Ash‘arī’s proof from 
aggregation and separation. The proof (as al-Āmidī explains) establishes the world’s reliance on 
a cause in the first instance, and secondarily, the exercise of that cause in creating the world ex 
nihilo. Al-Ash‘arī’s belief is that there must be an aggregator and segregator of the world’s parts. 
The fact that the world’s substances (for al-Ash‘arī, indivisible parts) must exist either in 
composites or in isolation from one another (thanks to accidents of aggregation [ijtimā‘] and 
separation [iftirāq]) indicates their dependence on a cause of either state.601 Al-Āmidī presents a 
formalised version of this proof. He postulates that substances exist in a state of aggregation or 
separation by virtue of their own essences. This, however, is impossible, since that which 
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601 Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad, 211. 
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belongs to the essence of a thing is unchanging. It is manifestly true that substances transform 
from a state of aggregation to a state of separation and vice versa. Therefore, the cause of these 
states must be external to the substances.602  
Al-Āmidī’s criticism of this proof is multi-faceted. Firstly, he observes that the ‘opponent’ in 
this discussion does not deny the outcome of the proof thus far, namely, that the world relies 
on a cause. This demonstrates that for al-Āmidī, the opponent in question is a theistic 
eternalist, rather than an atheistic materialist, most probably Ibn Sīnā himself. Nevertheless, he 
writes, it is worth establishing this agreed belief through evidence, not least to repel the 
‘objections of the obstinate’ (shaghab al-mu‘ānid).603 
The aspect of his critique of the proof which particularly concerns us relates to the relevance of 
Ash‘arī physical theory to his discussion of creation. He writes: ‘establishing the veracity of the 
outcome of this proof depends upon the substance and the existent being confined to that 
which is susceptible to aggregation or separation. But the opponent might claim the existence 
of substances devoid of matter, and of matter’s concomitants, which are not susceptible to 
aggregation or separation, and which cannot be described as ‘aggregated’ or ‘separated’, since 
they are pure intellect.’604 Here is al-Āmidī’s clearest statement of the sticking point between 
the classical Ash‘arī worldview and the philosophers’ cosmology. Because of the immanence of 
an ontology totally unlike the atom-accident dichotomy of the Ash‘arīs, any proof relying on 
that framework no longer suffices. 
This, of course, also applies to the proof from accidents, and in the second part of his discussion 
of creation, al-Āmidī concedes the deficiency of that proof because of its reliance on physical 
theoretical premises which are difficult to establish. Here he describes the proof rhetorically as 
‘that upon which the theological greats and eminent ones of the past relied upon: the famous 
and renowned method.’605 The method al-Āmidī present is as follows: 
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1) The world is exhaustively categorised into material substance and accident 
2) The existence of the accidents of motion and rest is proven 
3) The temporal origination of motion and rest is proven 
4) An infinite regress of accidents of motion and rest is shown to be impossible 
5) That substances cannot exist devoid of motion or rest is proven 
6) It is argued that that which cannot be free from what is temporally originated is 
temporally originated. 
The premises presented here seem to reflect al-Ghazālī’s explanation of the proof from 
accidents in his Iqtiṣād, where he bases his discussion on the accidents of motion and rest. Al-
Āmidī’s critique of the proof is also targeted, in the first instance, at al-Ghazālī. Al-Āmidī firsts 
lists a limited number of physical theoretical premises required for establishing the proof, 
namely: the existence of accidents; their being additional entities to substances; and that the 
qualities of substances are not latent (kāmin) within them, nor simply transferred from one 
substance to another. These are precisely the only physical theoretical premises which al-
Ghazālī does discuss in his own defence of the proof. 606 Al-Āmidī writes that ‘even if it is 
possible to prove these premises’ there are others which are more difficult.607 This suggests an 
implicit critique of al-Ghazālī for his failure to treat the other physical theoretical proofs al-
Āmidī has in mind. 
The physical theoretical premises which al-Āmidī claims are more problematic are the 
impossibility of substances existing devoid of accidents and that all accidents of motion and 
rest are temporally originated. It is immediately striking that al-Āmidī himself, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, has expended considerable effort in his earlier theological compendium in proving 
the very physical theoretical premises he here decries. It seems that physical theory is absent 
from Ghāyat al-Marām not only because of the work’s focus on ‘the noblest of all things’, but 
because al-Āmidī has lost confidence in the reliability of that theoretical framework.  
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Apart from his criticism of al-Ghazālī, al-Āmidī’s treatment of this proof also bears a cloaked 
critique of al-Rāzī’s refined version of the proof from accidents (his proof from motion and 
rest), worth considering briefly here to demonstrate the continued, unstated, importance of al-
Rāzī as intellectual opponent to al-Āmidī. Al-Āmidī argues that an opponent of the proof from 
accidents could deny the impossibility of the bodies of the world being at rest in pre-eternity 
until motion occurred. Al-Āmidī now cites a defender of the notion that the eternal rest of 
physical bodies is impossible. That defender argues that if rest were eternal, it could never 
cease. If it ceased, this would require a cause. That cause could not be a) the rest itself, since 
that which belongs to a thing by virtue of itself cannot cease. Neither could the cause of the 
cessation of rest be b) an agent possessed of power, since the effect of power cannot be a non-
existent (the cessation of rest being a non-existent). Neither could the cause of the cessation of 
rest be either c) an obstacle (māni‘) preventing the rest from continuing nor d) the removal of a 
condition (sharṭ) which had hitherto maintained the rest. In both cases, both the eternity of the 
obstacle or of the condition and their temporal originatedness are impossible. Therefore, the 
eternity of rest is impossible because the cessation of eternal rest is impossible. This argument 
features in al-Rāzī’s proof from motion and rest in different versions in the Arba‘īn and the 
Maṭālib.608 
Al-Āmidī opposes the argument. He introduces an attribute of volition into the scenario 
proposed, and suggests that the presence of volition makes the cessation of rest after its pre-
eternal presence possible. He argues that it is conceivable that rest could have existed from pre-
eternity, caused by the exercise of an eternal attribute of volition, but that at a given point, the 
connection of the volition to the state of rest could have been withdrawn. This would have 
caused rest to cease, without entailing the exercise of power on a non-existent (as suggested in 
the original argument).609 Thus al-Āmidī suggests that God’s freely functioning attribute of 
volition could have determined the exercise of power even in eternity. This concurs with his 
																																																						
608 Al-Rāzī, Arba‘īn, 1, 36; Maṭālib, 4, 282-298, especially 297. For a precedent, see al-Rāzī’s discussion of the proof from 
accidents in the Nihāya, where he establishes, more generally, that accidents of spatial occupation are temporally 
originated, in a very similar manner (al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 224-227). 
609 Ghāya, 263.  
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concession to the possibility of the exercise of volition in eternity in the separate dialectical 
context of critique of the proof from possibility. His response may demonstrate his focus on 
protecting the status of God’s volition as entirely autonomous and utterly unrestricted. 
However, once again, the importance of these statements lies primarily in their direct 
opposition to al-Rāzī’s views, since they are not developed in al-Āmidī’s own conception of 
creation. 
Al-Āmidī’s closing comments in relation to the proof from accidents reveal his motivation here. 
He writes that ‘the intention here is simply to be fair, and to avoid unsatisfactory methods – 
otherwise we would not concern ourselves with the investigation of such obscurities, nor with 
exposing these details.’610 This is a thinly veiled attack on al-Rāzī’s involved and incredibly 
thorough discussion of such questions as the eternity of accidents of spatial occupation, and his 
method of gathering multiple defensible arguments for a given belief. Al-Āmidī is deliberately 
signalling the difference of his approach, with its focus on determining the single most 
convincing proof for a given doctrine, for the pragmatic purpose of demonstrating the 
soundness of classical Ash‘arī belief.  
Despite having endorsed the proof from accidents in his Abkār, in al-Āmidī’s most mature 
thought, physical theory is extraneous to theology proper, not robust enough to serve its 
classical purpose in demonstrating the world’s creation ex nihilo in the face of Ibn Sīnā’s 
ontology. Now al-Āmidī, having both opposed the use of metaphysical proofs for God and 
abandoned the physical theoretical proof of his school, presents his alternative. 
5. Al-Āmidī’s Original Proof for Creation Ex Nihilo 
For al-Āmidī, proofs against the eternity of the world (whether physical theoretical or 
metaphysical in basis) achieve little. This is because even if they are found to be demonstrative, 
al-Ash‘arī’s proof from aggregation and rest, and al-Shahrastānī’s proof from possibility only 
rule out the necessity of the world’s eternity. That is to say that by establishing that the world 
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requires a cause (al-Ash‘arī’s Aggregator) which does not cause by necessity (as shown by al-
Shahrastānī), one only disproves a) that the world is eternally self-sufficient and b) that the 
world is eternally caused by the essence of its cause. Al-Āmidī comments that these outcomes 
are already entailed by the doctrines that God is voluntary and possessed of power; doctrines 
which he has independently established. Yet the world’s cause being voluntary and omnipotent 
does not automatically entail the world’s being preceded by non-existence. Therefore, its 
temporal finitude must be established separately.611  
Al-Āmidī describes his method as ‘elegant’ for its simplicity. His argument for creation ex nihilo 
is a proof for the impossibility of an infinite series of motions. He refers the reader back to his 
proof for God, where he showed that an infinite series of causes and effects is an impossibility.  
He writes that the proof he presented applies to any series of individual items, including 
motions and moments of time. There is no need, he writes, to restate the argument, but it is 
sufficient for proving the world’s temporal origination. The proof as it appears earlier in the 
work is as follows: in any series of existents, each individual item is only possible of existence 
by virtue of itself, which is to say that it relies for its existence on something external to its 
essence. It is impossible for such a series to regress infinitely. There are two possibilities for the 
configuration of a series of existents: either a) they exist successively or b) their existence is 
simultaneous. Only the former is relevant to al-Āmidī’s proof for creation ex nihilo, since he 
must prove that an infinite temporal regress of motions is impossible. He argues that the 
existence of each item in a successive series cannot come about without the existence of the 
previous item. But if every item in the series is conditioned upon the existence of the previous 
item ad infinitum, there being no first item, then the existence of the series is inconceivable.612  
																																																						
611 Ghāya, 257. Although al-Āmidī critiques al-Shahrastānī for not having established the world’s creation ex nihilo 
using his proof from possibility for the world’s creation by a volitional agent, the accusation is unjust. As we saw, al-
Shahrastānī’s understanding of creation ex nihilo is that God is ontologically prior to the world, and he does, in fact, 
establish this through his proof from possibility. Furthermore, al-Shahrastānī (in fact, like al-Āmidī) explicitly 
establishes the finitude of the world’s motion separately. Al-Āmidī wishes to present his own method as superior, 
and rather obscures the similarity of his method with that of al-Shahrastānī. 
612 Ghāya, 13. 
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Despite Al-Āmidī’s claim to originality here, the basic form of this argument is of course highly 
familiar as belonging to a group of arguments from the impossibility of an infinite number. 
Arguments for creation ex nihilo from the impossibility of the infinite motion of the planets in 
particular are common to classical kalām refutations of the world’s eternity. They have their 
remote origins in the works of the Alexandrian Christian John Philoponus (d. 54/570), whose 
arguments against the pre-eternity of the world were influential on the philosopher al-Kindī (d. 
260/873) and on many theologians after him.613 More immediately, they are a key part of al-
Ghazālī’s Tahāfut critique of the eternalist doctrine.614 Indeed, they are foremost among the 
proofs which al-Āmidī himself refutes in the context of his support for the world’s eternity in 
his Nūr.615 Furthermore, we have seen al-Shahrastānī similarly argue against the infinite regress 
of motion in his Nihāya. One explanation of al-Āmidī’s preference for this proof is his desire to 
differentiate his own approach from that of al-Rāzī, who does not use proofs of this variety.  
Al-Āmidī is specifically concerned with undermining Ibn Sīnā’s Neoplatonist cosmology, 
something which, he has held in this latter work of theology, the proof from accidents and 
others of its ilk are incapable of doing. At the forefront of the discussion is the question of 
immaterial substance. Al-Āmidī proves that all the existents of the philosophers’ ontology apart 
from the necessary of existence, material or immaterial, must be temporally originated. He 
argues that since an infinite series of motions is impossible, it is impossible for the celestial 
sphere to be eternal. This is because, by the ‘opponent’s’ own admission, the planets cannot be 
free from motion inhering within them. The same principle entails that the immaterial 
intellects which are the principles of the celestial sphere must be temporally originated, since 
these intellects cannot exist without instantiating the planets of which they are the principles. 
Finally, the First Effect, from which the immaterial intellects issue, must itself be temporally 
originated. This is because according to the opponents’ ontology, the intellects issue from the 
First Effect by essential necessitation. That which is essentially necessitated cannot come to 
																																																						
613 See Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Chapter 4 on Philoponus’ influence on the mutakallimūn.  
614 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 18-19. As Davidson notes, ‘The train of thought animating proofs of creation from the 
impossibility of an infinite number was such that arguments could easily proliferate’ (Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 
122). 
615 Nūr, 5, 213-215. 
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exist after the existence of its cause, but must exist simultaneously. Thus, if the effects of the 
First Effect exist after having not existed, the First Effect must be likewise. The conclusion is 
that everything which is caused by the Necessary of Existence is originated after its non-
existence. In closing his argument, al-Āmidī once more calls into use Ibn Sīnā’s own principle. If 
everything aside from the First Cause is temporally originated, the cause must be acting by 
volition, since the effect of the necessary cause must exist concurrently with its cause.616 
Here, al-Āmidī concedes Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of efficient causation, but turns it against his 
doctrine of the world’s eternity. That is to say that he permits, as elsewhere, that causes can act 
on their effects by their essence alone, and that such causes must co-exist with their effects. 
However, he argues, this does not entail the eternity of the world since he has proven the 
effects observable in the world (the series of motions which unfold around us) to have a 
beginning in time. Furthermore, against the background of his concession of his inability to 
prove the existence of immaterial beings, al-Āmidī here postulates a scenario in which the 
immaterials of Ibn Sīnā’s ontology do indeed exist, but are not eternal. The purpose of this is 
therapeutic: al-Āmidī is concerned with proving that even on the assumption that the classical 
Ash‘arī atom-accident dichotomy is false, the world can be shown to be temporally originated. 
Al-Āmidī is preoccupied with the sole objective of proving that the world was created ex nihilo. 
This, though it does not amount to rejection of Ash‘arī physical theory, is a clear 
acknowledgement that it is not sufficiently robust to counter Ibn Sīnā’s competing worldview, 
and must be abandoned as a framework for the defence of the key Ash‘arī dogma of the world’s 
creation ex nihilo. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter was built on the findings of Chapters 3 and 4. Its aim was to assess the respective 
applications of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical distinction between the possible and necessary of 
existence, and of Ash‘arī atomism, within al-Āmidī’s discussions of creation in his works of 
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kalām. This was designed as a case study in the amalgamation of al-Āmidī’s major intellectual 
influences on his theological thought. Initially, the immediate context for al-Āmidī’s thought 
was discussed. I argued that under the influence of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of creation, a very 
significant shift occurred among Ash‘arī theologians with respect to the theological significance 
of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. This begins with al-Ghazālī, who strongly objects to the 
notion that a cause which brings the world into existence pre-eternally via emanation can be 
described as an agent. It is in the thought of al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī, however, that the shift 
really takes place. For al-Ghazālī, the world’s temporal origination is what determines its 
causedness; for these later theologians, the notion that the world requires a cause because of its 
essential possibility supplants the classical Ash‘arī notion. For this reason, the question of the 
character of the world’s cause takes centre stage for these theologians in their own doctrines of 
creation.  
Al-Rāzī’s reflections on scripture lead him to the position that both Qur’ān and Torah demand 
belief in an omnipotent, voluntary creator. His rational investigations lead him to the belief 
that the existence of such a being requires the doctrine that the world was created ex nihilo. 
Thus, though he debates the scriptural basis of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, he ultimately 
finds it requisite to the defence of God’s character as he understands it. The doctrine has no 
role, however, in his defence of God’s existence. For al-Shahrastānī also, it is not the existence 
of a cause for the world, but the personality of that cause, that is at stake in the debate over the 
world’s origination. He holds that God’s precedence over the world is ontological, but that this 
does not entail the world’s emanation by necessity from God. Unlike al-Rāzī, however, al-
Shahrastānī lays an important precedent for al-Āmidī in maintaining that establishing God’s 
attributes of volition and power does not itself prove the finitude of the world’s motion. He 
argues only secondarily for this point.  
It is not an exaggeration to describe the shift away from reliance on the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo in support of other doctrines as touching on the heart of Ash‘arism. Central to classical 
Ash‘arism is the belief that the world’s absolute inferiority to its Creator is primarily its 
impermanence. This penetrates the spectrum of Ash‘arī beliefs, nowhere more obviously than 
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in Ash‘arī occasionalism, and explains the status of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo as a 
foundation (aṣl) of Ash‘arī doctrine, the first item (for instance) in al-Isfara‘īnī’s creed. It is the 
notion that the world has a beginning that informs the Ash‘arī interpretation of the Qur’ānic 
depiction of God’s transcendence. God is totally unlike his creation primarily because there is 
no beginning to his existence; the world, by contrast, is characterised by the perpetual 
instability of its existence: having once not existed at all, the start of its existence was utterly 
dependent on God, just as its continued existence relies on his continued intervention.  
And yet, in the post-classical period, there are outside influences so compelling that they 
ultimately pervade the personality of Ash‘arī theology. Transformations surrounding the 
doctrine of creation result, I have shown, from both the positive, and negative influences of Ibn 
Sīnā’s thought. The positive aspect is the impression of Ibn Sīnā’s theologically ground-
breaking metaphysical proposition that the world relies on a cause because of the essential 
possibility of its existence, and not because of its temporal origination. This idea fits Qur’ānic 
transcendentalism so well that it is fully embraced by many post-classical Ash‘arīs. The 
negative aspect is the reaction to Ibn Sīnā’s depiction of God’s creation of the world as a force of 
inevitable necessitation; it is this idea that results in the heavy emphasis on the presence of 
volition and power in the creation of the world. 
The transformation in the significance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo occurring among 
post-classical Ash‘arīs is the immediate context for al-Āmidī’s own views. With regard to al-
Āmidī’s own thought, I therefore focused firstly on the theological function of the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo. I demonstrated that al-Āmidī’s position recalls al-Shahrastānī’s. Like both al-
Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī, he upholds Ibn Sīnā’s notion of causedness. It is therefore the 
distinction between the possible and necessary of existence, and not the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo, which provides al-Āmidī with the grounds of his proof for God’s existence. Unlike al-Rāzī, 
however, al-Āmidī also relies on analysis of the relationship between the possible and necessary 
of existence in establishing the character of the world’s cause, and specifically, that God is 
possessed of attributes of volition and power. This is proven through a set of arguments by 
which al-Āmidī establishes that the necessary of existence cannot produce its effect by its 
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essence alone. Al-Āmidī’s support for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is not, then, a premise of 
his support for the more foundational doctrines of God’s existence and character. Instead, the 
doctrine is upheld independently and in its own right, against the eternalists. Al-Āmidī does not 
explore the scriptural grounds of the doctrine, focusing only on rational proofs for creation ex 
nihilo and against the world’s pre-eternity. Therefore his intellectual or theological motive for 
upholding the traditional Ash‘arī conception of creation cannot be determined, in contrast to 
the thought of al-Rāzī, for whom the doctrine’s renewed importance in relation to God’s 
voluntary, wise, omnipotent character is clear.  
The chapter next focused on al-Āmidī’s discussions of creation themselves, firstly with regard 
to the Avicennan influence. I was interested specifically in this connection with two theoretical 
aspects of al-Āmidī’s thought on creation. One of these was al-Āmidī’s perspective on the 
appropriation of Avicennan metaphysics in general in defence of the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo. The second was the extent of al-Āmidī’s concurrence with or departure from Ibn Sīnā’s 
theory of efficient causality in discussion of creation. Because of al-Āmidī’s methods of 
discussion, the most viable angle from which to address these questions was through analysis of 
his discussion of a proof for creation ex nihilo premised on the world’s essential possibility. With 
respect to al-Āmidī’s general perspective on the adoption of Avicennan metaphysics in support 
of creation ex nihilo, I demonstrated his reluctance, in both of his major kalām works, to utilise 
the notion of possible existence to establish the world’s beginning in time. I argued that a 
significant motivation in this was al-Āmidī’s opposition to al-Rāzī’s greater integration of Ibn 
Sīnā’s metaphysics in general, and specifically in his own defence of creation ex nihilo. 
With respect to al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of efficient causality in his discussion 
of creation, I demonstrated that al-Āmidī in fact concurs with the major tenets of that theory. 
He upholds the notion that an efficient cause cannot be responsible for the non-existence of its 
effect, and also concurs with Ibn Sīnā that an efficient cause must be temporally simultaneous 
with its effect. However, he emphasises against Ibn Sīnā that God’s essence is not the efficient 
cause of the world. Instead, the application or connection (ta‘alluq) of God’s pre-eternal 
attributes of volition and power to the origination of the world is ontologically and causally 
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prior to the world, and is the efficient cause of its creation. Thus al-Āmidī expresses in 
Avicennan terms the conviction that God creates by volition and power, and also safeguards his 
thought against objections regarding the impossibility of an eternal attribute coming to have 
efficacy after not having acted. Though not the focus of the chapter, al-Āmidī’s theory here 
extends to an absolute denial of causation by essence, and therefore of all secondary causal 
processes. The applications of God’s pre-eternal volition and power to their objects are 
understood in the mature thought of al-Āmidī as the efficient causes of everything that comes 
to exist. Al-Āmidī’s expression of his school’s doctrine of creation and causality in terms which 
borrowed from Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics serves the pragmatic purpose of making Ash‘arī doctrine 
watertight against critique by its main opponents, since there is no concession at all here to the 
substance of Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of creation. 
Another distinguishing feature of al-Āmidī’s thought on creation is that he implies that God 
could have produced, through his eternal volition and power, an eternal world. This is 
expressed in terms of the possibility of his application of those attributes in pre-eternity. I 
argued that this view is not, for al-Āmidī himself, central to his doctrine of creation. Rather, it 
arises primarily in the context of opposition to al-Rāzī, who maintains that the effects of a 
voluntary agent must be temporally originated, and becomes a standard reading of al-Āmidī 
among later commentators. The possible implications of the theory are, however, fascinating. 
This may be one of the reasons for its interest for later commentators. The notion that an 
eternal world could be the product of God’s volition inverts the classical Ash‘arī reliance on 
creation ex nihilo for the establishment of God’s existence and of his freedom of action. If it is 
possible to dispense with the theological functionality of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, that 
doctrine can be taken to imply a limitation on God’s power and autonomy. The latent 
suggestion, not at all developed, however, by al-Āmidī, is that a voluntary agent who willed the 
world eternally is in fact, more powerful and more beneficent than one who allowed the non-
existence of the world for a time. Whilst al-Āmidī himself firmly upholds creation ex nihilo, the 
hypothetical possibility of an eternally willed world within his notion of creation by volition is 
	 251	
a significant outcome of the influence on his thought of Avicennan metaphysics. Nevertheless, 
it is not central to his own views on creation. 
The second main thread of this chapter’s analysis concerned the presence of Ash‘arī physical 
theory in al-Āmidī’s discussions of creation. I demonstrated first the waning utility of atomism 
in each of al-Ghazālī’s, al-Shahrastānī’s and al-Rāzī’s discussions of creation. For al-Ghazālī, the 
proof from accidents remains important in defence of creation ex nihilo, but an excessive 
interest in physical theory is extraneous to theology’s main concerns. Al-Shahrastānī and al-
Rāzī share a concern with the limitations of physical theory in establishing creation ex nihilo. 
Specifically, the difficulty of disproving the existence of immaterial substances looms large for 
both thinkers in their assessment of proofs for creation premised on physical theory. In the 
thought of al-Āmidī, I demonstrated a progression with respect to the use of physical theory. In 
the Abkār, al-Āmidī demonstrates conservatism, using the proof from accidents and expending 
considerable effort in defence of its demonstrative capacity. This seems part of a general 
motivation, within this work, to present classical Ash‘arism as a philosophical system 
methodologically capable of countering Ibn Sīnā’s. It is, however, compromised by al-Āmidī’s 
acknowledgement of his inability to disprove the existence of immaterial substance.  
It is for this reason that in Ghāyat al-marām, al-Āmidī abandons physical theory in defence of 
creation, preferring his version of a proof from the impossibility of an eternal series of motions. 
Al-Āmidī can be understood here to be rejecting both the application of Avicennan metaphysics 
in discussion of creation and of classical Ash‘arī physical theory. His general attitude of 
opposition towards al-Rāzī and towards his integration of falsafa and kalām leads him to reject 
proofs for creation which rely on propositions appropriated from Ibn Sīnā. And yet, the 
pervasive influence of Ibn Sīnā’s thought on his physical theories also leads him, apparently 
more by necessity than by choice, to a rejection of the proof from accidents and others of its ilk. 
For these reasons, he prefers to defend creation ex nihilo in a manner which he claims is 
innovative, but which in fact continues a trend of arguments against the eternity of the world 
which pre-date the kalām tradition altogether. 
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In general, al-Āmidī’s thought on creation is marked by a tension between the curtailed 
theological significance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and a vehement quest to defend 
both the doctrines and methods of classical Ash‘arism. It is through the distinction between the 
possible and necessary of existence that al-Āmidī supports the vision of God’s personality which 
is at the heart of Ash‘arī theology. And so the notion that the world has a beginning becomes 
devoid of its traditional theological significance. Nevertheless, al-Āmidī defends this hallmark 
doctrine. And not only that, but at first (in the Abkār), his conservatism is so great that he 
insists on using the physical theoretical framework of classical Ash‘arism in its defence. This, 
we have seen, is deeply problematic because of uncertainties which al-Āmidī expresses over key 
aspects of that physical theory. The abandonment of physical theory in Ghāyat al-Marām is, 
then, no small thing.  
The progression in al-Āmidī’s thinking between these two works may be symptomatic of a 
broader shift in Ash‘arī theology, namely the decline in physical theory as a paradigm for the 
defence of theological postulates. We saw in Chapter 4 that among post-classical Ash‘arīs, 
physical theory comes to be isolated from theology proper, in reflection of Ibn Sīnā’s 
metaphysics-natural philosophy dichotomy. In al-Āmidī’s defences of creation, we witness the 
uncertainty produced by this change. The Ash‘arī tradition turned out to be flexible enough to 
incorporate the most philosophically compelling ideas available, most markedly here, Ibn Sīnā’s 
possible-necessary dichotomy. And yet, in al-Āmidī’s thought, the insecurities inevitable to 
such a transition are plain to see. Deeply important questions relating to the core of the Ash‘arī 
tradition underly the inconsistencies both within the Abkār treatment of creation and between 
al-Āmidī’s two works of theology: Which features of classical Ash‘arism can be dispensed with 
without losing the identity of that tradition? How important is it to preserve the methods, as 
compared to the doctrines, of the school? To what extent should Avicennan metaphysics come 
to dominate the contents, and structures, of Ash‘arī theological summae? And is the physical 
theoretical framework of classical Ash‘arism still fit for purpose as a theological tool?  
Al-Āmidī’s grappling with these questions is played out in his strong reaction to the innovations 
of his peers, most prominently, al-Rāzī. A master dialectician, we see him effect a thorough 
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evaluation of a variety of positions towards each of these questions, primarily through the 
detailed evaluation of proofs for and against classical Ash‘arī doctrines. Huge changes were 
sweeping the landscape of Ash‘arism in this important period. Whilst al-Āmidī’s thought on 
creation may not be that of the most innovative of post-Avicennan Ash‘arīs (that status is 
without doubt reserved for al-Rāzī), in it, the real tensions arising from the collision between 
two traditionally alien worldviews is laid bare. 
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Conclusion 
The obscurity of the figure of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī with respect to his intellectual involvements 
as philosopher cum theologian was the impetus for the preceding study. The thesis began with 
the puzzle of – on the one hand - al-Āmidī’s authorship of the Kashf, in which he appears to 
redress what has until recently been understood as al-Rāzī’s ‘attack’ (jarḥ) on Ibn Sīnā’s 
philosophical system, and on the other, al-Āmidī’s enduring legacy as an Ash‘arī theologian. I 
set out to investigate the nature of the meeting of falsafa and kalām in al-Āmidī’s thought 
against the background of the historically antagonistic relationship between adherents of the 
traditions. The study’s objective was to analyse the respective influences of Avicennism and 
classical Ash‘arism in each of al-Āmidī’s works of falsafa and kalām. This was approached 
through the case study of al-Āmidī’s discussion of creation, and its groundings in what I have 
argued are the two major paradigms within which creation was discussed in his intellectual 
context. This manner of approaching al-Āmidī’s philosophical and theological thought has 
revealed particular facets of the encounter between the two traditions as present therein. The 
findings of the thesis are conceived of as a contribution to our rapidly expanding knowledge of 
the early post-classical period of Islamic intellectual history. 
Firstly, the thesis has shown that al-Āmidī’s works of falsafa and kalām can be characterised 
according to three major stages in his reception of and attitude towards Avicennan falsafa. Al-Nūr 
al-bāhir is incompatible, in terms of the doctrinal commitments evidenced within, with all al-
Āmidī’s other extant works of philosophy and theology. In the work, probably a product of al-
Āmidī’s early encounters with philosophy in Baghdād, where we know Ibn Sīnā’s works were 
circulating widely and under heavy debate, he embraces Avicennan philosophy. His stated 
intellectual project, born out in the contents of the work, is not the development of philosophical 
ideas, but their defence against an array of critics. The great majority of each discussion within 
the work is taken up with this project, following brief statements of Ibn Sīnā’s essential positions 
across the sciences. Identifiable opponents are Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and al-Ghazālī, 
representing between them philosophical and theological criticisms of Ibn Sīnā. At this stage in 
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his thought, I have not found evidence of an awareness of al-Rāzī’s works. Despite the 
overwhelming support for Avicennan philosophy in this work, there are some minor departures 
from his methods of establishing certain doctrines, relevant to the discussion of creation and 
reflective of al-Āmidī’s familiarity with and concession to aspects of alternative metaphysical 
belief systems, to which I will return. 
Despite its very different intellectual project, al-Āmidī’s Kashf al-tamwīhāt may also be classed as 
a product of an early stage of interest in falsafa, in this case, however, after al-Āmidī’s first 
exposure to the thought of al-Rāzī. However, unlike the Nūr and contrary to what might be 
expected of such a work, the Kashf is not a defence of Ibn Sīnā, but an attack on al-Rāzī’s reading 
of Ibn Sīnā. Neither is it a true representation of al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā in the Sharḥ, which 
we now know to be a fair assessment of the Ishārāt, advancing Avicennan philosophy in several 
respects. Rather, al-Āmidī deliberately targets only al-Rāzī’s criticisms of Ibn Sīnā, and this in a 
rather ad hoc manner, such that many of the contents of the Sharḥ are not covered in the work. 
Furthermore, al-Āmidī’s criticisms of al-Rāzī are often philosophically inconsequential, 
suggesting that al-Āmidī’s primary agenda is to undermine al-Rāzī’s capabilities as a logician 
rather than to oppose him doctrinally. It is thus best characterised as a metacriticism of the 
Sharḥ, as al-Āmidī’s own introduction affirms. This makes it unreliable as an indicator of al-
Āmidī’s own intellectual commitments at this time. 
It would be highly desirable to be in the position to ascertain the catalyst for al-Āmidī’s entrance 
into the second stage of his reception of Avicennan philosophy. It is unfortunately impossible to 
explain the fundamental change of intellectual commitments which occurs between his 
authorship of the Nūr, and of Rumūz al-kunūz and Daqā’iq al-ḥaqā’iq, in which he expresses 
adherence to the major doctrines of classical kalām. It seems possible, however, that the existence 
of the Kashf represents relevant evidence, in that the work clearly demonstrates the impact of al-
Āmidī’s encounter with al-Rāzī’s works, probably early in his time in Syria. Al-Rāzī is a 
philosophically engaged Ash‘arī theologian, to whom al-Āmidī finds himself opposed. Whilst the 
Kashf does not offer any evidence of al-Āmidī’s own emerging Ash‘arī commitments, the simple 
fact of al-Āmidī’s close engagement with his contemporary’s reception of philosophy may 
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suggest that al-Āmidī was also influenced by and provoked to develop a response to the 
theological perspectives of his peer. However, this does not go far in explaining what amounts to 
a complete change of allegiance in al-Āmidī’s thought - perhaps there was some manner of 
conversion apart from his exposure to al-Rāzī’s thought which goes undetected in the 
biographical sources.  
Setting this question aside, I have established that the Rumūz, and apparently also the work of 
which it is an abridgement, the Daqā’iq, are the products of a middle phase in al-Āmidī’s thought 
in which, despite his commitment to the theological worldview and its major beliefs, he remains 
impressed by Avicennan philosophy. He is broadly accommodating of the aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s 
beliefs which he perceives not to represent a direct threat to kalām doctrines such as the notion 
that God is a voluntary agent possessed of power, and the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 
Philosophical beliefs which al-Āmidī accommodates in this work, against the traditions of 
classical kalām, include Ibn Sīnā’s belief in secondary causation and the majority of his natural 
philosophical theories. The Rumūz, then, represents an assessment of Avicennan doctrine in 
terms of its compatibility with theological belief. Al-Āmidī departs from his early phase of 
wholesale endorsement of Avicennan philosophy to a stage of adoption to the extent possible 
without contradiction of core theological positions, and critique only over those issues. Since the 
focus is on distinguishing between acceptable and problematic Avicennan beliefs, in this brief 
work (anomalously in relation to most others), al-Āmidī is not overly interested in other 
contemporary responses to Ibn Sīnā. However, there is evidence of his awareness of al-Ghazālī’s 
criticisms and al-Rāzī’s readings of Ibn Sīnā, indicating their continued importance for his own 
intellectual development. 
It is the products of al-Āmidī’s mature stage in the reception of Ibn Sīnā which have occupied the 
majority of the analysis of this thesis, primarily because these works (Abkār al-afkār and Ghāyat 
al-marām) represent his most independent thought, and also the culmination of developments in 
his thinking in his earlier works. It is hardly surprising that in these later works, al-Āmidī never 
acknowledges his authorship of al-Nūr al-bāhir, since his commitments and attitudes towards the 
Avicennan philosophical tradition are totally inverted between that early work and his mature 
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theology. In these later works, the influence of al-Āmidī’s background in Avicennism is keenly 
felt, and yet he overtly represents that tradition as alien to the theological tradition, and wrong-
minded in its understanding not only of God’s personality, his action, and his creation, but also 
in its view of the workings of the natural world.  Al-Rāzī is a very prominent intellectual opponent 
in al-Āmidī’s works of kalām, although al-Āmidī disguises his interest in his peer by never naming 
him or acknowledging the source of arguments which originate with al-Rāzī. More broadly, al-
Āmidī leans heavily towards a dialectical, even scholastic approach to theological enquiry in this 
work, and is preoccupied with the refutation of arguments which he deems undemonstrative, 
wherever they originate (frequently among classical theologians). His skill at disputation (jadal), 
often referenced by his biographers and evidenced in the work he dedicates to the subject, is 
manifest in these later works. 
Al-Āmidī’s, then, is an intellectual career in stages. This is in itself an interesting observation in 
relation to the history of the relationship between falsafa and kalām. In al-Āmidī’s thought, there 
is evidence of experimentalism in regard to the ways in which the traditions do, or ought to, 
intersect. It appears that a thinker of al-Āmidī’s era was no longer bound to a straightforward 
commitment to the approaches of either of the traditions of philosophy or theology. Rather, 
propelled by the intellectual circumstances of the widespread circulation of Avicennan 
philosophy, and of the heritage of al-Ghazālī’s rather radical reassessment of the Ash‘arī mode of 
theology, along with his heavy criticism of aspects of Ibn Sīnā, intellectuals of the time had more 
complex work to do. Al-Āmidī’s responses to al-Rāzī’s more thoroughgoing and innovative 
experimentalism remind us that his endeavours at the falsafa-kalām interface were not isolated, 
and speak of the towering prominence of al-Rāzī’s new mode of philosophical theology. Yet al-
Rāzī was not to be emulated by al-Āmidī, and the particular dynamic of the respective influences 
of Ibn Sīnā and of classical Ash‘arism on al-Āmidī’s thought is unique to him. 
Having provided evidence of the development of al-Āmidī’s general position with respect to 
Avicennan philosophy, the thesis has secondly established several more specific findings 
concerning the influence of Ibn Sīnā on al-Āmidī’s thought. Most markedly, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, al-Āmidī’s exposure to Avicennan philosophy impacts on his approach to, and 
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structuring of, his theological project in his mature works of kalām. Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between 
necessary and possible existents provides al-Āmidī with his key differentiator between God and 
his creation. And despite the great variation between al-Āmidī’s works, his adoption of this 
distinction is a consistent feature of his thought. I also demonstrated the immediate intellectual 
context for al-Āmidī’s ready adoption of the distinction in his theology, namely its acceptance in 
the thought of al-Shahrastānī, al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī, itself partly explicable against the 
background of notions of the necessity of God’s existence in classical kalām.  
The prominence of the distinction in al-Āmidī’s kalām informs the structure of his works, 
especially in the Abkār, where he distinguishes between questions relating directly to God, his 
existence, his attributes and actions, treated under the category ‘the Necessary of Existence’, and 
those pertaining to the world and its constituents and origins, under the category, ‘the Possible 
of Existence’. More significant than the structural impact of the adoption of the distinction is its 
impact on al-Āmidī’s proofs for God’s existence and attributes of volition and power, treated in 
Chapter 5. As well as accepting that God is most fundamentally distinct from all other existents 
because of the necessity of his existence and the possibility of theirs, al-Āmidī (unlike al-Ghazālī 
but like al-Shahrastānī and al-Rāzī) also accepts that the world requires a cause on account of the 
possibility of its existence, and not as a result of its having a temporal beginning. This notion is 
part of a transformation occurring within post-classical Ash‘arism, in which the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo is no longer requisite to the defence of God’s existence. Furthermore, al-Āmidī 
utilises analysis of the relationship between the necessary and possible of existence to establish 
the view, contra Ibn Sīnā’s, that the necessary of existence must cause the world by attributes of 
volition and power. Thus, the belief in creation ex nihilo, though defended by al-Āmidī as a 
standalone doctrine, is not required for establishing the Ash‘arī vision of God. Al-Āmidī’s 
concession to the hypothetical possibility of an eternally willed world (though not as significant 
for his doctrine of creation as later commentators suggest) makes this abundantly clear. 
Ibn Sīnā’s thought not only leads al-Āmidī to develop Ash‘arī doctrine. A second major aspect of 
the influence of the Avicennan legacy in al-Āmidī’s thought, demonstrated in Chapter 4, is a 
negative impact. Al-Āmidī expresses uncertainty over traditionally foundational kalām beliefs 
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such as the exhaustive division of existents apart from God into the categories of substance and 
its inherent accidents, and over the existence of an indivisible part of matter. Again, there is a 
certain observable continuity between his works in this regard, despite the development in his 
overall commitments. In the Nūr, al-Āmidī follows Ibn Sīnā’s lead in presenting a strident critique 
of atomism. More generally, he embraces Ibn Sīnā’s ontology, including the immaterial 
substances which are so problematic for the classical kalām worldview. In the works of his middle 
intellectual stage, despite his commitment to that worldview, al-Āmidī’s position in relation to 
such physical theoretical questions broadly concurs with the views expressed in the Nūr. And 
although he ostensibly supports Ash‘arī physical theory in his works of kalām, I have shown that 
deep and (in the Abkār) unresolved inconsistencies result from his lack of certainty over these 
key questions. His elimination of physical theory from arguments for theological doctrine in the 
Ghāya is the ultimate outcome of the undermining of Ash‘arī physical theory which begins with 
his authorship of the Nūr. Against the background of Chapter 2, where I showed the consistency 
between generations of classical Ash‘arīs with regard to their reliance on physical theoretical 
tenets in establishing theological doctrine, the relative novelty of al-Āmidī’s approach should be 
clear. 
The next major concern of the thesis was with the comparative influence of al-Āmidī’s classical 
Ash‘arī heritage on his thought. It has emerged that in the thought of mature al-Āmidī, it is a 
commitment to the doctrines of classical Ash‘arism (and in many cases, to its methods) which 
drives his intellectual project to a far greater extent than the respective Avicennan influence. For 
even with regard to al-Āmidī’s adoption of the distinction between the necessary and possible of 
existence, it is the metaphysics of classical Ash‘arism which informs his notions of what 
possibility constitutes, and of how the necessary of existence is causally related to the effects of 
his power (as demonstrated in Chapter 3). Specifically, al-Āmidī promotes the normative Ash‘arī 
perspective on potentiality, which is to say that he denies the existence of potency in the created 
order, and understands God’s creation not as the actualisation of already present potential, but 
as the making of stuff literally from nothing. Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of creation as the 
actualisation of possible essences which are already potential is strongly opposed. Possibilities 
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are understood as multiple synchronic conceptual alternatives to the course of action 
deliberately particularised by God. In this, al-Āmidī is doing little more than clarifying and 
articulating within a renewed metaphysical framework the classical Ash‘arī conception of God’s 
relation to the effects of his power.  
Furthermore, it has emerged that even in his earliest work of philosophy, the Nūr, al-Āmidī’s 
understanding of what possibility constitutes is not entirely Ibn Sīnā’s. I highlighted the 
importance of the natural philosophical connection here, and in particular, the grounding of Ibn 
Sīnā’s notion of possible existence in his conception of hyle as the potent principle of body, only 
actualised by its inherent forms. It is significant that, in his Nūr, al-Āmidī isolates the relevant 
natural philosophical discussions from their metaphysical significance, and accordingly, 
consistently opposes Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possibility itself as entitative and requiring a substrate 
of matter in which to inhere. I explained this as the result of the impact of al-Āmidī’s 
engagements with al-Ghazālī’s critique of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of possibility on his own reception of 
Ibn Sīnā. As he progresses towards a commitment to Ash‘arī kalām, al-Āmidī’s understanding of 
possibility is increasingly alienated from Ibn Sīnā’s. Thus, despite the prominence of the 
necessary/possible distinction as a framing device and with respect to the question of what 
determines an existent’s need for a cause, it is the classical Ash‘arī metaphysics of possibility 
which drives al-Āmidī’s vision of the God-world relationship. 
The second major evidence of al-Āmidī’s commitment to advancing the paradigms of classical 
Ash‘arism (demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5) is his full endorsement, in the Abkār, of Ash‘arī 
physical theory, and of its utility in establishing the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The topics 
treated within al-Āmidī’s discussions of physical theory concur with those of classical Ash‘arism 
and he defends most tenets rigorously. This is despite the uncertainties brought about by his 
background in Avicennism, and also contradicts his earlier claim in the Rumūz that Avicennan 
natural philosophy is not incompatible with kalām theology. As well as seeing Ash‘arī atomism 
(in the Abkār) in terms of its traditional utility in the defence of theological doctrine, al-Āmidī 
also clearly conceives of his tradition’s physical theory as a robust set of postulates equivalent to 
Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophy as a field in its own right, and more valid as an explanation of the 
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physical world. This can be seen as a further aspect of the Avicennan influence on his thought, 
given the clear distinction between metaphysics and natural philosophy in Ibn Sīnā’s 
philosophical system, and also as evidence of al-Āmidī’s driving commitment to classical 
Ash‘arism in all its facets. It also distinguishes al-Āmidī’s thought from that of his post-Avicennan 
Ash‘arī predecessors and contemporaries, particularly al-Ghazālī, who derides the classical 
theologians for their excessive interest in questions of physical theory, and generally avoids 
recourse to the use of atomism in defence of theological doctrine. Yet the tension between the 
respective influences of Ibn Sīnā’s opposition to atomism on the one hand, and al-Āmidī’s 
commitment to that theory as a valid natural philosophy means that his support for atomism 
cannot be maintained. In Ghāyat al-marām, we witness the outcome of this in the collapse of 
atomist physical theory as a paradigm for the defence of creation ex nihilo, and more generally, 
in al-Āmidī’s side-lining of physical theory from his theological project. 
In analysis of the respective influences on al-Āmidī’s thought, a major additional finding has been 
made with regard to the centrality of the figure of al-Rāzī as intellectual opponent to al-Āmidī. 
Evidence of al-Rāzī’s importance for al-Āmidī accumulates through the chapters of the thesis, 
beginning with the evidence of the biographers, which, though ambiguous and obviously not free 
from fabrication, already identifies al-Āmidī’s encounters with al-Rāzī’s disciples in Syria as a 
factor in his controversy as an intellectual. The evidence of the works themselves confirms al-
Rāzī’s towering significance in al-Āmidī’s thought, which takes several forms. Firstly, it is clear 
that, from the time of his writing of the Kashf and onwards, al-Rāzī stands as an important 
mediator in al-Āmidī’s reception of Ibn Sīnā. A key instance of this phenomenon is al-Āmidī’s 
responses to the theory of the relationship between essence and existence in the possible which 
he consistently attributes to ‘the philosophers’, but which is, in fact, al-Rāzī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā’s 
own metaphysical theory. This is an intriguing finding, since we know that al-Āmidī had directly 
and independently engaged with Ibn Sīnā’s theories, on the evidence of the Nūr. It was not for 
lack of access to or knowledge of Ibn Sīnā’s works that al-Āmidī preferred to treat al-Rāzī’s 
readings of the philosopher. Rather, al-Āmidī’s emphasis on Rāzian readings of Ibn Sīnā seems to 
suggest the rapidly increasing circulation and popularity of al-Rāzī’s commentaries on and 
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interpretations of Ibn Sīnā in the intellectual milieu of twelfth-century Syria, and perhaps 
beyond. 
Secondly, a consistent thread in al-Āmidī’s discussions of proofs for Ash‘arī doctrines (including 
the existence of the indivisible part and creation ex nihilo) in his works of theology is the critique 
of proofs devised or developed by al-Rāzī. Al-Āmidī seems intent on undermining his opponent’s 
capacity to defend Ash‘arī doctrine, especially where al-Rāzī’s defence is innovative in its 
utilisation of Avicennan metaphysical principles to support the ends of kalām. This suggests that 
al-Āmidī may be partially motivated, in his own conservative approach to the defence of Ash‘arī  
doctrine,  seen for instance in his use of the proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo in the 
Abkār, by a reaction to his peer’s greater radicalism and willingness to abandon the conventions 
of their common school.  
And yet, a third aspect of the Rāzian influence on al-Āmidī’s thought is in al-Āmidī’s adoption of 
certain of al-Rāzī’s proofs, such as his proof for the indivisible part derived from the nature of 
time and motion. Instances of the appearance of al-Rāzī’s proofs in al-Āmidī’s thought are marked 
by the fact that they find their proper context in al-Rāzī’s more integrative discussions of the 
issues at hand, a context which they lose in al-Āmidī’s works. Al-Āmidī also consistently fails to 
acknowledge the source of arguments which are Rāzian, even occasionally claiming originality. 
Al-Āmidī had a complex and perhaps troubled relationship with the work of his peer. Impressed 
by specific arguments his contemporary devised, al-Āmidī nevertheless seems to have opposed 
al-Rāzī’s dynamic integration of falsafa with kalām. Furthermore, he seems to have been in 
competition with al-Rāzī’s disciples for patronage. Against the background of both these figures’ 
close engagement with Avicennan philosophy, it appears that al-Āmidī willed to demonstrate 
firstly that he was a more skilled logician than his peer and better able to provide demonstrative 
proofs for school doctrines, and secondly that his peer had strayed in some of the more 
innovative aspects of his integration of falsafa into kalām. We can only speculate regarding other 
more personal motivations for the contention between the individuals, to which some of the 
biographical sources allude. 
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In summary, the theological and philosophical works of al-Āmidī offer a window over an unique 
trajectory of the influence of Ibn Sīnā on the post-classical tradition of Ash‘arī kalām. Al-Āmidī’s 
response to Ibn Sīnā in his theological thought is equivalent neither to the Tahāfut-inspired 
diatribes of theologians like Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī, with their narrowly polemical intent, nor to 
al-Rāzī’s evolving philosophical theology, which incorporates by stages so much of the Avicennan 
philosophical approach. Hallmarks of al-Āmidī’s approach in his mature thought include the 
considerable extent to which he evidently prizes the tradition of classical Ash‘arism, and is 
reticent in relinquishing its conventional physical theoretical paradigm for the discussion of 
creation, despite the fact that his encounter with Avicennism has led him away from that 
framework. It is this affinity with classical Ash‘arism which produces a second characteristic 
feature of his later works, namely, his tendency to present Avicennan philosophical doctrines as 
aspects of a competing and erroneous worldview, opposed to sound doctrine. This leads him 
consistently to present and refute Ibn Sīnā’s positions on a whole spectrum of metaphysical, 
theological and natural philosophical questions, and this refutation often appears as a kind of 
preliminary to the exposition and defence of the sound theological view. Though this recalls the 
approach of scholars like al-Balkhī, it serves the more positive theological purpose of allowing al-
Āmidī to demonstrate his familiarity with Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy and at once to side-line his beliefs 
as a way of clearing the ground for Ash‘arī opinions on the same questions. 
Of course, the very priority given to the discussion of Avicennan doctrines, even with this 
negativistic agenda, speaks of Ibn Sīnā’s influence on al-Āmidī’s mature theological thought, and 
we have seen that this is the natural outcome of his history of close engagement with his 
opponent’s philosophy, including a stage of straightforward commitment to that tradition. A 
further hallmark of al-Āmidī’s thought is the positive influence of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy. His 
background in Avicennan philosophy affects the way in which al-Āmidī differentiates between 
God and the world, his notion of the nature of the world’s dependence on God, his approach to 
the structuring of a theological enquiry, and his increasing departure from his school’s reliance 
on physical theory in the defence of theological doctrine. It even causes him to account for the 
purpose of kalām in highly Avicennan terms, in relation to the pursuit of knowledge - in this case, 
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of the Divinity, the most worthy goal of all knowledge - as part of the process of the completion 
and perfection of the human. It is true that al-Āmidī’s kalām does not manifest the same level of 
integration between the traditions as al-Rāzī’s, a fact which I have suggested represents in part a 
conservative reaction to al-Rāzī’s approach. And yet this ought not disguise the considerable 
influence of falsafa on al-Āmidī’s thought, an influence which makes al-Āmidī’s mode of Ash‘arism 
something quite distinct from that of his classical predecessors.  
Al-Āmidī’s thought, especially in the Abkār, is also tainted by certain inconsistencies which result 
from the tension between his determination to preserve the paradigms of classical Ash‘arism, 
and the Avicennan influence. This is historically useful to us, since in some of its facets, al-Āmidī’s 
thought in the Abkār can be understood as a work in progress, an experiment at the interface of 
the traditions. Where, in the Ghāya, al-Āmidī resolves some of these inconsistencies, we witness 
the choices made in balancing the competing influences at work in his thought. 
The light shed on al-Āmidī the philosopher-theologian in this thesis is a contribution to a more 
nuanced and variegated understanding of the interactions between the traditions of falsafa and 
kalām in the aftermath of Ibn Sīnā’s watershed contribution and its critique at the hands of al-
Ghazālī. Al-Āmidī died almost two centuries after Ibn Sīnā, yet it is clear that despite this 
considerable time lapse, many of the theological issues provoked by the latter’s philosophy were 
far from settled. There were a number of theological responses to Ibn Sīnā’s views, along a 
spectrum from pure negativism to profound acceptance and accommodation. Al-Āmidī lies 
somewhere along the spectrum, deeply impressed by the more theologically potent aspects of 
Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, swayed in his commitment to Ash‘arī physical theory by the strongest 
aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s critique thereof, and yet, ultimately, firmly committed to classical Ash‘arī 
doctrine and therefore, by his own definition, opposed to the school of thought in which 
competing doctrines originate and are furnished with new proofs. This situation is just one 
instance of the gradual and intricate process of absorption of and response to Ibn Sīnā’s 
philosophy occurring among Ash‘arī theologians in the long shadow of his ground-breaking work 
- work which so Islamises philosophy that it was bound to have an irreversible impact on the 
theological tradition of the Islamic world. 
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